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Preface 
On the second of December 1989, the husbands of the two sisters 
Emiliana and Claudia Auccasi departed from their hometown 
Sacsamarca to buy corn in Colca. They left for several days of 
walking through the highlands, together with a cousin and a horse 
to carry the load. Three decades later, Emiliana and Claudia wished 
the horse could speak: their husbands never returned and until 
today, the cousin keeps silent on what happened to them. According 
to rumors, the two men were killed by members of the Shining 
Path, and their bodies dumped in a lagoon. Emiliana and Claudia 
went looking for them several times, but they never found any trace. 
When they denounced the disappearance before the police, they were 
mocked with racist insults; humiliated by those who were supposed 
to protect them. As a widow with seven children, Emiliana became 
a beneficiary of the reparation program in 2005. The program is one 
of the ways in which the Peruvian state tries to deal with the legacies 
of two decades of civil war. Nevertheless, Emiliana refuses to claim 
her reparation: she states that her dignity is not for sale. 
My first encounter with Emiliana in June 2014 left a deep impression: 
she was so strong yet fragile and showed a kind of deep indignation 
that I had rarely seen before. It was one out of many conversations to 
follow that made me feel out of place for being an academic historian 
in a precarious (post-)conflict environment. I had nothing to offer 
but a listening ear, an audio recorder and a notebook to capture 
stories. Back in Belgium, I struggled time and again with these 
stories and with the ‘distance’ I was supposed to take from the field. 
Throughout the years of this project, I tried to cope with my doubts 
by transforming the frustration over the limitations of my research 
into commitment to the people who shaped it, the questions they 
brought up, the places they took me to. While writing, I even started 
to appreciate the added value of ‘distance’ in order to come closer 
to the essence of problems. This book probably testifies to some of 
these personal struggles that took place in-between the vastness of 
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Peru’s highlands and the confined bubble of Ghent, which is where 
I found myself for five years. If anything, I hope it bears witness to 
Emiliana and Claudia’s demand for a more inclusive nation. Their 
stories got under my skin and I will not be able to take them off.

Map of Peru with departments (Source: González 2011)
Map of Ayacucho with provinces (Source: González 2011)
Carnaval in Huamanga (2015)
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General Introduction
The Shining Path and the Peruvian civil war 
On the 18th of May 1980, the Peruvian president Francisco Morales 
Bermúdez convoked the first general elections in his country since 
1963, after he had overthrown the left-wing military dictatorship 
of general Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1977. While several socialist 
and communist parties decided to join forces in the Izquierda Únida1 
coalition, one political party decided to stick to its revolutionary 
principles and actively boycott the elections: the Partido Comunista 
del Perú - Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL), also known as the Shining 
Path.2 On the eve of the elections, a group of five armed Shining 
Path militants stole the ballot-boxes and voting forms in Chuschi, a 
small village in the Ayacucho department, and burned them on the 
main square of the village. The attack in Chuschi, while mentioned 
only sideways in some national media the following day, marked the 
beginning of two decades of civil war violence.3 
The Shining Path emerged as a radical splinter group of the Red Flag 
Maoist Communist Party of Peru and was led by Abimael Guzmán, 
a philosophy professor at the Universidad Nacional San Cristobal de 
Huamanga (UNSCH) in Ayacucho.4 Guzmán - nicknamed Camarada 
Gonzalo - became inspired by Maoism during several trips to China 
in the 1960s. After his return to Peru, he developed his own 
Pensamiento Gonzalo5, a mix of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist ideology. 
Under Guzmán’s influence, the UNSCH turned into an intellectual 
breeding ground of this ideology. Soon it became the base from which 
1 United Left. A glossary with frequently used Spanish and Quechua terms as well 
as a list of abbreviations is included at the end of the book.
2  Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path
3  Carlos Iván Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú 
- Sendero Luminoso y El Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú: 1980-1999 (IEP, 
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2013), 89.
4  The Red Flag or Bandera Roja on its turn had split off from PCP - Unidad, which 
had been founded by José Carlos Mariátegui as the Peruvian Socialist Party in 1928. 
Degregori, 28.
5 Gonzalo thought
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a growing network of militants emerged that started to disseminate 
the Pensamiento Gonzalo to the Quechua speaking peasant population 
in schools on the countryside (cfr. chapter 4).6 While the Shining 
Path was deemed a small and insignificant political phenomenon 
in the distant capital of Lima, the party gradually created support 
bases in communities in Ayacucho - the so-called zona liberada - 
where it recruited fighters for its ejército guerrillero popular7. The aim 
of Guzmán and his disciples was to overthrow the Peruvian state 
by initiating a violent people’s revolution desde el campo a la ciudad 
- from the countryside to the city. Both the limited presence of 
state institutions and the poor socio-economic conditions in the 
rural areas of Ayacucho provided a fertile soil for communist ideas 
on redistribution and social justice. However, the Shining Path’s 
violent and destructive methods - Guzmán was convinced that 
the revolution would not be reached without “crossing a river of 
blood” and that it would “cost a million dead” - rapidly generated 
repudiation among the population.8 When president Fernando 
Belaúnde decided to send the armed forces to restore order in the 
Ayacucho department in 1982, the situation further escalated into 
a complicated civil conflict marked by multidirectional violence, 
often perpetrated between ‘intimate enemies’.9 The brutal counter-
revolutionary intervention of the state forces resulted in large-scale 
human rights violations against civilians.10 In some places, the 
latter started organizing themselves in civil self-defense patrols to 
6 Antonio Zapata Velasco, Nelson Pereyra Chávez, and Rolando Rojas Rojas, 
Historia y cultura de Ayacucho (IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2008), 193.
7 Popular guerrilla army
8 CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 2” (Lima, 2003).
9 Kimberly Theidon uses this term in the context of the Peruvian civil war to 
stress the divisive dynamics generated by the Shining Path and to refer to violence 
between neighbors, families, villagers, i.e. former friends who became ‘intimate 
enemies’. I will borrow this term throughout the book. Kimberly Theidon, 
Intimate Enemies. Violence and Reconciliation in Peru, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Pennsylvania, 2013, 461 p. 
10 Degregori, 90.
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cope with the increasing insecurity generated by both the attacks 
of the Shining Path and the aggressive conduct of the military 
(cfr. chapter 6). In other parts of the country, the Marxist Leninist 
Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) started its own 
revolutionary struggle. During the government of Alan García 
(1985-1990) the country prolapsed in chaos as economic reforms 
provoked hyperinflation. The state forces did not succeed in 
containing the violence caused by the actions of the Shining Path, 
which raised its pressure on the capital by exploding car bombs 
and covering the city with darkness during frequent blackouts. 
In 1990, Alberto Fujimori, a political outsider, was elected to the 
presidency by promising economic recovery and the final defeat of 
the ‘terrorists’ of the Shining Path. Under the guise of the struggle 
against terrorism, Fujimori succeeded in getting the public opinion 
on his side, thereby legitimizing his growing authoritarianism and 
the violent repression by his paramilitary death squad Grupo Colina 
against suspected left-wing revolutionaries. On the 5th of April 
1992, Fujimori committed an autocoup by dissolving the Congress, 
taking control of the judiciary and installing a dictatorship with the 
support of the armed forces. A few months later, in the night of 12 
September 1992, Fujimori’s intelligence service captured Abimael 
Guzmán and two other prominent Shining Path leaders. By the end 
of the year, nineteen of the twenty-two members of the party’s Comité 
Central were jailed, leading to a rapid decline of their violent actions. 
The defeat of the Shining Path served the government’s propaganda 
machine well and for many Peruvians, Fujimori gained his place 
in history as the great pacifier of the country. After Fujimori’s 
fraudulent reelection in 1995, however, his regime faced growing 
protests from the political opposition and increasing international 
pressure to restore democracy. The turning point came on the 14th of 
September 2000, when Peruvians were confronted with the so-called 
vladivideos, video-recordings that were leaked from the archives of 
the National Intelligence Service, showing Alberto Fujimori’s spin 
doctor Vladimiro Montesinos bribing politicians of the opposition 
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and company owners in order to win their support for the regime. 
Only a few weeks earlier, Fujimori’s and Montesinos’ involvement in 
trading arms for drugs with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (FARC) had come to light. While Fujimori still tried to keep 
up appearances, Montesinos chose to save his skin by fleeing the 
country. Two months later, Fujimori eventually cleared off to Japan 
and resigned from the presidency via fax. Awaiting new elections, 
Valentín Paniagua, a member of the opposition party Acción Popular 
(AP), was appointed as interim president.11 
During the transitional government, a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) was erected which made recommendations for 
institutional reform, reparations and the search for the disappeared 
victims of the war. The final report of the TRC was published in 
2003 and stated that around 69 000 Peruvians had been killed or 
disappeared between 1980 and 2000. The Shining Path was held 
accountable for 54% of the casualties and the state forces for 37%. 
Quechua or another indigenous language was the mother tongue 
of 75% of the victims. More than 40% of the victims fell in the 
rural department of Ayacucho, one of Peru’s poorest regions. These 
numbers made clear that socio-economic factors played a key role 
in the presence and dissemination of the violence.12 Now that two 
decades of civil war and Fujimorismo had come to an end, Peru faced 
a window of opportunity for political and societal change, provided 
that – following the logic of transitional justice - it could throw off 
the burden of the past.
A multi-scale and multidirectional approach to transitional justice
This book is a study of the international paradigm of transitional 
justice and the way in which this paradigm modeled Peru’s process of 
dealing with the legacies of the civil war. More precisely, it unravels 
11  Jo-Marie Burt, Violencia y autoritarismo en el Perú bajo la sombra de Sendero y la 
dictadura de Fujimori (IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2011).
12  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 1” (Lima, 2003).
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how this process is shaped by the involvement of local, national and 
international actors and their respective ideas on and practices of 
coming to terms with the past. I study this involvement by looking 
at two different clusters of actions. The first is the diffusion of 
transitional justice: how and by whom is the international paradigm 
of transitional justice propagated and put into practice? What kind 
of interactions and exchanges take place between the local, national 
and international level throughout these processes of diffusion? The 
second cluster of actions concerns the appropriation, reaffirmation and 
contestation of transitional justice: how do survivors engage with, resist 
or transform these international ideas and practices in function of 
specific aims and (political) struggles? 
Transitional justice can be broadly defined as “the ways countries 
emerging from periods of conflict and repression address large 
scale or systematic human rights violations so numerous and so 
serious that the normal justice system will not be able to provide an 
adequate response.”13 For the sake of analytical clarity, I distinguish 
between transitional justice as a concept and as a network. The concept 
of transitional justice is the set of ideas and practices that make 
up the international paradigm of transitional justice. Throughout 
this book, I identify three normative core ideas underlying this 
concept. The first one relates to memory and entails the conviction 
that remembering the atrocities of the past leads to prevention, 
redemption and recognition. The second one relates to victimhood 
and encompasses the presumption that innocent victims, whose 
identity is based on trauma and suffering, are and should be the main 
subjects of transitional justice policies. The third one relates to time 
and involves the conception of the present as a transitional moment 
between past and future; a delineated phase to come to terms with the 
wrongs of the past in order to build a more democratic future. The 
network of transitional justice, then, is the amalgam of institutions, 
practitioners and academics that shape and disseminate the concept. 
Due to the blurred lines between advocacy, policy and academy 
13  https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice, consulted 14.03.2018.
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that characterize the network, the actors who are in some way or 
another involved in transitional justice often change roles over time: 
scholars or policy makers become consultants, activists become or 
are scholars and vice versa, NGO-workers take leading positions 
in state-driven transitional justice mechanisms, etc. According to 
Zinaida Miller, transitional justice therefore lacks “fully external 
critics”, which is why “the role of international actors in the process 
of spreading the ideas and ideals of the ‘movement’ of transitional 
justice has not yet been fully explored in the literature.”14 Emilio 
Crenzel points out how particularly in Latin America “the object of 
study itself also determines the discipline” because of the remarkable 
entanglement of survivor groups, activists and scholars.15 These 
‘insiders’ of the network of transitional justice are mostly ‘outsiders’ 
for the communities of survivors that are addressed through their 
policies. When talking about the diffusion and implementation of 
transitional justice in Peru, I will therefor refer to the broad range 
of actors involved in the network of transitional justice as ‘well-
meaning outsiders’, a term that Elizabeth Jelin uses to refer to “the 
community of transitional justice political actors, researchers and 
practitioners.”16 I will use this term in a broad sense to point to 
those who defend the rights of a certain group of survivors without 
strictly belonging to this group. This relation between survivors 
and outsiders can be more complex and multi-layered than a binary 
opposition between the international and the national or local level, 
the First and the Third World, the Western and the non-Western or 
top-down and bottom-up processes. In Peru, for example, NGO 
workers from Lima are considered outsiders in local communities 
14  Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in 
Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (December 1, 
2008): 290.
15  Eugenia Allier Montaño and Emilio Crenzel, Las luchas por la memoria en América 
Latina: Historia reciente y violencia política (Bonilla Artigas Editores, 2015), 15.
16  Elizabeth Jelin, “Silences, Visibility and Agency : Ethnicity, Class and Gender 
in Public Memorialization,” Research Brief (ICTJ, 2009), 2.
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in Ayacucho. Yet, these NGO workers or their families might also 
have been directly affected by the war, be it in a different fashion. 
The opposition then is between urban and rural experiences of the 
war, between Peruvians from the capital and the provinces, from 
the coast and the mountains or the jungle, or between those who 
migrated and those who stayed during the war. At the same time, an 
international or Western NGO worker or academic researcher might 
be considered more ‘local’ by the community than an NGO worker 
or academic coming from the capital simply because he or she is more 
familiar with the community. Or, survivor groups who are ‘insiders’ 
in their own country might become ‘well-meaning outsiders’ when 
their representatives travel to other countries to meet up with their 
counterparts and exchange experiences. Think, for example, of the 
relation between the Argentinean Madres de Plaza de Mayo and the 
Peruvian women of the Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, 
Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú17 (ANFASEP).18 Still, all of them 
remain outsiders for each other in the sense that they do not share 
the same experience of survival. The adjective well-meaning helps 
to distinguish between the negative outcomes of certain practices 
and the mostly good intentions in which they are rooted. 
The emergence of transitional justice as a new paradigm of dealing 
with the past has to be situated in the international expansion of 
human rights and memory discourse on the one hand, and the 
rise of what Didier Fassin has called ‘humanitarian government’ 
in the post-World War II period on the other (cfr. chapter 1).19 
The enactment of the “imagery”20 of transitional justice is often 
17  National Association of Family members of the Kidnapped, Detained and 
Disappeared of Peru
18  Bueno-Hansen, Feminist and Human Rights Struggles in Peru, 26.
19  Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason (University of California Press, 2012).
20  According to Hinton, “the transitional justice imaginary is normative (i.e., it is 
associated with certain truth claims and moral-laden assumptions), performative 
(i.e., through its enactment, people constitute an imagined community), and 
productive (i.e., the imaginary produces certain subject positions and types of 
being).” Alexander L Hinton, “Transitional Justice Time: Uncle San, Aunty Yan, 
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described by critics in market terms as a globalized “industry” 21, an 
“enterprise” or a “moral economy” in which memory and victims 
have become “commodities”.22 This ‘industry’ is being criticized for 
exporting and imposing a one-size-fits-all model of dealing with 
the past that does not sufficiently take into account the specific 
cultural context in which it is applied. The top-down application of 
this model by an international transitional justice “elite” network 
is said to overlook the importance of local actors and hinder their 
genuine participation in the process.23 This book endorses the 
critique concerning the friction between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ 
in transitional justice.24 Yet, a mere opposition between local and 
and Outreach at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” Genocide and Mass Atrocities in Asia : 
Legacies and Prevention, 2013, 87.
21  According to Madlingozi, “this industry is made up of constantly mushrooming 
transitional justice academic centres and think tanks, (‘peer-reviewed’ and 
subscription-based) journals and books, mail listserves, blogs, newsletters, 
fellowships, workshops and conferences. Most of these are based in the First 
World but also include big, influential Third World transnational NGOs and local 
informants/‘point men’. A well-travelled international cadre of actors – what I 
have called transitional justice entrepreneurs – theorize the field; set the agenda; 
legitimize what constitute appropriate transitional justice norms and mechanisms; 
influence the flow of financial resources; assist governments in transition; invite, 
collaborate with and capacitate ‘relevant’ local NGOs and ‘grassroots organizations’; 
and ultimately not only represent and speak for victims but ‘produce’ the victim.” 
Madlingozi, “On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of 
Victims,” 225.
22  Ksenija Bilbija and Leigh A Payne, “Introduction. Time Is Money: The Memory 
Market in Latin America,” in Accounting for Violence: Marketing Memory in Latin 
America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
23  Gready and Robins therefore plead for a new model of intervention in post-
conflict situations in which outsiders above all facilitate locally led transformation 
by providing the necessary material and intellectual resources. Paul Gready and 
Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 3 (November 1, 2014): 342, 
360.
24  This debate within transitional justice studies draws upon the local-global 
debate in human rights. See, for example: Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, 
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global falls short in thoroughly describing and understanding 
the multi-scale and multidirectional dynamics between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ involved in transitional justice. This study aims to unravel 
the entanglement of ideas and actors within these dynamics. As 
Alexander Hinton states, “transitional justice needs to more deeply 
grapple with the messiness of global and transnational involvements 
and the local, on-the-ground realities with which they intersect 
[…]”25 Globalization is as much a process of proliferation of diversity 
as it is a process of homogenization, as Richard Wilson points out.26 
The nexus between the rise of a transnational culture of human 
rights and memory, the emergence of a new paradigm of dealing 
with the past and its diffusion by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ has given 
several layered dimensions to contemporary processes of dealing 
with violent pasts that require further scrutiny through profound 
empirical research. According to Kimberly Theidon, “introducing 
a politics of scale” helps to reveal the “competing logics” that can 
exist between local, national and international aims and actors of 
transitional justice.27 While it holds true that the main ‘chain’ of ideas 
in transitional justice flows from the international to the local level, a 
politics of scale should transcend the opposition between top-down 
and bottom-up, or between the global and the local. This opposition 
too often results in an artificial conceptual divide, in which the local 
is characterized by “remoteness”, “marginality” and “absence (of 
modernity)”.28 Moreover, the dichotomy between local and global 
has often resulted in an underexposure of the dynamics between 
The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law between the Global and the Local (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
25  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 361.
26  Richard Wilson, “Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction,” in 
Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives (Londen: Pluto Press, 
1997), 12.
27  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 361.
28  Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan, Localizing Transitional Justice: 
Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 6.
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the national and local level.29 By emphasizing the entanglement of 
local, national and international actors, ideas an practices, I aim to 
“disturb the dichotomy between the concrete and the conceptual” 
and go against the presumption that ‘ideas’ and ‘politics’ (exclusively) 
belong to the global or international realm, and ‘experience’ and 
‘culture’ to the local. Therefore, only a multidirectional approach, 
i.e. an approach that integrates horizontal and vertical movements 
across the different scales, can uncover the processes of diffusion 
and contestation between local, national and international actors 
and ideas. The more the field expands, and the more transitional 
justice initiatives are being designed in diverging socio-economic 
and geographic contexts, the more multidirectional exchanges will 
take place, for example between so-called ‘South-South’ contexts. 
In addition, this multi-scale and multidirectional approach should 
be intersectional in order to clarify how structures of race, class 
and gender influence the processes of diffusion and contestation as 
well as to uncover the blind spots in research and practice created 
by these structures.30 This study thus attempts to identify some of 
the implications of the normative assumptions concerning memory, 
victimhood and time underlying transitional justice by adopting a 
multi-scale and multi-directional approach to processes of diffusion 
and contestation. This approach includes a fundamental critique 
of the paradigm of transitional justice, but it is not my intention 
to dismiss it. Rather, as Alexander Hinton states, “it is to engage 
in a ‘critical transitional justice studies’ that allows us to recognize 
the gaps within and shadows behind that which is assumed and 
naturalized.”31
29  Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: 
A New Agenda for Practice,” 349.
30  See: Eilish Rooney and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Transitional Justice from the 
Margins: Intersections of Identities, Power and Human Rights,” International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 1–8. 
31  Alexander L Hinton, “Transitional Justice Time: Uncle San, Aunty Yan, and 
Outreach at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” 96.
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A (post-)conflict setting: Ayacucho, Peru
To think, finally, that there is such a thing as a “Unity of the Third World,” 
to which one could address the new slogan in the era of decolonization “Natives 
of all underdeveloped countries unite!” (Sartre) is to repeat Marx’s worst 
illusions on a greatly enlarged scale and with considerably less justification. 
The Third World is not a reality but an ideolog y.32 
The setting from which this study of transitional justice emerges 
is the Peruvian civil war and its aftermath. Each of the three case 
studies will be embedded in its historical and geographical context 
in order to create a rich body of empirical material that represents 
the complexity of the setting. This book is thus also a study of the 
micro-dynamics of violence that characterized the civil war and mark 
the process of coming to terms with it. These dynamics of violence 
and its aftermath can only be grasped through long-term empirical 
research.33 The research presented in this book is based on twenty 
months of field research in Peru conducted in 2014 (three months), 
2015 (eleven months), 2017 (three months) and 2018 (three months). 
I will extensively introduce the context of the three different cases, 
as well as the specific methodology and empirical data used for each 
case in chapter four, five and six. However, some introductory notes 
on context, methodology, sources and research ethics are useful. 
The semantics of war and (indigenous) identity
As Stathis Kalyvas writes, “civil war is often the object of serious 
semantic contestation.”34 In Peru, positionality defines the 
terminology that is used to refer to the two decades during which the 
32  Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1970), 19.
33  Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 6.
34  Kalyvas, 17.
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Shining Path tried to overthrow the government. The TRC coined 
the term ‘internal armed conflict’, which was rejected by the state 
forces as they feared this would turn captured Shining Path members 
into political prisoners who could invoke the right to amnesty under 
the Geneva Convention. The state forces use(d) the term ‘terrorism’ 
to refer to the actions of the Shining Path, hereby considering these 
actions as criminal activities rather than as political struggles.35 
This term was also used by Fujimori’s government and is still 
very common in public opinion, especially in Lima. In Ayacucho, 
the war is mostly referred to as ‘the period of violence’ (‘la época 
de la violencia’), ‘political violence’, or ‘socio-political violence’. In 
Quechua, the term ‘sasachakuy tiempo’ (‘the difficult time’) is used. In 
order to avoid connotations or reductions, I will refer to the period 
of 1980-2000 with the term civil conflict or civil war as defined 
by Kalyvas: “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized 
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at 
the outset of the hostilities.”36 As Kalyvas proposes, I conceive the 
violence that characterized the civil war as a process rather than 
an outcome, in order to consider “the complex, and often invisible, 
nonviolent actions and mechanisms that precede and follow” 
it.37 The observation that both the civil war and its aftermath are 
characterized by mechanisms of structural violence, such as racism 
and socio-economic exclusion, runs as a common thread through 
this book. When referring to the aftermath of the war, I therefore 
use the term (post-)conflict, which alludes to the ongoing character 
of this structural violence and the social conflict that it provokes. 
By doing so, I aim to integrate the historical and socio-economic 
dimension into this study of Peru’s process of coming to terms 
35  Lisa J. Laplante and Kimberly Theidon, “Commissioning Truth, Constructing 
Silences: The Peruvian Truth Commission and the Other Truths of ‘Terrorists,’” in 
Mirrors of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 305.
36  Kalyvas main analytical distinction is between “civil war” and “violence in civil 
war”; he does not distinguish between war and conflict. Kalyvas,20.
37  Kalyvas, 21.
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with the legacies of the civil war, as it is all too often neglected 
in transitional justice.38 The notion of structural socio-economic 
violence and social conflict moreover responds to the debates on the 
legacies of colonialism that are rooted in the Peruvian and Latin-
American context.39
This also brings us to the question of race and indigeneity, which 
cannot be neglected given the particular (post-)conflict setting on 
which this book focuses. This setting is the Ayacucho department, 
the region situated in the central Peruvian Andes which was most 
severely affected by the war. The capital of the Ayacucho department 
is the homonymous city of Ayacucho, also called Huamanga.40 
According to the national census of 2017, 63,58% of the population 
of the Ayacucho department declares Quechua to be their mother 
tongue.41 This implies that they learned Spanish, the only official 
language of education and administration in Peru, as soon as they 
started to attend school. Indigenous ethnicity - this means outside 
of the categories white, criollo42, mestizo43, or afro descendant - is thus 
mostly defined by the indigenous language one speaks: Quechua, 
Aymara, Asháninka, etc. The same census makes clear that 81,2% 
of the population in Ayacucho identifies with ‘quechua’ as an ethnic 
category.44 That being said, they do not necessarily self-identify 
with the term indigenous (indígena) due to the long-time history of 
stigmatization and discrimination of indios in the Peruvian Andes. 
38  Alexander L Hinton, “Transitional Justice Time: Uncle San, Aunty Yan, and 
Outreach at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” 96.
39  See, for example: Aníbal Quijano, “Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y 
América Latina,” Journal of World-Systems Research VI, no. 2 (2000).
40  In order to avoid confusion, I will use the name Huamaga to refer to the city and 
Ayacucho to refer to the department.
41  INEI, “Ayacucho Resultados Definitivos, Tomo I” (Lima, 2017), 37.
42  Term used to refer to white Peruvians from the coast
43  Term used to refer to persons with combined European and indigenous 
American descent
44  13,1% identifies as mestizo, 2% as white, 0,2% as aymara and 0,8% as afro 
descendant. INEI, “Ayacucho Resultados Definitivos, Tomo I” (Lima, 2017), 38.
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Therefore, rural communities in Ayacucho mostly refer to themselves 
as comunidades campesinas45 and people primarily self-identify as 
campesinos or peasants. The debate on indigenous identity in Peru is, 
however, highly complex.46 As I will not engage with it explicitly, I 
will stick to the use of the terminology that was extended to me in 
the field and speak of peasant communities rather than indigenous 
communities.47 Moreover, by adopting this emic terminology, I want 
to avoid taking what Orin Starn has called an Andeanist approach, 
i.e. an essentialist, exotic and static view of the Peruvian peasantry. 
According to Starn, persistent cultural differences in Andean 
nations should be seen “not as the result of distance and separation, 
but as constructed within a history of continuous and multilayered 
connections.”48 
Field settings
Throughout my stays in Peru, I moved between four different 
geographical settings: the capital city of Lima, the city of Huamanga, 
highland peasant communities in the provinces south of Huamanga, 
and jungle peasant communities in the Valley of the Apurímac 
River situated to the north of Huamanga. Lima is the place where 
most (inter)national NGOs have their headquarters and where the 
majority of Peru’s academic community is based. When in Lima, 
I spent most of my time attending activities such as seminars, 
45  Peasant communities
46  See: Maria Elena García, Making Indigenous Citizens: Identities, Education, and 
Multicultural Development in Peru, 1 edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2005).
47  On the organization and cosmovision of peasant communities in Ayacucho see 
chapter 8, “El mundo campesino” in: Antonio Zapata Velasco, Nelson Pereyra 
Chávez, and Rolando Rojas Rojas, Historia y cultura de Ayacucho, 259–90.
48  Starn argues that the emergence of the Shining Path came as a complete suprise 
to anthropologists in Ayacucho precisely because they adopted this Andeanist 
approach. Orin Starn, “Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in 
Peru,” Cultural Anthropolog y, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), Pp. 63-91, 85.
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commemoration ceremonies or other cultural activities related to 
the legacy of the civil war. Huamanga was my main operating base 
during most of the time in the field; it is the place where I lived 
and from which I traveled back and forth to both the highland and 
jungle communities for trips of several days or weeks. Huamanga 
is a small highland city situated at 2.800 meters above main sea 
level (AMSL) with a population of around 180.000. The city grew 
significantly during the war due to the influx of refugees from the 
countryside. In the aftermath of the war, Huamanga became a hub 
for international human rights and development NGOs. Both the 
Belgian (BTC/Enabel) and German (DED/GIZ) development 
cooperation invested large amounts of money in, respectively, 
agricultural development projects and peacebuilding initiatives. 
These injections are gradually declining, however, as for most 
Western donor countries Peru is no longer a priority country for 
development aid. The UNSCH is one of Peru’s oldest and largest 
provincial universities but carries the stigma of being the cradle of 
the Shining Path, which is why conducting critical research about 
the civil war at the UNSCH is not self-evident. 
Research collaboration
The fact that this book is a single-authored piece conceals the 
reality that this research would not have been possible without 
the collaborations that emerged in the field. It was during the field 
research for my master dissertation in 2012 that I first established 
contact with the Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense49 (EPAF) 
in Lima. The EPAF, a Peruvian NGO dedicated to the search of 
missing persons, appealed to me as one of the few human rights 
organizations that was still doing fieldwork in remote highland 
communities in Ayacucho. Through my collaboration with the 
EPAF, I could establish my first contacts in Hualla and Sacsamarca 
and gain access to the network of NGO representatives in Lima 
49  Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team
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and Huamanga. When in Lima, I spent most of my time working 
at the EPAF’s office, and hereby I got involved as a volunteer in 
some of the organization’s activities.  Also, I made several of the 
fieldtrips for this dissertation together with members of the EPAF 
(cfr. infra chapter 4 and 5). To conduct fieldwork independent of 
the EPAF, I furthermore worked together with three research 
collaborators: Karina Barrientos, Alicia Noa and Gabriela Zamora, 
who are graduates in respectively anthropology, community 
psychology and history. Karina, Alicia and Gabriela accompanied 
me in the field, helped me to establish contacts, provided translation 
from Quechua to Spanish where necessary, transcribed interviews 
and most of all were important sounding boards for a gringa50 lost 
in the contradictions of an unknown cultural reality. Many of my 
insights emerged through conversation with them. Despite the fact 
that ‘North-South’ research collaborations in academic fieldwork 
generate a lot of questions concerning power relations, ethics, security 
and precarity, they are all too often taken for granted and more 
often than not remain invisible in the research output of Western 
academics. Moreover, academics based at Western universities 
mostly have significantly more resources to conduct their research 
and get it published than their colleagues based at universities in 
the ‘global South’. On several occasions, I captured frustrations of 
academics at the UNSCH about the fact that foreign researchers 
like me come to extract data and ‘make a career’ on a conflict that 
is not ‘theirs’. In order to address these problems and inequalities, I 
believe there is an urgent need for an open and sincere dialogue on 
transnational collaborations in academic (field) research.51
50  Term used in Latin America to refer to US citizens, and by extension also to 
(white) Europeans
51  The research collective ‘(Silent)Voices from the Field’ is based at Ghent 
University and forms part of the Governance in Conflict Network. The collective 
integrates researchers from the field of development and (post-)conflict studies 
working in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europa who aim to put these questions 
on the agenda. See: https://www.gicnetwork.be/silent-voices-manifesto/.
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An historian in the field
This study methodologically balances between history and 
anthropology, two closely related disciplines. Over the course 
of my fieldwork in rural communities in both the highlands and 
the jungle of Ayacucho, I conducted around 185 semi-structured 
open interviews with survivors of the civil war and engaged in 
participant observation in activities such as commemorations, 
community meetings, exhumations of mass graves, etc. Fieldnotes 
and an extensive fieldwork diary as well as audiovisual recordings 
and photographs helped me to process the information gathered 
through participant observation. The majority of interviews was 
conducted in Spanish and recorded, transcribed and processed 
through open coding with the qualitative research software NVivo.52 
The interviews in Quechua were conducted with translation by one 
of the research collaborators, recorded and subsequently transcribed 
in Spanish for coding in Nvivo. For privacy reasons, all names of 
interviewees referred to in this book are pseudonyms. I will refer 
to the position from which the interviewed persons speak to the 
extent that this does not make them identifiable. Interview citations 
52  “Open coding refers to the initial phase of the coding process in the grounded 
theory approach to qualitative research (generating theory from data) espoused 
by Anslem Strauss and Juliet Corbin. They call this initial stage of data analysis 
open coding because they view the process as the ‘opening up’ of the text in 
order to uncover ideas and meanings it holds. The process of open coding begins 
with the collection of raw data (e.g., interviews, fieldnotes, art, reports, diaries). 
The intent of open coding is to break down the data into segments in order to 
interpret them. Detailed word-by-word and line-by-line analysis is conducted by 
researchers asking what is going on. The researcher discovers, names, defines, and 
develops as many ideas and concepts as possible without concern for how they 
will ultimately be used. How the issues and themes within the data relate must 
be systematically assessed, but such relationships can be discovered only once the 
multitude of ideas and concepts it holds have been uncovered.” “Open Coding,” 
in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, by Lisa Given (2455 Teller 
Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 
2008).
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are translated to English, but the Spanish original is included in the 
footnote. In case of interviews conducted in Quechua, the citation is 
translated from the Spanish transcription to English. 
Paige Arthur has noted that historians have been remarkably absent 
from the field of transitional justice because it was “presented as 
deeply enmeshed with political problems that were legal-institutional 
and, relatively, short-term in nature.”53 By combining fieldwork 
with the use of archival sources and by adopting a meta-historical 
approach, I incorporate this historical dimension in the study of 
transitional justice. Most noteworthy, in this respect, is the archive 
of the central headquarter of the self-defense committees of the 
valley of the Apurímac river that Gabriela and I stumbled upon 
in Pichiwillca and which provides a unique look into the historical 
reality of the civil war (cfr. infra chapter 6). Furthermore, for the 
cases of Hualla and Sacsamarca, I consulted the testimonies given 
by survivors to the TRC which are available for consultation in the 
Centro de Información para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos54 in 
the ombudsman office in Lima. 
The ethics of researching and representing violence
According to Fassin, the rise of ‘humanitarian government’ is 
mirrored by an epistemological shift, which implies an increased 
sensitivity of researchers and intellectuals “to the subjectivity of 
agents and to the experience of pain and affliction.”55 Integrating 
this subjectivity and sensitivity into academic research is, however, 
not self-evident. The process of working with survivors - both 
victims and perpetrators - of civil war violence raises several 
questions regarding research ethics, vulnerability, positionality and 
representation. It goes for all the fieldwork that I have conducted 
53  Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 333.
54  Information Center of Collective Memory and Human Rights
55  Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason (University of California Press, 2012), 6.
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for this dissertation that I have always prioritized the ‘do no 
harm’ principle and taken into account the guidelines concerning 
confidentiality, anonymity, informed consent and data protection 
prescribed in the ethical clearance given for this research by Ghent 
University and the Research Foundation Flanders. However, ethical 
clearance is an institutional starting point that does not necessarily 
provide answers to the series of questions and dilemmas that emerge 
when one is actually in the field. As Cheryl Lawther, Rachel Killean 
and Lauren Dempster state, “conducting sensitive fieldwork with 
often vulnerable individuals and communities demands a sensitivity 
to the challenges of empathy and expectation [my emphasis].”56 
To manage the challenge of expectations generated by my presence 
as a foreign researcher, I tried, in first instance, to be clear and 
modest.57 To respond to expectations, I often switched between 
two roles. As a researcher, and particularly as an historian, I could 
react to the request of sharing the research participant’s story 
‘in my country’ and granting it legitimacy by giving it a place in 
historiography. During my fieldwork, I put the act of sharing stories 
in practice by writing a blog illustrated with photographs which 
was published on the website of the Belgian magazine MO*.58 In 
my position as a volunteer or NGO worker - which I unavoidably 
became on some occasions through my affiliation with the EPAF 
- I responded as much as possible to the requests for support by 
providing answers and information regarding the procedures of 
inscription in the victim register, the follow-up of the reparation 
program, or the legal procedures concerning the search for the 
disappeared, and by directing or accompanying survivors to the 
corresponding institutions in Huamanga and Lima. 
The challenge of empathy is a tricky one in sensitive (post-)conflict 
56  Cheryl Lawther, Rachel Killean, and Lauren Dempster, “Working with Others: 
Reflections on Fieldwork in Postconflict Societies,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 13, no. 2 (2019): 389.
57  Lawther, Killean, and Dempster, 390.
58  See: https://www.mo.be/auteur/eva-willems
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settings and the question of reliving experiences of violence by 
recounting them should be taken seriously in light of the ‘do no 
harm’ principle. Moreover, in addition to being survivors of war, the 
majority of research participants live in precarious socio-economic 
conditions, which increases their vulnerability. While my research 
focuses on the aftermath rather than on the war itself, it soon turned 
out during conversations that the two were inseparable and that 
people would share their experiences of the war even if I did not 
explicitly ask for it. If at some initial point I still believed that I could 
stick to a set of questions, I realized very soon that it was not just 
me who set the course of the conversation. As Elizabeth Jelin states, 
those who talk and those who listen co-produce testimony.59 Mostly, 
I ended up on the listening side. Interviews always started out from 
what people wanted to share rather than from what I wanted to 
know, and I never insisted on talking. When I felt that conversations 
got too emotionally charged, I mostly switched the topic to daily 
affairs, the customs and culture of the village or recent events in 
local or national politics. I did my best not to awaken the ghosts 
of the past against people’s will, although I am very aware of the 
fact that the latter is partly out of my control as one can never fully 
predict the effect of research on its participants. 
For the researcher, listening to stories of survival but also 
perpetration of violence, including detailed descriptions of torture, 
sexual violence and homicide, can become emotionally charged. As 
I re-read interview transcripts and re-lived parts of my fieldwork 
throughout the process of writing this dissertation, I struggled 
with the ways in which I could or should textually represent the 
testimonies provided by research participants. I am wary of reducing 
conversations to citations, which are but a selective representation 
of the wide range of thoughts expressed by research participants. 
Especially when dealing with testimonies of violence, the balance 
between omission and representation requires careful consideration. 
59  Elizabeth Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria (Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 2012), 116.
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I consider the vivid descriptions of violence that these citations 
sometimes contain as crucial information for understanding 
the dynamics of war and violence. While I have done my best to 
balance this aim of understanding the dynamics of violence and 
safeguarding the dignity of those who helped me to come closer to 
this understanding by providing their intimate stories, I am fully 
aware of the limitations of my representations of their experiences.
Outline of the book
This book can be roughly divided into two parts. The first 
part investigates the emergence of the paradigm of transitional 
justice (chapter one), its underlying ideas (chapter two) and its 
implementation in Peru (chapter three) through an analysis of the 
existing debates. The second part entails an in-depth empirical 
analysis of the diffusion and contestation of transitional justice by 
means of three different case studies from rural contexts in the 
Ayacucho region (chapter four, five and six). 
Chapter one is a genesis of the origins and expansion of international 
transitional justice, a paradigm that emerged from the dilemma of 
how to achieve both justice and reconciliation in a limited time 
span in the wake of large-scale human rights violations. I take the 
last phase of the Cold War as a starting point for writing a genesis 
of transitional justice, with the political transition in Argentina in 
1983 as a benchmark. I will first explore the ways in which the idea 
of post-war or post-dictatorship transition to liberal democracy is 
Western in its origins and closely linked to post-Cold War discourse 
on human rights and humanitarianism. Subsequently, the origins of 
international transitional justice will be examined by identifying a 
range of key initiatives and processes that gave rise to the concept. I 
will then elaborate on the establishment of international transitional 
justice as a distinctive network shaped by a blend of institutions, 
practitioners and academics. The chapter concludes by sketching 
the proliferation and expansion of the concept and network of 
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transitional justice, resulting in a wide range of critical and alternative 
views in which this study is also embedded.
Chapter two investigates three normative ideas concerning memory, 
victimhood and time underlying international transitional justice. 
By doing so, the aim of this chapter is to provide the necessary 
conceptual background for the analysis of the case studies in chapter 
four, five and six. First, I will explore the idea of the memory duty: 
the conviction that the violent past must be actively remembered 
and should not be forgotten. This idea on its turn contains three 
underlying assumptions: the assumption that the past will repeat 
itself if it is not remembered, that remembering can have a redemptive 
potential for survivors, and that memory is a moral duty of society 
towards the victims of human rights violations. I will describe the 
origins of this idea of a duty to remember and show how it became 
and remains an essential feature of transitional justice, despite many 
criticisms. In the second part of chapter two, I will elaborate on how 
and why transitional justice puts victims and their stories of suffering at the 
heart of the process of dealing with the past. I argue that transitional 
justice tends to strip survivors from their agency by backgrounding 
active narratives of perpetration on the one hand and producing 
‘ideal’ victims whose identity is grounded in innocence on the other. 
By doing so, stories of violence risk to be taken out of their political, 
cultural and historical context. The last part of chapter two deals 
with the temporal assumptions underpinning transitional justice, and 
more specifically with the idea of a transition that draws clear lines 
between past and future and uses the present as a delimited time to 
make the change from conflict to post-conflict and achieve ‘closure’ 
of the past. I will challenge this notion of closure by elaborating 
on the notion of a ‘contemporary past’: a concept to describe the 
condition in which the presence of the past does not take the shape 
of a memory of violence that has happened in the past but is perceived by 
survivors as violence that has happened in the past and is still happening in 
the present. This idea of a ‘contemporary’ past helps us to relate recent 
human rights violations to longer historical process of injustice 
46
General Introduction
that have not yet concluded and therefore potentially spark new 
outbreaks of social conflict and violence.
Chapter three provides a bridge between the first two chapters and 
the latter three. This chapter presents a general overview of the 
dissemination and implementation of transitional justice in Peru by 
looking at various actors and mechanisms that shaped the (post-)
conflict process. The main actors that will be discussed are the 
human rights movement, the survivors and the state. As for the 
mechanisms, the analysis focuses on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and two of its recommendations: the reparation plan 
and the plan for the search of the disappeared. The emphasis in this 
chapter lies on the interaction between international, national and 
local actors and ideas in shaping the (post-)conflict process. A brief 
sketch of public narratives on the civil war as they are verbalized 
and materialized in public opinion and space furthermore gives 
an impression of the turbulent landscape in which the process of 
dealing with the legacies of the past takes place in Peru.
In the second part of the book, I turn to three different case-
studies from the Ayacucho region in order to scrutinize processes 
of diffusion and contestation of transitional justice. The approach 
of the analysis in chapters four, five and six slightly differs per 
case. Chapter four focuses on a specific place and is a microhistory 
of Sacsamarca that takes the particularities of one spatial context 
and the historical events in which it is embedded as a starting point. 
The emphasis in chapter five lies on a specific phenomenon - that of 
(the aftermath of) enforced disappearance - which I study from the 
angle of the village of Hualla. Chapter six, then, deals with a specific 
phenomenon in a specific place, namely the self-defense committees in 
the Valley of the Apurímac River, and therefore takes a regional and 
multi-sited spatial approach. 
Chapter four analyzes the process of dealing with the legacies of 
the civil war in Sacsamarca, a village in which the Shining Path’s 
revolutionary struggle got entangled with existing power imbalances 
and slumbering conflicts over land and resources. The tension 
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between involvement with and resistance against the Shining Path 
which marked Sacsamarca’s position during the civil war resulted in 
a particular (post-)conflict dynamic between the public narrative on 
the past on the one hand, and the (open) secrets and silences that 
surround it on the other. The work of the TRC, the implementation 
of the reparation program and the exhumation of clandestine burial 
sites in Sacsamarca were all intersected by the tense coexistence 
between ‘intimate enemies’ and at first sight seem to have fomented 
confrontation rather than reconciliation or unity among the villagers. 
Nevertheless, the Sacsamarquinos appropriated their own space within 
the transitional justice process to create a heroic narrative in which 
their resistance against the Shining Path stands center-stage. Putting 
forward this narrative of resistance allows the villagers to shift their 
(post-)conflict identity on the axis between victimhood and heroism 
in function of their claims for recognition and reparations directed 
to the state and the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ of transitional justice. 
Chapter five addresses the problem of dealing with the desaparecidos60 
of the civil war. The scenery of this chapter is Hualla, a village in 
the middle of the Shining Path’s zona liberada in which the violence 
of the civil war was characterized by enforced disappearance, and 
the crimes of torture and sexual violence that are closely related to 
it. I will first demonstrate how survivors appropriated an identity 
based on disempowering characteristics which was offered to them 
by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ as a precondition to claim certain rights. 
Then, I will show how the search for the disappeared has stranded 
in a deadlock because of the tension between legal and humanitarian 
purposes on the one hand, and the bureaucracy of the judicial 
apparatus on the other. The relation between state representatives 
and survivors throughout the process of searching, identifying and 
restituting the bodies of the disappeared is moreover intersected 
by racism and discrimination against rural indigenous peasants, 
which adds insult to injury for the survivors: new non-physical 
violence is inflicted upon those who seek redress, who are hereby 
60  Disappeared persons
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reminded of the mechanisms of structural violence that underlie the 
crimes of the past and still characterize the present. I point to this 
phenomenon as the contemporary past of enforced disappearance. 
Taking this contemporary past into account, I argue that, while 
exhumation and restitution can provide important contributions to 
recognition as well as to justice, the narrow focus on bodies as the 
main starting point for addressing the problem of the disappeared 
can result to be highly problematic. Therefore, I suggest shifting the 
emphasis from ‘how can we find the bodies of the disappeared?’ to 
‘how can we achieve recognition and citizenship for the relatives of 
the disappeared in absence of the bodies?’. 
Chapter six turns to the valley of the Apurímac River (VRAEM), 
where the Comités de Autodefensa Civil61 (CADs) played a key-role in 
defeating the Shining Path during the civil war. Because of the 
ongoing struggle against ‘narcoterrorism’, the VRAEM is declared 
in state of emergency and is the most militarized area of the country. 
The process of dealing with the past in the VRAEM is therefore 
intersected by (the perception of) ongoing conflict which thwarts 
future perspectives for progress and development. First, by analyzing 
how the CADs were dealt with by the TRC and the reparation 
program, I argue that the agency of the CADs corresponds to a blind 
spot in the transitional justice process which is a result from the 
typical categorization of survivors that emerges at the intersection 
of trauma and human rights discourse. In order to sketch a more 
comprehensive image of the CADs, I will demonstrate how they 
became important providers of local governance and social order 
during the war in the VRAEM. Then, I will turn to the heroic 
memory fostered by the CADs, which conflicts with the kind of 
commemorative discourse and practice that stands center-stage in 
transitional justice. The memory of the CADs stands in function 
of the recognition of their contribution to the defeat of the Shining 
Path and identifies heroes rather than victims. I argue, however, 
that the lacking conceptualization of the agency of the peasantry 
61  Civil self-defense committees
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resulted in a failure to recognize their contribution. Consequently, 
the transitional justice process missed an important opportunity to 
strengthen the citizenship of an historically excluded population 
group.
In the conclusions, finally, I will first reflect upon the common 
thread that runs through survivors’ contestations of transitional 
justice: the claim for citizenship and inclusion, which appears as 
the Achilles’ heel of Peru’s process of coming to terms with the 
legacies of the civil war. Lastly, I will formulate three conceptual 
and methodological implications of this dissertation for the study 
of (post-)conflict dynamics and the implementation of transitional 
justice policies. The first implication relates to the conceptualization 
of agency of survivors in (post-)conflict settings and proposes the 
notion of a multi-layered survivor identity that goes beyond the 
opposition between victims and perpetrators and embraces the fact 
that victimhood, violation, resistance and heroism are no mutually 
exclusive features. The second recommendation relates to the study 
of violence and its aftermath and pleads for the integration of a 
historical approach that is more responsive to notions of structural 
violence. The third suggestion, finally, is an invitation to rethink 
the ‘local’ as more than a mere domain of reception of transitional 
justice policies by taking the entanglement of local, national and 
international actors and ideas into account.
Relatives of La Cantuta case demonstrating in Cieneguilla (2014)
I 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The Emergence of a New Paradigm of Dealing with the Past
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The road to the future has come to run through the catastrophes of the past.1 
Introduction
This first chapter gives an overview of the origins and the expansion 
of international transitional justice. Transitional justice is an amalgam 
of theory and practice that is shaped by the interplay between 
institutions, practitioners and academics dealing with the question 
of coming to terms with a violent past on a societal level since the 
end of the 20th century. According to the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “Transitional justice refers to the ways 
countries emerging from periods of conflict and repression address 
large scale or systematic human rights violations so numerous and 
so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to provide 
an adequate response.”2 Jon Elster goes as far back as to the trials 
and purges in ancient Athens to trace the origins of transitional 
justice3, while Ruti Teitel on her turn identifies the Nuremberg 
Tribunal as a defining moment in what she calls the first phase of 
transitional justice.4 As Paige Arthur, however, points out, ascribing 
the term a posteriori to phenomena that were not defined as such by 
contemporaries holds the danger of anachronism. She rightly notes 
that such an anachronistic view does not enhance our conceptual 
understanding of how current-day transitional justice emerged.5 
My starting point for writing a genesis of transitional justice will 
therefore be the last phase of the Cold War and the so-called third 
1  John Torpey, “An Avalanche of History: The ‘Collapse of the Future’ and the Rise 
of Reparation Politics.,” in Historical Justice in International Perspective. How Societies Are 
Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past., 2009, 29.  
2  https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice, consulted 14.03.2018.
3  Jon Elster, Closing the Books : Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
4  Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 
(2003).
5  Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 328.
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wave of democratization, with the political transition in Argentina 
in 1983 as a benchmark.6 Within this historical context, the idea 
took shape that emerging democracies should apply a set of tailor-
made measures when handling their violent past. Imposing these 
measures, including prosecutions, truth-telling, institutional reform 
and reparations, was believed to provide for a successful transition.7 
This response to past human rights violations arose, thus Arthur, 
from a conception of justice based on two normative goals: 
achieving justice for victims and establishing a more just democratic 
order to prevent recurrence.8 “ ‘Transition’ - and, more specifically, 
‘transition to democracy’ – was the dominant normative lens through 
which political change was viewed at this time,” states Arthur.9 The 
dilemma of how to achieve both justice (punishment for crimes of 
the past) and reconciliation (durable peace in the present) in a limited 
time span came to stand center stage in the debates of the human 
rights movement and gave birth to a new little sister: transitional 
justice.10 In this search for a midway ‘between vengeance and 
forgiveness’, as Martha Minow has described the dilemma of finding 
a path between too much memory and too much forgetting when 
addressing a violent past, truth-telling arose as a means of achieving 
reconciliation.11 Reflections about the triangular relation between 
justice, truth and reconciliation became the substantive foundation 
of the new field of transitional justice. 
Why, however, did transitional justice emerge when it did? Which 
shift in thinking caused the emergence of a new paradigm of dealing 
with violent pasts? What are the guiding principles behind it? Where 
6  Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman ; London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998). 
7  Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,”355. 
8  Arthur, 357.
9  Arthur, 325.
10  Arthur, 323.
11  Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and 
Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998)
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did international transitional justice take shape? 
In this chapter, I will first explore the ways in which the idea of post-
war or post-dictatorship transition to liberal democracy, relying on a 
society’s capacity to come to terms with its violent past, is – despite the 
Argentinean benchmark – Western in its origins and closely linked 
to post-Cold War discourse on human rights and humanitarianism. 
Subsequently, the origins of international transitional justice will be 
examined by identifying a range of key initiatives and processes that 
gave rise to the concept. I will then elaborate on the establishment of 
international transitional justice as a distinctive network shaped by 
a blend of institutions, practitioners and academics. I refer to the 
concept of transitional justice to address the set of ideas and practices 
that it entails, and to the network to indicate the amalgam of people 
that shape it. The latter distinguishes transitional justice from being 
a movement, which I consider to be more activist – such as for example 
the human rights or environmental movement –, or a disciplinary field, 
which leans more closely to academia. This does not mean, however, 
that transitional justice has no characteristics similar to those of a 
movement or a disciplinary field. Naturally, the concept and network of 
transitional justice are in reality often inseparable, but I differentiate 
here for the sake of analytical clarity. The chapter concludes by 
sketching the proliferation and expansion of the concept and 
network of transitional justice, resulting in a wide range of critical 
and alternative views in which this study is also embedded.
1.1 The need to confront the past and the rise of 
‘humanitarian government’ 
The end of the Cold War and the culmination of processes of 
decolonization in the global South has been typically conceived 
as a turning point for the intensified preoccupation with the past 
and the need to confront it in order to build a democratic future. 
The breakthrough of human rights discourse in Western politics 
– from the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
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the Genocide Convention in 1948, over the anti-Vietnam war 
movement in 1964 and the foundation of Helsinki Watch (the 
precursor of Human Rights Watch, HRW12) in 1978 – significantly 
changed our relationship with the past.13 Historian John Torpey has 
used the metaphor of an ‘avalanche of history’ to talk about a shift 
in the temporal horizon of politics from future- to past-oriented 
at the end of the 20th century. The optimistic belief in progress 
that characterized the foregoing centuries was overshadowed by 
experiences of economic crisis, war and genocide.14 In The Empire 
of Trauma, Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman likewise identify 
a change in how societies relate to their violent pasts that marked 
the last decades of the 20th century. According to the authors, 
this “new relationship to time and memory, to mourning and 
obligations, to misfortune and the misfortunate” is characterized 
by a shift in focus from the heroic histories of the victors to the 
tragic histories of the victims.15 Fassin coins the term ‘humanitarian 
government’ to describe the use of moral sentiments – defined as 
“the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others 
and make us want to remedy them” – in contemporary politics.16 
‘Humanity’ hereby refers both to the concept of universality of all 
human beings considered as equal, as to the underlying ‘humane’ 
sentiments of empathy and compassion as motives for action. The 
12  Helsinki Watch was founded in 1978, Americas Watch in 1981. In 1988, Human 
Rights Watch was founded as the umbrella of ‘the watch committees’, including 
also Asia Watch (1985), Africa Watch (1988), and Middle East Watch (1989). See: 
https://www.hrw.org/our-history, consulted 14.03.2018. The Ford Foundation 
inverted 6 million dollars in the foundation and operationalization of HRW. See: 
Rowen, 27. 
13  Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (New York: Verso Books, 
2014), 72.
14  Torpey, “An Avalanche of History: The ‘Collapse of the Future’ and the Rise of 
Reparation Politics.,” 28. 
15  Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry Into the 
Condition of Victimhood (Princeton University Press, 2009), 275. 
16  Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 1. 
56
I Transitional Justice
term ‘government’ is used in a broad sense, meaning the set of 
interventions adopted by various institutional bodies (ranging from 
local to international administrations) that “manage, regulate, and 
support the existence of human beings.”17 According to Fassin, these 
moral sentiments first appeared in the eighteenth century, when 
abolitionist movements organized themselves in Britain, France 
and the United States. The culmination point of this development 
came in the last two decades of the 20th century, with the emergence 
of humanitarian organizations providing assistance to vulnerable 
societal groups which they deemed vulnerable (such as the homeless, 
the poor, refugees, immigrants, etc).18 It is not the nature of conflict 
and oppression that has radically changed, thus Fassin, but rather 
the way in which we give meaning to it. The shift which he discerns 
is that conflicts are increasingly being described as humanitarian 
crises.19 By adopting the vocabulary of moral sentiments, social 
scientists provide legitimation for politicians who propagate the 
idea and practice of humanitarian government. Although the idea 
of humanitarian government may have become self-evident in the 
eyes of many, it inhibits a fundamental paradox: on the one hand, 
humanitarian government acknowledges that war and conflict take 
a central place in politics, but at the same time it seems to strip the 
origins and consequences of these events from their political nature. 
In the vocabulary of humanitarian government “inequality is replaced 
by exclusion, domination is transformed into misfortune, injustice is 
articulated as suffering, violence is expressed in terms of trauma”.20 
Fassin identifies the rise of humanitarian government as a Western 
phenomenon, partly because its key developments21 took place in 
17  Fassin, 1.
18  Fassin, 5.
19  Fassin, 7.
20  Fassin, 6.
21  Fassin chronologically lists the international key developments that he identifies 
on a timeline at the end of the book (Humanitarian Reason, 259-262), starting with 
the International Committee of the Red Cross Nobel Peace Prize in 1944 and 
ending with the earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan in 2010.
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Europe and the United States, but also because of its close link to 
Christian ideas such as the sacralization of life, and the valorization 
of suffering as a precondition for redemption.22 Notwithstanding 
the process of secularization in Western democracies, religious 
expression is thus still present in humanitarian government. What 
is more, since humanitarian government recognizes life as the 
highest of all values, it is perceived by some as a “form of political 
theology”.23 Similarly, Robert Meister speaks of human rights as a 
“global secular religion” that developed at the end of the Cold War.24 
The sacredness of human life as one of the core values of human 
rights discourse25 has, according to Meister, led to a predominance of 
ethics over politics, hereby providing the logic for a kind of human 
rights interventionism that paradoxically supports war in order to 
secure peace.26 Paige Arthur points to the self-criticism of social 
movements after failed experiments and deceptions in, among other 
countries, the Soviet Union and Cuba, leading to a global decline 
of the radical Left and a turn from a political ideology based on 
class warfare towards the moral framework of human rights in the 
1970s.27 As a change occurred from silence to speaking out about 
past injustices and demanding recognition for harm suffered in the 
public sphere, thus Torpey, “the narrative structure of emancipation 
appears to have shifted”.28 Or, as stated by Samuel Moyn, it is at 
22  Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 248.  Notwithstanding the link with Christianity, 
Fassin recognizes the existence of traditions of compassion and charity in other 
religions such as Islam or Buddhism. 
23  Fassin, 249 and 251. 
24  Robert Meister, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,” Ethics & 
International Affairs 16, no. 2 (2002): 91. 
25  Meister understands human rights discourse as “the mainstream version of 
human rights advocacy”. Meister, 92.
26  Robert Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 41. 
27  Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,”339. 
28  Torpey, “An Avalanche of History: The ‘Collapse of the Future’ and the Rise of 
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thispoint in history that “ ‘ideology’ died and the phrase ‘human 
rights’ entered common parlance.”29
It is the context of this historical shift in thinking that the concept 
of transitional justice emerged as a means to transform a war-
torn community into a free and egalitarian society with equal 
opportunities for all.30 Transitional justice thus has clear roots 
in Western liberal legality and is closely related to human rights 
discourse and practice.31 Meister points out how the concern with 
the responsibility of perpetrators of human rights violations lies 
at the heart of the project of liberal human rights discourse.32 The 
idea of punishment and accountability was indeed central to the 
human rights movement from the very beginning.33 The human 
rights movement’s focus on international criminal law incited 
heated discussions between HRW and the ICTJ at the time of its 
foundation in 2001. The ICTJ was believed to promote a model of 
justice that did not prioritize punishment and – keeping in mind 
the experience of the South-African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission – even took a flexible stance towards amnesty.34 
According to José Zalaquett, a Chilean human rights lawyer who 
was part of the transitional justice network since its earliest days, 
the big change for the significance of the human rights movement 
in the context of political transitions involved a shift in temporality. 
The former concern with present violations moved to a focus on 
dealing with past abuses in hindsight and preventing recurrence in 
Reparation Politics,” 28. 
29  Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History, 83. 
30  Kora Andrieu, “Political Liberalism after Mass Violence: John Rawls and a 
‘Theory’ of Transitional Justice,” Transitional Justice Theories, 2015, 86. 
31  Jamie Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 160.
32  Meister, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,” 107. 
33  Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History, Reprint edition 
(Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 258.
34  Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement, 44. 
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the future.35 Yet, as was explained by HRW staff during interviews 
with Jamie Rowen in 2009, the goals and strategies of the human 
rights movement and of the transitional justice network remain very 
similar – even though both groups often use a different vocabulary 
to articulate them.36 
In his book The International Human Rights Movement: A History, co-
founder of HRW Aryeh Neier regards the ICTJ as the most recent 
significant player in the arena of the worldwide human rights 
movement. 37 In its first annual report 2001-2002, then-president 
of the ICTJ Alex Boraine refers to “the development of a human 
rights culture” as one of the principal goals of transitional justice.38 
Indeed, despite initial skepticism among human rights scholars and 
activists, the concept of transitional justice quickly gained ground.39 
The newly emerging network of transitional justice scholars and 
practitioners soon started to influence existing disciplinary fields, 
such as conflict resolution and peacebuilding. More generally, the 
vocabulary of transitional justice gradually became predominant in 
issues related to dealing with the past as more and more human 
rights organizations started framing their work in these terms.40
1.2 A genesis of international transitional justice
A concept as broad and malleable as transitional justice did not, 
however, arise all of a sudden. As pointed out by Thomas Carothers, 
the democratic acceleration in Southern and Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, and some parts of Asia and Africa during the last 
35  José Zalaquett, cited in: Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A 
Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” 336. 
36  Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement, 44. 
37  Neier, The International Human Rights Movement, 242.”
38  International Center for Transitional Justice, “Annual Report 2001-2002,” 
2002, 3. 
39  Neier,242.International Center for Transitional Justice, 3.
40  Rowen, 43. 
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decades of the 20th century was applauded by the democracy-
promotion community in the United States, which he defines 
as “an active array of governmental, quasi-governmental, and 
nongovernmental organizations”. According to Carothers, “this 
new democracy-promotion community had a pressing need for an 
analytic framework to conceptualize and respond to the ongoing 
political events”.41 In this light, several initiatives and processes 
can be identified that contributed directly to the birth of the 
term transitional justice. A research project on transitions was set 
up at the Woodrow Wilson center for scholars by, among others, 
the Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell and the 
American political scientist Philippe Schmitter in 1978, resulting in 
the publication of the four-part series Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule in 1986.42 The normative assumption underpinning this project 
was that the installation of democracy should be the end goal of 
political transitions, which also was the core idea of the newly 
emerging academic field of ‘transitology’.43 The transitions project 
attached importance to political choices made by elites rather than 
to structural socio-economic factors as conditions for democracy.44 
Paige Arthur points to the Aspen Institute conference in 1988 (cfr. 
infra) as the place where important conceptual underpinnings took 
shape, while Ruti Teitel describes how she coined the term during 
a consultancy on newly democratized societies in 1991.45 Guillaume 
Mouralis, on his turn, points to the inaugural meeting of the Project 
41  Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, 
2002, 6.
42  Guillermo A O’Donnell, Philippe C Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986). 
43  Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 6.
44  Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,”346. 
45  Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement, 25. Ruti Teitel, 
“Editorial Note-Transitional Justice Globalized,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 2, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 1–4. 
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on Justice in Times of Transition (PJTT) in Salzburg (cfr. infra) in 
1992 as the catalyst for transitional justice.46 The 1994 ‘Dealing with 
the Past’ conference in South-Africa organized by the Institute for 
Democracy and the PJTT, which contributed to the creation of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission inspired on the 
model of Argentina and Chile, also was an important foundational 
moment for the transitional justice network.47  Although there was 
a difference in the countries represented at the meetings in Aspen, 
Salzburg and Somerset West, a number of participants attended 
two of the three meetings and some influential key figures can be 
identified.48 
Early Latin American Truth Commissions 
The catalysts for all of these intellectual efforts were, in the first 
place, the events that had been taking place in Latin America during 
the last phase of the Cold War. In that period, political change was 
on hand for the military dictatorships supported by the United 
States in, most notably, Chile and Argentina, but also Paraguay, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, Guatemala and El Salvador. Already 
before the phrase transitional justice was born, efforts were made to 
set up truth commissions in order to ‘reveal the secrets’ which these 
regimes had been hiding successfully for decades.49 Putting human 
46  Guillaume Mouralis, “The Invention of ‘Transitional Justice’ in the 1990s,” in 
Dealing with Wars and Dictatorships (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2014), 83–100.
47  Arthur, 325. 
48  Alice Henkin (Aspen Institute), Jaime Malamud-Goti (University of Buenos 
Aires), Juan Méndez (Americas Watch), Adam Michnik (Member of the Polish 
Parliament), Aryeh Neier (HRW), Diane Orentlicher (Columbia University), 
Andras Sajo (advisor of Hungarian president Arpad Gönz), and José Zalaquett 
(Chilean human rights lawyer) attended two of the three meetings; Lawrence 
Weschler, journalist of The New Yorker, attended all three meetings. See: Arthur, 
364.
49  For a detailed account of the role of truth commissions in transitional justice, 
and the application of truth-telling in post-conflict settings all over the world, 
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rights high on its agenda since 1981, the Ford Foundation started 
financing these efforts, particularly in Argentina, where president 
Raúl Alfonsín replaced General Reynaldo Bignone in 1983. This led 
to the creation of the National Commission on the Disappearance 
of Persons (CONADEP) that investigated the disappearance of 
tens of thousands of political prisoners during the regime of the 
military junta. 50 The report of the commission, with the telling title 
Nunca Más51, was published in 1984 and became a bestseller of which 
more than 300 000 copies were sold.52 The Madres, mothers of the 
disappeared who demanded information about the whereabouts 
of their sons while holding their pictures and walking around 
the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, became a worldwide icon of 
activism against enforced disappearance. Directly inspired by the 
Argentinean transition with the CONADEP and the trials against 
the junta commanders, the Chilean president Patricio Aylwin, 
who had taken over from General Augusto Pinochet in 1985 after 
seventeen years of dictatorial rule, created the National Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation in 1990.53 The Chapultepec peace 
agreements brokered by the UN, which ended the civil war between 
the army and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El 
Salvador in 1991, provided for the creation of the Commission on 
the Truth in order “to contribute to the reconciliation of Salvadorian 
society”.54
see: Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions--1974 to 1994,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 4, no. 16 (1994): 597–655 and Priscilla B Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: 
Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 
2011). 
50  Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement, 27. 
51  Never again
52  Antonius C.G.M Robben, “Testimonies, Truths, and Transitions of Justice in 
Argentina and Chile,” in Transitional Justice : Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after 
Genocide and Mass Violence, 2010, 191. 
53  Robben, 191.
54  UN General Assembly Security Council, The Situation in Central America: 
Threats to international peace and security and peace initiatives, 30.01.1992, 
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The Aspen Institute conference
The 1988 Aspen Institute55 conference in particular was a direct 
response to the developments in the human rights movement since 
the start of the transition in Argentina in 1983: Alice Henkin took 
the initiative for the meeting after hearing a talk of Julio Raffo of the 
Argentine human rights organization Center for Legal and Social 
Studies (CELS).56 Henkin, who was the director of the Justice and 
Society Program at that same institute, received funds from the 
Ford Foundation in order to organize the event.57 Argentina was 
represented by Carlos Nino and Jaime Malamud-Goti, the principal 
advisors of president Raúl Alfonsín, and José Zalaquett shared the 
Chilean experience. The rest of the participants of the conference 
were mostly US-based academics and activists from South Africa, 
Brazil, Uruguay, Korea, Guatemala, Uganda and Haiti, among 
whom the Africanist Mahmood Mamdani, philosopher Thomas 
Nagel, law scholar Diane Orentlicher, Juan Méndez of Americas 
Watch and Aryeh Neier of HRW.58 According to Henkin, the aim 
of the conference was “[…] to discuss the moral, political and 
jurisprudential issues that arise when a government that has engaged 
in gross violations of human rights is succeeded by a regime more 
inclined to respect those rights.”59 In the discussions on pardons 
versus accountability, Arthur describes that there were some 
disagreements between, on the one hand, Zalaquett and Malamud-
Goti who pointed to the importance of the political context in 
ht tps://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/f i les/SV_920116_
ChapultepecAgreement.pdf, consulted 19.03.2018.
55  The Aspen Institute is a “nonpartisan forum for values-based leadership and 
the exchange of ideas”, founded by Chicago businessman Walter Paepcke in 1949. 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/about/heritage/, consulted 14.03.2018.
56  Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,”349. 
57  Arthur, 322.
58  Arthur, 350.
59  Henkin cited in: Arthur, 352.
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developing justice policies, and, on the other hand, Neier and Méndez 
who stated that political concerns should in no way limit justice.60 
As already mentioned in 3.1, this would be a recurring discussion 
between Neier’s HRW and the ICTJ, and it probably reflects the core 
of what distinguished transitional justice from the already existing 
human rights movement, namely pursuing justice and reconciliation 
not only to right the wrongs for individual victims, but in function 
of democracy building.
The Salzburg meeting
The inaugural meeting of the PJTT took place in Salzburg in 1992, 
with, among others, George Soros (philanthropist and founder of 
the Open Society Institute), Neil Kritz (United States Institute of 
Peace, USIP), Ruti Teitel (law professor at New York University) 
and the principal initiators Timothy Phillips and Wendy Luers (co-
founders of the PJTT).61 Other than the Aspen Institute Conference, 
which was a direct response to the Latin American experience, 
the Salzburg meeting was centered around the transitions taking 
place in countries of the former Soviet Union. More specifically, 
the aim was to establish connections between leaders from Central 
and Eastern European and Latin American countries dealing with 
political transitions and “to provide perspective, guidance and 
direction to the decision-makers currently grappling with the grave 
and complicated issues connected with transitional justice”. To 
60  Arthur, 353.
61  Tim Phillips, “The Project on Justice in Times of Transition,” in The New 
Humanitarians: Inspiration, Innovations, and Blueprints for Visionaries, vol. 3, The New 
Humanitarians: Inspiration, Innovations, and Blueprints for Visionaries (Praeger, 
2009), 8. The meeting received financial support from the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, the National Endowment for Democracy, George Soros’ 
Open Society Fund, the Rockefeller Family & Associates and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Charter 77 Foundation - a New York based nonprofit founded 
by Wendy Luers that was dedicated to building democracy in Czechoslovakia and 
is now known as The Foundation for a Civil Society.  
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do so, the invited political leaders were joined by social scientists, 
legal scholars, journalists and human rights activists from Western 
Europe and the United States.62 The representation of the various 
geographical groups was remarkably unbalanced, as 42 Westerners 
(of whom 30 were US-based), 34 Eastern and Central Europeans 
and only eight Latin Americans participated in the meeting.63 
Still, one of the principal reasons behind the organization of this 
meeting, thus Timothy Phillips, was the belief that the new leaders 
of the post-communist states could learn from the transitional 
experiences of their Latin American counterparts.64 Indeed, despite 
the numerical underrepresentation of Latin American countries, 
their presence was influential. The report of the meeting mentions 
that “the Europeans in particular learned some important lessons 
from the Latin American experience with transitional justice.”65 
The idea of inciting a learning process – the so-called ‘methodology 
of shared experience’ – was based on the intuitive universalist belief 
that “on a biological, emotional and psychological level, humans 
have many of the same response mechanisms to the formative 
experiences of their lives”. Phillips and Luers were convinced that, 
despite cultural differences, “how people respond to the terrifying, 
humiliating and dehumanizing experience of life under dictatorship 
62  Mary Albon, “Project on Justice in Times of Transition. Inaugural Meeting, 
Salzburg, Austria, March 7-10, 1992” (Project on Justice in Times of Transition, 
1992), 1. 
63  Beyond Conflict, “Beyond Conflict – Justice in Times of Transition,” accessed 
March 7, 2018, http://www.beyondconflictint.org/initiatives/geographic-
programming/eastern-europebalkans-focused-programs/justice-in-times-of-
transition/. The representatives for Latin America were Raul Alcondo, Raúl 
Alfonsín, Jaime Malamud-Goti (Argentina); Claudio Grossman, Roberto Garreton 
Merrino (Chile); Francisco Diaz Rodríguez, Leonel Gomez (El Salvador), Rafael 
Michelin (Uruguay), most of them being (former) government officials.  
64  Phillips, “The Project on Justice in Times of Transition,” 8. 
65  Albon, “Project on Justice in Times of Transition. Inaugural Meeting, Salzburg, 
Austria, March 7-10, 1992,” 18.  
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or during civil war is fundamentally the same around the world”.66 
In addition to this belief in a psychologically universal humankind, 
the second principle underpinning the methodology of the Salzburg 
meeting, and of the following meetings of the PJTT, was the 
conviction that, even in war-torn societies, everyone can change 
their world view and leaders will eventually understand the benefit 
of making compromises, seeing this as a capacity of strength rather 
than as a weakness or humiliation.67
The fundamental topic of the Salzburg meeting was the question of 
responsibility “which emerging democracies must address in order 
to allow society to move forward”. Both acknowledgment (the issue 
of remembrance) and accountability (the issue of prosecution) were 
identified as the two key issues regarding this central question.68 In 
the discussion on acknowledgement, the participants came to the 
conclusion that telling the truth about the past brings about justice for 
the victims and restores their dignity. They also concluded that truth 
facilitates national reconciliation and prevents further violations 
from occurring. Thus their adage: “memory is the ultimate form 
of justice”.69 The meeting resulted in the institutionalization of the 
PJTT and the foundation of a separate program within the Charter 
77 Foundation-New York consisting of an international advisory 
board of which, among others, Nelson Mandela, Václav Havel, 
Árpád Göncz, Mikhail Gorbachev, Óscar Arias and Jose Zalaquett 
66  Phillips, “The Project on Justice in Times of Transition,” 9. For a more thorough 
analysis of the shared experience methodology, see Phillips and Taffel, The Project 
on Justice in Times of Transition’s “Shared Experience Methodology” of Conflict 
Resolution, 2013. In this publication, Phillips and Taffel embed their methodology 
in the field of conflict resolution and the already existing methodologies, such 
as the human needs approach and the interest based approach, and they present 
some evidence from neuroscience for the effectivity of the shared experience 
methodology.  
67  Phillips, 15.
68  Albon, “Project on Justice in Times of Transition. Inaugural Meeting, Salzburg, 
Austria, March 7-10, 1992,” 1.  
69  Albon, 3.
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formed part.70 The PJTT started organizing meetings and programs 
in countries all over the world, such as El Salvador71, South Africa72, 
Nicaragua73, Northern Ireland74, Hungary75 and Colombia76.77 Neil 
Kritz from the USIP edited a three-volume series on transitional 
justice in 1995, which was directly inspired by the meeting and 
boosted the proliferation of the concept.78 
1.3 Between advocacy, policy and academy: blurred lines
As the above descriptions of the Aspen Institute Conference and the 
Salzburg meeting make clear, the rise of the concept of transitional 
justice was shaped by a mix of scholarship, policy making and 
advocacy. According to Rowen, the distinct actors involved in 
transitional justice – institutions, practitioners and scholars – do not 
really consider themselves as part of a movement, contrary to human 
rights activists. This has to do as much with the fact that the concept 
and the network are still young and in search of a well-established 
identity, thus Rowen, as well as with the intrinsic malleability of 
transitional justice.79 In the same way, Arthur stresses that the term 
70  Phillips, “The Project on Justice in Times of Transition,” 11. 
71  ‘Reconciliation in Times of Transition’, 1993.
72  ‘Dealing with the Past’, 1994.
73  ‘Reflections on Transition’, 1994.
74  ‘Reconciliation and Community’, 1995.
75  ‘Conference on Missing Persons for Family Members in the Former Yugoslavia’, 
1997.
76  ‘Negotiating from Conflict to Peace’, 2007.
77  Phillips, “The Project on Justice in Times of Transition,” 18. 
78  Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement, 26. Neil J Kritz, 
Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). The series includes contributions 
from, among others, Luc Huyse, Raúl Alfonsín, Guillermo O’Donnell, Ruti Teitel, 
José Zalaquett, Jaime Malamud-Goti, Samuel Huntington, Priscilla Hayner and 
Diane Orentlicher.    
79  Rowen, 50. 
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transitional justice has no fixed meaning and is constantly evolving 
due to its rapid proliferation and expansion around the globe. She 
argues nonetheless that there is an internal coherence based on 
common concepts, distinctive practical aims and shared beliefs.80 
The network is loosely tied together by the shared commitment 
to find ways of dealing with the legacies of a violent past.81 
Understanding the interplay between institutions, practitioners and 
academics, and the way in which these move across the blurred lines 
of policy, advocacy and academy, is therefore crucial to apprehend 
the way in which transitional justice processes take shape, generate 
impact and circulate between the local, national and international 
level. Both on-the-ground practitioners at the grassroots and civil 
society level, as well as international institutions play their part in 
influencing national government policies on transitional justice. At 
the same time, approaches and interests of various actors might differ 
according to variables such as time frames, mandates, methodology 
and funding. 
Transitional justice on the ground: grassroots and civil society practitioners 
On-the-ground experiences of dealing with the past in post-
conflict or post-dictatorial societies form the point of departure 
of transitional justice. As stated above, the central scenery for the 
development of the concept and network of transitional justice 
was late Cold War Latin America, and in particular its political 
landslides. Actors from civil society, such as grassroots victim-
organizations and human rights advocacy groups, played a key-role 
in instigating these transitions by pressuring national governments 
and connecting with international institutions. A substantive part 
of the transitional justice practitioners (i.e. actors that are involved 
80  Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,”359. 
81  J.R. Quinn, “The Development of Transitional Justice,” in Research Handbook on 
Transitional Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 33. 
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in the practice of transitional justice) are thus situated at the local 
and national level of grassroots movements and civil society NGOs. 
Especially in societies where governments and (democratic) state 
institutions are weak or associated with human rights violations, 
bottom-up processes of mobilization, advocacy and monitoring can 
be crucial in defining and evaluating the course of transitional justice 
measures.82 Think, for example, of the Argentinean Madres, the Hijos 
por la Identidad y la Justica contra el Olvido y el Silencio (H.I.J.O.S.) in 
Argentina and Guatemala83, the women of ANFASEP in Ayacucho84 
or the Peruvian Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH)85, to 
name but a few Latin American examples. 
The expansion of the concept of transitional justice – from a narrow 
focus on accountability and the rule of law to a broader engagement 
with, among others, peacebuilding, reconciliation, trauma and 
development – has encouraged the proliferation of civil society 
and community actors involved.86 Hugo van der Merwe and Maya 
82  Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, Transitional Justice from below: Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change (Oxford; Portland, Or.: Hart Pub., 2008), 5. 
83  Sons and daughters for Identity and Justice against Forgetting and Silence. 
H.I.J.O.S Argentina was founded in 1995, its Guatemalan counterpart in 1999. 
H.I.J.O.S. Argentina and Guatemala are activist groups consisting of children 
of the disappeared who raise public-awareness on the crimes of the military, for 
example by public shaming. See: http://www.hijos-capital.org.ar/?option=com_
content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=400 and http://hijosguate.blogspot.be/, 
accessed April 3, 2018. 
84  National Association of Family members of the Kidnapped, Detained and 
Disappeared of Peru. ANFASEP, Peru’s most emblematic association of victims 
of the civil war, was founded in 1983 by (mostly Quechua speaking) women and 
mothers of the disappeared in Ayacucho.
85  Association for Human Rights. APRODEH was founded in 1983 by, among 
others, Francisco Soberón and played a leading role in providing legal support 
to victims, human rights advocacy and the creation of the Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Since 1990, APRODEH is part of the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). See: http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/nosotros/
historia/, accessed April 3, 2018.
86  Hugo Van der Merwe and Maya Schkolne, “The Role of Local Civil Society 
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Schkolne differentiate between eight categories of civil society 
actors that commit themselves to implementing transitional justice: 
religious organizations, human rights NGOs, peacebuilding NGOs, 
psycho/medical NGOs, gender justice NGOs, victim organizations, 
social movements and coalitions (i.e. collaborative efforts of multiple 
NGOs).87 Development NGOs focusing on subjects such as food 
security and sustainable economy can also play their part, for example 
in the light of reparation policies. Historic socio-economic inequality 
and poverty, “leading to a blurring of past and present injustices and 
patterns of structural and physical violence”, are often identified 
by civil society as root causes of conflict and oppression.88 A very 
specific type of actor that engages with addressing the legacies of the 
past is the group of forensic NGOs specialized in the exhumation of 
mass graves and the identification of victims. This network started 
out in Argentina with the Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense 
(EAAF)89, and now has its counterparts in, among others, Peru 
(EPAF) Guatemala (Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala, 
FAFG)90, Bosnia and Herzegovina (International Commission 
on Missing Persons, ICMP)91 and Mexico (Equipo Mexicano de 
Antropología Forense, EMAF)92. Furthermore, civil society actors 
are important facilitators of (alternative) initiatives of truth telling, 
in Transitional Justice,” in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017), 222. 
87  Hugo Van der Merwe and Maya Schkolne, “The Role of Local Civil Society in 
Transitional Justice,” in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017), 226.Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 226.
88  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 238. 
89  Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team. See: http://eaaf.typepad.com/eaaf__
sp/, accessed April 4, 2018.
90  Foundation of Forensic Anthropology of Guatemala. See: https://www.fafg.
org/, accessed April 4, 2018.
91  See: “ICMP History,” accessed September 2, 2019, https://www.icmp.int/
about-us/history/.
92  Mexican Forensic Anthropology Team. See: http://emaf.org.mx/, accessed 
April 4, 2018. 
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commemoration and memorialization that go beyond the restricted 
time frames and mandates of formal transitional justice processes, 
which “inexorably limit the type of stories told and the format 
through which these stories can be shared.”93 Murals, for example, 
are but one typical Latin American example of memorialization in 
the form of art. 
Despite its image of impartiality, especially in contrast with (often 
fragile or corrupt) governments, the role of civil society should 
be evaluated carefully. Funding streams, mostly provided by 
international donors such as foreign governments and (Western) 
institutions, play a crucial role in defining the agenda of civil society 
organizations. Therefore, “professional NGOs usually come with 
agendas that unsurprisingly match very closely international human 
rights frameworks and Western justice priorities.”94 As transitional 
justice has become the subject of huge amounts of funding 
worldwide, it has also become an arena in which NGOs – regardless 
of whether they are really specialized in transitional justice or not – 
try to get a piece of the pie.95 Moreover, relations between different 
groups of civil society are complex and interests might be opposed 
on some issues. For instance, there often is a gap between victim-
survivors and NGOs that (claim to) represent them since it is difficult 
to combine real bottom-up participatory processes with a funding-
driven agenda that formulates a priori goals.96 At the same time, 
certain groups of civil society might of course also oppose instead 
of support transitional justice. Think, for example, of veterans and 
family members of soldiers, but also of certain religious groups 
which believe that victims should resign to their fate and leave the 
past behind instead of confronting it.97 
93  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, “The Role of Local Civil Society in Transitional 
Justice,” 239. 
94  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 239.
95  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 239.
96  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 240.
97  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 224. In Ayacucho, evangelical churches often 
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As great amounts of money have been invested in transitional justice 
projects and mechanisms, the pressure from donors to evaluate 
impact has generated a considerable amount of research that 
measures the failures and successes of transitional justice initiatives.98 
That said, Van der Merwe and Schkolne note that academic research 
on the impact and effectiveness of civil society actors in transitional 
justice processes is still scarce.99 Their role on the ground and their 
interaction with national governments and international institutions 
is, however, of paramount importance to transitional justice. 
The institutionalization of transitional justice 
The on-the-ground experiences with truth commissions in Latin-
America and the subsequent intellectual efforts that gave rise to the 
concept of transitional justice, resulted in the creation of several 
(inter- and supra)national institutions that started undertaking 
and promoting transitional justice work, as well as the anchoring 
of transitional justice frameworks in already existing institutions. 
The concept of transitional justice was rapidly institutionalized in 
an international network of non-governmental organizations, think 
thanks and policy bodies throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
As stated above, the Salzburg meeting led to the institutionalization 
of the PJTT in 1992, which currently operates under the name 
Beyond Conflict. The objective of this institution is “to promote 
peace and reconciliation by connecting, inspiring, and empowering 
diverse communities and leaders.”100 Since its foundation, Beyond 
Conflict has been part of over 75 initiatives in more than 50 
oppose exhumations of mass graves by stating that the death should be left in peace 
and victims should close the past. Fieldnotes, 25.06.2014, Hualla, Peru. 
98  See, for example: Tricia D Olsen, Leigh A Payne, and Andrew G Reiter, 
Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2010). 
99  Van der Merwe and Schkolne, 243.
100  Beyond Conflict, “Beyond Conflict – About Us,” accessed March 23, 2018, 
http://www.beyondconflictint.org/about-us/. 
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countries all over the world with a broad range of approaches 
related to transitional justice and peace building.101 One of their 
most recent projects (set up in 2011) for example, examines the role 
of neuroscience in understanding practices of conflict resolution, 
reconciliation and diplomacy.102 The USIP, an independent national 
institution founded and funded by American Congress at the 
initiative of World War II veterans in 1984, played an important 
role in the institutionalization of transitional justice, starting with 
the publication of Neil Kritz’s three-volume series on transitional 
justice in 1995 (in the wake of the Salzburg meeting).103 USIP works 
on several transitional justice issues in (post-)conflict societies, such 
as reconciliation, democracy and governance, justice and rule of 
law.104 It defines transitional justice as “efforts to address a legacy 
of large-scale human rights abuses that cannot be fully addressed 
by existing judicial and non-judicial structures.”105 The USIP has 
published extensively on transitional justice and has issued several 
publications that focus on measuring impact, such as Transitional 
Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy, which was the 
result of an extensive research project carried out by Leigh Payne, 
Tricia Olsen and Andrew Reiter.106 The USIP also awards grants and 
101  Beyond Conflict, “Beyond Conflict – Initiatives,” accessed March 23, 2018, 
http://www.beyondconflictint.org/initiatives/. 
102  Beyond Conflict, “Beyond Conflict – Neuroscience and Social Conflict 
Initiative,” accessed March 23, 2018, http://www.beyondconflictint.org/
neuroscience-and-social-conflict-initiatives/.
103  USIP, “USIP Timeline,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed March 29, 
2018, https://www.usip.org/about-us/usip-timeline. 
104  USIP, “Issue Areas,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed March 29, 2018, 
https://www.usip.org/issue-areas. 
105  USIP, “Transitional Justice,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed March 
29, 2018, https://www.usip.org/glossary/transitional-justice. 
106  USIP, “Transitional Justice in Balance,” United States Institute of Peace, 
accessed March 29, 2018, https://www.usip.org/publications/2010/06/transitional-
justice-balance. For this project, they developed the Transitional Justice Database 
containing over 900 mechanisms (trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties 
and lustrations) used from 1970-2007. The database can be consulted at http://
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fellowships to NGOs, research institutions and scholars to instigate 
transitional justice research and practice.107 
In 2001, the International Center for Transitional Justice was 
founded as a non-governmental organization by Priscilla Hayner, 
expert on truth commissions, and Alex Boraine, deputy chair of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with the 
financial support of the Ford Foundation.108 The Latin-American 
experiences once again served as a model, as the foundation of the 
ICTJ was the result of a meeting on ‘historical memories’ in Chile 
in 1999, which in turn was a continuation of a project launched by 
the Ford Foundation on ‘historical memory’ in Chile, Argentina 
and Uruguay in 1996-1997.109 At the moment when the plan was 
conceived to create an international center for transitional justice 
as a means of streamlining the Ford Foundation’s funding flow, 
some disagreements between the key figures of the emerging field 
arose. These differing opinions were expressed during a second 
meeting organized in April 2000. While the future leaders of the 
ICTJ, including Boraine and Paul Van Zyl, were excited about the 
idea of creating an international hub of expertise, Neil Kritz of the 
USIP and Graeme Simpson of the South African Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) – another grantee 
of the Ford Foundation, erected in 1989 – were concerned about 
reinforcing existing power dynamics by focusing on a US-based elite 
and neglecting the already existing local and regional efforts. One of 
www.tjdbproject.com/, and there is also a bibliography available at https://sites.
google.com/site/transitionaljusticedatabase/. Another publication of the USIP on 
impact is: Hugo Van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R Chapman, Assessing 
the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2008). 
107  USIP, “Grants & Fellowships,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed 
March 29, 2018, https://www.usip.org/grants-fellowships. 
108  Sara Dezalay, “The Role of International NGOs in the Emergence of 
Transitional Justice: A Case Study of the International Center for Transitional 
Justice,” in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, 203. 
109  Dezalay, 210. 
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the core incentives for the Ford Foundation to support the creation 
of the ICTJ was indeed to foster the emergence of a network of elites 
– acquainted with US know-how and values – across transitional 
societies around the globe.110 Also, while the discussion was mostly 
centered around truth and accountability, Kritz advocated for the 
inclusion of reintegration and development issues in transitional 
justice.111 Discussions on local vs. global approaches and the 
preponderance of retributive vs. social and distributive justice, that 
lie at the root of the expansion of the field (cfr. infra 3.4), were thus 
present from the outset.
The ICTJ, which rapidly became the leading NGO in the field, 
has its headquarters in New York but works with regional offices 
in Abidjan, Beirut, Bogotá, Brussels, Goma, The Hague, Kampala, 
Kathmandu, Nairobi and Tunis and has intervened in more than 
30 countries all over the world.112 Its work consists of providing 
assistance “in countries that have endured massive human rights 
abuses under repression and in conflict” to “ensure redress for 
victims and to help prevent atrocities from happening again”.113 
The six ‘transitional justice issues’ around which its work – from 
supporting activist victims groups to policy advisement, training for 
local organizations and research – is centered, are criminal justice, 
reparations, truth and memory, institutional reform, children 
and youth, and gender justice.114 Similar to the methodology of 
110  Dezalay, “The Role of International NGOs in the Emergence of Transitional 
Justice: A Case Study of the International Center for Transitional Justice,” 206. 
Dezalay also describes how, in the same line, the South-African Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies (CALS) and the Argentinean Center for Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS) were founded with a grant of the Ford Foundation in respectively 1978 
and 1981.
111  Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement, 35. 
112  ICTJ, “Contact,” International Center for Transitional Justice, accessed March 
26, 2018, https://www.ictj.org/about/contact. 
113  ICTJ, “About the International Center for Transitional Justice,” International 
Center for Transitional Justice, February 15, 2011, https://www.ictj.org/about. 
114  ICTJ, “Our Work,” International Center for Transitional Justice, February 15, 
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shared experience of the PJTT described above, the approach of 
the ICTJ is based on exchanging experiences from various post-
conflict settings. While recognizing that “no two transitional justice 
projects are the same”, it is at the same time believed that “each new 
endeavor yields a fresh set of lessons and best practices”.115 These 
best practices are stored in what is called the transitional justice 
toolkit that provides responses to massive human rights abuses in the 
form of prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, institutional 
reform and reconciliation initiatives.116 Despite the development of 
this toolkit, which seems to imply the existence of a set of ready-
made solutions, the ICTJ states in its first annual report 2001-2002 
as part of its core principles that “the Center will undertake each 
assignment with a focused assessment of local conditions and 
relevant international circumstances, rather than approaching its 
work with prior blueprints or rigid guidelines that pre-determine 
options.”117 
In the course of the years, the idea that addressing the injustices 
of the past is a necessary precondition for building more just 
and peaceful societies in the present was also picked up by the 
United Nations (UN).118 The UN working group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances was already addressing important 
challenges in (pre-)transitional societies since the 1980s, by 
undertaking country visits to investigate disappearances in Latin 
American countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brasil, Guatemala, 
Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay and El Salvador.119 In 
2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a report for the UN 
2011, https://www.ictj.org/our-work. 
115  International Center for Transitional Justice, “Annual Report 2001-2002,” 5.
116  International Center for Transitional Justice, “Annual Report 2001-2002,” 9. 
117  International Center for Transitional Justice, 33.
118  Alison Davidian and Emily Kenney, “The United Nations and Transitional 
Justice,” in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, 201. 
119  United Nations, “OHCHR | Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances,” accessed March 28, 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Disappearances/Pages/DisappearancesIndex.aspx. 
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Security Council on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies in which he highlights the importance of 
addressing large-scale past abuses in order to (re-)establish the rule 
of law, thereby stressing the need to articulate “a common language 
of justice” among the international community. UN interventions 
should, thus Annan, at all times be based on the “universally 
applicable standards” formulated by international human rights 
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and 
international refugee law. Despite this focus on international norms 
and standards, he also stated that it is the role of the UN to “eschew 
one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models” 
and reinforce national structures and assist domestic processes 
instead.120 Since the 2004 report, transitional justice has become 
an essential component of the UN’s peacebuilding missions and 
post-conflict agenda. The Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) is the coordinating entity for transitional 
justice within the UN, although it works closely with other entities 
such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Women 
and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).121 The 
international standards underpinning the UN’s transitional justice 
work were further elaborated in guidelines such as the Updated Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action 
to Combat Impunity and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law in 2005.122 The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance was adopted in 2006 and set out the right 
to truth. This right would be further established with a resolution 
120  United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” 2001, 4, http://www.
unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=3096. 
121  Davidian and Kenney, “The United Nations and Transitional Justice,” 186, 
190. 
122  Davidian and Kenney, 189.
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adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2009 that “recognizes the 
importance of respecting and ensuring the right to the truth so as to 
contribute to ending impunity and to promote and protect human 
rights.”123
Most importantly, a guidance note on transitional justice containing 
ten guiding principles was issued by the UN in 2010. In this note, 
transitional justice is defined as “the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with 
a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
serve justice and achieve reconciliation.” In addition to the centrality 
of victims (principle six) and special attention for women’s and 
children’s rights (principle four and five), the guidance note puts 
emphasis on adopting “an approach that strives to take account 
of the root causes of conflict or repressive rule and addresses the 
related violations of all rights”; on possible mutual reinforcements 
between transitional justice and disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR); and on the inclusion of social, economic and 
cultural rights.124 A plea for the latter was already made by then United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour in 
2006.125 Pablo de Greiff, research director of the ICTJ from 2001 to 
2014, was appointed as UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence in 
2011.126  The ‘toolkit’ offered by the UN is similar to that of the ICTJ 
as it entails prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, institutional 
123  UN, A/RES/61/177, 12 January 2007 and UN, A/HRC/RES/12/12, 12 
October 2009. 
124  United Nations, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General. United Nations 
Approach to TJ,” 2010, 2, http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_
March_2010FINAL.pdf.  
125  Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,” New 
York University Journal of International Law & Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 1. 
126  United Nations, “OHCHR | SR on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation 
and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence,” accessed March 28, 2018, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Index.aspx. 
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reform and national consultations.127 The UN has promoted several 
important transitional justice mechanisms, including (hybrid128) 
international criminal courts and tribunals such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017)129, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-
2015)130, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC, 2001)131 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, 
2002-2013)132. 
The European Union (EU) adopted a policy framework in support 
of transitional justice as part of the EU Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, which is closely related to 
the UN’s framework. In its framework, the EU states that there 
is “no ‘one-size-fit-for-all’ approach” and engages to stimulate 
“a context specific combination of measures promoting truth, 
justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence, i.e. ensuring 
transitional justice”. The framework emphasizes the importance of 
a comprehensive approach that combines several mechanisms. The 
EU applies a rights-based approach to transitional justice, which 
means that it “integrates the achievement and fulfilment of human 
rights in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
all development policies and programs”, the first principle being 
the legality, universality and indivisibility of human rights. It also 
recognizes the importance of “identifying and dealing with root 
127  United Nations, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General. United Nations 
Approach to Transitional Justice,” 9. 
128  A hybrid court is an ‘internationalized’ court consisting of a mix of domestic 
and international instruments.
129  ICTY, “International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | United 
Nations,” accessed March 29, 2018, http://www.icty.org/. 
130  UN, “The ICTR in Brief | United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda,” accessed March 29, 2018, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal. 
131  ECCC, “About ECCC,” accessed March 29, 2018, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/
en/about-eccc. 
132  RSCL, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,” accessed March 29, 2018, http://www.rscsl.org/. 
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causes of conflict and violence that may reside in discrimination, 
marginalization or violation of social, economic and cultural rights.” 
The EU has an informal network of experts on transitional justice 
that exchanges information and best practices with, among others, 
the UN OHCHR and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. 133 Like 
the UN, the EU strongly supports the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which came into being in 2002 as part of the implementation 
of the Rome Statute.134
In Latin-America, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
of the Organization of American States (OAS) played a key-role 
in the development of transitional justice.135 By setting precedents 
with rulings on enforced disappearances and amnesty laws, the 
Inter-American Court reinforced survivors’ and human rights 
organizations’ demands for domestic investigations.136 Peru hereby 
played an exemplary role with the cases Barrios Altos vs. Peru 
(2001) and La Cantuta vs. Peru (2006) that ruled against Fujimori’s 
amnesty law. Although the Inter-American Court  encourages the 
work of truth commissions, it pressures governments to pursue 
truth through judicial proceedings.137 The inter-American model of 
human rights litigation and the continent’s “groundbreaking shift 
133  EU, “The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice,” 2015. 
134  ICC, “About,” accessed March 29, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about. 
135  The IACHR (based in Washington DC) and the Court (based in San José, 
Costa Rica) were founded in, respectively, 1959 and 1978 by the OAS. OAS, 
“OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and 
Development,” accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/
what.asp.Security.
136  Jasmina Brankovic and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “African Union Transitional 
Justice Policy Framework in Practice: Implementing Accountability Measures” 
(Cape Town: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2013), 2. 
137  Carolina de Campos Melo, “Transitional Justice in South America: The Role 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” Revista Cejil: Debates Sobre Derechos 
Humanos Y El Sistema Interamericano IV, no. 5 (2009): 88.  
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towards accountability” in the 1990s and 2000s directly inspired the 
African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework, which was 
designed in collaboration with the CSVR in 2012.138 
Scholarly engagement with transitional justice
Despite the fact that the foundational academic texts on transitional 
justice mostly stem from the field of law (‘justice’) (Orentlicher 1991, 
Hayner 1994, Kritz 1995, Minow 1998, Teitel 2002) and political 
science (‘transition’) (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Elster 2004), 
the proliferation of the concept and network during the early 2000s 
has led to the involvement of scholars from a wide range of disciplines. 
Philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and 
historians engage in academic research on the theory and practice of 
transitional justice.139 The remarkable involvement of academics in 
transitional justice – a result of the close link between international 
institutions such as the USIP and the ICTJ and academia – has 
contributed significantly to the concept’s theorization and to its 
legitimation as the dominant paradigm for dealing with the past in 
(post-)conflict societies.140 At the same time, scholarly engagement 
with transitional justice is characterized by competing ideas on both 
the goals of transitional justice and the understanding of the notions 
‘transition’ and ‘justice’.141 
138  Brankovic and Roht-Arriaza, “African Union Transitional Justice Policy 
Framework in Practice: Implementing Accountability Measures.”  The policy 
framework states to be “anchored on African conceptions of justice” and wants to 
consolidate “Africa’s contribution to the field of transitional justice and international 
law by incorporating African dispute resolution and reconciliation approaches.” 
African Union, “African Union Transitional Justice Framework (ATJF),” 2012, 6, 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bcdc97/pdf/. 
139  Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the 
‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (March 1, 
2009): 9.
140  Mouralis, “The Invention of ‘Transitional Justice’ in the 1990s,” 89. 
141  Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or 
‘Non-Field,’” 26.
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According to Hinton, anthropologists only hesitantly found a way to 
the study of transitional justice because of the normative associations 
that come with it. He thus states that “the very term ‘transitional 
justice’ suggests a hierarchy and teleology, with an implicitly more 
‘backward’ or ‘barbaric’ society using the tools of liberalism to 
‘develop’ into a more modern, ‘civilized’, liberal, democratic state.”142 
This perspective explains the close involvement of anthropologists 
in critical transitional justice studies, a strand of scholarship that 
questions the end goals of transitional justice and points to the 
importance of including the complexities of local realities. Arthur on 
her turn points to the absence of historians in the forty-two texts of 
Kritz’ 1995 three-part volume – an absence that is remarkable given 
the centrality of the past in transitional justice.143 Mouralis similarly 
notes that “for its proponents, ‘transitional justice’ has no history, 
neither the promoted measures to which it refers, nor the phrase or 
‘concept’ itself. Thus, its theorists think in terms of (almost) national 
‘cases’ which are comparable whatever their historical, geographical, 
or social context might be.”144 In his metahistorical approach to 
transitional justice, Berber Bevernage points out that historicizing 
discourse, however, is often used in transitional justice “in order to 
symbolically delimit the borders between past and present”. This, 
he argues, can have strong ethical implications like the denial of 
ongoing injustices from the past in the present (cfr. infra chapter 
2).145 
The variety of disciplines involved in transitional justice studies, 
142  Alexander Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice Global Mechanisms and Local Realities 
after Genocide and Mass Violence, 6.
143  Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,” 333. 
144  Mouralis, “The Invention of ‘Transitional Justice’ in the 1990s,” 84. 
145  Berber Bevernage, “Transitional Justice and Historiography: Challenges, 
Dilemmas and Possibilities,” Macquarie Law Journal 13 (2014), 1. The present study 
responds to the remarks of Arthur, Mouralis and Bevernage by engaging with 
the “historical complexities” of the processes of dealing with the past from an 
ethnographical and metahistorical perspective.  
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and the diversity of approaches and methodologies which it entails, 
have challenged the search for a common language to exchange 
knowledge and experiences. Journals such as the International 
Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ) claim to provide a forum to 
do so.146 Even though transitional justice is mostly considered as 
an (inter)disciplinary field driven by shared questions and concerns, 
this common language is often still missing. The main cause for 
this is the concept’s malleability and incredibly rapid expansion.147 
Christine Bell points to the political implications of narrating 
transitional justice as a coherent interdisciplinary field. Talking 
of a field as a consistent unity, she argues, implies covering up 
the variety of actors – stemming from distinct contexts and in 
pursuit of diverse goals – and the different normative and political 
implications of their engagement with transitional justice. The 
call for interdisciplinarity, in its turn, is therefore “not a romantic 
and innocent call to intellectual interchange” but functions as a 
legitimation for transitional justice as a field.148 At the same time, 
it is a call to cut free from the legal roots of transitional justice as it 
enables a “mutual project of (de)colonization and resistance” by other 
disciplines.149 Moreover, Bell argues that justice, democracy, rule of 
law and reconciliation are essentially contested concepts. Only by 
146  IJTJ, “About | International Journal of Transitional Justice | Oxford 
Academic,” accessed April 9, 2018, https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/pages/About. 
147  For example, the Transitional Justice Review, a peer-reviewed journal on 
transitional justice, defines transitional justice both as a field and a discipline: 
“Transitional Justice Review seeks to publish high-quality, peer reviewed scholarly 
articles in the field of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction. It 
provides an outlet for original research and commentary arising from the emerging 
discipline of transitional justice.” See:  “Transitional Justice Review - Centre for 
Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Reconstruction - Western University,” 
accessed April 9, 2018, http://tjcentre.uwo.ca/journals/transitional_justice_
review.html. 
148  Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or 
‘Non-Field,’” 24. 
149  Bell, 22.
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engaging in the battlefield of negotiation and compromise over what 
these concepts mean, instead of just applying the transitional justice 
toolkit, academics and practitioners can engage with the “deeper 
justice project”. This involves the acceptance of the incoherence 
rather than the coherence of transitional justice, thus Bell.150
The proliferation of transitional justice
Jamie Rowen states that, given the malleability of the concept, 
“transitional justice has become a black box into which actors can 
throw situations ranging from colonial violence to civil war, where 
the goals are everything from restorative to procedural to retributive 
to economic to social justice.”151 From the outset, transitional justice 
was indeed meant to be broad, ambiguous and ambitious, and the 
concept and network have expanded quickly.  According to Ruti 
Teitel, transitional justice has moved “from the exception to the 
norm to become a paradigm of rule of law” since the end of the 20th 
century.152 For example, in an interview with the New York Times 
in the wake of the #MeToo movement, the British actress Minnie 
Driver made a plea for using the model of truth and reconciliation to 
combat sexual assault. Through speaking out and being heard, there 
will be justice and eventually healing, she argued.153 Furthermore, 
truth and reconciliation commissions have been set up in Australia 
and Canada in order to deal with legacies of oppression and 
abuse. Similarly, transitional justice was being widely discussed in 
Colombia long before the signing of the peace agreement between 
the government and the FARC in 2016. In sum, the ‘mainstreaming’ 
150  Bell, 27.
151  Jamie Rowen, Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 156. 
152  Teitel calls this the third or “steady-state phase” of transitional justice. Teitel, 
“Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 71.
153  “Minnie Driver Calls for ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ Model to Combat Sexual 
Assault,” The New York Times, sec. World, accessed April 10, 2018, https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/02/20/world/europe/minnie-driver-metoo.html.  
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of transitional justice has brought about expansions of the concept 
that mostly result from critiques of either the strictly legal approach 
to justice, or the narrow political understanding of transition to 
liberal democracy. 
The debate on how to take into account the local specificities of 
various contexts when applying a framework that takes universality 
as a starting point is one of the most important critiques of 
transitional justice.154 Desmond Tutu’s plea for a South African 
response in which restorative justice – in the spirit of ubuntu – instead 
of ‘Western’ retributive justice should stand center stage, is probably 
the most well-known call to ‘localize’ transitional justice.155 Studies 
on the micro-politics that are at stake in post-conflict societies have 
shown that the international network of transitional justice and 
the local contexts in which the concept is applied are often miles 
apart.156 Alexander Hinton therefore proposes an ‘anthropology of 
transitional justice’ that takes into account the ‘messiness’ of the 
intersection between the international, national and local level, that 
pays attention to vernacular understandings of justice, and that is 
wary of the way certain groups and their perspectives are fore- or 
backgrounded by transitional justice and the interests and structures 
of power that drive it.157 My study is embedded in this debate and 
aims to respond to Hinton’s call for ‘messiness’ by emphasizing the 
multi-scale entanglement of ideas and practices of transitional justice 
rather than taking an approach either ‘from below’ or ‘from above’.
The focus on accountability and civil and political rights has 
154  Lieselotte Viaene and Eva Brems, “Transitional Justice and Cultural Contexts: 
Learning from the Universality Debate,” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 28, 
no. 2 (2010): 199–224. 
155  Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999). 
156  See for example: Kimberly Susan Theidon, Intimate Enemies, and: Rosalind 
Shaw, “Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in Sierra Leone,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 2 ( July 1, 2007): 
183–207. 
157  Hinton, Transitional Justice Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and 
Mass Violence, 1–22.  
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broadened up to a conception of dealing with the past involving 
restorative and distributive justice, including economic, social and 
cultural rights. The link between transitional justice and development 
has become one of the pet subjects of UN special rapporteur Pablo 
de Greiff and Roger Duthie, current director of research of the 
ICTJ. It is also a main focus of the EU’s approach to transitional 
justice.158 Next to its original ‘toolkit’ of mechanisms – criminal 
justice, reparations, truth and memory, institutional reform – the 
ICTJ now has a gender justice and children and youth program, 
which demonstrates the increased concern with certain vulnerable 
groups in post-conflict societies.159 The broadening of the notion 
of accountability has also led to new perspectives on human rights 
violations, such as the complicity of corporations and how they 
should be held accountable.160 
Furthermore, ‘transition’ is no longer exclusively interpreted as the 
change from conflict or dictatorship to democracy. It is alternatively 
described as a process of transformation taking place within a 
consolidated democracy, or in societies still in conflict or under 
dictatorship.161 As an answer to the question whether transitional 
158  See: Roger Duthie, “Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to 
Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 292–
309 and: Pablo De Greiff, Roger Duthie, and International Center for Transitional 
Justice Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Transitional Justice and Development: 
Making Connections (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009). For the 
EU’s approach to transitional justice see: EU, “The EU’s Policy Framework on 
Support to Transitional Justice.” 
159  ICTJ, “Gender Justice - Accountability for Gender-Based Atrocities | ICTJ,” 
International Center for Transitional Justice, accessed April 11, 2018, https://
www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/gender-justice. ICTJ, “Children 
and Youth - Adapting Transitional Justice Tools | ICTJ,” International Center 
for Transitional Justice, accessed April 11, 2018, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/
transitional-justice-issues/children-and-youth. 
160  Sabine Michalowski, ed., Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional 
Justice (London: Routledge, 2016).
161  Luke Moffett and Cheryl Lawther, Research Handbook on Transitional Justice 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 32. 
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justice requires a transition, the ICTJ states on its website that “[…] 
there can sometimes be unnecessary confusion about whether a 
country is in a period of ‘transition’ or not, but practically speaking 
it is not that complicated. The question is whether an opportunity 
has emerged to address massive violations, even if it is a limited 
opportunity.”162 At the same time, the call for including socio-
economic and cultural rights is a plea for a more transformative 
approach to transition that takes into account patterns of violence 
predating the conflict and continuing in the post-conflict time, such 
as long-term exclusion, oppression or racism.163
Transitional justice has, in sum, been criticized for its limitations and 
challenged to adopt a more intersectional approach (i.e. interweaving 
a class-, race- and gender-based analysis) “to interrogate the present 
dominant frameworks for the lives they ignore, the injustice they 
fail to see and the patriarchal and racialized power structures that 
remain intact and unexamined.”164 As Bell writes, transitional 
justice has been subject of “a dramatically compressed trajectory of 
fieldhood” as the normal track from establishment over acceptance 
to expansion and (self-)critique has taken place at an incredible 
speed. Indeed, the field has simultaneously been pushed to be broad 
and inclusive as well as to open up to critique.165 So to speak, it has 
been deconstructed even before it was properly established. This 
has led to numerous identity crises and efforts to rethink the nature 
and future of transitional justice. For example, Kora Andrieu has 
suggested to consider transitional justice not as a content provider 
but as a method of promoting deliberative democracy and solidarity, 
162  ICTJ, “What Is Transitional Justice?,” International Center for Transitional 
Justice, accessed January 29, 2019, https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.
163  Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: 
A New Agenda for Practice,” 339–61. 
164  Eilish Rooney and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Transitional Justice from the 
Margins: Intersections of Identities, Power and Human Rights,” 1–8.  
165  Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or 
‘Non-Field,’” 7, 13.
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“a way of looking at the past that would authorize discussion and 
disagreement.”166 In her analysis of the Peruvian TRC’s way of 
dealing 
with gender-based violence, Pascha Bueno-Hansen aims at 
decolonizing transitional justice by combining an intersectional 
sensibility with a decolonial feminist approach. The limits of the 
temporality of transitional justice, which aims at separating the 
injustices from the past from those of the present, come to the fore 
by studying “the spatial and temporal manifestations of the legacy of 
colonialism in Peru”. 167 Addressing the tension between transitional 
justice’s goal of rupture with the past on the one hand, and the 
reality of ongoing structural injustices that date back to colonialism 
on the other hand, demands contextualization and historicization.168
One should also ask the question, however, how far these expansions 
and critiques reach beyond the walls of academia or international 
institutions and to what extent they influence the practice of (new) 
transitional justice initiatives. The actors moving across policy, 
advocacy and academy, thus constituting the network of transitional 
justice, do not necessarily have a shared approach nor epistemology. 
Crossing the borders between theory and practice often means to be 
confronted with solidified normative ideas, but also to stumble upon 
the limits of time frames, mandates, methodology and funding. 
Last but not least, the influence of the revival of nationalism and 
the rise of post-truth politics on universalist human rights discourse 
and humanitarian government globally remains to be seen. The 
democratic election of leaders such as Donald Trump in the United 
States, Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Jaír Bolsonaro in Brazil, 
who openly attack human rights and its defenders, represents a 
remarkable shift in global politics as we enter the second decade of 
166  Kora Andrieu, “Transitional Justice: A New Discipline in Human Rights,” 
Mass Violence and Resistance (MV&R), 2010, s.p. 
167  Pascha Bueno-Hansen, Feminist and Human Rights Struggles in Peru: Decolonizing 
Transitional Justice (University of Illinois Press, 2015), 15, 21.
168  Bueno-Hansen, 19.
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the 21st century. Will the concept of transitional justice survive the 
changes of the 21st century after the survivors of WWII will have 
passed away and the memories of the Cold War will have faded? 
Or, keeping in mind the recent #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo 
activist movements, will human rights discourse be overruled by the 
struggle against structural injustice and transformed into discourses 
of redistribution and decolonization? Samuel Moyn argues that the 
international human rights regime will prove inadequate to address 
problems of redistribution: “To the man with a hammer, it is said, 
everything looks like a nail. Now that Trump is in power, in the 
train of a series of other populists, hammering away with human 
rights alone is to neglect the desperate need for other tools.”169 
Mark Philip Bradly agrees that “[…] human rights is losing some 
of its moral power to instruct in an era when structural arguments 
about economics and race are displacing other kinds of oppositional 
political discourses.”170 At the same time, he argues that “the 
language of human rights is still there for the taking” and that 
“recovering the moral power of human rights may in fact become 
an unintended consequence of Donald Trump’s presidency.”171  In 
any case, if transitional justice evolves as quickly in the following 
decades as it has since its emergence, then new shifts in the concept 
and network undoubtedly are on the horizon. 
169  Samuel Moyn, “Donald Trump and the Irrelevance of Human Rights,” in 
Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-
First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 390.
170  Mark Philip Bradley, “The United States and the Global Human Rights 
Order,” in Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the 
Twenty-First Century, 383.
171  Bradley, 385.
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Memory, Victimhood and Time
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The cost of achieving a moral consensus that the past was evil is to reach a 
political consensus that the evil is past.1
 
Introduction 
After having described the genesis of the concept and the network of 
transitional justice in the foregoing chapter, I will now delve further 
into the core of transitional justice’s way of dealing with violent pasts. 
In doing so, I will identify three normative ideas underpinning the 
concept of transitional justice. The first idea relates to memory and 
entails the conviction that remembering the atrocities of the past 
leads to prevention, redemption and recognition. The second one 
relates to victimhood and encompasses the presumption that innocent 
victims, whose identity is based on trauma and suffering, are the 
main subjects of transitional justice policies. The third one relates 
to time and involves the idea that the transitional moment provides 
clear ruptures between the violent past, the transitional present and 
the democratic future. By reflecting upon these three ideas and their 
implications, this chapter aims to provide the necessary conceptual 
background for the analysis of the case studies in chapter four, five 
and six.
First, I will explore the idea of the devoir de mémoire or memory 
duty: the idea that the violent past must be actively remembered 
and should not be forgotten. To clarify what ‘memory’ means in 
this context, I will follow Michael Rothberg’s interpretation of 
Richard Terdiman’s definition: “memory is the past made present”.2 
According to Rothberg, this definition implies firstly “that memory 
is a contemporary phenomenon, something that, while concerned 
1  Robert Meister, After Evil a Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 25.
2  Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2018), cited in: Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: 
Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 3.
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with the past, happens in the present” and secondly that “memory is 
a form of work, working through, labor, or action.”3 
The idea of a duty to remember in transitional justice discourse 
is based on three underlying assumptions. The first is that if the 
past is not remembered it will inevitably repeat itself. Closely linked 
with this is the idea that the legacies of mass-violence can serve as 
a learning process for the future. The second assumption is that 
remembering, for instance in the form of testimonies in a truth 
commission, can have a liberating potential. According to this 
reasoning, memory can release survivors from ‘the weight of the 
past’, thereby leading to a ‘catharsis of the mind’. The third and final 
assumption is that memory is an essential step in recognizing the 
suffering of victims of human rights violations. This assumption is 
often connected with the conviction that remembering is a moral 
duty of society towards these victims. The beneficial properties 
assigned to memory – prevention, redemption and recognition – 
are verbalized in transitional justice processes all over the world in 
slogans such as ‘Revealing is healing’ (South-Africa), ‘Never again’ 
(Argentina, Brazil) or ‘So it does not repeat’ (Peru). I will describe 
the origins of this idea of a duty to remember and show how it 
became (and remains) an essential feature of transitional justice, 
despite many criticisms. 
In the second part of the chapter, I will elaborate on how and why 
transitional justice puts victims and their stories of suffering at the 
heart of the process of dealing with the past. I will first go back 
to Fassin and Rechtman’s “Empire of Trauma” (cfr. supra 1.1) to 
investigate the emergence of the psychological language of trauma 
and suffering to narrate histories of violence since the last decades of 
the 20th century. I will argue that, because of this shift, the condition 
of victimhood based on trauma and suffering has become central 
to defining (post-)conflict agency and identity. Subsequently, and 
building on the foregoing, I will examine how transitional justice 
tends to reduce the agency of survivors to the categories of victims 
3  Rothberg, 3.
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and perpetrators and to the (often unintended) consequences of this 
twofold categorization. I will apply the term survivor not as a mere 
reference to surviving victims (as it is mostly used), but to refer to “all 
those who continue to be blessed with life in the aftermath of civil 
war”. Hereby I attempt to “transcend the bipolar notions of victim 
and perpetrator”.4 I do not state, however, that no such situations 
exist in which clear victims and perpetrators can be defined. What 
I do mean is that a reduction of (post-)conflict agency to these two 
diametrically opposed roles fails to grasp the complexity of violence. 
In concrete terms, I argue that this reduction overlooks both the 
existence of additional roles such as bystanders or beneficiaries 
and the fluidity that characterizes these roles. Subsequently, I will 
analyze how transitional justice tends to strip survivors from their 
agency by backgrounding active narratives of perpetration on the 
one hand and producing ‘ideal’ victims whose identity is grounded 
in innocence on the other. By doing so, stories of violence risk to be 
taken out of their political, cultural and historical context.
The third part of the chapter revolves around the temporal 
assumptions underpinning transitional justice. Especially in 
comparison with the overload of studies that deal with memory 
and victimhood, the issue of time and temporality in transitional 
justice processes has, as Natascha Mueller-Hirth and Sandra Rios 
Oyola point out, received relatively little scholarly attention.5 The 
central subject of investigation in this paragraph will be the idea 
of a transition that draws clear lines between past and future and 
uses the present as a delimited time to make the change from 
conflict to post-conflict and achieve ‘closure’ of the past. First, I will 
investigate the concept of transition and its linear and teleological 
underpinnings. Then, I will problematize this linearity and teleology 
by challenging the idea of closure. In doing so, I will touch upon two 
4  Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 272.
5  Natascha Mueller-Hirth and Sandra Rios Oyola, “Introduction,” in Time and 
Temporality in Transitional and Post-Conflict Societies (New York: Routledge, 2018), 1.
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notions that describe a certain ‘presence of the past’. The first one 
is that of a ‘haunting’ past which returns to the present in the form 
of non-linear memories of violence. While the time of transition 
has a clear beginning and ending, the temporality of memories of 
violence mostly follows a less predictable trajectory. How does this 
influence the way survivors and society in general will be able to 
‘keep up’ with the pace of the transition? The second notion refers 
to what happens when the presence of the past does not take the 
shape of a memory of violence that has happened in the past but is perceived 
by survivors as violence that has happened in the past and is still happening 
in the present. This idea of a ‘contemporary’ past helps us to relate 
recent human rights violations to long-lasting historical processes of 
injustice that have not yet concluded and therefore potentially spark 
new outbreaks of social conflict and violence.
2.1 The duty to remember
Prevention, redemption and recognition: Beneficial properties ascribed to memory 
As one could go back to ancient Athens to trace the origins of 
transitional justice, one could go back to ancient Rome to find 
Cicero’s reflections on history as a magistra vitae.6 It is indeed an age-
old idea7 that the (study of the) past contains lessons for the future 
and that – in the famous words of George Santayana – “those who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.8 This idea 
especially gains strength when it comes to learning lessons from 
6  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero. De oratore. Book II. A translation. (London: W.B. 
Clive & Co., 1889).
7  For a more detailed reflexion on this idea see “2. Historia magistra vitae” in: 
Reinhart Koselleck, Futuro pasado: para una semántica de los tiempos históricos (Barcelona: 
Paidos, 1993).
8  George Santayana, The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress: Introduction and 
Reason in Common Sense, Volume VII, Book One., ed. Marianne S Wokeck and Martin 
A Coleman, 2011, 172, 5.
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the dark side of history and recollecting the wrongs of the past. In 
Western Europe for instance, the phrase ‘lest we forget’, originally 
taken from a poem written by Rudyard Kipling for Queen Victoria 
in 1897, became the refrain of the commemoration of the Great 
War.9 The political transition in Argentina in 1983 again marks an 
important starting point for the proliferation of the duty to remember 
in the context of the emergence of transitional justice. The famous 
Argentinean writer Ernesto Sábato presided the CONADEP and 
authored its Nunca Más report published in 1984. In the prologue of 
this unambiguously titled report, Sabato writes: 
“[…] the great calamities are always instructive, and without a 
doubt the most terrible drama that the Nation suffered in its 
entire history during the period of the military dictatorship 
that began in March 1976 will serve to make us understand 
that only democracy is capable of preserving a people of such 
horror, that only democracy can maintain and save the sacred 
and essential rights of the human creature. Only then can we 
be sure that NEVER AGAIN in our homeland facts will be 
repeated that have made us tragically famous in the civilized 
world.”10 
9  The poem is entitled “Recessional” and contains five stanzas, four of which end 
with the exclamation “Lest we forget – lest we forget!”. The Poetry Foundation, 
“Recessional by Rudyard Kipling,” accessed January 8, 2019, https://www.
poetryfoundation.org/poems/46780/recessional.
10  My translation of Spanish citation: “Las grandes calamidades son siempre aleccionadoras, 
y sin duda el más terrible drama que en toda su historia sufrió la Nación durante el periodo que 
duró la dictadura militarar iniciada en marzo de 1976 servirá para hacernos comprender que 
únicamente la democracia es capaz de preservar a un pueblo de semejante horror, que solo ella 
puede mantener y salvar los sagrados y esenciales derechos de la criatura humana. Unicamente 
así podremos estar seguros de que NUNCA MÁS en nuestra patria se repetirán hechos que 
nos han hecho trágicamente famosos en el mundo civilizado.” CONADEP, “Nunca Más: 
Prólogo,” accessed January 8, 2019, http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/conadep/
nuncamas/7.html.
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Starting from the CONADEP, the spread of the model of the 
truth commission throughout Latin America (cfr. 1.1) went hand in 
hand with the diffusion of the ‘never again’ idea.11 In this context 
of coming to terms with the legacies of repressive dictatorial 
regimes, truth seeking and memory became important tools to 
counterbalance the systematic denial and erasure of evidence of 
human rights violations that characterized these regimes.12 The 
mandate of the truth commissions that were set up in different 
countries and contexts, in Latin America and beyond, was to gather 
experiences and evidence on past human rights violations in order 
to keep the memory of the past alive. These memories would in 
some cases turn into evidence for the purpose of criminal justice, 
but in many other cases the search for truth in function of the 
establishment of historical memory (i.e. with the aim of preserving 
the past) was a goal in itself. As Elizabeth Jelin states, “‘remember, 
so as not to repeat’ began to emerge as a message and as a cultural 
imperative.”13 Looking back to the past and actively remembering 
it became an essential cornerstone of a more democratic society.14 
At the same time, democracy was assumed to be the safeguard of 
a memory that prevents history from repeating itself, as the above 
citation from the Nunca Más report illustrates. 
The notion of pursuing truth, justice and eventually democracy 
11  The title Nunca Má(i)s was also used for the reports of the Brazilian and the 
Uruguayan TRC. Elizabeth Jelin, “The Past in the Present: Memories of State 
Violence in Contemporary Latin America,” in Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, 
Practices and Trajectories, ed. Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, Palgrave 
Macmillan Memory Studies (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010), 69.
12  Allier Montaño and Crenzel, Las luchas por la memoria en América Latina: Historia 
reciente y violencia política, 25.
13  Jelin, 69.
14  Ruti Teitel refers to “the normative claim about history’s relation to democracy” 
as something that is characteristic of what she calls “poetic justice”, i.e. a narrative of 
transition that contains certain “poetic leaps” that rest on non-proven assumptions 
such as the redemptive power of truth. Ruti G Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford university press, 2002), 109-111.
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through the act of memory in the first place suggests the potential 
of remembering (the horrors of the past) for bringing about a certain 
political order (in the present or future). Furthermore, on a more 
personal and psychological level, memory is often assigned therapeutic 
properties. This therapeutic notion, which is widely studied in the 
fields of psychoanalysis and literary studies15, is omnipresent in 
transitional justice discourse and practice. Truth telling is then seen 
as a precondition for redemption, and speaking out about the past, 
in the form of testimony, is deemed necessary in order to be able 
to deal with it.16 The slogan ‘revealing is healing’ used by the South 
African TRC on posters announcing the public hearings is a literal 
expression of this idea.17 Moreover, these therapeutic properties 
of remembrance are often metaphorically extrapolated from the 
individual to the collective level, in the sense of an entire nation 
that needs to heal its traumas, as Alex Boraine suggested for South 
Africa.18 The underlying idea here is that a ‘healthy’ democracy is 
one that actively deals with the past. According to Boraine, who was 
one of the key figures in spreading the concept of transitional justice 
worldwide, “it is as bad for nations as it is for individual people 
15  Andreas Huyssen criticizes the fact that, especially in the 1990s, trauma has 
become a central category of analysis in memory studies: “But to collapse memory 
into trauma, I think, would unduly confine our understanding of memory, marking 
it too exclusively in terms of pain, suffering, and loss. It would deny human 
agency and lock us into compulsive repetition. Memory, whether individual or 
generational, political or pub lic, is always more than only the prison house of 
the past.” Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009), 8.
16  Jack Volpe Rotondi and Nir Eisikovits, “Forgetting after War: A Qualified 
Defense,” in Theorizing Transitional Justice, ed. Nir Eisikovits and Claudio Corradetti 
(Ashgate, 2017), 17.
17  The full text on the poster is: “Revealing is healing. Come and listen as people 
tell their stories. Truth. The road to reconciliation.” Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, “Revealing Is Healing,” South African History Online, accessed 
January 9, 2019, https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/revealing-is-healing.
18  Alex Boraine et al., eds., The Healing of a Nation? (Rondebosch, Cape Town, South 
Africa; Johannesburg: Justice in Transition, 1995), xiv.
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to suppress the memory of evil or mournful experience” and “to 
remember is the secret of redemption”.19
Next, in the context of coming to terms with the legacies of mass 
human rights violations, memory is often considered to be a moral 
duty of society towards the victims of these violations, as an act 
of recognition of their suffering.20 Memory as recognition is even 
believed by some to constitute a form of justice in itself. Jefrey Blustein 
states, for example, that “this duty of remembrance […] is also a duty 
of justice, justice of a particular kind. Modes of remembrance […] 
are instances of a type of historical redress or reparation for the 
harms caused by the wrongs of the past.”21 Andreas Huyssen agrees 
with this moral duty of remembrance towards the victims, “all the 
more so since it was the express aim of the masters of genocide to 
obliterate all memory of their victims.”22
The role of memory in society has indeed gained increasing attention 
since the emergence of humanitarian government (cfr. 1.1). Despite 
the fact that the rise of human rights culture and the proliferation 
of memory discourses in the last decades of the 20th century are 
often implicitly linked to each other, Andreas Huyssen is one of 
the few scholars who investigates this link. As Huyssen states, both 
phenomena arose in the wake of World War II and spread during 
the wave of democratization in Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
South Africa.23 In the first place, Huyssen states that “one could argue 
19  Nanci Adler, ed., Genocide and Accountability: Three Public Lectures by Simone Veil, 
Geoffrey Nice and Alex Boraine (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2004), 39.
20  Elizabeth Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria (Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 2012), 18.
21  Jefrey Blustein, “How the Past Matters: On the Foundations of an Ethics of 
Remembrance,” in Historical Justice and Memory, ed. Klaus Neumann and Janna 
Thompson, Critical Human Rights (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2015), 75.
22  Andreas Huyssen, “Memory Culture and Human Rights. A New Constellation,” 
in Historical Justice and Memory, ed. Janna Thompson and Klaus Neumann, Critical 
Human Rights (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 34.
23  Huyssen, 29.
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that only the memory of rights violations can nurture the future of 
human rights in the world, thus providing a substantive link between 
past and future.”24 According to Huyssen, contemporary human 
rights activism is thus highly related to “the depth and breadth of 
memory discourses in the public media” as its concern with the 
future is based on the recognition of the past.25 Blustein similarly 
points out that memory is a necessary precondition for restitution 
because one can simply not address the wrongs of the past if they are 
not remembered.26 On the other hand, Huyssen argues, if memory, 
“and especially traumatic memory”, is not linked to human rights 
and justice, it runs the risk of “becoming a vacuous exercise feeding 
parasitically on itself.”27 Memory and human rights are thus believed 
to be mutually reinforcing.
Indeed, the beneficial properties ascribed to memory – the potential 
of prevention, redemption and recognition – have made it a very 
popular ‘tool’ in the task of coming to terms with a violent past and 
establishing a future culture of human rights. The duty to remember 
therefore occupies a central space in transitional justice discourse.28 
On its website, the ICTJ states that “victims of human rights abuses 
cannot forget, and states have a duty to preserve the memory of 
such crimes. For this, architectural memorials, museums, and 
commemorative activities are indispensable educational initiatives 
to establish a historical public record that is beyond denial — and 
to help prevent repetition.” Moreover, it is stated that truth-seeking, 
which according to the ICTJ is fundamentally connected to the 
memory duty, “enables proper mourning practices, essential to most 
cultures, helping to achieve personal and communal healing.” When 
it comes to the potential of recognition, UN Special Rapporteur on 
24  Huyssen, 28.
25  Huyssen, Present Pasts Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory, 95.
26  Blustein, “How the Past Matters: On the Foundations of an Ethics of 
Remembrance,” 79.
27  Huyssen, “Memory Culture and Human Rights. A New Constellation,” 28.
28  Andrieu, “Transitional Justice.”
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the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of 
Non-Repetition Pablo De Greiff puts forward that “persisting in the 
refusal to acknowledge great harms in itself generates new harms”. 29 
The ICTJ thus clearly endorses the beneficial properties of memory. 
The practice of transitional justice indeed involves a wide range of 
memory initiatives. Some of them have a particular focus in space 
or time, such as memorial sites and commemoration dates. Others 
take a broader scope and try to cover a wide range of events of the 
past by representing them in for example a museum exhibition or 
an art project. Memory practices widely differ in scale as they can 
take place on a national level on the initiative of governments or 
non-governmental institutions, but they can also be initiated on a 
micro-level by smaller groups of community members. 
For the sake of analytical clarity, this amalgam of memory discourses 
and practices in transitional justice can be roughly subdivided into 
two branches which each have a particular way of perceiving the 
structure and goals of memory. Despite the fact that these two 
branches seem adverse, they coexist or are even intertwined in most 
transitional contexts. They have in common that they depart from 
the beneficial properties of memory.
The first branch is centered around the idea of creating one shared 
collective memory in the form of a consensus or master-narrative 
about the past. This narrative denounces the human rights 
violations of the past, identifies clear victims, heroes and villains, 
and stands in function of building a liberal, democratic future. 
It is thus a linear and teleological narrative that serves the final 
purpose of transitional justice. Alex Boraine represents this branch 
when he states about the South African TRC that “the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission can make an important contribution 
to healing and reconciliation. South Africans desperately need to 
create a common memory that can be acknowledged by those who 
29  ICTJ, “Truth-Seeking, Memory, and Memorials,” International Center 
for Transitional Justice, February 25, 2011, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/
transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory.
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created and implemented the apartheid system, by those who fought 
against it and by the many more who were in the middle and claimed 
not to know what was happening in their own country.”30 The final 
report of truth commissions often reflects this attempt to compile 
diverging narratives of past violence into a single story that aims to 
foment a renewed national identity.31 
The second branch focuses on the idea of a plurality or heterogeneity 
of memories that can be contradictory but nevertheless coexist in a 
kind of patchwork. This idea is often called upon to counter the 
belief in a monolithic master-narrative. The increasing stress on 
multi-perspectivity in initiatives concerned with so-called ‘historical 
dialogue’, ‘shared narratives’ or ‘shared history’ in post-conflict 
societies, which are often part of or closely linked to transitional 
justice initiatives, is an example hereof.32 According to Felix 
Reátegui, Peruvian sociologist and former senior associate at the 
ICTJ, “the idea of heterogeneous memories must be taken seriously” 
because it “is accelerating another form of democratization in Latin 
American societies, an opening of symbolic systems – analogous to 
the openings of political systems that put an end to oligarchies.” 33 
30  Boraine et al., The Healing of a Nation?, xvi. 
31  Ruti G Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2002), 110; 
Lars Waldorf, “Ex-Combatants and Truth Commissions,” in Disarming the Past: 
Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants, ed. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo De Greiff, and 
Lars Waldorf (New York: ICTJ, 2009).
32  According to Bevernage, the focus on multi-perspectivity marks a recent 
qualitative shift in the nature of these initiatives, that no longer solely focus 
on the notion of objective truth. This shift is clearer in some initiatives than in 
other: “Due to new evolutions in the thinking about the relation between history 
and reconciliation, current discourses and practices seem to revolve around 
an ambiguous conceptual mix of neopositivist and postmodernist (or post-
postmodernist) concepts – with some projects leaning much more to one or the 
other side.” Berber Bevernage, “Narrating Pasts for Peace? A Critical Analysis of 
Some Recent Initiatives of Historical Reconciliation through ‘Historical Dialogue’ 
and ‘Shared History,’” in The Ethos of History : Time and Responsibility (Berghahn 
Books, 2017), 75 .
33  Félix Reátegui Carrillo, “The Victims Remember. Notes on the Social Practice 
103
II Contesting Transitional Justice
In that view, it is the pluralistic instead of the monolithic nature of 
memory that serves the purpose of a democratic future. In a similar 
vein, Elizabeth Jelin proposes a non-linear approach to memory that 
takes into account the plurality of voices that give meaning to the 
past and incorporates the way in which these meanings can change 
according to their historical and cultural context or their ideological 
and political purpose.34 Michael Rothberg’s concept of memory 
as multidirectional, or “as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-
referencing, and borrowing”, can also be situated in this branch.35 
According to Rothberg, “pursuing memory’s multidirectionality 
encourages us to think of the public sphere as a malleable discursive 
space in which groups (…) come into being through their dialogical 
interactions with others”.36 In addition to the (analytical) difference 
highlighted here between ‘monolithic memory’ and ‘patchwork 
memory’, other – though sometimes parallel – demarcations can 
be made by assigning all kinds of properties to different types of 
memory discourses and practices, often resulting in oppositions 
such as macro-micro, official-unofficial, top-down – bottom-up, 
static-dynamic, closed-open, and so forth. 
Silence, amnesia and amnesty: Questioning the duty to remember
The increasing attention for memory after mass-violence has led to 
a so-called memory-boom.37 This term is often used to describe the 
rapid expansion of the field of memory studies, which according 
to Andreas Huyssen has even led to a certain degree of “memory 
of Memory,” in Transitional Justice Handbook for Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui 
Carrillo (Brasilia/New York: Brazilian Amnesty Commission of the Ministry of 
Justice/International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 2011), 341.
34  Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria, 17.
35  Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, 3.
36  Rothberg, 5.
37  Rothberg, 315.
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fatigue”.38 As a reaction to this memory-boom, the beneficial 
properties of memory and the normative character of the duty to 
remember have been widely questioned. These explorations have 
taken diverse forms ranging from re-examinations and nuances 
to fundamental critiques, but they have in common that they go 
against the normative character of the memory duty.
A first fundamental critique directly questions the link between 
remembering the past and establishing a more democratic future. 
For example, in the prologue of the second edition of Los trabajos de 
la memoria published in 2012, Elizabeth Jelin points to the fact that 
she is not sure anymore whether an active politics of memory is a 
necessary precondition for democracy-building. It is high time, she 
states, to investigate the precise relationship between memory and 
democracy. What seemed a self-evident postulate in the context of 
fighting the repression and denial by military dictatorships, does not 
necessarily find a solid base anymore in the present, thus Jelin.39 It is 
probably the preventive potential of memory that has resulted most 
questionable from this inquiry into the relation between memory 
and democracy. According to Huyssen, “the belief that memory 
of genocide as a crime against humanity might prevent further 
genocides from happening broke down at the moment that the 
world confronted new forms of genocide, state massacres, and ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur.”40 Even Jefrey Blustein, 
who aims at developing an ethics in favor of remembrance, has to 
admit “the existence of frustratingly little evidence” to support the 
claim that remembrance prevents history from repeating itself.41 
The therapeutic, redemptive power of memory in the form of 
testimony is contradicted by the notion of re-traumatization. 
Holocaust survivor Primo Levi explicitly refers to this in his 
38  Huyssen, Present Pasts Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory, 3.
39  Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria, 27.
40  Huyssen, “Memory Culture and Human Rights. A New Constellation,” 36.
41  Blustein, “How the Past Matters: On the Foundations of an Ethics of 
Remembrance,” 79.
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reflections on memory in his book The Drowned and the Saved: “The 
memory of a trauma suffered or inflicted is itself traumatic because 
recalling it is painful or at least disturbing […] Once again, it must 
be observed, mournfully, that the injury cannot be healed.” In the 
same paragraph Levi refers to the Jewish resistance fighter Jean 
Améry, who stated about his experience of torture by the Nazi’s 
that “anyone who has been tortured remains tortured. […] Faith 
in humanity, already cracked by the first slap in the face, then 
demolished by torture, is never acquired again.”42
Another set of explorations investigates the potential of silence and 
forgetting as strategies of dealing with the past that oppose or at 
least nuance the duty to remember. Spain with its so-called ‘pact 
of silence’ is the most well-known example of a transition from 
dictatorship to democracy during which this strategy was applied.43 
The most common argument made in favor of forgetting is that too 
much memory sparks revenge and gives rise to new conflicts.44 In 
their respective typology of forms of forgetting, memory scholars 
42  Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (London: Abacus, 2013), 12. Primo Levi 
nevertheless believed in a duty to bear witness and share his memories of the 
camps. Both Primo Levi and Jean Améry suffered from serious depression and 
committed suicide, respectively in 1987 and 1978.
43  Moreover, the example of Spain was often used to demonstrate that memory was 
not a necessary prerequisite for a smooth transition to democracy. Nevertheless, 
according to Lore Colaert, this has shifted with the relatively recent rise of memory 
movements and their claims for historical justice in Spain: “Spain has turned 
from an example of the viability of amnesty and amnesia to an example of the 
dysfunction of the politics of forgetting. The case is now used as a case in defence 
of a strategy of working through a painful past to put it to rest.” Lore Colaert, 
“History from the Grave. Politics of Memory in Exhumations of Mass Graves from 
the Spanish Civil War” (Ghent University, 2015), 15.
44  For an extensive debate on this question, see: Minow, Between Vengeance and 
Forgiveness.” The same argument is made in favor of amnesty as an alternative to 
punishment. 
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Paul Connerton45 and Aleida Assmann46 indeed do not only define 
repressive or destructive forms of forgetting, they also identify 
forms of “constructive and therapeutic forgetting” (Assmann) and 
“forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity” 
(Connerton). In the same way, Nir Eisikovits and Jack Volpe Rotondi 
identify several situations in which a case for forgetting can be made, 
such as post-conflict contexts characterized by a complicated division 
of responsibility or an extreme political volatility.47 Transitional 
justice scholars such as Buckley-Zistel, Theidon and Eastmond and 
Selimovic have pointed to the role which silence and amnesia can 
play in post-conflict coexistence and processes of reconciliation on a 
micro-level (cfr. chapter 4).48 In 2016, the publication of David Rieff’s 
slightly controversial book In Praise of Forgetting. Historical Memory and 
its Ironies49 triggered an online debate on the website of the ICTJ 
between Rieff and UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff, entitled 
Does Collective Remembrance of a Troubled Past Impede Reconciliation?. 50 In a 
nutshell, Rieff argues that it is impossible to distinguish between the 
uses and abuses of memory. He cites the Balkan wars as an example 
of how conflict can be sparked by the misuse of memory. De Greiff 
does not deny that these abuses exist but maintains faith in the duty 
to remember as a way of fostering a culture of human rights and 
45  Paul Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting,” Memory Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 
59–71.
46  Aleida Assmann, “Forms of Forgetting”, Lecture Dr. A. H. Heinekenprijs for 
historical sciences, (Amsterdam, October 1, 2014).
47  Rotondi and Eisikovits, “Forgetting after War.”
48  See, for example: Theidon, Intimate Enemies; M. Eastmond and J. Mannergren 
Selimovic, “Silence as Possibility in Postwar Everyday Life,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, vol. 6 no. 3 (2012): 502-524; Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering 
to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda,” Africa : Journal of the International African Institute Africa / International 
African Institute 76, no. 2 (2006): 131–50.
49  David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2016).
50  ICTJ, “The Duty to Remember,” International Center for Transitional Justice, 
accessed January 18, 2019, https://www.ictj.org/debate/article/duty-remember.
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recognizing victimhood and suffering. In fact, De Greiff objects, 
it is the failure to acknowledge violations of the past that facilitates 
instrumentalization.51 For Rieff, the potential of recognition of 
victimhood is the only justification of memory that is left because 
he agrees that “people who suffered have the right to have their 
suffering acknowledged”.52 On the other hand, the potential of 
memory in the struggle for recognition has been unmistakably 
questioned by survivors themselves. Especially in contexts of deeply 
rooted socio-economic inequality, the symbolic value of recognition 
in the form of memory is often deemed unsatisfactory. Alex Boraine 
acknowledges this tension when he states that “economic justice and 
the restoration of the moral order must be seen as twin goals.”53 
Or, as it was once clearly articulated to me by a research participant 
during fieldwork: “you can’t eat memory”.54
Notwithstanding the above critiques and nuances, the tendency in 
favor of remembrance remains well-established in both the concept 
and the network of transitional justice.55 The discussions on silence 
and forgetting often rather mirror than fundamentally contradict 
the duty to remember. Among transitional justice scholars and 
practitioners few will be found that go along with a plea against 
remembrance in the style of David Rieff. In other words, the idea 
that the past must actively be dealt with and that memory is an 
elementary component of this process still remains an essential 
feature of transitional justice. 
51  ICTJ, “The Duty to Remember,” International Center for Transitional Justice, 
accessed January 18, 2019, https://www.ictj.org/debate/article/duty-remember.
52  David Rieff, “In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies” (April 
8, 2017).
53  Boraine et al., The Healing of a Nation?, xvii.
54  My translation of original citation: “No se puede comer la memoria.” Fieldnotes, 
Sacsamarca, 29.06.2014.
55  Kimberly Theidon, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, 
no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 295–300.
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2.2 Constructing victims and perpetrators
A trauma- and rights-based identity
The shift in focus from the heroic histories of the victors to the 
tragic histories of the victims characterizes a change in how 
societies relate to their violent pasts which emerged at the end of 
the 20th century (cfr. 1.1).56 Whereas the post-WWI ‘lest we forget’ 
still appealed primarily to remembering the honor and sacrifice of 
the fallen heroes, the grief and agony of the tormented victims has 
become the main subject of ‘never again’. The emergence of this 
new focus on victims and victim identity is closely related to the rise 
of the concepts of psychological trauma and human rights. In fact, 
it is exactly the nexus between trauma and human rights discourse 
that is constitutive of the kind of victim identity that is at stake here. 
Fassin and Rechtman point out how the language of psychological 
trauma is used to narrate histories of violence from this new 
perspective.57 They state that the introduction of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) as a diagnostic category by the DSM-III in 
198058 resulted in the universalization of the effects of suffering: 
56  Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 275.
57  Fassin and Rechtman, 281.
58  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is the standard 
handbook for psychiatric diagnosis worldwide. The first edition was published in 
1952, the second in 1968. The first and second edition do not yet define PTSD 
(nor the related concentration camp syndrome). In DSM-III, post-traumatic stress 
disorder is defined as an anxiety disorder in the following way: “The essential 
feature is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically 
traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human experience. The 
characteristic symptoms involve reexperiencing the traumatic event; numbing of 
responsiveness to, or reduced involvement with, the external world; and a variety 
of autonomic, dysphoric, or cognitive symptoms. The stressor producing this 
syndrome would evoke significant symptoms of distress in most people, and is 
generally outside the range of such common experiences as simple bereavement, 
chronic illness, business losses, or marital conflict. The trauma may be experienced 
alone (rape or assault) or in the company of groups of people (military combat). 
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“Survivors of disasters or war wounded, victims of plane crashes 
or sexual abuse, Vietnamese civilians or US soldiers, all shared the 
same symptoms and thus the same clinical diagnosis.”59 While earlier 
definitions of traumatic neurosis were based on the assumption of a 
weak personality, the definition of PTSD as an event-based disorder 
marked an important shift: “It effectively affirmed that any normal 
individual might suffer from such distress if he or she were exposed 
to an event deemed traumatic. […] the event alone was sufficient to 
produce the distress. The sincerity of the victim of trauma was no 
longer in doubt: he or she was a priori credible.”60
Moreover, according to Fassin and Rechtman, this universal 
acknowledgment of suffering as trauma goes beyond mere clinical 
diagnosis. It is a form of social recognition as it expresses a moral 
judgment on who has the right to be considered a legitimate victim 
by identifying “complaints as justified and causes as just”.61 Drawing 
on the work of Fassin and Rechtman, Michael Humphrey sees a 
clear link between the trauma lens and the human rights lens as 
both produce universalizing discourses that are used in transitional 
Stressors producing this disorder include natural disasters (floods, earthquakes), 
accidental man-made disasters (car accidents with serious physical injury, airplane 
crashes, large fires), or deliberate man-made disasters (bombing, torture, death 
camps). Some stressors frequently produce the disorder (e.g., torture) and others 
produce it only occasionally (e.g., car accidents). Frequently there is a concomitant 
physical component to the trauma which may even involve direct damage to the 
central nervous system (e.g., malnutrition, head trauma). The disorder is apparently 
more severe and longer lasting when the stressor is of human design.” American 
Psychiatric Association, DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
Third Edition) (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1980), 236.
59  Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 214. Detailed historiographic 
accounts of the evolution in thinking about trauma before the emergence of PTSD 
are provided throughout the first part of the book, such as for example in the 
paragraph “The Birth of Trauma” (p. 30) or in Chapter Three “The Intimate 
Confession” (p. 70). Chapter Four “An End to Suspicion” (p. 77) gives a detailed 
account of the emergence of PTSD. 
60  Fassin and Rechtman, 77.
61  Fassin and Rechtman, 284. 
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contexts to define who is to be recognized as a victim of violation 
of rights. The universalization of trauma, he argues, is based 
on our shared bodily ability to feel pain and suffering while the 
universalization of human rights is based on our shared humanity 
that allows us to be part of the same community of rights. The 
trauma lens is used as a tool to morally recognize those who form 
part of the community of rights.62 In other words, the traumatized 
subject will only turn into a victim if his or her trauma is embedded 
in a discourse of rights.63 Trauma has thus become the fundament 
of a victim identity, that can be transmitted from the individual to 
the collective level, for example by identifying with other victims.64 
John Torpey identifies a similar shift from trauma as an individual 
experience to victimhood as a fundament of public identity.65 
According to Humphrey, this victim identity is reinforced by human 
rights discourse because in this discourse, the position of the 
victim (i.e. the rights holder) is placed in opposition to that of the 
perpetrator (i.e. the rights violator).66 
The Holocaust and its aftermath again played a crucial role in the 
development of this concept of victimhood.67 In line with Fassin 
and Rechtman’s study, which draws on ethnographic and psychiatric 
62  Michael Humphrey, “The Politics of Trauma,” Arts: The Journal of the Sydney 
University Arts Association 32 ( January 27, 2012): 40.
63  Or, as Michael Rothberg puts it: “The categories of victim and perpetrator 
derive from either a legal or a moral discourse, but the concept of trauma emerges 
from a diagnostic realm that lies beyond guilt and innocence or good and evil”. 
Multidirectional Memory, 90, cited in: Stef Craps, Postcolonial Witnessing (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 15. 
64  Humphrey, 39.
65  Torpey, “An Avalanche of History: The ‘Collapse of the Future’ and the Rise of 
Reparation Politics.,” 24.
66  Humphrey, “The Politics of Trauma,” 39.
67  Fassin and Rechtman state that “with the survivors of the camps, testimony to 
trauma […] was gradually recognized as offering ultimate truth about the human 
condition. It is in relation to this unprecedented perspective that we can now 
consider the universalization of victim status in the last three decades.” Fassin and 
Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 73.
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research, Stef Craps has argued from his point of view as a literature 
scholar how trauma theory, despite its claim of universality, suffers 
from a Western bias.68 The obsessive focus on the Holocaust has, 
thus Craps, resulted in Eurocentrism.69 The claim that human 
rights discourse is primarily rooted in Western culture (cfr. 1.1) can 
be extended to the kind of victim identity that has emerged at the 
crossroads of trauma theory and human rights discourse. In addition 
to the universalization of the effects of suffering, I argue that, in line 
with the event-based model of PTSD, it is now assumed that certain 
events will almost automatically lead to trauma. The nexus between 
human rights and trauma thus instigates a kind of chain reaction: 
one becomes traumatized because one’s human rights were violated, 
and by becoming a traumatized victim of human rights violations, 
one becomes entitled to a new set of rights: that of the victim. 
Victims, perpetrators and ‘implicated subjects’ 
The website of the ICTJ states that “transitional justice is rooted in 
accountability and redress for victims” and that it puts “victims and 
their dignity first”.70 On the same website, an attendee of the ICTJ’s 
intensive Course on Truth Commissions comments that “they taught 
us that transitional justice can only be successful when it is centered 
on victims.”71 As transitional justice expert Lars Waldorf puts it: 
68  Craps, Postcolonial Witnessing.
69  Craps, 3. Torpey contradicts this claim. He agrees that “the Holocaust gets a 
disproportionate share of the attention given to past injustices” but still believes 
that “the Holocaust template” has “inspired a massive upsurge of concern for 
other historical injustices” because it “has provided a whole armamentarium that 
others have been able to use to highlight experiences that were, or at least could be 
said to be, “Holocaust-like.” By making this statement, however, I believe he does 
exactly what Craps criticizes, as he takes the Holocaust as a universal touchstone 
for suffering worldwide. Torpey, “An Avalanche of History: The ‘Collapse of the 
Future’ and the Rise of Reparation Politics.,” 25.
70  ICTJ, “What Is Transitional Justice?”
71  “ICTJ - International Center for Transitional Justice,” accessed September 18, 
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“What unites all transitional justice mechanisms —in theory, if not 
always in practice —is that they are victim-centered. At bottom, the 
legitimacy of transitional justice mechanisms depends on how much 
they serve victims’ needs and aspirations.”72 
The notion of victimhood is indeed central to transitional justice 
as it defines the identity of those who should be actively addressed 
by its mechanisms and under what conditions rights can be claimed 
by survivors. Similarly, as ideas on victimhood began to crystalize, 
a definition of those who should be unable to claim victim identity 
took shape as well. The result of these reflections was the belief 
in a symmetric distinction between victims and perpetrators. This 
desire to separate the guilty from the innocent is closely linked to 
transitional justice’s strive for accountability.73 At the same time, it 
relates to the concept of monolithic memory described above: the 
master-narrative creates a clear distinction between victims and 
perpetrators, or the other way around, the construction of victims 
and perpetrators serves the master-narrative. Michael Humphrey 
warns that this reasoning entails the risk of cherry picking, in such 
a way that only the experiences which fit the consensus will be 
selected as part of the narrative.74 
As Luc Huyse notes, however, “guilt is a many-headed monster”.75 
Without denying the need for accountability, many scholars who 
investigate post-conflict situations have remarked that representing 
violence through the binary opposition between victims and 
perpetrators mostly results in a simplification of reality.76 It fails 
2017, http://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory.
72  Lars Waldorf, “Introduction,” in Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-
Combatants, ed. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo De Greiff, and Lars Waldorf (New York: 
ICTJ, 2009), 22.
73  Erica Bouris, Complex Political Victims (Kumarian Press, 2007), 19.
74  Humphrey, “The Politics of Trauma,” 43.
75  Luc Huyse, All Things Pass, except the Past (Amsterdam: AWEPA, 2009).
76  See, for example: Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities 
after Genocide and Mass Violence, 8; Theidon, Intimate Enemies. This does of course not 
mean that these scholars deny that victims and perpetrators can exist. 
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to fully recognize additional conceptualizations of agency, such as 
passive witnesses of human rights violations (bystanders) or those 
who have not directly perpetrated human rights violations but have 
benefited from them or continue to do so (beneficiaries). Michael 
Rothberg coins the term ‘implicated subjects’ to refer to “the manifold 
indirect, structural, and collective forms of agency that enable 
injury, exploitation, and domination but that frequently remain in 
the shadows”.77 The fact that both bystanders and beneficiaries are 
not directly addressed by transitional justice policies has, according 
to Robert Meister, two reasons. The first concerns transitional 
justice’s search for reconciliation: “[…] the general exoneration of 
all nonperpetrators might be more conducive to national ‘healing’ 
than an inculpation of those whose interests were served.” The 
second relates to the fact that addressing the persistent injustices 
in which bystanders and beneficiaries might have their share, for 
example through redistributive justice, is beyond the scope of most 
transitional justice projects.78 I will return to this second reason in 
2.3. Despite the fact that the problem of bystanders and beneficiaries 
is indeed not explicitly included in transitional justice’s search for 
accountability, they are indirectly addressed through the ‘never 
again’ idea. Raising awareness and promoting a general culture of 
human rights is believed to prevent indifference and create citizens 
that will take an ethical stance against future violations. As a result of 
this, the group of potential bystanders or beneficiaries is supposedly 
diminished.79 Of course, this idea of prevention is primarily forward- 
instead of backward-looking.
Furthermore, the binary opposition between victims and 
perpetrators ignores the fluidity and obscurity of roles in (post-)
conflict situations: how they might be combined in one person and 
77  Michael Rothberg, The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators, 1st edition 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019), 1. I will borrow this term 
throughout the dissertation. 
78  Meister, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,” 97.
79  Meister, 96.
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the way they change over time. This obscurity has been famously 
described by Primo Levi as ‘the grey zone’. Levi uses this term 
specifically to refer to ‘privileged’ concentration camp prisoners who 
in some way or another collaborated with the Nazi’s to obtain a slight 
improvement of their living conditions.80 According to Levi, “the 
network of human relationships inside the Lagers was not simple: 
it could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and persecutors. 
[…] it did not conform to any model, the enemy was all around 
but also inside, the ‘we’ lost its limits, the contenders were not two, 
one could not discern a single frontier but rather many confused, 
perhaps innumerable frontiers, which stretched between each of 
us.”81 In his account of the Rwandan genocide, Mahmood Mamdani 
traces the historical legacies of colonialism and postcolonial politics 
to analyze how “victims become killers”. He hereby stresses the 
importance of understanding the dynamic nature of “Hutu and 
Tutsi as political identities that have changed from one historical 
period to another”.82 The case of Dominic Ongwen, a former child 
soldier of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda who is 
currently on trial at the ICC for war crimes, is another example of 
the fluidity of roles that characterizes (post-)conflict.83
Paradoxically enough, the failure to recognize the existence of 
‘implicated subjects’ and the possible fluidity of roles might at 
some point collide with the idea of universality and lead to a 
selective entitlement to human rights based on a delineated and 
80  Levi describes it as follows: ““Let us confine ourselves to the Lager which 
(even in its Soviet version) can be considered an excellent ‘laboratory’: the hybrid 
class of the prisoner-functionary constitutes its armature and at the same time its 
most disquieting feature. It is a grey zone, with ill-defined outlines which both 
separate and join the two camps of masters and servants.” Levi mentions the 
Sonderkommandos of Auschwitz as one of the extreme examples hereof. Levi, The 
Drowned and the Saved, 27.
81  Levi, 23.
82  Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 15.
83  Erin K. Baines, “Complex Political Perpetrators: Reflections on Dominic 
Ongwen,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 47, no. 2 ( June 2009): 163–91.
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static condition of victimhood. Kimberly Theidon has warned for 
example that the binary logic of victims versus perpetrators can lead 
to situations in which only the innocent have rights.84 In chapter 3.3 
I will further illustrate how this is indeed the case for the Peruvian 
reparation program. 
Stripping survivors’ agency
Two additional critiques can be formulated in relation to transitional 
justice’s inclination to describe the reality of (post-)conflict in terms 
of victims and perpetrators. Both relate to the way in which the 
agency of the respective roles is being dealt with.  
Firstly, as Michael Humphrey states, the centrality of a victimhood 
based on trauma and suffering leads to a focus on the effects rather 
than on the causes of violence.85 Especially in truth politics, the 
question of responsibility is often subordinate to the final goal of 
achieving a consensus about the past in order to obtain reconciliation 
and eventually closure. The (passive) narratives of undergoing 
violence embodied by the victims stand center-stage in this process. 
At the same time, the perpetrators’ (active) narratives of inflicting 
violence disappear to the background.86 On the rare occasions 
that perpetrators are put to the fore, for example in court, they are 
mostly represented as isolated individuals. South Africa’s Amnesty 
Committee is one of the few transitional justice mechanisms 
that directly gave a voice to the perpetrators and their narratives. 
Nevertheless, the scope of the committee was rather limited in 
comparison with that of the Human Rights Violations Committee.87 
Moreover, one could argue that more than the desire to understand 
84  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 389.
85  Humphrey, “The Politics of Trauma,” 43.
86  Humphrey, 42.
87  The Amnesty Committee received 7.116 requests for amnesty of which 1.167 
were granted. The Human Rights Violations Committee filed more than 21.000 
statements. Huyse, All Things Pass, except the Past.
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the perpetrator’s motive, it was still the victim’s right to truth that 
was the central motivation behind the Amnesty Committee, as 
amnesty for the perpetrators was granted in exchange for truth for 
the victims. The reconciliatory purpose of the Amnesty Committee 
ultimately also depended on the victims, as only they could decide 
whether or not to forgive the perpetrators. Mahmood Mamdani 
points out how the taboo on the narrative of the perpetrator has, in 
the case of the Rwandan genocide, resulted in obfuscating the agency 
of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans who directly participated 
in the killings. The stress on the design of the genocide by state 
functionaries fails to explain the massive participation from below 
that eventually made it happen, thus Mamdani.88
The second critique concerns the way in which groups of survivors 
are represented as ‘ideal’ victims by ‘well-meaning outsiders’. Nils 
Christie coined the concept ‘ideal victim’ to refer to “a person or 
a category of individuals who – when hit by crime – most readily 
are given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim.”89 
This idea of an ‘ideal’ victim can help us to understand how, in the 
context of transitional justice, survivors tend to be reduced to certain 
characteristics that make up their victim identity and how these 
properties accordingly become preconditions to claim certain rights. 
By relating victimhood to human rights discourse, Erica Bouris 
identifies innocence, and by extension purity, lack of responsibility, 
the absence of guilt and moral superiority as key characteristics of the 
88  Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 8, 185. It must be noted that Mamdani’s 
work predates the installation of the Gacaca courts in 2002. More than a million 
cases were tried through confessions of perpetrators in these community-based 
courts. Nevertheless, the Gacaca courts have resulted to be highly problematic and 
it is questionable whether in the end they contributed to a better understanding 
of the massive participation from below, as many confessions proved to contain 
lies, judges were bribed, etc. See for example: Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “‘The Truth 
Heals’? Gacaca Jurisdictions and the Consolidation of Peace in Rwanda,” Die 
Friedens-Warte 80, no. 1/2 (2005): 113–29.
89  Nils Christie, “The Ideal Victim,” in From Crime Policy to Victim Policy: Reorienting 
the Justice System, ed. Ezzar A Fattah (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986), 18.
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‘ideal’ victim.90 This focus on innocence and the moral separation 
between good and evil, she argues, is typical of a human rights-
based approach. The image of the innocent victim contrasted with 
the vicious perpetrator facilitates empathy with the former and his or 
her claim for justice.91 In addition to that, it provides a counterweight 
against victim-blaming.92 Despite the fact that human rights activists 
and NGOs are often aware of the fact that this binary opposition 
is a simplification of conflict reality, they pragmatically chose to 
instrumentalize it in communication and fundraising campaigns in 
order to raise support for their advocacy work.93 Moreover, similar 
to the chain reaction caused by the nexus between human rights and 
trauma that I have mentioned above, Bouris suggests that becoming 
a victim of human rights violations in many cases also means to 
be automatically assigned the characteristics of innocence, purity, 
etc; and accordingly become an ‘ideal’ victim.94 In his application 
of Christie’s concept of the ‘ideal’ victim to international crimes, 
Joris Van Wijk points to the lack of empirical research on the lived 
experiences of this kind of categorization of victims.95 The existing 
empirical studies on the direct implications of the existence of ‘ideal’ 
victims for transitional justice policies show that this categorization 
highly influences the ways in which survivors can claim rights in the 
aftermath of violence. 
Tshepo Madlingozi, a South-African law scholar and member of 
the victim organization Khulumani Support Group that brings 
together victims of Apartheid, criticizes the disempowering effects 
of what he calls the ‘production’ of ‘ideal’ victims: “Despite all 
the talk about victim empowerment then, the victim produced by 
90  Bouris, Complex Political Victims, 35.
91  Bouris, 27.
92  Bouris, 49.
93  Bouris, 27.
94  Bouris, 48.
95  Joris van Wijk, “Who Is the ‘Little Old Lady’ of International Crimes? Nils 
Christie’s Concept of the Ideal Victim Reinterpreted,” International Review of 
Victimolog y 19, no. 2 (2013): 175.
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transitional justice NGOs and others in the international human 
rights movement is a hapless, passive victim dependent on NGOs 
and others to speak for her and argue her case.”96 Mijke de Waardt’s 
work on victims’ associations in Peru demonstrates how this 
production of ‘ideal’ victims by well-meaning outsiders influences 
self-identification processes of survivor groups. She shows how the 
extent to which these associations can find legal, political and social 
recognition is a result of the interplay between internal and external 
identification with the condition of victimhood.97 This allows me 
to clarify that the lack of agency that I want to point at here does 
not necessarily or exclusively lie in the assignment of an identity 
from above by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ who speak for the survivors, 
for this would prevent us from seeing how this ‘passive’ identity 
is in many cases also actively appropriated by survivors to make 
claims. More precisely, the lack of agency that is at stake resides in 
the characteristics of the kind of ‘ideal’ victim identity that is both 
assigned by outsiders and appropriated by survivors and becomes 
the predominant perspective from which stories of violence are 
being told in the aftermath. At the same time, the diffusion of this 
passive victim identity reinforces the idea that others should speak 
on behalf of the victim and thus entails the risk of becoming a self-
fulfilling prophecy. However, through this process of appropriation 
from below, this initial passive victim identity can in some cases 
also be transformed into a tool for empowerment, as Madlingozi 
also points out for the Khulumani Support Group, which according 
to him has moved “from dependency to agency” by “taking 
responsibility for their own stories and how they should be used”.98 
96  Madlingozi, “On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of 
Victims,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 2, no. 2 ( January 7, 2010): 213.
97  Mijke de Waardt, “Naming and Shaming Victims: The Semantics of 
Victimhood,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 10, no. 3 (November 1, 2016): 
432–50.
98  Madlingozi, “On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of 
Victims,” 221.
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In the case studies, I will emphasize mutual processes of diffusion 
and contestation of victimhood between ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
and survivors and their implications.
The critique of speaking on behalf of the victims instead of letting 
victims speak for themselves has led to increasing efforts to organize 
genuine victim participation in transitional justice processes.99 As 
Tine Destrooper has pointed out, however, the methodological and 
conceptual framework for the successful implementation of such 
participation is still lacking.100 According to Gready and Robins, 
victim participation in mechanisms such as truth commissions and 
trials is mostly limited to “victims as performers” which offers them 
“little or no agency in challenging power relations or in determining 
what mechanisms occur or how they are implemented.”101 This 
was also the case for the Peruvian TRC, as will become clear in 
the following chapters. Indeed, victim participation should not 
be confused with victim-centeredness. In order to achieve a 
more horizontal approach that leads to genuine participation and 
ownership of victims in transitional justice mechanisms, Mijke de 
Waardt and Sanne Weber advocate for the mobilization of already 
existing forms of participation and organization by including local 
and regional networks of victims’ associations.102
The lack of attention for the perpetrator’s narrative of inflicting 
violence and the production of ‘ideal’, innocent victims by ‘well-
meaning outsiders’ can be seen as two sides of the same coin: 
99  For an overview of the trajectory of the role of victims in transitional justice 
mechanisms such as trials and truth commissions, see chapter 1 in: Thorsten 
Bonacker and Christoph Safferling, eds., Victims of International Crimes: An 
Interdisciplinary Discourse (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013).
100  Tine Destrooper, “Righting Victim Participation in Transitional Justice,” 
Human Rights Centre (blog), accessed January 31, 2019, https://hrc.ugent.be/
research/righting-victim-participation-transitional-justice/.
101  Gready and Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice,” 357.
102  Mijke de Waardt and Sanne Weber, “Beyond Victims’ Mere Presence: An 
Empirical Analysis of Victim Participation in Transitional Justice in Colombia,” 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 223.
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both attest to the way in which transitional justice tends to strip 
survivors and their stories of agency. Consequently, histories of 
violence risk to be taken out of their political, cultural and historical 
context. Fassin and Rechtman argue that the terminology of trauma 
produces “histories without history”, as all suffering is homogenized 
and decontextualized.103 Kimberly Theidon has demonstrated for 
the Peruvian case how specific complexities and meanings that 
survivors give to violence and suffering got lost in translation as the 
TRC coded testimonies with the terminology of trauma. Quechua 
speaking survivors talk about the disease of susto (fear), about llaki’s 
(painful thoughts and memories that can take over your body) or 
about la teta asustada (literally ‘the frightened breast’, the idea that 
women will give their painful memories to their children through 
breastfeeding). However, in the testimonies that were recorded and 
transcribed by the Peruvian TRC, most of these specific references 
to mental health problems were left out and replaced by the notion 
of trauma. By using the diagnostic category of PTSD, the original 
vocabulary used to express violence and suffering was taken away 
and the aftermath of the conflict got ‘Westernized’.104 Elizabeth 
Jelin has pointed out how the Argentinean Nunca Más report 
silenced the social and political struggles of survivors by focusing on 
their victimhood. She explains that therefore “within the new and 
evolving human rights framework, a depoliticized image of conflict 
prevails […]”.105 Mamdani on his turn warns that an analysis that 
excludes the “popular character” of the Rwandan genocide “tends 
to reduce the violence to a set of meaningless outbursts, ritualistic 
and bizarre, like some ancient primordial twitch come to life.”106 
According to Stathis Kalyvas, an analysis of violence that does 
not take into account the before and after “assumes (and further 
propagates) a dichotomous world populated only by victims and 
103  Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 214.
104  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 28.
105  Jelin, “The Past in the Present,” 70.
106  Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 8.
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perpetrators, combined with the flawed perception that victimhood 
and guilt are mutually exclusive categories – hence victims cannot 
be guilty.”107 In the case of Peru, the criminalization of the Shining 
Path as, in first instance, a terrorist organization has led to a complete 
taboo on talking about the motives for their armed struggle. In 
combination with the focus on innocent victims this has created 
a serious blind spot in understanding the history of the conflict by 
obfuscating civil participation in the violence. Furthermore, the 
vocabulary of victimhood and perpetration proves insufficient to 
conceptualize these forms of civil participation, such as resistance 
and self-defense. I will further elaborate on this blind spot in chapter 
six by taking a closer look at the ambiguous role of the self-defense 
committees in the Valley of the Apurímac River. 
To summarize, describing the (post-)conflict world exclusively in 
terms of victims and perpetrators thus risks to result in fragmented, 
ahistorical and individualized accounts of war, in which political 
violence is framed as an evil and meaningless aberration from 
normal life and civil participation in violence is obfuscated. 
Moreover, once the transition takes off, survivors have to let go off 
all possible ambiguity in their identity. In this way, they are able to 
be ‘on the right side of history’ and thus claim their victimhood. The 
binary logic is in other words reinforced throughout the process as 
survivors are stimulated (either intrinsically or by others) to identify 
with these roles. 
2.3 “A time between times” 108
Closing the past: Linear and teleological transitional time
According to the ICTJ, “massive atrocities are a tragic indication of 
the collapse of the rule of law in a very real sense. Transitional justice 
107  Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 21.
108  Meister, After Evil a Politics of Human Rights, 10.
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is about helping to restore trust in the rule of law.”109 It “signals 
the way forward for a renewed commitment to make sure ordinary 
citizens are safe in their own countries – safe from the abuses of 
their own authorities and effectively protected from violations by 
others”.110 In the previous chapter I already pointed to the teleological 
nature of transitional justice, which resides in its aim of establishing 
a liberal democracy based on human rights. Democratization and 
liberalization are the end goals of every transition and are assumed 
to bring about “an open society where no one is excluded because 
of their ethnicity or beliefs, where citizens can pursue their own 
happiness and abide the pursuits of their peers, where there is both 
liberty and opportunity for all”.111 Thomas Carothers identifies this 
teleological aspect as the core assumption of what he has called “the 
transition paradigm”: moving away from conflict or dictatorial rule is 
automatically assumed to be moving towards democracy.112 To reach 
this goal, the past must be actively addressed, worked through and 
eventually closed. Only then will post-conflict societies be able to 
move on to the future. Such an attitude implies a constant balancing 
between retrospective (i.e. truth and justice) and prospective policies 
(i.e. democracy, peace and reconciliation).113 The ideal innocent and 
morally superior victim described above holds the key for achieving 
closure as he or she is expected to transcend feelings of vengeance 
and reconcile with the wrongdoers. Moreover, these aims of peace, 
democracy, reconciliation and closure need to be established within a 
certain timeframe: the transitional period. The concept of ‘transition’ 
in transitional justice implies a linear temporality: it delineates 
a period in time that has a clear beginning and end point. In his 
109  ICTJ, “Rule of Law,” International Center for Transitional Justice, accessed 
February 5, 2019, https://www.ictj.org/gallery-items/rule-law.
110  ICTJ, “What Is Transitional Justice?”
111  Andrieu, “Political Liberalism after Mass Violence,” 86.
112  Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 6.
113  Alexandra Barahona De Brito, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez, and Paloma 
Aguilar, The Politics of Memory and Democratization : Transitional Justice in Democratizing 
Societies (OUP Oxford, 2001), 151.
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book After Evil114, Robert Meister describes this time of transition as 
“a time between times, when evil has ended but before justice has 
begun” or a moment “not still in the past, not yet in the future”.115 
He argues that in transitional justice, clear lines are drawn between 
past and future so that the present can be conceived as a delimited 
time to make the transition from evil to good.116 The evil is put in 
the past to demonstrate that the time of violence is over and will 
not come back.117 This discourse implies an idea of moral progress 
from bad to good.118 Consequently, the monolithic memory created 
by certain transitional justice mechanisms reproduces this linearity 
and teleology in its narratives, as I have discussed in chapter 2.1. As 
Ruti Teitel explains, these transitional narratives follow a structure 
that starts with the history of suffering but have “a happy ending 
of peace and reconciliation”.119 According to Kimberly Theidon, 
“the seductive language of ‘transition’ performs temporalizing 
functions, serving to mark discontinuities, invoking a before-and-
after narrative of change.”120 Alexander Hinton refers to transitional 
justice time as “a kind of ‘zero time’ by which past and present are 
foreshortened and reframed.”121 In consonance with Meister, Hinton 
states that the teleology of transitional justice also implies a moral 
hierarchy since “barbaric” societies are believed to transform into 
“civilized” societies through liberalization and democratization.122 
Already in 2002, Thomas Carothers has pointed to the limitations of 
114  This book is, as Meister calls it himself, “a critique of the dark side of the 
particular version of human rights that followed from U.S. global dominance”. 
Meister, After Evil a Politics of Human Rights, VII.
115  Meister, 10.
116  Meister, 31.
117  Meister, 25.
118  Meister, 14.
119  Teitel, Transitional Justice, 109.
120  Theidon, “Editorial Note,” 295.
121  Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and 
Mass Violence, 7.
122  Hinton, 6. 
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the linearity and the teleology of “the transition paradigm” as many 
“transitional” countries fail to establish well-functioning democracy 
and end up in what he calls a “political gray zone” which despite 
significant efforts to establish political change is characterized by 
serious democratic deficits.123 In other words, reality has shown that 
most transitions do not neatly follow the linear model of transitional 
justice and that the ‘evil of the past’ can be persistent. By now, most 
transitional justice institutions and practitioners are fully aware of 
these limitations and complications. As I have pointed out in chapter 
1.3, the ICTJ has broadened up its notion of transition to a time, 
any time, in which “an opportunity has emerged to address massive 
violations, even if it is a limited opportunity.”124 Nevertheless, in the 
variety of transitional justice measures that are realized during these 
differing windows of opportunity – whether they occur during peace 
processes, at the moment of regime change, or within Carothers’ 
“political gray zone” – the linearity and teleology stay present within 
the normative claims about what kind of change should take place 
and when it should happen. Broadening up the notion of transition 
does thus not necessarily involve a shift in its linear and teleological 
underpinnings. 
‘Haunting’ pasts: Non-linear memories of violence
In transitional justice, the present is conceived as a new time “in 
which the evil is remembered rather than repeated”.125 The duty to 
remember in transitional justice is based on the assumed beneficial 
properties of prevention, redemption and recognition that are 
assigned to memory, as I have argued in chapter 2.1. The transition 
thus opens up a space for memory in the present, a time to give a 
certain meaning to the events of the past in order to stimulate the 
process of coming to terms with that past. What happens, however, 
123  Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 9.
124  ICTJ, “What Is Transitional Justice?”
125  Meister, After Evil a Politics of Human Rights, 25.
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when memory seems to impede closure instead of favoring it? 
Transitional justice’s linear approach to dealing with the past often 
collides with the temporality that characterizes memories of violence 
and the way they are dealt with by survivors. While its final project 
seems linear, teleological and future-oriented, the focus on testimony 
and the notion of trauma causes a constant evocation of the past into 
the present. This present is “a space where past experiences and the 
yet-to-be or not yet experienced future converge.”126 While the time 
of transition has a clear beginning and end point, the temporality 
of memories of violence mostly follows a less predictable trajectory. 
How does this influence the way survivors and society in general 
will be able to ‘keep up’ with the linear and teleological pace of the 
transition? Several scholars concerned with history and memory 
after mass human rights violations have highlighted this tension 
by examining the presence of the violent past and the temporality 
of memories in post-conflict or post-dictatorial societies. Berber 
Bevernage has pointed out that post-conflict societies are sometimes 
characterized by a perception of time that is not necessarily linear 
and irreversible. In these cases, the violent history returns to the 
present in bits and pieces in the form of a ‘haunting’ past: “the past 
in post-conflict situations somehow gets stuck in the present and 
refuses to go.” Bevernage relates this phenomenon to the “relatively 
recent loss of confidence in time as a force that heals all wounds” 
which, according to John Torpey, has occurred since the end of the 
Cold War.127 The increasing claims for justice for past violence by 
human rights defenders and survivors of mass atrocities lead to a 
questioning of the irreversible nature of time and a focus on the 
irrevocable nature of the harm suffered. In this way, they challenge 
“the clear delineation between past and present that lies at the root 
of the modern consciousness of time and modern historiography”.128 
126  Jelin, “The Past in the Present,” 62.
127  Berber Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 13.
128  Bevernage, 14.
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These kind of survivors who cannot or do not want to follow the 
pace of the transition can therefore be considered saboteurs of 
the “construction of national simultaneity”, namely the process of 
peacebuilding, nation building and reconciliation.129 According to 
Ponciano Del Pino, the defined temporality of transitional justice 
does indeed not take into account the “multiple layers of memories 
and temporalities” that characterize the historical process of 
violence and its aftermath.130 Similarly, Elizabeth Jelin remarks 
that “the temporality of memories is not linear, chronological or 
rational”.131 “When it comes to trauma”, Aleida Assmann states 
that “there is no divide between the realm of experience and the 
horizon of expectations; on the contrary, past, present and future 
are fused in various ways.”132 According to Alexandra Barahona de 
Brito,  post-conflict societies are characterized by  “the existence 
of a parallel world of shadows” and “’irruptions of memory’ 
occur unexpectedly, holding people to the past.”133 Indeed, the 
(uncontrolled) reliving of memories characterizes the aftermath for 
many survivors of violence. Magdalena Zolkos speaks in that case 
of “the temporal distortion of inner life (living in the present as if 
it were the past)”.134 According to Danielle Granville, “because of 
129  Bevernage, 16.
130  Ponciano Del Pino, ““En El Nombre Del Gobierno”: Políticas Locales, 
Memoria y Violencia En El Perú Del Siglo XX,” in Las Formas Del Recuerdo. 
Etnografías de La Violencia Política En El Perú, ed. Ponciano Del Pino and Caroline 
Yezer (Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2013), 30.
131  Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 55.
132  Aleida Assmann, “Transformations of the Modern Time Regime,” in Breaking 
up Time. Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future, ed. Berber Bevernage 
and Chris Lorenz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 53.
133  Alexandra Barahona de Brito, “Truth, Justice, Memory, and Democratization 
in the Southern Cone,” in The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing 
Societies, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-Enríquez, and Paloma 
Aguilar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 156.
134  Magdalena Zólkos, “Redressive Politics and the Nexus of Trauma, Transitional 
Justice and Reconciliation,” in Transitional Justice Theories, ed. Susanne Buckley-Zistel 
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such teleology in transitional justice’s approaches to memory, the 
field still lacks a conceptual framework that can cope with the lack 
of linearity in certain countries’ approaches to their pasts.” 135 This 
is especially the case when speaking of the kind of master-narrative 
created by monolithic memory as described in 2.1. The idea of 
patchwork memory or multi-directionality provides more space 
for the integration of non-linear memories of violence, although it 
mostly still relies on the assumed beneficial properties of memory. It 
fails to take into account the paradox many survivors face: to feel the 
desire to close of the past, but to encounter oneself unable to do so 
because of haunting memories. Survivors can, for diverging reasons, 
experience the constant confrontation with the past as something 
painful which causes additional harm. In chapter 4, we will see how 
the pragmatic need for coexistence motivates the desire to silence 
instead of actively remember certain aspects of the past. The often 
poor and disappointing results which the constant confrontation 
with the past has brought about strengthens some survivors in the 
will to ‘forget’.
Contemporary pasts: Ongoing and structural violence
The temporality of transitional justice thus situates itself in an 
“ambiguous context of a fragile modernity and a shaky belief in the 
possibility of a strict demarcation of past and present”.136 On the one 
hand, it tries to tell a linear story with the aim of ‘putting the past in its 
place’ and turning to the future. On the other, this linear story needs 
to be built upon non-linear memories of violence that constantly 
challenge the boundaries of what used to be the past, should be the 
present and could be the future. According to Bevernage, transitional 
(New York: Routledge, 2015), 164.
135  Danielle Granville, “Self-Inflicted Genocide and State- and Nation-Building 
in Post-Soviet,” in Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice, ed. Nicola Frances Palmer 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 377.
136  Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence, 15.
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justice mechanisms such as truth commissions try to manage this 
tension between “two conflicting ways of remembering that are 
driven by contrary temporal features” precisely by turning non-
linear memories of violence into history.137 But what happens then, 
when the presence of the past does not take the shape of a memory 
of violence that has happened in the past but is perceived by survivors as 
violence that has happened in the past and is still happening in the present? 
The way in which the violent past is evoked in the present requires 
an analysis that goes beyond the notion of traumatic memory. As 
Andreas Huyssen states, “this approach to history as trauma […] 
does not help much to understand the political layers of memory 
discourse in our time”.138 Indeed, Bevernage points out that the 
manner in which the relation between past, present and future is 
represented, actively constituted and regulated in transitional justice 
can have certain political and ethical implications.139 The linear 
progress from conflict to post-conflict can easily be conceived as an 
emancipatory process characterized by the struggle for a future of 
justice. But what more does the strict divide between past, present 
and future pursued by transitional justice entail? 
While delineating the time of transition in the present, transitional 
justice also delineates the past: the part of history that will be 
actively addressed during the transition. Alexander Hinton remarks 
that during the transition, “long, complicated histories are reduced 
to an immediate past of conflict; future horizons are delimited 
by the promised end of the transition, an idyllic state of civilized 
democracy.”140 According to Robert Meister, this attempt to separate 
the injustices of the past from those of the present and future 
implies that “evil is no longer widely understood to be a system of 
137  Bevernage, 15.
138  Huyssen, Present Pasts Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory, 9.
139  Bevernage, “Transitional Justice and Historiography: Challenges, Dilemmas 
and Possibilities,” 23.
140  Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and 
Mass Violence, 7.
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social injustice that can have ongoing structural effects” but that it is 
conceived as “a time that is past – or can be put in the past.”141 This 
contrasts sharply with the idea of processes of historical injustice 
and structural violence that are not easily demarcated in time. The 
danger thus exists that the moment of transition will be seized as 
an opportunity to ‘clean up’ only the recent past without addressing 
the fundamental historical causes of conflict that might persist and 
cause cycles of violence. 
In line with the findings of Meister, Ponciano Del Pino argues 
that transitional justice imposes a defined temporality in which the 
violent past is conceived as an exception.142 This idea of an exception 
implies the notion of violence as a coincidental mistake and fails to 
acknowledge that outbreaks of violence are mostly rooted in larger 
historical processes that are not easily delimited in time, and that are 
not exceptional or coincidental. Considering violence as an outcome 
rather than as a process results in a “focus on instances of violence 
rather than the complex, and often invisible, nonviolent actions and 
mechanisms that precede and follow them.”143 Mahmood Mamdani 
argues that the lack of historical perspective in most accounts of 
the Rwandan genocide results in an analysis of the genocide as “an 
anthropological oddity.”144 He argues that the logic of colonialism is 
a crucial element in understanding the “violence of victims-turned-
perpetrators” as a genocidal impulse.145 In his analysis of memories of 
141  Meister, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,” 96.
142  Ponciano Del Pino, “Introducción: Etnografías e Historias de La Violencia,” 
in Las Formas Del Recuerdo. Etnografías de La Violencia Política En El Perú, ed. Ponciano 
Del Pino and Caroline Yezer (Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2013), 21.
143  To clarify: Kalyvas uses the term “nonviolent” here in opposition to the kind 
of violence to which his study is dedicated, i.e. physical violence (more specifically 
homicide) against non-fulltime combatants. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil 
War, 21.
144  “For Africans, it turns into a Rwandan oddity; and for non-Africans, the 
aberration is Africa. For both, the temptation is to dismiss Rwanda as exceptional”, 
thus Mamdani. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 7.
145  Mamdani, 10.
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the civil war in local communities in the Peruvian Andes, Ponciano 
del Pino notes how memories of recent violence are inscribed by the 
local population in historical narratives of structural injustice and 
oppression. This larger political and historical context is absent in 
many studies that stick to the universal language of human rights 
when describing the conflict and its aftermath, he argues.146 In the 
Colombian case, Felix Reátegui observes how memory initiatives 
of the Afro-Colombian population strive for the recognition of 
the continuity between contemporary violence and their history of 
slavery and exclusion.147 Integrating a broader historical dimension 
which exceeds the strict delineation of the past proposed by 
transitional justice thus seems to be useful for understanding the 
dynamics of violence and its consequences for survivors. If not, 
transitional justice mechanisms once again risk to produce “histories 
without history”.148
However, transitional justice’s aim to ‘put the past in its place’ does 
not merely lead to hollow ahistorical accounts of past violence. The 
attempt to differentiate the time of violence from the present can 
also result in denial of ongoing structural violence and engender, 
as Bevernage states,  “a moral relativism and an incapacity for 
ethical judgment”.149 Zinaida Miller points out that “the notion 
of transition as a dramatic break from a ‘bad’ to a ‘good’ regime, 
inherently narrows the possibilities for imagining redistribution.”150 
Transitional justice as a limited time for change can therefore also 
imply the danger that it will be used to cover up longer historical 
146  Del Pino, ““En El Nombre Del Gobierno”: Políticas Locales, Memoria y 
Violencia En El Perú Del Siglo XX,” 29.
147  Reátegui Carrillo, “The Victims Remember. Notes on the Social Practice of 
Memory,” 349.
148  Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 214.
149  Bevernage, “Transitional Justice and Historiography: Challenges, Dilemmas 
and Possibilities,” 20.
150  Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in 
Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (December 1, 
2008): 291.
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processes of injustice that were present before and will last after the 
time of transition. For example, Martha-Cecilia Dietrich concludes 
from her analysis of memory discourses in (post-)conflict Peru that 
“if we continue to situate the conflict in the past, we run the risk 
of […] mistakenly considering the sociopolitical problems from 
which they arose as resolved.”151 In addition, structural inequality 
is likely to provoke a self-maintaining system of structural violence 
or injustice.152 Beneficiaries of past violence often play a crucial role 
in upholding these structures, as is stressed by Meister.153 Survivors 
who keep on contesting the enduring injustice of the past on their 
turn risk to be blamed for being ‘stuck in the past’ and resisting to 
move forward. After all, the ‘ideal’ innocent and morally superior 
victim is expected to reconciliate without fostering vengeance. Stef 
Craps warns how the hegemonic trauma discourse, which isolates 
single events as exceptional, can become “a political palliative to 
the socially disempowered.”154 In this sense, transitional justice will 
not have an emancipatory potential, but it will, on the contrary, run 
the risk of depoliticizing and weakening the struggle for distributive 
justice. Meister argues that, viewed from a political perspective, 
taking a stance between vengeance and forgiveness forces survivors 
to reach for a moral compromise while distracting them from “the 
temptation to engage in a political analysis that might open the 
question of whether that evil has finally been defeated.” Justice for 
recent human rights violations comes, thus Meister, at the expense 
of long-term distributive justice.155 
In addition to the notion of a returning or ‘haunting’ past 
described above, it thus seems useful here to introduce the notion 
151  Martha-Cecilia Dietrich Ortega, “Discourses of Violence or Violent 
Discourses? An Audio-Visual Ethnography into the Experience of Memory in 
Postconflict Peru” (University of Manchester, 2015), 125.
152  Nevin Aiken, “Rethinking Reconciliation in Divided Societies,” in Transitional 
Justice Theories, ed. Susanne Buckley-Zistel (New York: Routledge, 2014), 54.
153  Meister, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,” 95.
154  Craps, Postcolonial Witnessing, 28.
155  Meister, After Evil a Politics of Human Rights, 323.
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of a continuous or ‘contemporary’ past that challenges the linear 
temporality of transitional justice.156 This second notion of ‘presence’ 
of the past helps us to relate recent human rights violations to longer 
historical processes of injustice that have not yet concluded and 
therefore potentially spark new outbreaks of social conflict and 
violence which may take different shapes but essentially have the 
same roots. In chapter five, we will see how encounters between the 
state and survivors in the context of searching for the disappeared is 
shaped by historically rooted socio-economic discrimination against 
the Andean population. 
Last but not least, it is necessary to ask how the critique of the 
specific temporality of transitional justice relates to what transitional 
justice does or pretends to do. On the eve of the establishment of 
South Africa’s TRC, Alex Boraine was fully aware of the fact that 
“economic justice and the restoration of the moral order must be 
seen as twin goals. The attempt to narrow the gap between the 
dispossessed, disadvantaged majority and the privileged few and the 
attempt to restore the moral order cannot be separated: the healing 
of the nation will require absolute commitment to both.”157 Today, 
as an answer to the question “What is transitional justice not?”, the 
ICTJ states that “it is not the way to fix everything that is wrong 
with society. The long-term social and political struggles for justice 
and equal opportunities might be assisted by measure of transitional 
justice but not solved by it.”158
The core idea behind ‘transitology’ was a technocratic believe 
in institutions and political choices made by elites rather than in 
structural socio-economic factors as conditions for democracy, as 
I have pointed out in chapter 1.2.159 Paige Arthur explains how the 
156  I borrow the expression of a ‘contemporary past’ from Jose Pablo Baraybar, 
director of the EPAF who used it to refer to the persistence of the past in Peru. 
Fieldnotes, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2014. 
157  Boraine et al., The Healing of a Nation?, xvii.
158  ICTJ, “What Is Transitional Justice?”
159  Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 8.
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concept of ‘transition’ was originally recycled from the discourse 
of social transformation and gradually remolded to describe a 
change at the legal-institutional level. One of the reasons for this 
appropriation of the concept of transition for the purpose of 
democratization is, according to Arthur, “the global decline of the 
radical Left during the 1970s and a concomitant ideological shift in 
favor of human rights.” In Latin America, this decline of the radical 
Left is linked with, among others, the death of Che Guevara and 
the outcomes of the Cuban revolution.160 As Arthur explains, it is in 
this context that “many on the Left abandoned the language of class 
warfare to describe state violence in favor of the language of human 
rights.”161 Or, as Boaventura De Sousa Santos states: “human rights 
talk was separated from the revolutionary tradition and began to be 
conceived of as a grammar of depoliticized social change […].”162
The struggle for social justice was thus never the primary point 
of departure of transitional justice. Nevertheless, discussions 
on the inclusion of social, cultural and economic rights next to 
civil and political rights were present from the outset and caused 
an immediate proliferation of the original narrow legal-political 
conception of transitional justice. Yet, the existing attempts to 
integrate socio-economic rights and development into transitional 
justice “have been thin on conceptual inspiration and had only 
modest impact on practice.”163 Paul Gready and Simon Robins 
therefore propose an approach to justice in post-conflict situations 
which they call transformative rather than transitional. The authors 
define transformative justice as “transformative change that 
emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process 
rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal 
160  Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice,” 339.
161  Arthur, 340.
162  Boaventura De Sousa Santos, If God Were a Human Rights Activist (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), 4.
163  Gready and Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice,” 346.
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and intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at 
both the local and the global level.”164 Indeed, other scholars in the 
field have also made increasing efforts to bring an intersectional 
approach to the study of transitional justice in an attempt to engage 
with “the conditions that have produced systematic and sustained 
human rights violations in transitional societies.”165 Others suggest, 
however, that we should be modest and realistic about the aims and 
potential of transitional justice. Roger Duthie, whose research focuses 
on the nexus between transitional justice and development, states 
that transitional justice cannot be expected to be transformative. 
He argues that “transitional justice efforts make up but one set of 
tools for effecting social change in a particular context, one that on 
its own can make an important contribution to but will not bring 
about a radical transformation of society.”166 A modest approach to 
the transformative potential of transitional justice should, however, 
not get in the way of an analysis of the implications of the specific 
temporality of the paradigm and its implications for post-conflict 
policies. 
164  Gready and Robins, 340.
165  Rooney and Aoláin, “Transitional Justice from the Margins,” 1.
166  Roger Duthie, “Afterword,” in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and 
Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 256.
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La justicia es como las serpientes: sólo muerde a los descalzos.1
 
Introduction
It was almost as if it was written in the stars that Peru, after Fujimori’s 
exit to Japan in 2000, would follow the example of its Latin-American 
neighbors by erecting a truth commission The Peruvian case was, 
however, fundamentally different in that it did not follow the 
expected ruptures of (post-)Cold-War historiography. After all, the 
Shining Path started its revolutionary struggle only in 1980, when the 
international success of communist ideology was already declining. 
Nevertheless, apart from the Colombian FARC no other subversive 
group inspired by communist ideology ever was as powerful and 
deadly in Latin America as the Shining Path. The magnitude of 
the bloodbath caused by the followers of camarada Gonzalo in its 
turn made it easier for the successive governments to legitimize 
their excessive use of violence during the counteroffensive, despite 
the rise of international human rights discourse and humanitarian 
government during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to that, socio-
economic patterns in the violence during that period made clear 
that Peru was a country of many worlds that were not only separated 
by mountain ranges and rainforest, but also by different mentalities 
and structural patterns of exclusion and racism. In contrast to for 
example Argentina and Chile, it was the rural population that was 
mostly involved in and affected by the violence. The exercise of 
retributive justice was thus from the outset inseparably connected 
to the challenge of bridging the divides between Peruvians from 
the coast and those of the Andes and Amazon on the one hand, and 
between citizens and a state that failed to protect them on the other.
1  My translation of original citation: “Justice is like a snake, it only bites those who 
are barefoot.” The origin of this quote is not entirely clear. It is mostly ascribed 
to Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano, but sometimes also to archbishop Óscar 
Romero from El Salvador. 
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What happened to the ‘success recipe’ of transitional justice once 
applied to the Peruvian context? How did the concept and network 
of transitional justice arrive to Peru in the first place? How was the 
international discourse on justice, truth and reconciliation – which 
was widespread throughout Latin America by 20002 – implemented, 
appropriated and transformed in the Peruvian context after 
Fujimori’s exit? And, vice versa, how did the Peruvian experience 
change international transitional justice? 
This chapter provides an overview of the dissemination and 
implementation of transitional justice in Peru by looking at various 
actors and mechanisms that shaped the (post-)conflict process 
which, as recent developments have shown, is still ongoing. The 
main actors that will be discussed are the human rights movement, 
the survivors and the state. As for the mechanisms, the analysis 
will focus on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and two 
of its recommendations, namely the reparation plan and the plan 
for the search for the disappeared.3 The aim here is not to give an 
exhaustive overview of all the different steps in the process, but to 
focus on the interaction between international, national and local 
actors and ideas in forming the (post-)conflict process. The chapter 
concludes with a brief sketch of public narratives on the civil war 
as they are verbalized and materialized in public opinion and space. 
This gives an impression of the turbulent landscape in which the 
process of dealing with the legacies of the past takes place in Peru. 
2  Lutz and Sikkink use the term “justice cascade” to refer to the proliferation of 
human rights law in Latin America at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 
21st century and state that this phenomenon is part of a “larger human rights norms 
cascade in Latin America”. Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: 
The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” 
Chicago Journal of Internaitonal Law 2, no. 1 (2001): 1–34. 
3  I will focus on these two because they are directly related to the survivors and 
therefore are most present in my research. The third general recommendation of 
the TRC was institutional reform. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, 
“Informe Final” (Lima, 2003), TOMO IX.
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3.1 The human rights movement 
Putting truth and accountability on the agenda of the transitional 
government of Valentin Paniagua was above all the merit of civil 
society groups and their tireless struggle for justice. The reason 
why civil society groups played a decisive role during the transition 
is that political parties were rather weak by the end of Fujimori’s 
government.4 Coletta Youngers situates the birth of the Peruvian 
human rights movement in 1977, when the military government of 
Francisco Morales Bermúdez adopted drastic economic reforms 
that caused a dramatic price increase of 45% for foodstuff. 
Progressive political parties, syndicates and a wide range of civil 
society organizations set up a national strike against rising poverty 
levels and increasingly severe government repression. Peru being the 
cradle of liberation theology, the progressive sector of the Catholic 
Church played a crucial role in the struggle for the improvement of 
the Peruvian poor’s socio-economic rights.5 The Comisión Episcopal de 
Acción Social (CEAS)6 opened the first human rights office to receive 
denunciations of abuses by the military and grant legal and economic 
support to victims. In the footsteps of CEAS, local human rights 
committees were founded all over the country. Despite the fact that 
left-wing political parties were reluctant to adopt the human rights 
discourse, considering it something ‘bourgeois’ and Western, they 
shared the interest in the fight against poverty and inequality.7 In 
4  According to Degregori, the creation of the TRC would have been impossible 
if the traditional political parties would have played a significant role during the 
transition, as this would have meant that Acción Popular and APRA would bring 
their own presidents, respectively Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985 AP) and Alan 
García (1985 -1990, APRA) under scrutiny. Carlos Iván Degregori, Qué Difícil Es 
Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero Luminoso Y El Conflicto Armado Interno 
En El Perú: 1980-1999, 2013, 278. .
5  Coletta Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú 
Un Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición” (WOLA, 2002), 2. 
6  English translation: Episcopal Commission for Social Action. 
7  Youngers, 3. 
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a first attempt to combine forces on a national level, the Comisión 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CONADEH) was founded in 1979, 
which evolved from a coalition of smaller local groups to a new 
organization that was renamed as the Comisión de Derechos Humanos 
(COMISEDH)8 in 1988.9
Human rights advocacy during wartime
The beginning of the civil war in 1980 announced important but 
difficult times for the development of the human rights movement 
as it had to maintain a firm and credible stance against the various 
actors involved in the violence. The focus shifted from the struggle 
for labor and socio-economic rights to denouncing the human 
rights violations and war crimes perpetuated by both the Shining 
Path and the state. Gradually, claiming the rights of the detained, 
disappeared and displaced victims of the civil war became the 
movement’s central cause. Organizations focusing on legal support 
for victims, such as the Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL)10, the Comisión 
Andina de Juristas (CAJ)11 and APRODEH, played a prominent role 
in this process. The Peruvian branch of Amnesty International was 
reactivated by the international secretariat and was one of the first 
organizations to denounce human rights violations in Ayacucho on 
an international level.12 The women of the disappeared in Ayacucho 
organized themselves in the ANFASEP from 1983 onward, hereby 
8  Human Rights Commission
9  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 4.
10  Institute for Legal Defense. 
11  Andean Commission of Jurists. The Andean Commission of Jurists was 
originally founded as a regional office of the International Commission of Jurists 
and has its headquarters in Lima. José Zalaquett and Diego García-Sayán, among 
others, form part of the general assembly of the CAJ. CAJ, “Comisión Andina de 
Juristas,” accessed May 22, 2018, http://www.cajpe.org.pe/index.html.
12  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 6. 
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representing the rural victims of the war on a regional and national 
level, while the human rights movement mainly had its headquarters 
in Lima.13 The work of ANFASEP was very risky, since repression 
against human rights activists and survivor groups by the military 
and the conservative branch of the Catholic Church was severe 
in the war’s emergency zones (the departments of Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica and Apurímac). As a result, they could often only 
operate underground.14 On a national level, however, the human 
rights movement was strengthened by the civil war. In 1985, more 
than fifty Peruvian human rights organizations decided to unite 
in an umbrella organization, named the Coordinadora Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH)15, which soon became known as one 
of Latin America’s strongest human rights advocacy networks.16 
The CNDDHH was in rotation supervised by CEAS, APRODEH 
and the COMISEDH and operated – and continues to do so – 
independently from political organizations or the Catholic Church. 
This independence was important in the context of growing distrust 
and changeable alliances caused by the civil war.17 By spearheading 
13  ANFASEP, “La Historia de ANFASEP – ANFASEP,” accessed May 22, 2018, 
http://anfasep.org.pe/anfasep/historia-de-anfasep/. 
14  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 8. 
15  National Human Rights Coordinator 
16  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 45. The precursor of the CNDDHH was the 
Comité de Solidaridad “Mártires de Uchuraccay” (Solidarity Committee martyrs 
of Uchuraccay) that was founded in the aftermath of the assassination of nine 
journalists in the village of Uchuraccay, Ayacucho, in 1983, a case that moved 
national public opinion. Novelist and public intellectual Mario Vargas Llosa 
chaired the committee of inquiry that was erected by the government of president 
Fernando Belaúnde to investigate the massacre. Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-
commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017. For an extensive overview of the 
history of the CNDDHH, see: Coletta Youngers, Violencia política y sociedad civil en 
el Perú: historia de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 2003). 
17  Youngers describes how sympathizers of the Shining Path were present at the 
foundational meeting of the Coordinadora, accusing the organizers of trading 
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the advocacy for peace, democracy and human rights, the CNDDHH 
managed to maintain an autonomous position. In contrast to 
other Latin-American countries, where civil society focused on 
human rights violations perpetuated by the state, the CNDDHH 
also documented the violations of international humanitarian law 
committed by the Shining Path and other actors in the conflict. 
Despite the fact that the movement defended the rights of suspects 
during their imprisonment, human rights lawyers did not take up 
the defense for suspects of terrorism in lawsuits.18 Nevertheless, 
human rights NGOs and victim associations such as ANFASEP 
were – and still are – often associated with left-wing politics and 
therefore accused of supporting the Shining Path and impeding the 
army’s counter-offensive by denouncing the abuses of the military.19 
This stigmatization reached its peak during Fujimori’s government, 
who infamously referred to the human rights movement as “the legal 
arms of terrorism”.20 The Shining Path in turn considered human 
rights NGOs as products of Western capitalism and committed 
attacks directed against activists and community leaders.21
“the rights of the people” (“los derechos del pueblo”) for human rights. After a 
conflict over the condemnation of the violence inflicted by the Shining Path against 
civilians, pro-Shining Path participants left the meeting.  Youngers, 10, 11. 
During the second general meeting in 1987, the rotating supervision was replaced 
by a separate general secretariat and Pilar Coll was assigned as the first president of 
the CNDDHH. Youngers, 15.  
18  Youngers, 20.
19  Youngers, 5. Root points to the international context for understanding the 
stigmatization of the human rights movement: “Because human rights movements 
in other Latin American countries tended to focus on abuses by the state, they were 
more easily targeted as enemies of the state and could be more easily depicted as 
rebel sympathizers to the public.” Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 46. 
20  Burt, Violencia y autoritarismo en el Perú bajo la sombra de Sendero y la dictadura de 
Fujimori, 335.   
21  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 12. 
144
III Clean Hands, Clean Slate
Links with international networks
In the heat of war during the 1980s, and throughout Fujimori’s 
increasingly authoritarian government in the 1990s, the Peruvian 
network of human rights NGOs and survivor groups established 
strong links with international players such as Americas Watch, 
Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ)22 and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).23 The 
ever more repressive national context, under the first governments 
of Alan García (1985-1990) and  Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) made 
these international connections of vital importance to exert pressure 
on a domestic level. The CNDDHH regularly sent delegations and 
reports to the OAS and the UN to inform these organizations about 
the Peruvian situation.24 Especially after Fujimori’s autocoup in 
1992, international attention increasingly turned to the deteriorating 
democratic context. Assistance money from the US state department, 
for example, was redirected from state institutions to civil society.25 
When the administration of US president Bill Clinton visited Peru 
in 1994, they met with representatives of the CNDDHH before 
talking to Fujimori.26 Furthermore, the CNDDHH established 
22  Juan Méndez, ex-president of Americas Watch and of the ICTJ, is one of the 
members of the ICJ. ICJ, “Commissioners from the Americas | ICJ,” accessed May 
22, 2018, https://www.icj.org/commission/commissioners-from-the-americas/. 
23  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 49. 
24  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 21. 
25  Root, 50. In 1995, however, elections were organized, and Fujimori was re-
elected, after which international attention decreased again despite the fact that 
the elections were fraudulent, and that Fujimori continued consolidating his 
authoritarian government. For example, in 1995 congress approved a law that 
granted amnesty to all the military personnel involved in human rights violations 
since the beginning of the civil war in 1980. The design and approval of the 
law happened overnight, impeding any kind of public debate. Youngers, “La 
Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un Estudio de Caso de 
Construcción de Una Coalición,” 23, 24. 
26  Youngers, 21. 
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close relations with North American, Latin American and 
European advocacy networks, including the US-based Peru Peace 
Network, the London-based Peru Support Group, the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)  and the Centro por la Justicia 
y el Derecho Internacional (CEJIL)27.28 In 1990, the Permanent People’s 
Tribunal, the Bologna-based successor of the Russel Tribunals, 
was invited by the CNDDHH to hold a session in Lima and 
concluded that crimes against humanity were being committed 
both by the state and by the subversive groups in an environment 
of impunity.29 This entanglement of the national human rights 
movement with international players, which was strengthened by 
their opposition against Fujimori, was going to play an important 
role in the implementation of the transitional justice agenda during 
the transitional government.  
The creation of the TRC: A victory for the human rights movement 
The capture of Abimael Guzmán – a second landmark event of the 
year 1992, next to Fujimori’s autocoup – caused the gradual collapse 
of the Shining Path and a significant decrease in the number of human 
rights violations in the following years. This made the CNDDHH 
shift its agenda from human rights advocacy to a focus on democracy 
building, especially under the presidency of Sofía Macher, who took 
up the mandate in 1997.30 In the run up to the general elections in 
2000, a plan with 44 recommendations for a “basic human rights 
platform in Perú” was drawn up in order to raise awareness among 
the electorate. Even tough this plan did not contain any concrete 
27  Center for Justice and International Law. CEJIL is an inter-American 
organization with headquarters in Buenos Aires, Río de Janeiro, San José and 
Washington D.C. “CEJIL,” accessed May 24, 2018, https://www.cejil.org/en/
cejils-offices-0.
28  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 35. 
29  Youngers, 19.
30  Youngers, 28.
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idea for establishing a truth commission, it included demands for 
historical clarification about the conflict, the liberation of political 
prisoners and the reintegration of Peru into the Interamerican 
Court.31 After the fraudulent reelection of Fujimori in 1995, the 
OAS set up a dialogue (Mesa de Diálogo) with eighteen participants, 
including officials of the Fujimori administration, members of 
the political opposition and representatives of civil society in 
order to exert pressure on the government to implement reforms. 
The human rights movement was headed by, among others, Sofia 
Macher, Susana Villarán de la Puente and human rights ombudsman 
Jorge Santistevan de Noriega.32 When the Fujimori regime collapsed 
only a few months later, the human rights representatives at the Mesa 
de Diálogo were capable of defining the agenda of the transitional 
government of Paniagua and some of them even acquired offices 
in the new administration.33 Most importantly, Diego García Sayán 
was appointed as Minister of Justice. He had previously directed 
the CAJ and had participated in UN peace missions in Guatemala 
and El Salvador. Furthermore, Susana Villarán de la Puente became 
Minister of Women’s Promotion and Social Development, and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar, who served as a secretary general of the UN from 1982 to 
1991.34 According to Sofía Macher, Villarán and Pérez de Cuéllar 
brought up the idea of establishing a truth commission based on 
the examples of Chile, Argentina and El Salvador.35 Historian 
Carlos Iván Degregori, who together with Macher would become 
one of the commissioners, also points to the international contexts 
of the Southern Cone and Central America as important examples. 
As Degregori writes, “by 2000, truth commissions were part of 
the options menu in countries where democratic transitions took 
31  Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
32  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 51. 
33  Root, 52.
34  Root, 52.
35  Interview with Sofía Macher.
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place after internal armed conflicts.”36 Macher adds, however, that 
they had no clue what a truth commission really entailed. Thus, an 
inter-institutional working group was set up which designed the 
Supreme Decree, a constitutional text that defined the objectives of 
the future truth commission. In order to learn from international 
experiences, a seminar was organized together with the nascent 
ICTJ represented by Priscila Hayner (cfr. 1.3) in which members of 
the human rights movement participated, as well as representatives 
of the military and the police.37 José Zalaquett, a personal friend 
of Sofía Macher, brought the South-African experience into the 
debate, which had resonated broadly in international media and 
was also well-known in Peru.38 There was a lot of discussion on the 
different shapes which the truth commissions could take: a ‘light’ 
commission limited to research by experts, or an open commission 
with public hearings where victims could testify. Macher was a 
fervent advocate of the full option with public hearings. Another 
difficult point of discussion was the question of amnesty for 
perpetrators in exchange for confessions of crimes, as in the South-
African TRC. The topic of amnesties was, however, fiercely opposed 
by the human rights movement, which stood united in its struggle 
against Fujimori’s amnesty law for the military personnel. Amnesty 
International even entirely rejected the idea of establishing a truth 
commission, fearing that it might be used to avoid prosecutions.39 
36  My translation of Spanish original: “Para el año 2000, las comisiones de la verdad 
eran parte del menu de opciones en los países donde se producían transiciones 
democráticas luego de conflictos armados internos.” Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser 
Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero Luminoso Y El Conflicto Armado Interno En 
El Perú: 1980-1999, 279. 
37  The ICTJ was officially founded in March 2001, while the inter-institutional 
working group was created on December 9, 2000.  
38  Zalaquett, commissioner of the Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, had been a consultant for the South-African TRC. Albie Sachs, 
“Meeting the Man Who Organised a Bomb in My Car,” The Limits of Transition: The 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 20 Years on, 2017, 28. 
39  Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
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Despite the fact that Minister of Justice García Sayán, who had a 
background in international diplomacy, emphasized the importance 
of reconciliation and restorative justice, the inter-institutional 
working group agreed that the truth commission should focus on 
accountability by paving the way for trials.40 The working group 
made a draft design of the Supreme Decree, which was sent to 
Priscila Hayner for revision. The ICTJ eventually standardized 
and systematized the set-up of the commission.41 Interim president 
Paniagua was hesitant to establish the truth commission during his 
term, stating that he had no mandate to do so. In the meantime, 
however, elections were coming up in which former president 
Alan García would run against Alejandro Toledo. Afraid that the 
momentum would be lost after the elections, especially in case 
of a victory for García, the human rights movement led by Sofía 
Macher pressured the government to establish the truth commission 
at once. Their persistence was successful, and in the last weeks of 
his presidency Paniagua officially appointed the seven members of 
the Truth Commission.42 Salomón Lerner, rector of the Pontífica 
Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP)43, was assigned to chair the 
commission. The other commissioners included (mostly left-wing) 
intellectuals, representatives of the Catholic Church and the National 
Evangelical Council, a general of the army and representatives of the 
human rights movement, including Sofía Macher who took charge 
of the public hearings.44 The presidential elections were narrowly 
40  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 55. Macher also states that the CAJ, which is 
directed by García Sayán, in general took a more diplomatic stance (calling them“los 
activistas de corbata” – “the activists with tie”) within the Peruvian human rights 
movement and did not form part of the CNDDHH because they considered it 
too political. Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 
24.05.2017. 
41  Interview with Sofía Macher. The ICTJ would also send consultants to work 
with the TRC later on. Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 75.
42  Root, 57. 
43  Pontifical Catholic University of Peru
44  According to Macher, the choice for Lerner as president of the commission 
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won by Toledo, who controversially rebaptized the commission 
into Truth and Reconciliation Commission as soon as he assumed 
the presidency, and extended its workforce with five extra 
commissioners.45 While the decision to rename the commission 
was inspired by the South-African model as well as by proposals 
of Peruvian church leaders, opponents of the TRC – such as the 
army, that feared accusations – seized this moment to bring up 
the discussion on amnesties again and accused the commission of 
wanting to leave the Shining Path unpunished. The commissioners 
in turn argued that the intended reconciliation was to be understood 
as a way of bringing together the rural populations of el Perú profundo46 
and the elites of the capital.47 The Supreme Decree that created the 
TRC equipped it with an eighteen-month mandate to “clarify the 
process, the facts and responsibilities of the terrorist violence and 
the violations of human rights that occurred between May 1980 and 
November 2000, attributable to both terrorist organizations and 
State agents, as well as to propose initiatives to consolidate peace 
and harmony among Peruvians.” The concrete aims of the TRC 
were to analyze the historical context that gave rise to the conflict, 
to assign responsibilities for human rights violations, to propose 
strategies for reparations, to recommend institutional, legal and 
educational reform and to establish mechanisms for the follow-
up of its recommendations.48 The TRC possessed a staff of more 
was much to the dismay of the students of the PUCP due to the case of the 
disappearance by police forces of student Ernesto Castillo Páez in 1990, which 
according to the students was not met with adecuate action by Lerner, who then 
was vice-rector of the PUCP. Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the 
TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017. 
45  Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero Luminoso 
Y El Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú: 1980-1999, 275. 
46  The deep Peru, term used to refer to Peru’s rural areas in opposition to Lima
47  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 74; Interview with Sofía Macher.
48  My translation of Spanish original: “Créase la Comisión de la Verdad encargada 
de esclarecer el proceso, los hechos y responsabilidades de la violencia terrorista 
y de la violación a los derechos humanos producidos desde mayo de 1980 hasta 
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than five hundred people at its peak, and disposed of a budget of 
over thirteen million US dollars, of which approximately two thirds 
were provided by the government and one third by the international 
community.49 The creation of a TRC with so many resources and 
such an extensive mandate marked an historical momentum and 
meant, at that point, a great victory for the human rights movement. 
3.2 The TRC and its recommendations 
Truth through testimony
Despite the establishment of a state supported TRC being a big 
achievement for the human rights movement, the project of truth-
telling took off in an adverse context. Fujimorismo was (and is) still 
deeply rooted in Peruvian society. Fujimori’s defeat of the Shining 
Path and the absence of a negotiated peace fostered a victor’s history, 
broadly adopted by the public, according to which state abuses were 
a necessary evil to beat ‘terrorism’. By contrast, the domestic human 
rights movement and their international partners condemned both 
the violence by state actors and that of the Shining Path and other 
armed groups. Their view was based on universal human rights 
discourse, in which the voice of the ‘innocent’ victims was deemed 
noviembre de 2000, imputables tanto a las organizaciones terroristas como a los 
agentes del Estado, así como proponer iniciativas destinadas a afirmar la paz y 
la concordia entre los peruanos.” Decreto Supremo N° 065-2001-PCM, Lima, 
04.06.2001.
49  Priscilla B Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2011), 36. The entire budget, also the 
domestic part, was put in a fund managed by the UNDP. International donors 
included, among others, USAID, the Ford Foundation, the EU, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the governments of Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. CVR, “Información Financiera,” 
accessed September 5, 2018, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/lacomision/ifinanciera/
financiamiento.php.
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essential for establishing the truth.50 By appealing to the so-called 
impartiality of the victim’s voices in order to go around the complex 
and adverse domestic context, the movement adopted the (highly 
contested) model of truth finding through testimony.  
The TRC’s pursuit of truth through testimony became a massive 
undertaking. The Peruvian TRC was the first in Latin America 
to hold hearings that were open to the public and broadcasted on 
television.51 The TRC thus broadened its outreach by providing the 
opportunity to testify as a witness, as well as to be a witness of 
the testimonies.52 Apart from the eight public hearings (which were 
held in different parts of the country), testimonies were registered in 
regional offices. Furthermore, mobile teams of the TRC visited 509 
districts in order to collect additional testimonies. In total, 15.220 
Peruvians testified before the TRC.53 By applying a victim-centered 
and testimony-based model, Peru responded to the (by then 
internationally well-established) idea that revealing the truth about 
the past was beneficial for the future of post-conflict societies. The 
model was believed to bring about justice for the victims, while at the 
50  This choice to focus on ‘innocent’ victims was in fact already clear before the 
start of the TRC, with the campaign “In name of the Innocent” (“En nombre de 
los inocentes”) that was set up by the CNDDHH as a protest against Fujimori’s 
amnesty law in 1995. Coletta Youngers, Violencia política y sociedad civil en el Perú: 
historia de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 25.
51  International Center for Transitional Justice, “Annual Report 2001-2002,” 20. 
The public hearings were broadcasted on the state channel TV Perú and on the 
cable channel Canal N. CVR, “El Impacto de Las Audiencias Públicas En Los 
Participantes,” accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/apublicas/
audiencias/impacto.php.  
52  Silvia Rodríguez Maeso, “Testimonios, Discurso Experto Y Comisiones de La 
Verdad: El Contexto de La Denuncia,” Política y Sociedad (2011): 589.
53  The TRC held eight public hearings with victims, five thematic public hearings, 
seven public assemblies and fifteen ‘dialogues’ (diálogos y encuentros ciudadanos). 
In total, 422 people testified during these public events and 9.500 people attended. 
CVR, “Informe Sobre Las Actividades Realizadas Por La Comisión de La Verad Y 
Reconciliación Y Convocatoria Al País,” accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.
cverdad.org.pe/lacomision/balance/index.php. 
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same time restoring their dignity, facilitating national reconciliation 
and preventing further violations (cfr. 1.2). This conception of truth 
goes beyond the forensic aspect of documenting crimes in order 
to collect juridical evidence that can be used in court, as it implies 
a notion of truth as already being a form of justice in itself and 
therefore a right that victims can appeal to.54 Promoting this right 
to truth is one of the main goals of international transitional justice 
institutions such as the ICTJ.55  Within this paradigm, the mere 
act of testifying publicly and breaking the silence is considered to 
be a form of symbolic reparation, provoking a liberating catharsis 
for the victims. Finding truth through testimony then gains 
importance over the pursuit of some kind of reconciliation between 
the witnesses and the audience, or the pursuit of criminal justice.56 
The Supreme Decree that established the TRC followed this trend 
by underscoring that “the State should guarantee society’s right 
to truth”.57 In his inaugural speech of the public hearings, TRC 
president Salomón Lerner stated that the public hearings “will not 
be a stage for the debate of ideas or for the confrontation of versions. 
[…] They are moments for respectful and compassionate listening 
and, above all, for the dignification of the victims […].”58 Reflecting 
on the public hearings, commissioner Carlos Iván Degregori wrote 
54  For a discussion on ‘truth as acknowledgment’ see: Berber Bevernage, History, 
Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice (New York: Routledge, 2012), 10. 
55  “ICTJ Program Report: Truth and Memory,” accessed September 23, 2014, 
http://ictj.org/news/ictj-program-report-truth-and-memory.
56  For a discussion on historical vs. juridical truth in the Peruvian TRC, see: 
Rodríguez Maeso, “Testimonios, Discurso Experto Y Comisiones de La Verdad: 
El Contexto de La Denuncia,” 593 a.f. 
57  My translation of original citation: “[…] el Estado debe garantizar el derecho de la 
Sociedad a la verdad.” Decreto Supremo N° 065-2001-PCM, Lima, 04.06.2001.
58  My translation of original citation: “No serán estas audiencias un escenario para el 
debate de ideas ni para la confrontación de versiones. [...] Son momentos para la escucha respetuosa 
y compasiva y, sobre todo, para la dignificación de las víctimas […]”. CVR, “Inauguración 
de Las Audiencias Públicas. Palabras Del Presidente de La CVR,” accessed June 1, 
2018, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/apublicas/audiencias/inaugura.php.
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that the very act of daring to speak gave agency to the survivors 
and therefore constituted a symbolic reparation.59 The choice for a 
testimony-based model was thus a very conscious one inspired by 
the international paradigm of transitional justice. 
Reparations for victims
The recommendations of the TRC resulted in the opening of the 
Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV)60 and the creation of the Programa 
Integral de Reparaciones (PIR)61 monitored by the Comisión Multisectorial 
de Alto Nivel (CMAN)62 and the Consejo de Reparaciones63, institutions 
created within the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.64 The 
final design of the reparation plan was based on a proposal prepared 
by the ICTJ and APRODEH, in dialogue with several national 
and regional victims’ associations. The parameters put forward in 
the proposal are based on four objectives: bringing justice to the 
victims, recognizing the pain and suffering experienced by victims, 
reestablishing civic trust amongst citizens and contributing to 
social solidarity with the victims.65 In its pursuit of integrality, the 
reparation plan consists of no less than six different categories of 
reparation: restoration of citizens’ rights, reparations in education, 
reparations in health, individual economic reparations, collective 
59  Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero Luminoso 
Y El Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú: 1980-1999, 282. 
60  Unique Victim Register
61  Integral Reparation Program
62  High-Level Multisector Commission
63  Reparations Council 
64  The CMAN was created in 2004, the law that established the reparation plan 
was approved in 2005 and the reparation council was installed in 2006. Elisabeth 
Bunselmeyer, “Trust Repaired? The Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Reparation Program on Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict 
Communities of Peru” (Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2017), 112. 
65  ICTJ and APRODEH, “Design Parameters for a Reparations Program in 
Peru,” 2002.
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reparations and symbolic reparations.66 The Peruvian reparation 
plan thus clearly reflects the ICTJ’s vision that “reparations should 
be based on a process of listening to victims” and that it should 
combine “measures that are symbolic, material, individual, and 
collective”.67 Eligible beneficiaries of the reparation plan are defined 
as “all the persons or groups of persons who because of the internal 
armed conflict […] have suffered acts or omissions that violate 
norms of international human rights law”.68 The plan thus seems to 
take a universal approach towards the notion of victim by explicitly 
mentioning that the notion of violation is independent of any 
previous conduct of the victim, following international standards 
based on the principle of non-discrimination and equality before the 
law. In the next paragraph, however, one crucial exception is made 
as it is stated that “taking into account the nature of the violence in 
Peru, the TRC considers that those persons who have been injured 
or killed during armed confrontations and who at that moment 
belonged to a subversive terrorist organization cannot be considered 
victims.” 69 The commission hence distinguishes between state 
forces and self-defense committees who are included in the universe 
of victims in case of having suffered human rights violations, and 
66  Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final” (Lima, 2003), 
Anexo 6: Plan Integral de Reparaciones. 
67  ICTJ, “Reparations & Transitional Justice,” International Center for Transitional 
Justice, February 25, 2011, https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-
issues/reparations.
68  Ten different categories of violations are defined in the PIR: enforced 
disappearance, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution, murder, forced displacement, 
arbitrary detention and violation of due process, forced recruitment, torture, rape, 
and injuries or death in attacks violating international humanitarian law. Comisión 
de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final,” Tomo IX, 149. The RUV 
was closed for a while in 2011 by the Garcia administration but was later reopened 
and is still open for registration. By 2017, 223.000 people were registered in the 
RUV. Bunselmeyer, “Trust Repaired? The Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Reparation Program on Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict 
Communities of Peru”, 116. 
69  CVR, Tomo IX, 149.
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members of the Shining Path and the MRTA that can under no 
circumstances benefit from any category of the reparation plan.70 
The different types of violation moreover give access to different 
categories of the reparation plan. Individual economic reparations, 
for example, are limited to family members of victims who died 
or disappeared, victims with mental or physical disabilities as a 
consequence of (sexual) violence or torture, victims of wrongful 
imprisonment, victims of rape and children born from rape. 71  
Although comprehensive in its design, the implementation of the 
plan has been facing many problems.72 The registration procedure 
confronts potential beneficiaries with an overly bureaucratic process 
that is mostly only accessible in Spanish. On top of that come severe 
logistical problems such as the journey from a remote place to the 
central registration offices. Not only does this involve significant 
expenses (for travel and accommodation) but also a loss of valuable 
70  This goes against the criteria formulated in the draft design of the ICTJ and 
APRODEH, where it is stated that “the program should satisfy the principles 
of nondiscrimination and equal treatment. […] Regarding these principles, 
international law rejects the notion that in order to receive reparations, the 
victims of human rights violations or international humanitarian law violations 
must have ‘clean hands’.” ICTJ and APRODEH, “Design Parameters for a 
Reparations Program in Peru,” 3. For an analysis of the implications of this “clean 
hands doctrine” for the Peruvian reparation plan, see: Lisa LaPlante, “The Law 
of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in 
Peru’s Political Transition,” American University International Law Review 23, no. 1 
( January 1, 2007).
71  Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final” (Lima, 2003), 
Anexo 6: Plan Integral de Reparaciones. In the case of individual economic 
reparation for deceased or disappeared family members, the amount (10.000 PEN 
or €2.500) is divided between the family members, regardless of the numbers of 
persons in the family. 
72  For an extensive evaluation of the different aspects of the reparation program 
and the expectations of beneficiaries see: Bunselmeyer, “Trust Repaired? The 
Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Reparation Program 
on Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict Communities of Peru” and Mijke De Waardt, 
“Are Peruvian Victims Being Mocked?: Politicization of Victimhood and Victims’ 
Motivations for Reparations,” Human Rights Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2013): 830–49.
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worktime. Next, there is a whole range of perception problems. As 
the majority of beneficiaries live in conditions of extreme poverty, 
some aspects of the plan that are set up as collective reparations – for 
instance health insurance or community projects – are not perceived 
by survivors as compensations for damage suffered during the 
conflict, but are instead interpreted as ‘regular’ assistance from the 
state or NGOs.73 Until today, most progress has been made in paying 
individual economic reparations, but the level of dissatisfaction 
among beneficiaries is very high because of the low amounts of 
money.74 Conflicts sometimes arise within communities or families 
over reparation claims.75 Cases of corruption committed by clerks 
of the National Bank that are in charge of the reimbursements 
have also been reported.76 In the most remote areas, disinformation 
and ignorance concerning the reparation plan impedes potential 
beneficiaries from subscribing to the victim register and making 
a claim.77 Former truth commissioners also criticize the poor 
implementation of the reparation program. Sofía Macher, ex-
73  For example, the reparations in healthcare include insurance for victims by the 
Integral Healthcare System (Sistema Integral de Salud, SIS) of the state, but SIS 
already applies automatically to Peruvians living in extreme poverty. Mental health 
care is in most cases completely absent, notwithstanding the fact that there is a lot 
of demand. 
74  Also, the payments only started in 2011, ten years after the start of the TRC. 
At that time, 3.200 registered beneficiaries had already died. By 2017, 83.600 
beneficiaries had received individual economic reparations. Bunselmeyer, “Trust 
Repaired? The Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Reparation Program on Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict Communities of Peru,” 
115.
75  A recurring example is women accusing each other of giving false declarations 
about rape in order to receive reparations.
76  “Extrabajador del Banco de la Nación acusado de robo a víctima de la violencia 
política,” accessed September 18, 2018, https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2014/10/28/
extrabajador-del-banco-de-la-nacion-acusado-de-robo-a-victima-de-la-violencia-
politica/elenachavez/; Bunselmeyer, 116.
77  This was most notable during my fieldwork in the VRAEM region and in the 
more remote annexes of districts in the highlands of Ayacucho. 
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commissioner and the first president of the Reparations Council, 
particularly refers to the poor training of the state personnel 
involved in the reparation process as being a huge problem.78
Forensic truth: Finding, exhuming and identifying the disappeared
Already during the conflict, the human rights movement and 
victims’ organizations such as the ANFASEP put the search 
for the disappeared high on their agenda (cfr. 3.1). According to 
Macher, finding the disappeared was therefore one of the main 
raisons d’être of the TRC.79 The commission did indeed not only 
conclude that the actual number of victims was a lot higher than 
generally expected. It also found that many of these victims were 
buried in clandestine graves – which means that they lack a death 
certificate – and/or were disappeared – in the sense that their final 
resting place is unknown.80 The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), the COMISEDH, the Public Ministry and the 
EPAF estimate that the number of persons that are still missing 
today fluctuates between 13.000 and 16.000.81 The TRC therefore 
elaborated a Registro Nacional de Sitios de Entierro82 containing 
4.644 presumed burial sites and designed the Plan Nacional de 
78  Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
79  Interview with Sofía Macher, 24.05.2017.
80  Law N°30470 on the search of persons who disappeared during the period 
of violence 1980-2000, approved by Peruvian congress in June 2016, defines 
a “disappeared person” as “any person whose whereabouts are unknown by his 
relatives or of whom there is no legal certainty of their location, as a consequence of 
the period of violence 1980-2000”. See: Ley n°30470, Ley de búsqueda de personas 
desaparecidas durante el período de violencia 1980-2000, <http://tbinternet.
ohchr.org/Treat ies/CED/Shared%20Documents/PER/INT_CED_ADR_
PER_25074_S.pdf>, last consulted 15.03.2017.
81  All these institutions manage different lists with diverging numbers which are 
based on the work of the TRC on the one hand, and post-TRC advancements in 
the search for the disappeared by different institutions involved in the process on 
the other. 
82  National Register of Burial Sites
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Investigaciones Antropológico Forsenses (PNIAF)83 as part of 
its recommendations.84 Furthermore, the TRC participated in the 
exhumation of the mass graves of three so-called emblematic cases: 
Chuschi, Totos and Lucanamarca.85 The search for the disappeared 
was also integrated in the reparation program under the category 
symbolic reparations, in the form of reburial ceremonies and 
restitution of the legal status of people without death certificate.86 
In case of the three exhumations carried out during the mandate 
of the TRC, the process of restitution and reburial of the remains 
was indeed performed during highly symbolical public ceremonies 
which were well-attended by representatives of the state and the 
TRC.
The importance given in Peru to the process of finding the 
disappeared should be seen against the international background 
of “forensic human rights investigations”, as Adam Rosenblatt 
describes it. Scholars like Elisabeth Anstett and Lore Colaert have 
referred to this tendency as the “forensic turn” in transitional 
justice.87 As explained in chapter one, this international ‘forensic 
turn’ is represented by an international network of forensic NGOs 
specialized in the exhumation of mass graves and the identification 
of victims. This network has its roots in Argentina but was further 
83  National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Investigations
84  Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final,” Tomo IX, 209. 
85  On the process of exhumation and reburial in these three cases, see: Isaias Rojas-
Perez, Mourning Remains: State Atrocity, Exhumations, and Governing the Disappeared in 
Peru’s Postwar Andes, 1 edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2017), 41–49.
86  Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final” (Lima, 2003), 
Anexo 6: Plan Integral de Reparaciones.
87  Elisabeth Anstett and Jean-Marc Dreyfus, Destruction and Human Remains. 
Disposal and Concealment in Genocide and Mass Violence, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2014).; Adam Rosenblatt, Digging the Disappeared: Forensic Science 
after Atrocity (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2015); Lore Colaert, “History from 
the Grave. Politics of Memory in Exhumations of Mass Graves from the Spanish 
Civil War” (Ghent University, 2015).
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developed in the aftermath of the ex-Yugoslavian and Rwandan 
conflicts. According to Colaert, the increasing application of forensic 
exhumations of mass graves in post-conflict settings is closely related 
to the right to truth, and more specifically to the idea that “truth 
can be straightforwardly found on the victim’s body”.88 Indeed, as 
Isaias Rojas-Perez states while writing about the Peruvian context, 
the problem of the disappeared embodied the TRC’s concern with 
both legal and historical truth, responding to the “needs of society 
at large for healing and reconciliation” by focusing on “patterns of 
human rights violations [...] within a broader narrative of violence 
and injustice.”89
Despite the initial strong engagement with the search for the 
disappeared, the execution of the National Plan faced serious 
difficulties from the outset. A pertinent problem was the 
disagreement between the involved human rights institutions over 
the specific methodologies and aims that were to be followed.90 
Also, ever since the mandate of the TRC ended, the Equipo Forense 
Especializado (EFE)91 of the Public Ministry has been the only 
institution allowed to carry out exhumations. This “ill-conceived 
autonomy” has significantly restrained the possibility for partnership 
between specialized civil society organizations and the state in 
carrying out the immense and complex task of exhuming the graves 
and identifying the victims.  The result is a Kafkaesque situation in 
which the state and civil society organizations work parallel to each 
other instead of exchanging experience and expertise.92 Finally, since 
88  Lore Colaert, “History from the Grave. Politics of Memory in Exhumations of 
Mass Graves from the Spanish Civil War” (Ghent University, 2015), 34.  
89  Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 38.
90  The actors involved were the EPAF, the COMISEDH, the CNDDHH, the 
Centro Andino de Investigaciones Antropológico Forenses (CENIA) and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC-CICR). Interview with Sofía 
Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
91  Specialized Forensic Team
92  COMISEDH, Los Muertos de Ayacucho. Violencia Y Sitios de Entierro Clandestinos 
(Lima, 2012), 22.
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the Public Ministry focuses on criminal justice it requires relatives 
to open (an often overly bureaucratic and slow) judicial process. 
In the past two years, however, several measures have been taken 
that might bring a new dynamic to the search for the disappeared. 
The persistent lobby work of human rights NGOs has resulted in a 
new legal framework that aims to tackle the principal obstacles to the 
process. On the 26th of June 2016, in the last month of government 
of president Ollanta Humala, the Law On the Search for Persons 
Who Disappeared During the Period of Violence 1980-2000 was 
approved by the congress.93 By December 2016, under the new 
government of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, the law resulted in the design 
of a national plan for the search for the disappeared, coordinated by 
the Dirección General de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas (DGBPD)94 
of the Ministry of Justice. Both the law and the plan focus on the 
humanitarian aspect of the search for the disappeared by putting 
the rights of the relatives center stage. The plan states that “all the 
teams that are involved in the process of finding missing persons 
must first and foremost ensure that no further harm is done to the 
victims.” Following a humanitarian approach is understood as “to 
orient the process of search in a way that it has a reparative effect 
for the families, without this implying encouraging or hindering the 
determination of criminal responsibility.”95 Finding the appropriate 
balance between the humanitarian approach and the focus on 
criminal justice is indeed one of the major challenges characterizing 
the search for the disappeared. The new legal framework furthermore 
resulted in the creation of a genetic databank through a legislative 
93  Ley n°30470, Ley de búsqueda de personas desaparecidas durante el período 
de violencia 1980-2000, <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CED/Shared%20
Documents/PER/INT_CED_ADR_PER_25074_S.pdf>, last consulted 
15.03.2017.
94  General Directorate of Search for Disappeared Persons 
95  Plan nacional para la búsqueda de personas desaparecidas (1980-2000), p. 9, 
<https://www.minjus.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Plan__busqueda_
personas_desaparecidas.pdf>, last consulted 13.02.2017.
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decree approved on August 29th 2018.96 This instrument should 
facilitate the identification process by contrasting DNA samples of 
relatives with the profiles of recovered remains. Despite the fact that 
the new legal framework represents an important step forward on 
a theoretical level, in practice it might be too little too late. Many 
valuable years have passed, crucial information has gone lost and 
foremost, the state may have missed an important momentum for 
recognition towards the survivors. I will further elaborate on the 
search for the disappeared in chapter five.
Peru as an international example 
Inspired by, most notably, the Argentinian and South-African 
experience, the Peruvian transitional justice process was clearly 
a product of the international discourse on justice, truth and 
reconciliation in post-conflict settings. As described above, 
the entanglement of the national human rights movement 
with international players was decisive in shaping the Peruvian 
transitional justice project. Regardless of the failure of the Peruvian 
state to properly follow-up on the recommendations made by the 
TRC, the Peruvian experience did set a landmark for transitional 
justice in that it is internationally seen as a successful example of 
dealing with the past. There are a number of elements that explain 
this positive perception. First of all, no other country has filed as 
many complaints with the Inter-American Court as Peru and the 
rulings have had an important ripple effect on the region.97 Cases 
such as Castillo Páez v. Peru (1997), Barrios Altos v. Peru (2001) and 
La Cantuta v. Peru (2006) were important international precedents 
96  “Consejo de Ministros aprueba Decreto Legislativo que crea el Banco de 
Datos Genéticos,” accessed September 25, 2018, https://www.gob.pe/institucion/
minjus/noticias/18416-consejo-de-ministros-aprueba-decreto-legislativo-que-
crea-el-banco-de-datos-geneticos.
97  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 62.
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in establishing the right to truth.98 Second, Priscilla Hayner, co-
founder of the ICTJ and expert on truth commissions, counts 
the Peruvian TRC as one of the five most ‘successful’ worldwide 
due to its large staff, high budget, broad mandate and extensive 
recommendations.99 The Peruvian TRC was also the first in Latin 
America to hold public hearings and to explicitly pay attention to 
gender and sexual violence.100 Furthermore, the Peruvian case was 
an important breeding ground for UN Special Rapporteur Pablo De 
Greiff’s ideas on reparations.101 These ideas were presented for the 
first time in the draft design of the Peruvian reparation plan by the 
ICTJ and APRODEH and were firmly established as an international 
paradigm in subsequent publications of the ICTJ.102 The Peruvian 
experience was thus not only shaped by the international network 
and concept of transitional justice, it also significantly influenced it. 
3.3 “Las víctimas no nacen, se hacen”103
Clean hands doctrine vs. universalist approach
As stated above, ‘innocent’ victims became the main subjects of 
Peru’s transitional justice project. The TRC played a crucial role 
in defining this particular subject position of survivors in the 
aftermath of the war. The TRCs model of truth through testimony 
98  Dermot Groome, “The Right to Truth in the Fight Against Impunity,” Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 29, no. 1 (2011): 183.
99  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 35, 274. The criteria of ‘succes’ used by Hayner 
seem to be rather quantitative and are not based on factors such as the level of 
satisfaction of survivors. 
100  Bueno-Hansen, Feminist and Human Rights Struggles in Peru, 53.
101  Pablo De Greiff was UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence from 2011 to 2018. 
102  Pablo De Greiff and International Center for Transnational Justice, The 
Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 472.
103  Quote by Jose Pablo Baraybar, director of the EPAF, lit. translation: “Victims 
are not born, they are made”, fieldnotes, Huamanga, 14.03.2015.
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has been criticized for promoting a victim identity that responds 
to certain stereotypical criteria (e.g. passive, indigenous, poor, 
Quechua speaking, female) and stimulated survivors to reproduce 
narratives of violence that fit a prefixed structure.104 Pascha Bueno-
Hansen has pointed out, for example, how the agency of the 
survivors during the public hearings was limited by the fact that 
translation was only provided from Quechua to Spanish (i.e. from 
the survivors to the commissioners) but not vice versa. According 
to Bueno-Hansen, “this unidirectionality reflects an economy of 
emotion in which the historically marginalized produce testimonies 
that conform to dominant linguistic and temporal frames for 
mainstream consumption.”105 Nelson Pereyra, professor of History 
at the UNSCH, speaks of a “subalternizing discourse of transitional 
justice that creates passive victims that are easy to dominate”.106 
Furthermore, Laplante and Theidon have pointed out how the 
victim-centeredness of the TRC left no space for the “other truths” 
of subversive perpetrators. By constructing a narrative of citizens 
caught between two fires, it did not succeed in providing insight 
in why so many Peruvians sympathized with or participated in the 
Shining Path.107 Both the domestic context of criminalization and 
stigmatization of the Shining Path and the international context of a 
104  Rodríguez Maeso, “Testimonios, Discurso Experto y Comisiones de La 
Verdad: El Contexto de La Denuncia,” 596.
105  Bueno-Hansen, Feminist and Human Rights Struggles in Peru, 96.
106  Nelson Pereyra during a seminar in the SER (Asociación Servicios Educativos 
Rurales), fieldnotes, Huamanga, 19.11.2015.
107  The authors also rightly point out how this is related to the context in which 
the commission took shape: the Shining Path was defeated by the government, 
there was no negotiated peace which fostered the demonization of Shining Path 
members as “terrorists”. “As a result, despite the country’s massive effort to present 
a collective truth of its internal armed conflict, there is scant political or discursive 
space in Peru to explore why so many people joined SL and MRTA and remained 
sympathetic to the movements even under military repression.” Lisa J. Laplante 
and Kimberly Theidon, “Commissioning Truth, Constructing Silences: The 
Peruvian Truth  Commission and the Other Truths of ‘Terrorists,’” in Mirrors of 
Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 305. 
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victim-centered human rights discourse left little room for including 
the voices of ‘difficult’ actors. More ambiguous roles, such as those 
of the self-defense committees, clearly do not really fit the dominant 
narrative of the TRC and are therefore generally disregarded (as we 
will see in chapter 6). Notwithstanding the fact that the TRC also 
took a stance against the violence committed by state actors, the idea 
of a necessary evil is dominant in public opinion and the Shining 
Path is generally blamed as the one and only real perpetrator.108 
This has created a (post-)conflict landscape in which there is an 
extreme “victimización del afectado” (“victimization of the affected”) 
on the one hand, and a persistent exclusion of anyone associated 
with the Shining Path or the MRTA on the other.109 The discussion 
on the reintegration of former combatants, for example, has been a 
persistent taboo, even for human rights defenders.110
The construction of the particular subject position of survivors, 
initiated by the TRC, was firmly anchored by the opening of the 
victim register and the implementation of the reparation plan. As 
described above, the definition of victim applied by the reparation 
program is contradictory in the sense that it combines a universalist 
human rights approach with the exclusive clean hands doctrine.111 
108  The TRC’s criticism on the state is often dismissed as ‘left wing propaganda’ 
and the TRC has been constantly accused, mostly by Fujimorista’s, of supporting 
‘the terrorists’.
109  In Spanish, there is a slight difference in meaning between people ‘affected’ by 
the conflict (afectados) or victims (víctimas). The term afectados sounds more objective, 
while the term víctimas implies appropriating a certain identity. Javier Torres, “Tan 
Lejos de La Transición, Tan Cerca de La Postguerra,” Revista Argumentos (blog), 
accessed October 16, 2015, http://revistaargumentos.iep.org.pe/articulos/tan-
lejos-de-la-trasncision-tan-cerca-de-la-postguerra/.
110  Torres.
111  Lisa LaPlante, “The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: 
Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition,” American University 
International Law Review 23, no. 1 ( January 1, 2007).
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Getting organized (or not)
Even though organizations of internally displaced persons (IDPs 
or desplazados) and family members of disappeared persons, such as 
the ANFASEP, were already well-organized during the conflict, the 
TRC and the reparation plan had a huge effect on the emergence of 
(all kinds of) grassroots victims’ associations. Giving a testimony to 
the TRC was for many survivors closely related to the expectation of 
receiving something in return. Through the TRC and the reparation 
program, survivors were stimulated to identify with the proposed 
victim categories in order to claim their rights. For communities 
who wanted to claim collective reparations, organizing themselves 
in a victims’ association was a precondition for making this claim. 
According to Root, more than 200 of these associations existed by 
the end of the mandate of the TRC. 112 De Waardt considers the 
large number of associations in Peru exceptional in comparison 
with other post-conflict contexts and directly links it to the longer 
tradition of grassroots organizations that started in the 1970s.113 
Although the majority of the victims’ associations emerged from 
bottom-up initiatives, national and international NGOs played or 
play a crucial role in supporting victims’ associations and pressuring 
the implementation of the recommendations of the TRC.114 Even 
small rural villages in Ayacucho mostly have (or had) such a 
victims’ association. As these local organizations mainly focus on 
obtaining individual economic reparations, survivors who do not 
fit the categories of beneficiaries of individual economic reparations 
generally are not a member or do not actively participate. The 
Regional and National Coordinator of Organizations of Persons 
112  Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, 91. This number increased in the following years 
with the opening of the RUV and the start of individual reparations payments. 
113  Mijke de Waardt, “Do Victims Only Cry? Victim-Survivors and Their 
Grassroots Organizations in Peru,” 2012, 64.
114  De Waardt mentions a report by Oxfam (2002) that states that 90% of the 
victims associations received support from NGOs or churches. De Waardt, 72, 74.
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Affected by the Political Violence (CORAVIP115 and CONAVIP116 
respectively) function as umbrella organizations for the local 
associations. The organization of victims’ associations is marked 
by a strong difference between rural and urban contexts. Rural 
associations, of which most members are peasants who are tied to 
their work on the land, typically have limited time and resources. 
Traveling to Huamanga or Lima to participate in the activities of the 
CORAVIP or CONAVIP implies spending money and time. Urban 
associations generally have more access to resources and have more 
contact with national or international NGOs and politicians. In 
Lima, associations of victims of emblematic cases have great visibility, 
such as for example the relatives of the disappeared students of La 
Cantuta. Furthermore, the voice of survivors is often appropriated 
by human rights organizations and activists who claim to speak on 
behalf of the victims.117 In Huamanga, the ANFASEP is the main 
defender of the rights of victims. The ANFASEP started out as a 
grassroots association of women searching for their disappeared sons 
and husbands but was quickly supported and influenced by human 
rights (I)NGOs and international victim associations such as the 
Latin American Federation of the disappeared (FEDEFAM) and 
the Argentine Madres de Plaza de Mayo.118 ANFASEP’s mottos ‘para 
que no se repita’ and ‘verdad y justicia’ reflect the international discourse 
on human rights and transitional justice. During a meeting on the 
construction of a memorial site at La Hoyada, the mass grave next 
to the military base of Los Cabitos in Huamanga, the president of 
115  Coordinadora Regional de Organizaciones de Afectados por la Violencia Política Ayacucho 
116  Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones de Afectados por la Violencia Política
117  Elizabeth Jelin, “Silences, Visibility and Agency : Ethnicity, Class and Gender 
in Public Memorialization,” 2009, 212.  
118  Youngers, “La Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Del Perú Un 
Estudio de Caso de Construcción de Una Coalición,” 8; Elizabeth Jelin, “Silences, 
Visibility and Agency : Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Public Memorialization,” 
2009, 212; Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 
24.05.2017.
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ANFASEP stated that it should become “Peru’s Auschwitz”.119 
The (post-)conflict human rights community in Huamanga is 
characterized by a ‘scramble’ for the women of ANFASEP, and 
by extension a scramble for the victims in general.120 The victim 
identity of survivors is often appropriated by these ‘well-meaning’ 
outsiders who translate their needs into human rights language and, 
in many cases, make it fit the agenda of international donors. In this 
process, not only their authenticity as a victim is cultivated but often 
also their ‘cultural authenticity’ as indigenous Quechua speaking 
peasants. For example, during a meeting in Huamanga dealing with 
the commemorative activities regarding the massacre of Cayara, 
an NGO representative rejected the name ‘santuario’ (‘sanctuary’) 
which the survivors wanted to give to the memorial, and stated that 
they should come up with “something more original, something 
in Quechua, something authentic linked to the cultural theme”. 
Whereas the local representatives from Cayara wanted to seize the 
occasion to denounce the defective water supply in their village in 
front of the government officials attending the ceremony, the NGO 
representative stressed the importance of official apologies and the 
presence of the national press instead.121 The fact that NGOs all 
fish in the same pond in order to pursue money for projects often 
stimulates conflict rather than collaboration. In the last couple of 
years, Peruvian human rights NGOs have experienced a dramatic 
decrease in funds for transitional justice related projects. The focus 
of many organizations has therefore shifted to other ‘hot’ topics 
such as women’s rights and the social and environmental impact of 
the extraction of natural resources.
119  Fieldnotes, Reunión ANFASEP y Centro Loyola sobre la Hoyada, Huamanga, 
10.03.2015. 
120  This community consists of national NGOs with offices in Huamanga, such 
as COMISEDH or APRODEH, local NGOs supported by religious groups, 
such as Paz y Esperanza and Centro Loyola Ayacucho, local NGOs supported by 
international agencies, such as Apoyo para la Paz, or local offices of INGOs, such 
as the ICRC.
121  Fieldnotes, Reunión autoridades de Cayara con APRODEH, Huamanga, 28.02.2015. 
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3.4 The state and its relationship with human rights, justice 
and citizenship
Reconciling multiple Peru’s 
In the direct aftermath of the so-called Baguazo in June 2009 – a 
violent confrontation between the police and indigenous protesters 
standing up against oil exploitation, which left 33 people killed in 
the Amazon town of Bagua – president Alan García declared that 
the protesters were no “first class citizens” and that “4000 natives 
cannot say to 28 million Peruvians: you don’t have the right to come 
here”.122 The existence of ‘multiple Peru’s’, with ‘first’ and ‘second 
class’ citizens separated by historically rooted socio-economic 
divisions and power imbalances, was identified by the TRC as one 
of the root causes for the escalation of violence. During two decades 
of civil war, the Peruvian state did not only fail to protect its citizens, 
it also committed large scale human rights violations against its 
own population under the guise of the ‘war on terror’. Salomón 
Lerner highlighted in his speech when presenting the final report 
that “much violence could have been prevented had it not been 
for the indifference, passivity, or simple ineptitude of those who 
occupied the highest public offices in this land.”123 As Rodríguez 
Maeso rightly points out, the TRC was created by the state but it 
was mostly perceived by the public as a human rights NGO and 
had limited authority to speak on behalf of the state.124 Moreover, 
the favorable environment for the defense of human rights during 
the transitional government of Paniagua was exceptional compared 
122  Redacción LR, “Conozca las ‘patinadas’ verbales de Alan García,” July 3, 2011, 
https://larepublica.pe/politica/553595-conozca-las-patinadas-verbales-de-alan-
garcia.
123  Orin Starn, Carlos Iván Degregori, and Robin Kirk, The Peru Reader: History, 
Culture, Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 404.
124  Rodríguez Maeso, “Testimonios, Discurso Experto y Comisiones de La 
Verdad: El Contexto de La Denuncia,” 599.
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to the established political order that preceded and followed it. 
Nevertheless, through its work, the commission aimed at reconciling 
the state and its citizens as well as bridging the gaps between the 
‘multiple Peru’s’. The concept of reconciliation was borrowed from 
the South-African model but was understood differently in Peru, as 
its emphasis was primarily on nation-building.125 As the final report 
states “the TRC understands by ‘reconciliation’ the beginning of a 
process of re-establishment and re-foundation of the fundamental 
bonds among Peruvians, bonds voluntarily destroyed or damaged 
by the outbreak of a violent conflict initiated by the Shining 
Path during the last decades, and in which the whole society was 
involved.” The involvement of the entire society refers to the “silent 
complicity” of the bystanders that “contributed in their own way 
to the destruction of our social coexistence”.126 Instead of focusing 
on reconciling victims and perpetrators, the Peruvian reconciliation 
project was thus in the first place about restoring the social contract 
between the state and its citizens and a renewed acquaintance of 
society with itself, a project in which every Peruvian was expected 
to be involved.127 The public hearings of the TRC were conceived as 
125  Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
126  My translation of original citation: “La CVR entiende por “reconciliación” la puesta 
en marcha de un proceso de restablecimiento y refundación de los vínculos fundamentales entre los 
peruanos, vínculos voluntariamente destruidos o deteriorados por el estallido de un conflicto violento 
iniciado por el PCP Sendero Luminoso en las últimas décadas, y en el que la sociedad entera se 
vio involucrada. […] No solo la acción directa de las protagonistas, sino también la complicidad 
silenciosa o la desidia de muchos han contribuido a su manera a promover la destrucción de nuestra 
convivencia social.” CVR, “Informe Final,” TOMO IX, 13. 
127  The TRC differentiates between three levels of reconciliation: 1) the political 
level (State-society), 2) the social level (institutions-society), 3) the interpersonal 
level (within communities or institutions). It also differentiates between 
reconciliation and forgiveness: “Reconciliation is the beginning of a process that 
seeks to re-establish the fundamental links between the members of a community, 
after having overcome the conflict that destroyed them -even if this conflict is 
initiated by one of the parties. Meanwhile, forgiveness is the gratuitous, asymmetric 
and unique act of absolving from payment and allowing the victim (occasionally 
the ruler, on behalf of the nation) to relive the past - however painful it may be - 
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an important encounter between the victims and the state listening 
to their stries.128 This aim of restoring the social contract was, of 
course, very ambitious. A rhetorical question frequently raised by 
victims and human rights defenders in Peru is how there can ever be 
reconciliation if there never even was conciliation? Instead of asserting 
that the the civil war destroyed the social contract, one should 
wonder whether it was not a symptom of a society that was already 
historically divided and never really had such a social contract. As 
Jo-Marie Burt concludes in her analysis of state formation in Peru 
during the 20th century, “the historical process of state formation 
in Peru culminated in a weak state that failed to integrate all its 
members into the nation and grant them citizenship.”129 The 
institutional reform recommended by the TRC aimed at touching 
upon a series of fundamental responsibilities left unfulfilled by 
the state, which had contributed to the outbreak of the civil war. 
In order to prevent such outbreaks from recurring in the future, 
thus the TRC, reforms were needed in the justice administration, 
the educational system, the army, the police and the intelligence 
service.130 Furthermore, civil participation in the construction of the 
state, decentralization of the state and the overcoming of poverty 
were formulated as recommendations for institutional reform in 
function of reconciliation.131 The persistence of profound power 
imbalances in Peruvian society today painfully shows the lack of 
political will to follow up on these recommendations. Since the 
release of the final report, no government has taken significant steps 
to overcome it.” [My translation from Spanish original.] Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación Perú, TOMO IX, 14, 25.
128  Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero Luminoso 
y El Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú: 1980-1999, 284.
129  My translation of original citation: “El proceso histórico de formación del Estado en 
el Perú culminó en un Estado débil que fracasó en integrar a la nación a todos sus miembros y en 
otorgarles ciudadanía.” Burt, Violencia y autoritarismo en el Perú bajo la sombra de Sendero y 
la dictadura de Fujimori, 84.
130  CVR, “Informe Final,” TOMO IX, 112.
131  CVR, IX 87.
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to realize profound reforms.132 According to Sofía Macher’s analysis 
in 2014, ten years after the final report, there has been no advance 
whatsoever in the recommendations for institutional reform related 
to securing greater civil participation in the political system, nor in 
the recommendations for the fight against poverty.133
The state has thus conceived its role in the transitional justice process 
mainly as a duty to ‘do something for the victims’, rather than 
structurally reforming state institutions. The ways in which both 
the reparation plan and the plan for the search of the disappeared 
are being executed are clear examples hereof. During inauguration 
ceremonies of collective reparation projects or ceremonies of 
restitution of exhumed and identified remains of disappeared 
persons, the presence of the state is often merely symbolic and very 
superficial. At the same time, the state uses the discourse of ‘doing 
something for the victims’ to frame interventions that in fact have 
nothing to do with the reparation plan, especially in Ayacucho. 
For example, when president Ollanta Humala visited the province 
capital of Huancasancos to inaugurate a new network of paved 
roads in 2015, he explicitly linked this realization to the reparation 
program and the history of the war while in fact these were just 
regular infrastructural works.134 As stated above, the TRC was more 
closely associated with the human rights movement than with the 
state since the early days of its existence. The fact that the former 
takes the lead in defending the rights of survivors, and not the state, 
has become self-evident in the eyes of many. As structural reforms 
remained unaccomplished, the window of opportunity that was 
created after the fall of Fujimori and in which the TRC saw the light, 
was quickly overshadowed by the resurgence of traditional politics 
132  Salomón Lerner Febres, “Paz y Reconciliación En Perú,” ReVista Harvard 
Review of Latin America, 2014, https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/paz-y-
reconciliaci%C3%B3n-en-per%C3%BA.
133  Sofía Macher, ¿Hemos avanzado?: a 10 años de las recomendaciones de la Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2014), 19.
134  Field recordings, Visita Ollanta Humala, Huancasancos, 27.03.2015.
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characterized by corruption and clientelism. Due to the legacy of 
the Shining Path and the persistent framing of left-wing politics as 
‘terrorist’, the struggle for social justice has become a political blind 
spot in Peruvian politics. Ironically, the TRC may have contributed 
to the further stigmatization of the left as it excluded ex-Shining 
Path and MRTA militants from testifying, hereby delegitimizing not 
only their violent methods but also their political struggle for social 
justice.135 The narrative of the TRC contributed to the (post-)conflict 
polarization between victims and perpetrators rather than providing 
insight into the political motivations of those who decided to take 
up arms.136 
Persistent impunity 
The TRC’s conception of reconciliation leaned heavily on justice 
as both a precondition for and a result of reconciliation. Truth, in 
its turn, was conceived as the necessary precondition for justice, 
and therefore also for reconciliation. The human rights movement 
thus took a strong stance in favor of justice through truth-telling. 
At the end of its mandate, the TRC presented 43 cases of human 
rights violations to the Public Ministry in which there was clear 
evidence against the perpetrators. When presenting the final report, 
president of the TRC Salomón Lerner underscored that “impunity 
is incompatible with the dignity of any democratic nation.”137 The 
progress of the trials has, nonetheless, been very slow. In 2014, 
135  Laplante and Theidon, “Commissioning Truth, Constructing Silences,” 306.
136  I agree here with Laplante and Theidon when they state that “selective truths 
create a social memory […] that can also ingrain stereotypes, prejudices, and rifts 
between social groups. Social memories of political violence may solidify distances 
between the heroes and villains, eliminating understanding of their overlap. […] 
Breaking down stereotypes and rigid adherence to categories may allow people and 
societies to move beyond the polarizing effects of winners and losers, victims and 
perpetrators. Yet, in Peru, the exact opposite seems to be occurring.” Laplante and 
Theidon, 309.
137  Starn, Degregori, and Kirk, The Peru Reader, 403.
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sentences were pronounced in only thirteen cases, three of which 
were sentences absolving the perpetrators.138 Furthermore, the 
TRC made a list of officials of the military and police who were 
involved in human rights violations with the aim of purging these 
institutions. Instead of fulfilling this recommendation, the Ministry 
of Defense designed a norm guaranteeing legal support for members 
of the army and police involved in judicial processes.139 According to 
Rights Peru, a research project set up by professor of political science 
Jo-Marie Burt of George Mason University in collaboration with 
Peruvian human rights NGOs and victims’ associations, there was a 
general downfall of judicial investigations of human rights violations 
in the past couple of years.140 In particular for investigations against 
the state forces there has been little appetite.141
The case of the massacre of Accomarca in the province of 
Vilcashuamán, Ayacucho, is one of the most emblematic illustrations 
of persistent impunity for human rights violations committed by the 
state, and the lack of reform in an overly bureaucratic and clientelist 
judiciary. On August 14th, 1985, the Peruvian army killed more than 
70 villagers in Accomarca by locking them up in houses that were set 
on fire. The women were separated from the men and raped before 
being killed. After 26 years of struggle by the relatives of the victims 
and human rights organizations, the trial against the 29 accused 
members of the military finally started in November 2010. The trial 
took six years and at least 250 hearings before the final sentence 
was pronounced in August 2016, condemning eleven of the accused 
persons to 10 to 25 years of prison for crimes against humanity. 
After two more years of appeal, this sentence was finally confirmed 
138  Macher, ¿Hemos avanzado?, 149.
139  Macher, 153.
140  Jo-Marie Burt and Maria Rodríguez, “Justicia, Verdad y Memoria: El Proceso 
Penal Para El Caso de La Masacre de Accomarca,” in Políticas En Justicia Transicional. 
Miradas Comparativas Sobre El Legado de La CVR (IEP, Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 2015), 136.
141  Burt and Rodríguez, 138.
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by the Supreme Court in September 2018. Telmo Hurtado, the 
commander in charge during the massacre, fled to the United States 
after the repeal of Fujimori’s amnesty law in 2002 but was detained 
in 2008 and extradited in 2011.142 Hurtado confessed but always 
maintained that he was only taking orders from his superiors, not 
showing any repentance towards the relatives and the survivors.143 
Still, the case of Accomarca was a landmark as it was the first time 
a military commander was condemned by the national court for 
human rights violations.144 It was, however, justice at a high prize: 33 
years of perseverant activism went by before this goal was achieved. 
During a meeting with the Board of Directors of the association of 
displaced Accomarquinos in Lima, which is the driving force behind 
the relatives of the victims involved in the trial, the president of the 
association stressed that the state was the only responsible for the 
massacre and therefore did not have any interest in bringing about 
justice.145 
3.5 Public narratives and memorialization 
Divergent truths 
“The history recorded here belongs to all of us, and it speaks of what 
we have been and what we should become”, thus Salomón Lerner 
when presenting the final report of the TRC and dedicating it to 
all Peruvians.146 Today, however, Peru is far from having achieved 
142  Burt and Rodríguez, 146.
143  Burt and Rodríguez, 153.
144  An extensive overview of all the developments in the Accomarca case is 
provided on the website of Rights Peru: “Accomarca – RIGHTSPERU.NET – 
Juicios Por Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos En El Perú,” RIGHTSPERU.
NET - Juicios Por Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos En El Perú (blog), accessed 
October 15, 2018, https://rightsperu.net/capturan-a-exmilitar-sentenciado-por-
caso-accomarca/.
145  Fieldnotes, Reunión residentes Accomarquinos, Lima, 09.12.2015.
146  Starn, Degregori, and Kirk, The Peru Reader, 406.
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a broadly shared consensus about its violent past. As soon as it was 
made public, the narrative recorded by the TRC had to compete with 
a strong ‘savior’s memory’ which honors Fujimori as the pacifier of 
the country. Human rights violations by the state were framed by 
Fujimori’s propaganda machine as collateral damage in the ‘war on 
terror’, and this idea is still shared by many Peruvians.147 To provide 
a counterweight against the narrative of the final report of the TRC, 
the Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú148 published 
its own version of the history of the civil war in a book with the 
telling title In honor of the truth. Version of the army on their participation 
in the defense of the democratic system against terrorist organizations.149 The 
chapter dedicated to the army’s relation with human rights takes 
off by stating that “the human rights violations that unfortunately 
occurred during the war were not a systematic practice, nor ordered 
or orchestrated by the guiding entities of the Peruvian army, but 
were based on absolute individual participation and decision.”150 
Furthermore, the book portrays human rights organizations as 
ideological left-wing groups that “while the war reached its most 
critical point used their influence to denounce genocide but never 
made any claim when the terrorists perpetrated indiscriminate 
killings”.151 On the other side of the political spectrum, the 
147  The term memoria salvadora (savior’s memory) was coined by Steve Stern 
in 1998. Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero 
Luminoso y El Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú: 1980-1999, 276.
148  Permanent Commission of History of the Peruvian Army
149  Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, En Honor a La Verdad. 
Versión Del Ejército Sobre Su Participación En La Defensa Del Sistema Democrático Contra 
Las Organizaciones Terroristas. (Lima, 2012).
150  My translation of original citation: “Las violaciones de derechos humanos que 
lamentablemente sucedieron durante la guerra no fue una prática sistematizada, ni ordenada 
ni orquestada por los entes rectores del ejército del Peru, sino que fueron hechos de absoluta 
participación y decisión individual.” Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del 
Perú, 295.
151  My translation of original citation: “En suma, mientras la guerra llegaba a su punto 
más álgido, usaron su influencia para denunciar genocidios, pero nunca hicieron reclamo alguno 
cuando los terroristas perpetraron matanzas indiscriminadas.” Comisión Permanente de 
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Movimiento por la Amnestía y Derechos Fundamentales (MOVADEF)152, 
an underground political organization directly related to the Shining 
Path, upholds that it is time to turn the page and release Abimael 
Guzmán and other ‘political prisoners’ from jail. Similar to the way 
the state forces justify their excesses, the MOVADEF frames the 
extreme violence of the Shining Path as an “inevitable consequence” 
of the war.153 In 2012, the MOVADEF was at the center of heated 
media debates as it repeatedly tried (but not succeeded) to inscribe 
itself as a political party, with amnesty and reconciliation being the 
main agenda points. They stress that the war is something of the 
past and strive for what they call a political solution for the legacies 
of the war.154 Over the past couple of years, when ex-MRTA and ex-
Shining Path members were gradually set free after having served 
their sentence, new debates have risen on their reintegration into 
society. On the 18th of May 2018, exactly 38 years after the Shining 
Path’s first attack in Chuschi, a law was approved by the congress 
that prohibits those who have ever been sentenced for terrorism to 
work in state institutions, demonstrating the persistent sensitivity of 
the topic in present-day Peru.155
Public memorialization: For and by whom?
Although the narrative of the final report of the TRC is heavily 
contested by several sectors of society, it does form the basis of many 
Historia del Ejército del Perú, 33.
152  Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights
153  Carmen Ilizarbe Pizarro, “Memoria, Olvido y Negacionismo En El Proceso 
de Recomposición Política En El Perú de La Posguerra Del Siglo XXI,” in Políticas 
En Justicia Transicional. Miradas Comparativas Sobre El Legado de La CVR, 2015, 244.
154  Fieldnotes, 03.2012.
155  This law was designed after a scandal revealing that a member of congress 
for the left-wing party Frente Amplio employed an ex-member of the MRTA who 
had fulfilled her sentence. Redacción EC, “Sentenciados por terrorismo no podrán 
trabajar en el Estado,” El Comercio, May 18, 2018, https://elcomercio.pe/politica/
sentenciados-terrorismo-podran-noticia-520863.
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public memorialization initiatives because it is generally accepted 
by human rights practitioners and the intellectual elite. One of the 
most important commemorative dates on a national level is the 28th 
of August, when the presentation of the final report of the TRC 
is commemorated at the Ojo Que Llora156, a monument erected in 
Lima by the human rights movement in honor of the victims of 
the civil war. As Javier Torres has pointed out, this commemoration 
spearheaded by human rights NGOs has “an auto celebratory touch” 
as it is a celebration of transitional justice rather than a ceremony 
owned by survivors.157 More recently, the narrative of the final report 
is also being visualized in the Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la 
Inclusión Social (LUM)158. In 2008, the German government donated 
two million euros for the construction of this memory museum 
in Lima dedicated to the civil war and its victims. This donation 
was first rejected by then president Alan García – an overt critic 
of the final report – who under national and international pressure 
eventually accepted the money for the project.159 After a long and 
bumpy process led by several directors and including more than 80 
negotiation meetings with victim’s associations, representatives of 
the army and police, human rights NGOs, state representatives and 
academics, a consensus was reached upon the museographic script. 
President Ollanta Humala eventually inaugurated the museum on 
December 17, 2015. Long before its inauguration, the LUM was 
already criticized for ‘looking at the Pacific and turning its back 
to the rest of the country’, a reference to its location on the pier 
in between Miraflores and San Isidro, two upper-middle class 
districts of Lima, far away from the daily reality of the majority 
156  Crying Eye
157  Torres, “Tan Lejos de La Transición, Tan Cerca de La Postguerra.” Fieldnotes, 
Conmemoración CVR+12 Ojo Que Llora, Lima, 28.08.2015.
158  Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion
159  “La Memoria del Lugar,” accessed October 18, 2018, https://redaccion.lamula.
pe/2014/06/16/el-lugar-de-la-memoria-y-la-discordia/enriquelarrea/.
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of survivors.160 Despite having become an important reference 
point for documentation and education on the history of the civil 
war in a relatively short time, the LUM is constantly under fire in 
the struggle for divergent truths described above. These attacks 
reached an all-time low in May 2018, when congressman Edwin 
Donayre together with some companions went undercover for a 
guided tour in the museum presenting himself as a mute victim 
of the Colombian civil war. After the visit, Donayre published an 
edited video on social media that compiled fragments of the tour 
in which a museum guide talked about human rights violations 
committed by the state forces. Donayre subsequently accused the 
LUM of being one-sided and ‘pro-terrorist’ as a result of which 
the guide was fired by the Ministry of Culture, which administers 
the museum.161 Another memorialization project funded by the 
German government is the Museo de la Memoria ‘Para que no se repita’162, 
which was created by the ANFASEP in Huamanga and opened to 
the public in 2005. The museum follows the testimonial style and 
narrative of the TRC in representing the history of the civil war. At 
the same time, it tells the history of the activism of the ANFASEP 
in searching for their disappeared relatives by displaying personal 
objects and pictures.163 The ANFASEP is also the driving force 
behind the future construction of a memorial site at La Hoyada, the 
mass grave next to the military base of Los Cabitos in Huamanga. 
Memorial sites are likewise to be found in several communities in 
the Ayacucho department, such as Uchuraccay, Cayara, Accomarca 
and Lucanamarca – not by chance places of emblematic cases 
detailed by the TRC. The majority of these memorial sites are clear 
160  Fieldnotes, Taller y coloquio IFEA, Lima, 15.07.2014.
161  LA RESISTENCIA, Congresista Donayre Denuncia Apología al 
Terrorismo En El LUM, accessed October 18, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Fl3EUou78z4.
162  Memory Museum ‘So it does not repeat’
163  “El Museo de la Memoria ‘Para que no se repita’ – ANFASEP,” accessed 
October 18, 2018, http://anfasep.org.pe/museo-de-la-memoria/.
Monument El Ojo Que Llora in Jesus María, Lima (2014)
products of the memory imperative fostered by transitional justice 
as they mostly come about under impulse of human rights NGOs, 
yet in collaboration with the local community. Nevertheless, as will 
be demonstrated extensively in the following chapters, the strategies 
of dealing with the past in most of the war-thorn communities are 
far more complex than the straightforward duty to remember which 
underlies these memorials. 
Pacha Pupum, ‘the navel of the earth’, Sacsamarca (2015)
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[...] éste rincón del Perú se enmarcaba en la escena sangrante, con valle de 
lágrimas, caminos que se cubrían sólo con el resucitar de un inocente polvo y 
sin poder calmar la inmensa sed que aquejaba a la gente humilde.1
 
Introduction
That night in mid-February 1983, Jelacio Llacsa and Walter 
Huaccachi were already asleep in the house of the teacher - one of 
the wealthiest people in the village - where they had moved in after 
the latter had fled the village a few weeks earlier.2 Around midnight, 
a group of men first assaulted Jelacio’s part of the house and stabbed 
him to death. About half an hour later, another group entered 
Walter’s part through the roof. While his wife was blindfolded and 
taken outside, Walter was killed in front of his five-year-old son and 
the house was ransacked.3 A few months earlier, in October, Jelacio 
and Walter had been appointed by camarada ‘Omar’ - the Shining 
Path commander of the zone of Hualla and Cayara - as leaders of 
the local comité popular (popular committee)4 of the Shining Path, 
which from then on replaced the existing authorities as Sacsamarca 
became part of the so-called liberated zone. The killers were a 
group of fellow-villagers who had been planning this conspiracy to 
rebel against the rule of the Shining Path during secret meetings in 
the highlands. When the Shining Path took revenge by attacking 
1  My English translation of Spanish original: “[...] this corner of Peru found itself  in the 
bloody scene, with a valley of tears, roads that were covered only with the resurrection of an innocent 
dust and without being able to calm the immense thirst that afflicted the humble people.” Hector 
González Huarcaya, La Vida No Vale Nada. Terror, Sangre y Muerte En Los Andes 
(Huancasancos: Visión y Vibración Andina, 2002), 26.
2  Interview with Francisco, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 10.04.2015.
3  Interview with Sara, direct witness of the events of February 1983, Sacsamarca, 
22.05.2015.
4  The denomination comité de base distrital (district base committee) is also used to 
refer to the local popular committees of the Shining Path. 
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Sacsamarca on May 21st with hundreds of recruits, it came to a battle 
which was won by the villagers and resulted in the death of, among 
others, comrade Omar. The events in Sacsamarca had a ripple effect 
throughout the region and meant the beginning of the end of the 
Shining Path’s control over the area. Every year on the 21st of May, 
Sacsamarca commemorates its victory in this battle and celebrates 
a memory of “rebellion and peace”, stressing that it was the first 
village to rebel against the Shining Path.5 It was this remarkable 
heroic memory that drew my attention to Sacsamarca and made me 
decide to do fieldwork there. While I found most of the villagers 
eager to share stories about the uprising against the Shining Path, 
during a conversation in the late hours of a communal celebration, 
one of the village authorities confirmed my presumption that the 
public narrative was entangled with other stories lying beneath the 
surface. He leaned forward over my shoulder and - as if making a 
clear demarcation - whispered in my ear:
You won’t find the truth here. From the 100% of what 
happened here, maybe we will tell you 50%. Because here we 
killed each other, among cousins, among brothers. There are 
many secrets in Sacsamarca.6 
While finding ‘the truth’ was not my main concern, I was intrigued 
by the interaction between the public narrative of the civil war and 
the secrets and silences that surrounded the community’s official 
memory. What does this dynamic between revealing and concealing 
tell about the way Sacsamarquinos7 deal with the legacies of the civil 
5  Fieldnotes, Conversation with the mayor of Sacsamarca and representatives of the victims’ 
association, Sacsamarca, 27.06.2014.  
6  My translation of original citation: “Aqui no vas a encontrar la verdad. Del 100% de lo 
que pasó aquí tal vez te vamos a contar 50%. Porque aquí nos hemos matado entre nosotros, entre 
primos, entre hermanos. Hay muchos secretos en Sacsamarca.” Fieldnotes, Conversation with 
a local authority, Sacsamarca, 19.06.2015. 
7  Villagers of Sacsamarca
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war? How do these strategies of dealing with the past relate to, 
differ from, or contest the ideas diffused by official transitional 
justice mechanisms such as the TRC, the reparation program or the 
exhumation of clandestine burial sites? 
Before turning to these questions, I will first set the scene by 
describing the demographical and geographical context of 
Sacsamarca, as well as the key events that marked the course of 
the civil war in the village, mainly between September 1982 and 
June 1983. Sacsamarca is a district of cattle-breeders in the basin 
of the Qaracha river which counts 1.313 inhabitants according to 
the national census of 2017.8 Its highlands are situated between 
2.850 and 4800 meters AMSL and the territory of the entire district 
stretches out over no less than 1206 km2.9 The district of Sacsamarca 
is located in the province of Huancasancos and consists of the town 
of Sacsamarca and four annexes: Asca, Colcabamba, Putaccasa and 
Pallcca.10 The area was characterized by an early presence of the 
Shining Path, which spread its ideology in the first place in schools 
on the countryside. As in many communities in Ayacucho, in 
Sacsamarca there initially was significant support for the ideas of 
redistribution and social justice. The Shining Path should thus not 
merely be considered as an external force arriving to the community 
with the purpose of installing the revolution. It also became a local 
internal force which was received, appropriated and mobilized with 
different motivations and purposes. Indeed, as the in-depth report 
of the TRC on the province of Huancasancos states, “the political 
violence emerges from within the communities under study.”11 The 
8  INEI, “Ayacucho Resultados Definitivos, Tomo I” (Lima, 2017), 160.
9  Juan Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero, “1. Población y Territorio,” in Historia de 
La Comunidad Campesina de Sacsamarca. Diálogo, Memoria y Reconocimiento, ed. Juan 
Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero (Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de 
la Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018) In comparison, Brussels-Capital 
Region has a superficies of 161 km2 and a population of aprox. 1.200.000.
10  Espinoza Portocarrero, 25. Annexes are smaller hamlets or villages that 
surround the district capital but maintain a certain degree of political autonomy.
11  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
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Shining Path’s revolutionary struggle got entangled with existing 
power imbalances and slumbering conflicts over land and resources. 
Nevertheless, despite the initial sympathy for and collaboration with 
the Shining Path, part of the villagers at a certain point turned to 
resistance and succeeded in overthrowing the regime of the popular 
committee. What began as a revolutionary struggle, escalated into a 
war between ‘intimate enemies’.
Subsequently, I will turn to the (post-)conflict process and look into 
the diffusion of transitional justice in Sacsamarca. I will do this by 
analyzing the TRC’s process of truth-seeking in the community, as 
well as the implementation of the commission’s recommendations 
concerning reparations and the exhumation of clandestine burial 
sites. 
The TRC’s process of truth-finding in Sacsamarca was characterized 
by silence and suspicion from the villagers toward the commission. 
One of the motivations for the villagers’ reticence to talk clearly 
was the intimate nature of the violence and its entanglement with 
local conflicts.  The presumption that the rapid escalation of the 
violence was due to preexisting conflicts and internal power 
struggles also was one of the main hypotheses of investigation 
formulated by the research team of the special in-depth report of 
the TRC on the province of Huancasancos. Moreover, the report 
states that this hypothesis played an even bigger role than suspected. 
Nevertheless, while in the work of the TRC there was still some 
- albeit limited - room to touch upon the complexity of agency, I 
argue that this complexity was nullified by the implementation 
of the reparation program which manages a rigid categorization of 
victims and perpetrators. At the same time, this rigid categorization 
provided a strong incentive for potential beneficiaries of reparations 
to transform the narrative of intimate violence into one of innocent 
victimhood. The implementation of the TRC’s recommendations 
concerning exhumations of clandestine burial sites in Sacsamarca on 
its turn ran the risk of - literally - digging up a contentious past. 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca” (Lima, 2002).
188
IV Open Secrets
Indeed, some of Sacsamarca’s burial sites are the material remainders 
of the complex encounter between villagers, the Shining Path and 
the state forces. These graves are spatial points of reference in the 
villagers’ narratives on the civil war; open secrets that rest beneath 
the surface of the highlands. I will focus on two different cases of 
clandestine burial sites in the highlands of Putaccasa in order to 
demonstrate how the possibility of uncovering these open secrets - 
some of which support a tense coexistence - provoked unrest in the 
community.
After analyzing how transitional justice - with its underlying ideas 
on memory, victimhood and time - was diffused through the 
implementation of these mechanisms of truth-telling, reparation 
and exhumation, I will identify several processes of dealing with the 
past that reflect the appropriation, reaffirmation and contestation of these 
underlying ideas by survivors.  
First, I will focus on public remembrance of the civil war in Sacsamarca. 
What happens when transitional justice’s memory duty collides with 
a contentious past of intimate violence? I argue that the truth-finding 
process of the TRC generated a space which was appropriated by 
the Sacsamarquinos to create a heroic narrative of resistance. This 
narrative stands in function of claiming recognition by the Peruvian 
state for the community’s role in opposing the Shining Path. 
Sacsamarca’s memory of resistance furthermore contradicts the idea 
of a passive peasantry caught between two fires and goes against the 
narrative of victimization and suffering that is predominant in the 
TRC’s final report. At the same time, the centrality of the rebellion 
as an act of resistance marks a before and after in the narrative of 
the community. This rupture allows the Sacsamarquinos to downplay 
the initial collaboration with the Shining Path and show their ‘clean 
hands’, a conditio sine qua non for making reparation claims.
Second, I will further scrutinize how the community (in)directly 
concealed certain aspects of the past in order to make them less 
visible for outsiders; in this case the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ of 
transitional justice. Therefore, I will look at the open secrets that are 
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entangled with the public heroic memory of resistance. In order to 
understand these open secrets and their origin, it is necessary to take 
a look at the micro-conflicts and power struggles that predated the 
conflict and escalated through the emergence of the Shining Path. 
I argue that, what is being (in)directly concealed by means of the 
open secrets is, in the first place, the intimate nature of the violence. 
These processes of concealment contest transitional justice’s idea of 
redemption through truth-telling that underlies the memory duty. 
Thirdly, I will investigate the role of concealment as a strategy of 
coexistence between (former) ‘intimate enemies’ on the one hand, 
and as a strategy of claiming citizenship within the Peruvian nation 
on the other. For the villagers, the pursuit of recognition as defenders 
of the Peruvian nation is not only a way of dealing with the past; it 
is also a means of denouncing the violence of a contemporary past 
of poverty and socio-economic exclusion and putting forward their 
expectations for the future. 
Forgetting, silence and secrecy
The beneficial properties of memory - its potential for prevention, 
redemption and recognition - and the normative character of the 
duty to remember have been widely questioned (cfr. chapter 2.1). 
This case-study on Sacsamarca situates itself within the debate on 
(the threats and opportunities of) forms of ‘silence’ and ‘forgetting’ 
as strategies of dealing with the past, which are the unavoidable 
mirror-image of transitional justice’s concern with truth-telling and 
remembrance. 
Due to this normative focus on revealing and speaking out about 
past human rights violations, mechanisms of ‘silence’ and ‘forgetting’ 
were for a long time mainly associated with negative processes of 
denial and erasure by both scholars and activists concerned with 
memory and transitional justice. Perpetrators and ‘implicated 
subjects’, those who had been on the wrong side of history and have 
something to lose in the (post-)conflict time, were mostly seen as the 
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(only) advocates of these mechanisms of denial and erasure.12 The 
subjects of ‘silence’ or ‘forgetting’, then, were typically considered to 
be the ‘subaltern’, the disempowered, women and victims of sexual 
violence, the disappeared; i.e. those who do not speak out or (are 
assumed to) not have the capacity to do so. On the nexus between 
trauma and memory discourse, which directly connects the act of 
speaking out with the psychological process of working through, 
the survivors’ refusal to speak out would then in the first place be 
pathologized as a symptom of PTSD (‘not being ready yet to talk 
about it’).13
It speaks for itself that it should not be neglected that, in many post-
conflict societies, mechanisms of denial and erasure form important 
threats to transitional justice’s aims of coming to terms with the past. 
At the same time, the decision of survivors not to speak out about 
past human rights violations as a protection against re-traumatization 
should be taken seriously and respected. However, there is a lot 
more to say about the dynamics of ‘silence’ and ‘forgetting’ than 
merely pointing to the dangerous potential for denial and erasure 
or adopting a limited trauma-based psychological point of view that 
obfuscates political agency. In her analysis of the “labors of memory” 
(“trabajos de la memoria”) taking place in the Latin American post-
Cold War context, Elizabeth Jelin was one of the first scholars to put 
emphasis on the political significance of silence.14 In the past decade, 
a growing body of literature has emerged in the field of transitional 
justice, memory and post-conflict studies that investigates ‘silence’ 
and ‘forgetting’ as “enabling” processes, mostly taking place at the 
12  Andreas Huyssen points, again, to the importance of the holocaust in Europe 
and North America and the desaparecidos in Latin America when discussing 
the “obsession” with memory which, according to him, resulted in a “terror of 
forgetting”. Huyssen, Present Pasts Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory, 18.
13  Caroline Yezer, “Who Wants to Know? Rumors, Suspicions, and Opposition 
to Truth-Telling in Ayacucho,” Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 3, no. 3 
(November 1, 2008): 280.
14  Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
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micro-level, which should be considered as one of many possible 
forms of dealing with the past rather than inherently opposed to 
remembrance. Such approaches to the potential constructive features 
of ‘silence’ reveal the agency that is behind the (in)direct choice of 
survivors to contest transitional justice’s memory duty and develop 
alternative strategies of dealing with the past. Accordingly, ‘silence’ 
can be considered as a deliberate decision rather than something 
that is merely imposed upon survivors against their will. My interest 
lies precisely in these alternative strategies and their (restorative) 
dynamics in light of (post-)conflict reconstruction and reintegration. 
Despite the increasing scholarly efforts to question the normative 
character of the memory duty and conceptualize the beneficial 
properties of ‘silence’, a lot of empirical work remains to be done 
to investigate how these mechanisms actually work on the ground. 
Moreover, as I have pointed out in chapter one and two respectively, 
crossing the borders between academic research and the practice 
of transitional justice is not always self-evident and the normative 
approach in favor of remembrance and ‘speaking out’ remains well-
established, especially in transitional justice practice.
For the Peruvian case, Ponciano del Pino, Caroline Yezer, Kimberly 
Theidon and Olga González have pointed to the dynamics between 
memory and ‘forgetting’ that characterize the post-war period and 
investigated the interaction between what is publicly known and 
what is kept secret; between the visible and the invisible in rural 
communities in Ayacucho.15 My research on Sacsamarca is inspired 
by their work, however it must be noted that my field research was 
15  Del Pino’s research on Uchuraccay is particularly valuable in this respect, 
as he compares and historicizes the narratives of the villagers on the massacre 
of the journalists at three different moments in time (right after the events in 
1983, when the villagers returned to the community in 1993, and when the TRC 
collected testimonies in 2002). Ponciano Del Pino, En Nombre Del Gobierno. El Perú y 
Uchuraccay: Un Siglo de Política Campesina (Lima: La Siniestra Ensayos, 2017); Caroline 
Yezer, “Anxious Citizenship: Insecurity, Apocalypse and War Memories in Peru’s 
Andes” (Duke University, 2007); Olga M. González, Unveiling Secrets of War in the 
Peruvian Andes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
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carried out almost a decade after Yezer’s and almost two decades 
after González and Theidon’s, and that mine postdates the work of 
the TRC. Narratives and memory strategies of survivors immediately 
after the war fundamentally differed in several ways from those that 
I encountered more than thirty years after the start of the war and 
more than a decade after the TRC visited Sacsamarca 16  
While I thus situate this chapter in the abovementioned branch 
of empirical research on (post-)conflict memory processes at the 
micro-level, I will limit the use of the terms ‘silence’ or ‘forgetting’ 
to describe strategies that contest the memory duty, because at 
least in this case, their use would generate confusion rather than 
clarification. ‘Forgetting’, while mostly used in a metaphorical 
sense, implies a cognitive process of not remembering anymore 
what happened, which definitely is not the case. ‘Silence’ on its turn, 
whether in the literal sense of ‘not speaking out’ about the past or 
metaphorically referring to ‘the unsaid’, would be unsatisfactory 
as a concept to describe what is at stake in Sacsamarca. As we 
will see, what we find in Sacsamarca is a memory of resistance 
that is entangled with open secrets, the latter of which are (in)
directly being concealed for certain outsiders. I  share González 
fascination for secrecy and prefer the use of the terms ‘open secret’ 
and ‘concealment’ to describe the particularities of the process of 
dealing with the past in this community and in order to stress the 
fact that “silence is more than a passive voice”.17 I define an ‘open 
secret’18 as a fact known by all within a delineated community but 
16  Del Pino, En Nombre Del Gobierno. El Perú y Uchuraccay: Un Siglo de Política 
Campesina, 47.
17  My translation of original citation: “El silencio es más que una voz pasiva.” Del Pino, 
20.
18  In her analysis of memories of the civil war in the village of Sarhua, Olga 
González uses the term “public secrecy” to refer to “that which is known but can’t 
be articulated”. González, 8; Del Pino on his turn speaks of a “shared secret” 
(“secreto compartido”) when talking about the restorative potential of silences in the 
context of post-conflict coexistence. Del Pino, En Nombre Del Gobierno. El Perú y 
Uchuraccay: Un Siglo de Política Campesina, 46.
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kept secret to certain outsiders19 and ‘concealment’ as the process of 
hiding certain (inconvenient) aspects of the truth. Of course, both 
open secrets and the process of concealment are often closely related 
to or can generate silences. In my analysis of memory processes 
in Sacsamarca, I furthermore follow Del Pino’s interest in the 
entanglement of “intracommunal dynamics” with “the pattern of 
public remembrance” that characterizes (post-)conflict memory in 
many rural communities in Ayacucho.20 As Del Pino states:
“What defines the pattern of public remembrance is the 
management of the nearness, of the proximity of the violence 
among its members and the administration of the information; 
which results in the fact that some stories are told, and others 
remain silent.”21
Methodology and sources
Fieldwork
My first visit to Sacsamarca was with the EPAF in 2012, during 
a two-month fieldtrip to Peru for my master thesis. At that time, 
Sacsamarca was one of the districts where the EPAF was doing 
preliminary research for the exhumation of mass graves. They 
maintained close ties with the authorities and with the victims’ 
association and through my affiliation with the EPAF I could 
19  Stanley Cohen refers to an open secret as something that is “known by all, but 
knowingly not known”. Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and 
Suffering (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity ; Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 138.
20  Del Pino, En Nombre Del Gobierno. El Perú y Uchuraccay: Un Siglo de Política 
Campesina, 18.
21  My translation of original citation: “Lo que define el patrón del recuerdo público es la 
gestión de la cercanía, de la proximidad de la violencia entre sus miembros y de la administración 
de la información; esto hace que ciertas historias se cuenten y otras queden en silencio.” Del Pino, 
23.
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establish my first contacts in the village when I returned in 2014 
during a two-month exploratory fieldtrip for my doctoral research. 
Moreover, as the territories of Sacsamarca and Hualla (cfr. chapter 
5) are adjacent to each other, it seemed interesting to study both 
communities and, to a certain extent, take into account regional 
pre- and post-conflict dynamics. After these first visits in 2012 and 
2014, I returned to Sacsamarca seven times in 2015 for stays varying 
from three to ten days each. Three of these seven fieldtrips in 2015 
were conducted together with the EPAF, the other four times I went 
alone or with Gabriela Zamora Castellares, who accompanied me as 
a research collaborator. On the fieldtrips that we undertook together, 
Gabriela was - with a few exceptions - present during the interviews. 
Alicia Noa, who was working with me as a research collaborator 
in Hualla, was sometimes also in Sacsamarca at the same time as 
me, because she was working there as part of a community project 
set up by the Academic Direction of Social Responsibility (Dirección 
Académica de Responsabilidad Social, DARS) of the Pontifical Catholic 
University of Peru (Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú)  in Lima. 
While I did not collaborate directly with Alicia in Sacsamarca, my 
research also benefitted from her knowledge about and contacts 
within the community. 
In total, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 33 different 
research participants, all inhabitants of Sacsamarca, with the length 
of the interviews varying between thirty minutes and two hours. 
Several of the interviewees, especially those who played a key-role in 
the resistance against the Shining Path, were interviewed up to three 
times. At least ten of the interviewees directly participated in the 
events of February and May 1983. Thirteen of the research participants 
were women and seven were (ex-)authorities. Five interviews 
were conducted in Quechua with Gabriela acting as a translator, 
the others were conducted in Spanish. Nine interviewees did not 
give permission to record the conversation, in that case notes were 
taken during the interview. In addition, some interviews conducted 
in Hualla also relate to events that occurred in Sacsamarca. The 
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interviews were complemented with many informal conversations 
during participant observation in daily activities and on special 
occasions such as community meetings, commemorations and 
festivities. In April 2015, at the beginning of my fieldwork, I traveled 
to the community to attend the asamblea comunal, the community 
assembly meeting which is the main decision-making body, and 
which is held four times a year. The asamblea comunal is a major 
event in which the entire community is expected to participate. The 
meeting lasted from 9am to 8pm with only a lunchbreak between 1 
and 2pm and was held at the central courtyard in front of the church, 
the gates of which were locked with a chain for the entire duration 
of the meeting to prevent anyone from entering or leaving. Only for 
the last two hours of the meeting, when it started raining heavily, 
the gates were unlocked and the asamblea moved to the auditorium 
of the municipality. All kinds of community affairs were discussed 
during the meeting, with discussions over land, improvement of 
cattle-breeding and measures against cattle-theft taking up most of 
the time and attention of the present comuneros. During this asamblea, 
I got the opportunity to present myself independently from the 
EPAF and explain my arrival to the community, after which formal 
permission was granted by the community to conduct my research. 
On the 21st of May 2015, I attended the yearly commemoration of 
the rebellion and battle against the Shining Path (cfr. chapter 4.4). 
Two weeks later, in June, I returned to the village to accompany 
one of the forensic experts of the EPAF during the exhumation of 
a mass grave carried out by the EFE, the forensic team of the state, 
in the highlands of Putaccasa. The exhumation lasted for four days 
and coincided with the celebration of Corpus Christi in Sacsamarca. 
In August, I participated for three days in the celebration of the 
Virgen de la Asunción (Assumption of Mary), which is the patron saint 
of Sacsamarca. In May 2017, I returned to the village to participate 
in the yearly Pacha Pupum festival, an agricultural fair celebrated in 
the highlands (cfr. infra). 
While I initially doubted to use a pseudonym for Sacsamarca, the 
Asamblea comunal in Sacsamarca (2015)
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events that occurred in the village during the civil war are so particular 
that anyone with some knowledge on the course of the civil war in 
Ayacucho would be able to identify it. Moreover, the resistance of 
Sacsamarca is described in the in-depth study on the province of 
Huancasancos of the TRC and by a testimonial memory project set 
up by the NGO SER in 2003, which resulted in a publication edited 
by the Peruvian historian Ricardo Caro and a book chapter authored 
by the latter.22 Moreover, by using a pseudonym, I would run the risk 
of reducing Sacsamarca to a random scene of the civil war, while one 
of my research aims is precisely to point to the particularities of local 
experiences and to stress the agency of the population. Especially 
when writing about a village whose population has experienced 
long-time processes of exclusion and marginalization, it can be 
“an act of justice to inscribe its name in academic writing and in 
historiography”.23
Additional sources on Sacsamarca
In addition to my own fieldwork data, I consulted the available 
testimonies given by Sacsamarquinos to the TRC in the Centro de 
Información para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos (Information 
Center of Collective Memory and Human Rights) in the ombudsman 
office in Lima. Of the 33 villagers who gave their testimony to the 
TRC, only fourteen gave permission for public consultation in the 
archive. (In comparison, in Hualla 92 persons testified of which 
58 gave permission for consultation.) Of these fourteen available 
22  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca”; Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate 
Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La 
Violencia Política, Mayo 2004 (Lima: SER, 2005); Ricardo Caro, “Commemorative 
Paths in Sacsamarca,” in Art from a Fractured Past, ed. Cynthia E. Milton (Durham; 
London: Duke University Press, 2014).
23  My translation of original citation: “[...] es un acto de justicia colocar su nombre en la 
escritura académica y en la historiografía (...)”, personal communication with Ricardo 
Caro, 17.05.2019. 
198
IV Open Secrets
testimonies given by Sacsamarquinos, only three were registered by the 
mobile team of the TRC in Sacsamarca in July 2002.24 Two of the 
three testimonies registered in Sacsamarca were given by persons 
that I also interviewed. Nevertheless, only three of the consultable 
testimonies given to the TRC directly relate to the events of 1982-
1983 which stand center-stage in this chapter. In addition, there is 
the in-depth study of the TRC on the province of Huancasancos, the 
purpose of which was in the first place to investigate the massacre of 
69 people by the Shining Path in the village of Lucanamarca, but as 
the regional events are all related, the resistance against the Shining 
Path in Sacsamarca is also described in this report.25 The in-depth 
report was based on fieldwork which was carried out by another 
team than the mobile team collecting testimonies, and which took 
place between March 20 and April 13, 2002, of which six days were 
spent in Sacsamarca. During its stay in Sacsamarca, the team of 
the in-depth report conducted twelve formal and eleven informal 
interviews.26 In the final report of the TRC, the in-depth report on 
the province of Huancasancos is included as part of chapter two of 
volume five.27
Furthermore, during one of our visits to Huancasancos with the 
EPAF, we met Hector González Huarcaya, a teacher who published a 
booklet entitled La vida no vale nada. Terror, sangre y muerte en los Andes28 
in which he recounts his version of the events in Huancasancos 
24  This means that the other testimonies related to events in Sacsamarca were 
given to either mobile teams or offices of the TRC in Huancasancos (3), Huancayo 
(1), Carapo (1), Huamanga (2), Cayara (1) and Ica (2). This geographical spreading 
is mostly due to internal displacement during the war.
25  The TRC conducted nineteen in-depth studies of “significant cases”. The 
redaction of the final report was based on these in-depth studies. The content 
therefore partly overlaps with the text of the final report, but the in-depth studies 
are more detailed and extensive.
26  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
27  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 5” (Lima, 2003).
28  Life is worthless. Terror, blood and death in the Andes
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and Sacsamarca during the civil war - an interesting testimonial 
source.29 Other important additional sources for this chapter were 
the publications of the above-mentioned community projects of the 
NGO SER and of the DARS of the PUCP, a publication of the 
EPAF on the legacies of the civil war in the valley of the Pampas 
and Qaracha rivers, and Ricardo Caro’s work on commemoration 
practices in Sacsamarca.30 Personal conversations with Ricardo 
as well as with historian Percy Rojas from the EPAF also led to 
important insights.
The ethics of researching ‘silence’
A lot can be said about the ethics of researching silence or digging 
up secrets that support a tense (post-)conflict coexistence. The 
potential harm that can be caused for survivors should at all times 
be considered when conducting research in (post-)conflict settings 
and especially when investigating sensitive topics. In my case, 
researching ‘the untold’ was never a purpose in itself; rather it simply 
was what I was confronted with during fieldwork. (Open) secrets 
were not something I had been looking for or had been aware of. 
They were revealed piecemeal by the villagers themselves through 
their stories. Ironically, I did initially expect to encounter a lot of 
‘silence’ during fieldwork because, when I recently started setting up 
my research, most of my contacts in Huamanga and Lima warned 
me that people wouldn’t be too keen to share their stories with me. 
It is indeed a persistent idea in Peru that people in Ayacucho don’t 
29  González Huarcaya, La Vida No Vale Nada. Terror, Sangre y Muerte En Los Andes.
30  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004; Juan 
Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero, ed., Historia de La Comunidad Campesina de Sacsamarca. 
Diálogo, Memoria y Reconocimiento (Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad 
Social de la Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018); Equipo Peruano de 
Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia 
Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas (Lima: EPAF, 2012); Caro, 
“Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca.”
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want to talk about the war. At least in my fieldwork experience, this 
warning in most of the cases proved to be unfounded. It was not so 
much the case that people did not want to talk about the civil war. 
Rather, the topics that were brought up varied and changed over the 
course of my fieldwork and according to the degree of trust that I 
was able to build up. I felt that the act of leaving and returning to 
the village, which I repeated many times, played a crucial role in 
this process, as villagers at a certain point got used to my occasional 
presence in the community and in some cases started approaching 
me proactively to share their stories. Some research participants also 
hinted at the fact that my position as a foreigner inspired a certain 
degree of trust, as they considered me as someone neutral who had 
nothing to do with their history and therefore a ‘safe’ or ‘harmless’ 
person to talk to. They then adopted a position in which they had 
to explain me, the ignorant gringa, how things had happened. My 
position as a researcher affiliated to a foreign university enhanced 
this perception of neutrality.
The relative openness that I found in Sacsamarca probably also 
has to do with the timing of my fieldwork. While there was still 
a well-founded fear for the Shining Path in the 1990s, and a lot of 
mutual mistrust and fear for vengeance and prosecution during 
the mandate of the TRC in the early 2000s, I arrived at a less 
turbulent point in time. Nevertheless, there were a few situations 
in which I encountered initial mistrust, although I could mostly 
overcome this quite quickly by explaining my research purposes. 
On a few occasions, especially around the date that an exhumation 
in Putaccasa was about to take place, some people explicated their 
suspicion that I was a representative of the prosecutor’s office. Some 
other villagers remarked - some more jokingly than others - that I 
reminded them of camarada ‘Carla’; Carlota Tello, who together with 
Edith Lagos was one of the main female leaders of the Shining Path 
in the provinces of Victor Fajardo and Huancasancos in the 1980s. 
According to Ricardo Caro, camarada Carla was mainly represented in 
the media as a “cruel woman” with a “rigid and resentful” character 
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and a “penetrating gaze” - not really a pleasant or trust-inspiring 
point of comparison.31 While my physical appearance moreover 
does not quite come close to Carlota’s, Caro points out how, in July 
1984, media reported on an attack on the police station of Luricocha 
led by camarada Carla and remarkably enough described her as “a 
tall, blond girl, with a regular posture who wore a red sweatshirt and 
sneakers.” While in reality, Carlota was short and dark-haired, the 
latter description comes pretty close to myself - including the red 
jacket and sneakers I often wore during fieldwork. When the villagers 
compared me to Carlota, they also described her as ‘a gringa like you’. 
According to Caro, “it wouldn’t be the first time that these, perhaps 
idealizing, characteristics were used to describe young senderistas.”32 
Caro furthermore points out how the perception of camarada Carla as 
a female leader holding masculine values such as leadership, courage 
and militarism appeared as “a moral subversion of the world, where 
male domination is transgressed and confronted.”33 In addition to 
the descriptions of camarada Carla’s physical appearance as a gringa, 
the comparison between camarada Carla and I could be based on the 
way we both challenged gender relations in a machista society: she as 
a guerrillera and I as a an ‘emancipated’ western female researcher, 
traveling alone to the other side of the world. Carlota Tello’s life 
came to a tragic end as she was betrayed by a fellow party member 
and executed in the military base of Los Cabitos in Huamanga on 
Christmas Eve 1984, at the age of 23.34
31  Ricardo Caro, “Ser Mujer, Joven y Senderista: Género y Pánico Moral En Las 
Percepciones de Sendero Luminoso,” 2006, 4.
32  My translation of original citation: “[...] una muchacha alta y rubia, de regular 
contextura que vestía un buzo color rojo y zapatillas.” [...] “No será la única vez que se encuentran 
estos rasgos, quizás idealizados, para dar cuenta de las jóvenes senderistas.” Caro, 7; Kimberly 
Theidon encountered similar descriptions of senderistas as gringos with green eyes but 
interprets this as a process of othering rather than idealization. Theidon, Intimate 
Enemies, 216.
33  My translation of original citation: “[...] una subversión moral del mundo, donde el 
dominio masculino es transgredido y confrontado.” Caro, 4.
34  Caro, 10.
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4.1 ‘Village that breeds llamas with plenty of wool’
The district of Sacsamarca belongs to the province of Huancasancos, 
which was separated from the province of Victor Fajardo in 1984. 
The actual province of Huancasancos contains the districts of 
Carapo, Sancos, Lucanamarca and Sacsamarca. The capital of the 
province is the homonymous town of Huancasancos (in short 
Sancos), which lies at a 30 minutes’ drive from Sacsamarca. There 
are two main routes to enter Sacsamarca: coming from Huamanga, 
via Pampa Cangallo and Huancasancos, which is a four- to five-
hour drive through the mountains now that the road has been 
paved; or coming from Lima, taking the coastal route via Palpa 
and Ica, which takes up to twelve hours. This geographical location 
between the coastal and mountain cities facilitated Sacsamarca’s 
historical economic development as a trade hub of meat, milk, 
cheese, wool and pottery since pre-Colombian times.35 When I first 
arrived to Sacsamarca with the EPAF, we took an alternative route 
coming from Hualla, a two- to three-hour drive over an unpaved 
road through the puna.36 On the confluence of this road with the 
coastal route lies Sacsamarca’s annex of Putaccasa, a hamlet of a 
few houses, on an altitude of 4390 meters AMSL, where the air is 
thin, and vegetation mainly consists of ichu.37 During the coldest 
months of the year, between May and August, the icy wind has free 
reign over the plateau and temperatures can drop to -15 degrees 
Celsius. The village restaurant on the side of the road serves fried 
trout to the passing truck drivers and personnel coming from the 
nearby mine of Canarias, the company of which constructed this 
part of the connection to the coast. Next to the restaurant stands 
the primary school building, where we met a dedicated teacher with 
his five pupils, all of them with rosy cheeks and damaged skin from 
35  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 66.
36  Quechua word to refer to the highlands
37  Typical Peruvian feather grass
Putaccasa (2015)
Sacsamarca (2014)
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dry wind and sunburn. In 1987, Putaccasa was entirely burned down 
by the Shining Path. A bit further off-road from Putaccasa lies the 
Pacha Pupum - the ‘navel of the earth’ - an inactive geyser which 
looks like a small volcano and is surrounded by hot springs. The 
Pacha Pupum is a popular recreation spot among Sacsamarquinos and 
house to the yearly Pacha Pupum festival in the month of May. 
From Putaccasa, it is another 40 minutes’ drive to Sacsamarca, 
which lies in the greener and slightly warmer valley of the Qaracha 
river, an affluent of the Pampas river, at approximately 3500 meters 
AMSL. It took me some time to make sense of the landscape of the 
puna that surrounds Sacsamarca and understand how people could 
live there. What for me seemed nothing more than a breathtaking 
but foremost desolate place, soon turned out to be a resource and 
shelter for those who know how to coexist with it. The puna is the 
place where farmers spend a lot of time herding their cattle and 
where they have their estancias38, small houses built with rocks or 
adobe39 with a roof of ichu, mostly surrounded by a cattle pen built 
in stone to house their llamas, alpacas, cows or sheep. Cattle-
breeding is the main economic activity in Sacsamarca, which thus 
not accidentally means as much as ‘village that breeds llamas with 
plenty of wool’ in Quechua.40 While Sacsamarca was once known 
for its commercial activity, traditional trade networks have seized to 
exist and agriculture is now mainly for subsistence.41 Cattle-breeding 
is complemented with the cultivation of crops such as potatoes, 
38  Literally ‘places to stay’
39  Adobe are sun-dried bricks made from sand, clay and straw. It has very good 
thermal properties: it stores warmth during the day which it releases at night. 
40  Espinoza Portocarrero, “1. Población y Territorio,” 25.
41  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 66. 
Migration to the cities and a change in economic activities characterize the second 
half of the 20th century in the region and thus predate the civil war, but the process 
was accelerated due to the Shining Path’s control over mobility of people and 
goods, the massive internal displacement caused by the violence and the plundering 
of shops and warehouses by both the state forces and the Shining Path.
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corn, wheat, barley and beans. During the busiest times of the year, 
most farmers stay in their estancias rather than in their houses in the 
village. The puna became an important hide-out for the villagers 
during the civil war, as they spent the night in their estancias or in 
caves to escape the violent nightly incursions of the Shining Path 
or the military in the village. Many others fled to the cities of Ica, 
Lima and Huamanga. While a lot of Sacsamarquinos returned to their 
hometown after the end of the civil war, others decided to stay in the 
cities.42 Today, a lot of youngsters decide to leave the village again 
in pursuit of work and education. Therefore, the current population 
mainly consists of children below the age of 14 and adults above the 
age of 45.43 The largest community of Sacsamarquino migrants lives 
in Ica and is represented by the Asociación de Residentes de Sacsamarca 
- Ayacucho (ARSA-ICA)44, which maintains close relations with 
the hometown.45 While Quechua is the mother tongue of the vast 
majority of Sacsamarquinos, most people - with exception of the oldest 
generation - are fluently bilingual in Spanish. Spanish is furthermore 
the language used in public activities, community governance and 
education. Like all rural districts in Ayacucho, Sacsamarca knows 
high poverty levels. According to the National Institute for Statistics, 
77.1% of the population lives in poverty of which 38.6% in extreme 
poverty, which corresponds to a Human Development Index of 
42  The district of Sacsamarca counted with 2.248 inhabitants in 1972, 2236 in 
1981, 1905 in 1993 and 1797 in 2007. Espinoza Portocarrero, “1. Población y 
Territorio,” 32.
43  Espinoza Portocarrero, 35.
44  Association of Residents of Sacsamarca - Ayacucho
45  Juan Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El 
Siglo XX,” in Historia de La Comunidad Campesina de Sacsamarca. Diálogo, Memoria 
y Reconocimiento, ed. Juan Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero (Dirección Académica 
de Responsabilidad Social de la Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018), 
123. I did not actively engage with the Sacsamarquino migrants in Huamanga or 
Ica, although I met some of them when they visited Sacsamarca, mostly during 
celebrations. 
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0.237.46 The average monthly income per capita is 134 PEN (approx. 
€35) and 40,1% of the population suffers from chronic malnutrition. 
While most children now have access to basic education, 35% of 
women and 7,4% of men above the age of 15 are still illiterate. 47
The village nucleus as it is known today was founded by Spanish 
colonizers in 1574 as a regrouping of the indigenous population 
living in the area.48 The typical quadrangular Spanish floor-plan 
centralized around the plaza de armas and the church - the foundations 
of which still stand today -, as well as the syncretism of indigenous 
believes and customs with Catholicism reflect the colonial past. 
At the time of its foundation, Sacsamarca was organized in three 
neighborhoods according to the existing pre-Hispanic ayllus or clans 
which corresponded to three families that live in the village up until 
today: Aucasimi, Hanampa and Huaccachi.49 Conflicts with the 
central government as well as with neighboring communities such 
as Carapo and Pampamarca over the recognition and expansion 
of its territory run as a common thread through the history of 
Sacsamarca, and land claims still are the most important subject 
of intracommunal conflicts caused by for example inheritances.50 
While in the Northern provinces of Ayacucho land possession used 
to be concentrated in the form of haciendas, the Southern provinces 
46  Espinoza Portocarrero, “1. Población y Territorio,” 37 The HDI is an index to 
measure poverty beyond economic growth, taking into account life expectancy and 
education. A HDI below 0.550 is considered low human development. See: http://
hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.
47  Espinoza Portocarrero, 38.
48  Alejandro Santistevan Gutti, “3. Sacsamarca En El Periodo Colonial,” in 
Historia de La Comunidad Campesina de Sacsamarca. Diálogo, Memoria y Reconocimiento, 
ed. Juan Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero (Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad 
Social de la Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018), 69.
49  Santistevan Gutti, 71.
50  Alejandro Escudero Villanueva, “4. Sacsamarca En El Siglo XIX,” in Historia 
de La Comunidad Campesina de Sacsamarca. Diálogo, Memoria y Reconocimiento, ed. Juan 
Miguel Espinoza Portocarrero (Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de 
la Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018), 93.
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of Cangallo and Victor Fajardo - including the area of Sacsamarca - 
were characterized by the historical presence of multiple indigenous 
communities and their respective economic elites who disputed 
with each other to gain control over their own lands.51By the end 
of the 19th century, the traditional governance of the varayocs52 and 
the chacracura53 started to disappear and gradually made way for 
political structures that seek relation with and representation of the 
national government.54 After a long struggle, Sacsamarca was the 
first community in the valley of the Qaracha river to be recognized 
by the department of Indigenous Affairs of the Ministry of Health, 
Work and Social Welfare as a comunidad campesina in 1936 and have 
the boundaries of its territory officially registered.55 Subsequently, 
Sacsamarca became an independent district by separating itself from 
Huancasancos in 1961.56 In 1970, during the military government 
of Juan Velasco Alvarado national legislation established the 
governance model of the comunidad campesina as it exists today in 
Sacsamarca and in the majority of rural villages in the Andes.57 
The community is governed by two different entities: the municipal 
government authorities, led by the major; and the comunidad campesina, 
represented by the asamblea comunal 58and the junta directiva comunal 
59. While the municipal government authorities represent the state 
and are elected during the nationally organized municipal elections, 
the comunidad campesina is directly elected by the community every 
two years.60 The comunidades campesinas were recognized by the state 
51  Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El Siglo XX,” 138.
52  Governing body of elderly members of the community that existed since 
colonial times and watched over the maintenance of land and cattle
53  Religious leader
54  Escudero Villanueva, “4. Sacsamarca En El Siglo XIX,” 92.
55  Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El Siglo XX,” 105.
56  Espinoza Portocarrero, 135.
57  Espinoza Portocarrero, 139.
58  Communal assembly
59  Communal board of directors
60  Espinoza Portocarrero, “1. Población y Territorio,” 41.
Sacsamarquinos at their estancia in the highlands (2015)
Pacha Pupum festival (2017)
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as “fundamental democratic institutions, autonomous in their 
organization” by the Ley General De Comunidades Campesinas 61 of 
1987.62 In general, the comunidad campesina is in charge of everything 
which has to do with the community’s agricultural activities, such as 
the management of the granja comunal63 - the revenues of which are 
invested in community projects -  and the organization of the minka - 
collective communal work in function of agriculture. The municipal 
government on its turn manages public policies, the implementation 
of national government programs (mostly focused on poverty 
reduction and education) and infrastructural affairs, among which 
the faena - collective communal work in function of public space 
(e.g. construction works). The national government is furthermore 
represented by the subprefecto or gobernador who represents the 
Ministry of Interior and is in charge of security matters; and the juez 
de paz64 who represents the Ministry of Justice and manages minor 
legal issues and quarrels.65 
4.2 From collaboration to resistance: Sacsamarca and the  
Shining Path66
Education at colegio Los Andes 
A combination of several factors explains the presence of the 
Shining Path in the area of Sacsamarca and the population’s initial 
61  General Peasant Community Law
62  “Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas,” Pub. L. No. 24656 (1987).
63  Communal farm
64  Justice of the Peace
65  Espinoza Portocarrero, “1. Población y Territorio,” 43.
66  The chronology of the events in Sacsamarca described here is a reconstruction 
based on the testimonies collected by SER, my own interviews, the in-depth study 
of the TRC and the testimonies collected by the TRC. While most testimonies 
coincide, some contain contradicting information, for example on the exact date 
of events. I try my best to balance between the general narrative and significant 
details or contradictions. 
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positive reception of the ideas of redistribution and social justice. 
Education played a key role in the diffusion of the Shining Path’s 
revolutionary ideas, a process which was facilitated by the already 
existing degree of political empowerment among the local elites. 
The early organization in comunidades campesinas and the struggle for 
the creation of independent districts created an awareness of rights 
and recognition to be claimed from the national government. The 
local economic elites - basically those families possessing more 
land than others - were aware of the importance of education and 
literacy in order to be able to make these claims and gain access to 
bureaucratic procedures.67 According to the TRC, in Sacsamarca it 
were mainly the families Huaccachi, Herrera, Chávez and Yanqui 
who controlled power and divided political functions in a clientelist 
way.68 In the 1960s, the secondary school Los Andes was founded in 
Huancasancos. Initially, the teachers at Los Andes and other newly 
founded primary schools in the area were mostly the sons of the 
local economic elites, who could afford to send their children to 
Huamanga and Lima for completing secondary and higher education 
at, respectively, the UNSCH or the Universidad de San Marcos.69 The 
teachers made up an intellectual elite who, especially in Sacsamarca, 
enjoyed power and prestige through their literacy and, at the same 
time, abused this power by assigning themselves all kinds of 
privileges. The pupils, in contrast, were the children of the poorer 
families who for the first time enjoyed the opportunity to go to 
school in their own villages.70 The quality of education at Los Andes 
gained a good reputation and peasant families from communities in 
the valley of the Pampas river - such as Hualla, Cayara and Umaru; 
67  Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El Siglo XX,” 141.
68  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
69  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 67.
70  In Sacsamarca as well, the secondary school Daniel Alcides Carrión was founded 
by the community in 1982, although it would only start to function in 1984. 
Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El Siglo XX,” 151.
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very poor areas compared to Huancasancos - also started sending 
their children to Los Andes to attend classes. A gradual process of 
social mobility through education set in, as part of the graduates 
of Los Andes also pursued higher education at the UNSCH and the 
profession of teacher on the countryside was no longer exclusively 
performed by the elite, which in some places generated tensions 
between the old and new generation of teachers. At the same time, 
while the increased access to education broke the elite’s monopoly 
on literacy, this provoked growing awareness and discontent among 
the peasants over the existing inequalities and injustices they had to 
endure. By the 1970s, Shining Path militants - mostly students or 
alumni from the UNSCH, which by then already was a hotbed of 
revolutionary ideas - had successfully infiltrated the teaching staff of 
Los Andes.71 The school became a hub for the propaganda of Abimael 
Guzmán’s pensamiento Gonzalo which was spread from Los Andes to 
other schools in the area. The Shining Path’s communist ideas of 
redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor thrived well in 
the climate of growing discontent. In addition, some peasants saw 
the arrival of the Shining Path as an opportunity to question power 
relations, settle old conflicts or take revenge for abuses committed 
by the elites. Both the TRC and some of the testimonies collected 
by SER moreover mention that the idea of equality was a pull 
factor for women who embraced the Shining Path as a means to 
emancipate themselves. While the exact amount of support for or 
collaboration with the Shining Path remains hard to measure, the 
in-depth study of the TRC speaks of an initial “massive reception”, 
which is confirmed by the testimonies collected by SER and by my 
interviews.72  
The Shining Path militants formed at the UNSCH and at Los Andes 
71  According to the TRC, the student population of the UNSCH grew from 228 
students in 1959 to 6095 students in 1980. CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4” (Lima, 
2003), 30.
72  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
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started to visit the villages on the countryside to organize escuelas 
populares73 in which they taught communist ideology and prepared 
the population for the armed struggle. According to the villagers 
of Sacsamarca and Lucanamarca, these militants were indeed 
mostly students from Huancasancos, commanded by the regional 
Shining Path leaders camarada Victor, camarada Omar and camarada 
Carla. In order to gain support from the peasants, the Shining Path 
started targeting the local elites and authorities who, according to 
them, abused their power against the population and prevented 
the installation of the República Popular de Nueva Democracia74. 
Furthermore, the Shining Path drew on existing conflicts - mostly 
over land and cattle - to sow discord.75 The beginning of the armed 
struggle in 1980 moreover coincided with a climatological and 
agricultural crisis. Severe drought increased the vulnerability of 
the peasants’ subsistence and caused a significant increase in cattle 
theft and conflicts over borders. Between 1980 and 1981, there 
were 120 charges of cattle theft in Sacsamarca, corresponding to 
approximately 700 stolen animals.76 
The first incursions of the Shining Path in the district of Sacsamarca 
reflect these strategies of intimidating authorities and playing out 
existing tensions. On December 15, 1981, Enrique Cancho Vásquez, 
a villager of the annex of Pallcca, was killed by members of the 
Shining Path after being accused of cattle-theft.77 A few months 
later, in the night of August 10, 1982, Shining Path militants payed 
a visit to the Justice of the Peace in Sacsamarca, threatened him and 
searched the archives in his office.78 In the annex of Asca, Celedonio 
Huamaní was shot in his house by three Shining Path members, also 
73  Popular schools
74  Popular Republic of New Democracy
75  CVR.
76  Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El Siglo XX,” 149.
77  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 88.
78  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 127.
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after being accused by a fellow villager of cattle-theft.79 Only a few 
days later, a Shining Path militia of about four people on horses, 
led by comrade Omar, arrived and assembled the population on the 
main square for the entire day while preaching the revolution:
They took us to the main square, and they made us stand up 
straight, without moving, all day long, without food. [...] Then 
they taught us to talk about the comrades [...] ‘In the first place 
we greet camarada Gonzalo!’, that’s what they said. And that’s 
when my dad shouted at them: ‘How do you dare to make 
these old people stand up all day? Who do you think you are 
to command us like this?’ And that’s why they hated my dad.80 
In 1982 the youngsters arrived. They gathered the entire 
village, with this fondness, this charisma that they had. They 
attracted us in the same way as milk attracts flies. We fell for 
their slogans, their words.81 
Four armed persons appeared on the main square; two women 
79  CVR, Testimonio 203686, Centro de Información para la Memoria Colectiva y 
los Derechos Humanos.
80  My tranlation of original citation: “Nos ha llevado a la plaza, y nos ha hecho parar sin 
moverte ni nada, así derechitos, todo el día, sin comer. [...] Ahí pues han enseñado pues para que 
hablen de la camarada [...] ‘¡Camarada Gonzalo primer lugar le saludamos! así diciendo. En ahí 
mi papá les ha gritado: ‘¿Como van hacer parar así eso a los ancianitos? [...] ‘¿Qué cosa ustedes 
que piensan, para mandar al pueblo, qué cosa?’ Y por eso ya odiaron a mi papá.” Interview 
with Maria, daughter of one of the participants in the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
81  My translation of original citation: “El ochenta y dos ya llegaron jóvenes, nos reunieron 
a todo el pueblo, con ese cariño, con ese carisma que tienen. Atrajeron como si la leche atrajera a 
la mosca igualito. La gente caímos pues a los dichos, a las palabras de ellos.” Interview with 
Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 
15.04.2015.
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and two men with a red cloth as a scarf and a black hat with 
wisps, with red jackets, the ladies also, and they began to 
gather the people. ‘Ladies and gentlemen, come closer, we 
want to talk to you’, and well, as it was a novelty, the people 
approached without a problem. ‘We are communists. What is 
the central government doing? The capitalists are ruling and 
the poor nothing. We are going to fight for you!’ All the people 
said that it was alright and that they could go ahead.82 
According to one testimony in the publication by SER, the Shining 
Path militants returned two weeks later, by the end of September, to 
recruit youngsters and distribute arms: rifles, revolvers, knives and 
home-made grenades in milk cans.83
Zona liberada: The rule of the popular committee (October 1982 - February 
1983)
The permanent installation of Shining Path rule followed in 
October, when the regional leaders84 returned to Sacsamarca to 
force the existing authorities to abandon their posts and establish the 
local popular committee, subordinate to the regional Shining Path 
committee of Sacsamarca’s historical rival Huancasancos. During a 
general assembly, Walter Huaccachi - alias camarada Remigio - was 
82  My translation of original citation: “[...] en la plaza aparecieron cuatro personas 
armados, dos mujeres y dos varones y con trapo rojo como chalina y sombrero negro, dibujado 
con hileras, con casaca roja, las damas también, y empezaron a reunir a la gente pue. ‘Señores 
acérquense, queremos conversar con ustedes’, y bueno como era primera novedad la gente se acercó 
normal. ‘ Nosotros somos comunista. ¿Qué está haciendo el gobierno central? Los capitalistas 
están dominando y los pobres nada. ¡Nosotros vamos a luchar por ustedes!’ [...] Toda la gente dijo 
que está bien y sigan nomás.” Interview with Victor, one of the participants in the battle 
against the Shining Path on 21 May 1983, Sacsamarca, 28.03.2015.
83  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 79.
84  Both the regional leaders comrade Arturo, a scholar of the UNSCH, and 
comrade Omar are mentioned in the testimonies in relation to this event.
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assigned the responsibility of mando político85 and Jelacio Llacsa - alias 
camarada Mario - was appointed as mando militar86. Together with 
some thirty other villagers, they made up the popular committee 
which from then on would govern the ‘liberated’ Sacsamarca.87 The 
major was forced to hand in the key of the municipality to the new 
leaders.88 Testimonies contradict each other on the issue of to what 
extent Walter and Jelacio were forced by the regional leaders to take 
up the presidency of the popular committee or actually sympathized 
with the Shining Path. There is not a lot of information available on 
Jelacio, despite of the fact that he was a licenciado89 and that he was 
described to me by one informant as ‘dangerous’ (‘peligroso’).90 Walter 
figures as the central leader in the narrative, and most testimonies 
confirm that he ‘was with the party’ (‘andaba con el partido’). Walter 
Huaccachi was part of the economic elite of the village, as he 
belonged to one of the richest families of cattle-breeders. At the 
time of the events, he was about thirty years old and had spent 
some time studying agronomy at the UNSCH, but he did not finish 
his studies. During his time in Huamanga, he was the president 
of the Comité de Residentes de Sacsamarca91 and, according to the in-
depth study of the TRC, he was considered “a respected leader of 
the community”. Most likely, Walter established his first contacts 
with the Shining Path during his time at the UNSCH. 92 Upon his 
85  Political commander
86  Military commander
87  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 89.
88  Interview with Daniel, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
89  Someone who has completed military service in the Peruvian army
90  Interview with Julio, participant in the rebellion against the Shining Path, 
Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015.
91  Committee of Residents of Sacsamarca
92  The in-depth study of the TRC on the one hand states that Walter did not 
finish his studies because he joined the Shining Path, but no testimonies confirm this 
statement. On the other hand, one of the testimonies cited in the study suggests 
that Walter joined the Shining Path because he did not finish his studies and was 
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return to the village, Walter was eager to work as a teacher, but to 
his frustration, he was denied a position by the other teachers after 
which he dedicated himself to cattle-breeding and trade.93 
From the moment the popular committee was in power, the new 
rulers aimed at gaining full control over the resources of the village 
with the purpose of redistributing goods from the wealthy to the 
poor. Grocery shops of merchants were confiscated, as were convoys 
transporting merchandise that passed through the village, and the 
goods were distributed among the population.94 The same happened 
to the cattle: at a certain moment, Shining Path militias from all 
over the region assaulted the communal farm of Huancasancos in 
the valley of the Qaracha river and distributed all the cattle to the 
neighboring communities, as a villager recalls:
They took us to Huancasancos [...] to ruin the communal farm. 
There were five thousand sheep, brought together by each 
delegation of that pelotón [the Shining Path]. They gave twenty 
sheep to each village that had come. To Sacsamarca they gave 
twenty sheep.95
Furthermore, the popular committee obliged all villagers to 
participate in vigilance patrols in order to protect the so-called 
frustrated by this: “[...] yo pienso que WH se metió al Partido porque había sido un hombre 
fracasado, en la universidad no terminó sus estudios [...]” CVR, “Violencia Política En La 
Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.” 
One of the research participants stated that Walter returned to the community 
temporarily to work, but that he planned to go back to Huamanga to complete 
his studies. Interview with Sara, direct witness of the events of February 1983, 
Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015.
93  CVR.
94  CVR.
95  My translation of original citation: “Nos llevó a Huancasancos [...] al arrasamiento de 
la granja comunal. Era cinco mil ovinos, cada delegación de ese pelotón habrá traído. De ahí de 
cada pueblito que ha venido, veinte a veinte de cinco mil ovinos rapidito, veinte ovejas nos han dado 
a Sacsamarca” Interview with Andrés, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
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liberated zone from incursions by the military.96 Daily life was 
militarized and Sacsamarca became part of the Shining Path’s 
revolutionary armed struggle.97 Leaving the village in order to 
work on the land or herd the cattle in the puna was forbidden - 
notwithstanding the fact that the popular committee came to power 
in the rainy season, when farmers normally spend most of the time 
at their estancias.98 The new regime was extremely repressive and the 
leaders of the popular committee did not tolerate dissent. Any form 
of resistance or refusal to collaborate was severely punished. Those 
who were accused of betraying the revolution were judged during 
a so-called juicio popular99, leading to physical punishment and, in 
the worst case, execution. The first deadly victim of the repression 
of the popular committee was Bernabé López, a young man who 
openly opposed the authority of the popular committee. After being 
executed on November 24, 1982, his corpse was carried around 
the square and left in the middle under the eucalyptus tree with a 
sign on his chest saying: “Así mueren los soplones”100.101 Several days 
later, on December 1st, Alejandro Avilés García was denounced 
to the popular committee by his own daughter and drowned in 
the river with his hand and feet tied together. The reasons for his 
denunciation vary per testimony: envy in the family102, cattle-theft103 
and adultery104 are mentioned. On January 5th, 1983, during the 
village’s Three Kings Day celebration, a group of ex-authorities - 
96  Interview with Andrés, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
97  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
98  Interview with Daniel, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
99  Popular trial
100  This is how traitors die
101  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 89, 
128. Interview with Jesús, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 14.04.2015.
102  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 89.
103  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 123.
104  Interview with Jesús, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 14.04.2015.
218
IV Open Secrets
labeled by the Shining Path as tinterillos105 - was publicly tortured on 
the square while they had to watch how the archives of the justice of 
the peace were burned down.106 When the regional leader comrade 
Omar - who also happened to be in Sacsamarca that day - ordered 
the killing of the men, Walter Huaccachi intervened and prevented 
their execution by stating that they were blacklisted and would meet 
their fate later. One of the victims recounts the events of that day:  
[...] as a punishment they first cut our hair to zero, on our 
knees, and after that we had  to run several rounds barefoot 
around the square [...] it was this Omar and other neighbors, 
I don’t know where they were from, maybe Huancasancos, I 
don’t know. They grabbed me like a football on the top of 
their feet, punched me everywhere, they left me nearly dead. 
Since that date, I feel my back. And then, to put me in front 
of the public, they said: ‘Bring a scarf’ [to blindfold the victim 
for the execution], and I said to myself: ‘Well, I will grab this 
Omar and we will both die on the square’, but then, this leader 
from here, Walter Huaccachi, he said to him [Omar]: ‘There 
is no scarf. We will burn him next time, he’s already on the 
blacklist.’107 
Political repression and power abuse thus became the order of 
the day as soon as the Shining Path was in power. As the terror 
105  Literal translation ‘inkpot’, derogatory term to refer to clerks
106  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 98.
107  My translation of original citation: “[...]como castigo primero corte de pelo a cero, de 
rodillas, después correr a la plaza descalzo varias vueltas [...] ese Omar después otros vecinos de 
dónde serÍa, Huancasancos, no sé. Me agarran como a una pelota a punta pie, puñete todo, casi 
muerto me deja. Total de esa fecha siento la espalda. Así para sacarme a publico dijeron: ‘Traigan 
pañuelo’, y me dije: ‘Bueno, a este Omar le voy a agarrar y nos vamos a caer los dos en la plaza’, 
y ese jefe de acá, Walter Huaccachi, le dijo: ‘No hay pañuelo. Para la próxima vamos a prender 
compañero, ya está en la lista negra’.” Interview with Jesús, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 
14.04.2015.
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of the new regime became clear, more and more villagers tried to 
seek refuge in the puna or the cities. While preaching redistribution, 
the members of the popular committee kept the best part of the 
resources for their personal enrichment and the leaders allowed 
themselves all kinds of privileges and excesses. Several testimonies 
recount, for example, how the leaders picked the ‘best’ young girls 
of the village as their sex slaves.108 The popular trial that is most 
explicitly engraved in the village’s collective memory is the last one: 
the killing of the 28-year-old teacher Teodoro Fernández Huamaní, 
who originally was from Huancapi. After criticizing the abuses of 
the popular committee, Teodoro was executed with a bullet in his 
head in front of the church on February 6th, 1983.109 It is not clear 
whether the teacher had initially supported the popular committee, 
but the way in which his protest is recounted in several testimonies 
suggests that he denounced the aggressive methods of the Shining 
Path rather than the revolution per se:
Gabriela: Why did they execute the teacher? Pablo: Simply 
because he said: ‘We are depriving the people a lot. Why do 
you do this? The people will get tired of this. They might 
turn against [you/us].’110 
The words of the teacher would turn out to be prophetic. 
108  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 93, 95.
109  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 90, 100, 128.
110  My translation of original citation: Gabriela: “¿Por qué fusilaron al profesor?” Pablo: 
“Simplemente por haber dicho: ‘Mucho estamos privando a la gente. ¿Porqué hacen eso? La gente 
se va cansar. De repente puede venir en contra.›» Interview with Pablo, one of the leaders 
of the rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015.
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Conspiracy and resistance (February - March 1983)
The executions mark the point where the narrative on the position 
of the population turns from collaboration to resistance. The fact 
that the popular committee started killing - ‘ya empezaron a matar’ - 
is mentioned in many testimonies as a bridge too far.111 While the 
execution of the teacher can be seen as the proverbial last straw 
that broke the camel’s back, several motivations can be identified for 
the villagers’ change in position. The in-depth report of the TRC 
mentions four generic reasons: the Shining Path’s attack against the 
farmers’ economy, the discrepancy between ideology and practice, 
the use of terror, and the entanglement of the governance of the 
popular committee with existing conflicts and power struggles.112 
Testimonies mention two additional immediate causes for the 
rebellion. The first one is the existence of a blacklist with names 
of people that would be eliminated by the popular committee. One 
of the members of the popular committee would have passed this 
list on to the people involved, who subsequently decided to set 
up a conspiracy against the popular committee to save their own 
skin.113 The second one, mentioned by several interviewees, is a 
threat received by a general of the army. As Sacsamarca was marked 
as a ‘red zone’ infiltrated by the Shining Path, the general would 
have given the villagers an ultimatum to demonstrate which side 
they were on. If not, Sacsamarca would be wiped from the map by 
the military, as would later happen with villages such as Umaro, 
Cayara or Accomarca. One testimony even mentions this threat as 
111  Caroline Yezer similarly marks the popular trials as a breaking point for the 
village where she conducted her research. Yezer, “Who Wants to Know?,” 274.
112  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
113  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: 
Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 
2004, 123; CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos 
de Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.” Interview with Daniel, ex-authority, 
Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
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the principal cause:
The cause of our rebellion was the threat of the General 
[XXX] [...] who was determined to destroy this politics [of the 
Shining Path] [...]. He gave twenty days. [...] The general gave 
us this warning and if we would not organize this rebellion, 
this village, Sacsamarca, Huancasancos and Lucanamarca 
would totally disappear. [...] We rebelled foremost because of 
the threat by the general, if not we maybe would have died, if 
that [the threat] wouldn’t have happened, we wouldn’t have 
revolted against all these abuses.114
The in-depth report of the TRC touches upon a related fact. In the 
weeks before the rebellion, several newspapers in Lima published a 
map upon which Sacsamarca was marked as a ‘red zone’ in hands of 
the Shining Path. The community of migrants from Sacsamarca in 
Lima picked up this reporting and sent concerned messages to their 
hometown, urging their fellow-villagers to do something. Their 
concern was either that the military would leave the villagers to their 
fate and would not intervene out of fear for the Shining Path, or 
that they would massacre the population in case they did decide to 
intervene.115
In any case, it was in the days after the execution of the teacher on 
February 6th that a conspiracy against the popular committee started 
to take shape during secret meetings in the puna held by a group of 
approximately twenty villagers. They decided to strike during the 
114  My translation of original citation: “Y el caso de la causa de nuestra revelación fue 
por la amenaza del General [XXX] [...] que iba a hacer desaparecer esa política [...] Dió 20 
días [...] El general nos dió esa advertencia, y si no hacía esa revelación [rebelión], el pueblo 
este, Sacsamarca, Huancasancos y Lucanamarca iba a desaparecer, en global ya. [...] Más por 
amenaza del general es que nos hemos rebelado, sino de repente nos hubiéramos muerto, quizás 
sino hubiera pasado eso, no nos hubiéramos rebelado de tantos abusos.” Interview with Daniel, 
ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
115  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
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carnival celebrations on February 15th116, when the leaders would 
be drunk and inattentive. On the eve of the celebrations, a meeting 
with about 170 villagers was set up in the puna in which a detailed 
plan and corresponding division of tasks was defined. According to 
the testimonies, the plan was to capture the leaders and not to kill 
them.117 When it came to the crunch, however, Walter and Jelacio 
were both surprised in their sleep and stabbed and stoned to death, 
as described in the introduction. According to the in-depth report 
of the TRC, the villagers stated that they decided to kill the leaders 
instead of capturing them because there were no government 
authorities in Sacsamarca to which they could hand them over.118 
The other members of the popular committee were captured and 
tied together with a rope. Nevertheless, some of them could escape 
to Huancasancos and warn the Shining Path leadership there of what 
had occurred in Sacsamarca. Infuriated by the news of the rebellion, 
the popular committee of Huancasancos immediately sent militias 
to Sacsamarca and captured a group of thirty men, among whom 
the principal leaders of the conspiracy. They took the prisoners to 
Huancasancos, where they directed ten of them to the main square 
to be quartered in front of the population. The other twenty were 
locked up in an oven to be burned.119 They had to wait, however, 
116  Testimonies contradict each other on the exact date of the rebellion, but 
February 15, 1983, is the date on Walter Huaccachi’s gravestone at the cemetery 
of the village. 
117  Interview with Francisco, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 10.04.2015; interview with Julio, participant in the rebellion 
against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015; interview with Pablo, one of 
the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015; 
interview with Daniel, ex-authority and participant in the rebellion against the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015; Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate 
Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La 
Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 80. 
118  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
119  Interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015; interview with Julio, participant in the rebellion 
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for the permission of comrade Victor - the main regional Shining 
Path leader, who at that moment was out of town - to carry out the 
executions.120 In the meantime, a commission of three men from 
Sacsamarca traveled to the police station in Huancapi to ask for help. 
However, when confronted with the story about the rebellion, the 
police men were suspicious and did not believe the Sacsamarquinos. Out 
of desperation, the men decided to hurt themselves and went back 
the next day with the pretext that they were attacked by the Shining 
Path. With their faces covered in blood, they were finally believed 
by the police who decided to send a helicopter to Huancasancos in 
order to free the prisoners.121 Meanwhile, three days had passed and 
comrade Victor had not yet returned to Huancasancos. When the 
helicopter of the police arrived to Huancasancos, they found the 
prisoners alive and succeeded in liberating them. During the rescue 
operation, the Sinchis122 demonstrated their reputation as ruthless 
brutes by randomly firing their arms in the streets of Huancasancos, 
hereby killing fourteen civilians.123
The rebellion against the leaders of the popular committee in 
Sacsamarca unleashed a series of events of resistance and violence 
against (presumed members of) the Shining Path in the region 
perpetrated by the state forces as well as by civilians. On February 
20th, the villagers of Huancasancos lynched comrade Victor and 
against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015; interview with Barbara, widow, 
Sacsamarca, 20.05.2015.
120  According to one testimony, comrade Victor would have been on a mission 
in the region with Abimael Guzmán himself. Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 
Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las 
Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 100.
121  Interview with Daniel, ex-authority and participant in the rebellion against 
the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015; interview with Daniela, widow whose 
husband was involved with and later killed by the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 
21.05.2015.
122  Nickname of the anti-terror unit of the Guardia Civil
123  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
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other leaders of the popular committee. The villagers left the corpses 
of the leaders in the streets for three days in order to demonstrate 
their resistance to the Sinchis.124 A few days later, the Sinchis arrested 
three men in Sacsamarca on the suspicion of being part of the 
Shining Path. After being interrogated at the police station, the 
men were told that they were found innocent. They were taken back 
and released on the bridge at the entrance of the village. As soon 
as they had turned around to start their walk to the center of the 
village, the police men released a shower of bullets in their backs, 
leaving all three of them dead. One of the three victims, Liberato 
García, was Walter Huaccahi’s father-in-law.125 On February 24, the 
military raided the village of Lucanamarca, killed a Shining Path 
leader nicknamed comrade Nelson and ordered the population to 
revolt against the remaining leaders.126 The next day, the leaders 
of the popular committee of Colcabamba, who had decided to flee 
after having heard what had happened to Walter and Jelacio, were 
persecuted and killed by villagers of Sacsamarca in the highlands 
of Putaccasa.127 Two of the eight victims were Mavilón Cancho and 
Beatriz García, Walter Huaccachi’s brother- and sister-in-law. Their 
three-year-old daughter Giovanna was locked up in a room while 
she could hear her parents being shot. Beatriz was pregnant from 
a second child. The family members of the victims were prevented 
124  González Huarcaya, La Vida No Vale Nada. Terror, Sangre y Muerte En Los Andes, 
45; CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
125  CVR, Testimonio 201114, Centro de Información para la Memoria Colectiva 
y los Derechos Humanos.
126  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
127  They were persecuted by groups of villagers both from Colcabamba and 
Sacsamarca, but according to the most detailed testimonies it was the group from 
Sacsamarca that eventually perpetrated the killing. Interview with Manuel, Hualla, 
30.04.2015; CVR, Testimonio 201114; Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense 
(EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de 
La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 88.
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by their fellow-villagers from burying the corpses on the cemetery 
of Colcabamba, which is why the corpses were buried in Putaccasa 
close to the place of the massacre, where they rest up until today.128 
In the meantime, the military increasingly put pressure on the 
villagers of Sacsamarca to denounce the remaining Shining Path 
militants and executed at least three villagers in the weeks after the 
rebellion.129 On March 22, the villagers of Lucanamarca on their 
turn completed the military’s order to revolt and killed the leader of 
the local popular committee by stoning and burning him in front of 
the church.130 
The Shining Path takes revenge (April - May 1983)
The response of the Shining Path against the wave of resistance of 
the villages in the region was severe. On April 3, they besieged and 
raided Lucanamarca, where the villagers were collectively working 
on the maintenance of the roads. The participants in the faena 
were randomly killed in the streets. Thereafter, the Shining Path 
militants gathered the remaining population on the main square and 
carried out a mass execution. In total, they slaughtered 67 villagers - 
including men, women, children and elderly - with bladed arms. The 
massacre was planned with help from Shining Path militants among 
the population.131 Abimael Guzmán would justify the massacre a 
few years later as follows:
I reiterate that the main purpose was to make them understand 
128  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), 78; Servicios Educativos 
Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II 
Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 90.
129  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 111, 
125.
130  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
131  CVR.
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that we were a hard  nut to crack, that we were ready for 
anything. Because Marx has taught us that resistance is not a 
game.132
Sacsamarca was next in line to be repaid for its disloyalty. In the 
early morning of May 21, four- to five hundred Shining Path 
recruits from the villages of the valley of the Pampas river - Hualla, 
Tiquihua, Canaria, Chincheros -, led by comrade Omar and comrade 
Pablo, started to arrive to the highlands of Tambobamba, in the 
surroundings of Sacsamarca. As in Lucanamarca, a communal 
gathering and faena was planned to take place in Sacsamarca that 
day. Victor Auccasi, a farmer living in the puna, could escape the 
approaching Shining Path militias and ran downtown to warn the 
villagers by ringing the bells of the church tower. Together with 
three policemen who happened to be around and were armed 
with FALs133, the villagers decided to confront the Shining Path 
militias who, except for Omar and Pablo, fought without firearms. 
Ten villagers of Sacsamarca, Pallcca and Asca and an unknown 
number of Shining Path recruits lost their lives in the battle, which 
eventually turned in favor of the Sacsamarquinos.134 When comrade 
Omar and Pablo managed to escape in the direction of Pallcca, two 
of the policemen and some Sacsamarquinos gave chase. During the 
persecution, one of the policemen got shot by Omar, after which 
the other policeman killed the latter and ordered a villager to cut off 
his head. Pablo, who got shot in his leg, surrendered and asked for 
132  My translation of original citation: “Reitero ahí lo principal era hacerles entender que 
éramos un hueso duro de roer, que estábamos dispuesto a todo. Porque Marx nos ha enseñado que 
no se juega a la insurrección.” Cited in: CVR.
133  Fusil Automatique Léger, semi-automatic rifle produced by the Belgian company 
FN Herstal
134  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca”; Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate 
Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La 
Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 77–132.
‘Enfrentamiento’ by Anibal Pillaca Huaccachi (Source: SER 2005) 
Drawing depicting the battle of May 21st 1983
228
IV Open Secrets
mercy, but was killed on the spot by the villagers.135 
The day after, Sacsamarca mourned its victims. The dead policeman 
was picked up by helicopter and the fallen villagers buried on the 
cemetery. Some twenty or thirty Shining Path recruits who were 
taken as prisoners during the battle were brought to the village where 
they had to endure severe torture by the police and were locked up 
without any food. After three days, the police captain ordered his 
men to execute the prisoners on the outskirts of the village. Some 
villagers were obliged to bury the corpses in a mass grave close to 
the village, where they remain until today.136
Between the devil and the deep blue sea: Living with the Sinchis (May 1983 - 
ca. 1994)
The rebellion against the leaders of the popular committee and the 
battle of Tambobamba marked the end of Sacsamarca’s coexistence 
with the Shining Path, but the villagers now had to endure the 
presence of the abusive state forces. In the aftermath of the rebellion, 
a military base was installed in Huancasancos and a police station 
in Lucanamarca and Sacsamarca. In the latter case, an agreement 
was established with the population that they would provide the 
policemen with foodstuff and wood in exchange for protection. 137 
The minutes of a community meeting held in Sacsamarca on May 
22nd, 1983, the day after the battle, state that: 
[...] the major [XX] left the police detachment installed on this 
135  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 84, 
126.
136  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004; CVR, 
“Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de Lucanamarca, 
Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
137  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 111.
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date for the protection of all the inhabitants of the villages that 
were mentioned in the previous lines [Sacsamarca, Pallcca, 
Colcabamba, Asca, Putaccasa] [...] for which the population 
was very grateful and compromised itself to collaborate in 
every sense of the word.138 
During their presence, the police reorganized the village into two 
neighborhoods which exist up until today - Los Libertadores and Túpac 
Amaru - and obliged the population to carry out vigilance patrols.139 
Nevertheless, the mistrust and disdain of the Sinchis towards the 
population resulted in horrific abuses, including plundering, torture 
and rape:
“[...] the Sinchis did anything they wanted, like raping the 
women, they rinsed out the drunks at any time of the night, 
they let disobedient people run around naked, they massacred 
them, they took their belongings and even stole the animals, 
they treated us like dogs [...]”140
“[...] there was abuse from both sides, also from the state 
forces, because this village was already marked as a red zone. 
The people were virtually worth nothing for the state, and 
that is most regrettable. The people were totally unprotected, 
138  My translation of original citation: “[...] el mayor [XX] dejó en la fecha instalada 
el destacamaneto policial para el resguardo de todo los habitantes de cuyo [...] el pueblo quedó 
sumamanete agaradecido y se comprometió colaborar en todo sentido de la palabra.” Archivo 
directiva comunal Sacsamarca, Acta del día veintidos de mayo de mil novecientos ochentitres.
139  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 111.
140  My translation of original citation: “[...] los Sinchis hicieron todo lo que querían, 
como violar a las mujeres, los bañaban a los borrachitos a cualquier hora de la noche, hacían 
correr calatos a personas desobedientes, los masacraban, quitaban sus pertenencias hasta robaban 
animales, a las personas nos trataban como a perros [...]” Servicios Educativos Rurales 
(SER), 94.
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that was the reason why they came and then they came, and 
they did whatever they wanted with the mothers, the ladies, 
the girls. It was a violation of human rights, as much sexual as 
everything else.141
During a general assembly in 1984, the village reconsidered the 
agreement with the police and decided that they could no longer 
provide them with food.142 Testimonies contradict each other on 
when the police station in Sacsamarca was abandoned: in 1990, 
1992 or 1994.143 This confusion is probably due to the fact that the 
police regularly visited the village through patrols also after their 
withdrawal from permanent residence in the village. The military 
base in Huancasancos was dissolved in 1994.144
While the revolts against the popular committees in Sacsamarca, 
Huancasancos, Lucanamarca and Colcabamba meant the beginning 
of the end of the ‘liberated’ zone in the region, incursions of the 
Shining Path took a deadly toll during the entire decade to follow. 
The event that is marked in testimonies as the last violent action of 
the Shining Path in Sacsamarca is the killing of the mayor, Sergio 
Barrientos, in June 1994. Between 1981 and 1994, at least 107 
villagers of the district of Sacsamarca lost their lives as a result of 
violence perpetrated either by the Shining Path, the state forces, or 
141  My translation of original citation: “[...] también hubo abuso de las fuerzas armadas 
de las dos partes, porque este pueblo ya estaba designado ya como una zona roja, la gente ya 
no valía nada ni prácticamente para el estado, y eso es lo más lamentable. Estaba totalmente 
desprotegidos, tal es por eso que vino las fuerzas armadas vinieron e hicieron lo que quisieron con 
las madres, señoras, señoritas. Hubo una violación de los derechos humanos tanto sexual como de 
todo.” Interview with Alonso, witness of the events of 1983, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015. 
142  Personal communication with Ricardo Caro, 18.06.2019.
143  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 113, 
127, 132.
144  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
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their own neighbors.145 
4.3 Diffusion of transitional justice
Silence and suspicion: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Knowing the course of the events of the civil war in Sacsamarca, it 
already becomes clear that transitional justice’s quest of finding ‘the 
truth’ would not be self-evident in this community. If the arrival 
of the Shining Path opened a pandora’s box of micro conflicts and 
vengeances, as is stated by the TRC itself, then the process of truth-
finding at least ran the risk of re-opening this box.146 As mentioned in 
the introduction to this chapter, the TRC was present in Sacsamarca 
through the mobile teams which collected testimonies on the one 
hand, and, the research team in charge of the in-depth report on 
the province of Huancasancos on the other. In general, it seems 
that not a lot of Sacsamarquinos were eager to give their individual 
testimony to the TRC (33 of which only fourteen are available), and 
even less so in relation to the events of 1982 and 1983 (only three of 
the available testimonies). One research participant suggested to me 
that as soon as the villagers knew about the existence of the TRC, 
they came to an internal agreement during a general assembly not 
to testify on certain events such as the killing of the leaders of the 
popular committee.147 The in-depth research team indeed states in 
its report that it encountered “distrust, fear, resentment and envy” 
upon its arrival to the researched communities in the province of 
Huancasancos and that the team was insulted and accused of seeking 
the liberation of Shining Path members. In the report, the distrust 
of villagers towards the commission is in the first place ascribed 
145  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 114.
146  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
147  Fieldnotes, 28.06.2014. 
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to disinformation about the work and the purpose of the TRC.148 
Moreover, they indicated that, of all the visited communities in the 
province of Huancasancos, distrust was strongest in Sacsamarca:
In Sacsamarca, in comparison to the other communities, we 
encountered mayor  difficulties in accessing the population.
This is mainly due to the lack of information concerning 
the objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The average peasant had no knowledge of what it was and if 
they did, they did not want to talk to us, stating that they had 
no time and that they had not been present in those years of 
violence.149
If it is true, however, that an internal agreement had been made in 
advance by the villagers, than it was alertness rather than unawareness 
or disinformation that explains the villagers’ reluctance to talk to 
the TRC. Whether such an internal agreement existed or not, in any 
case several motivations can be identified for the villagers’ restraint. 
General distrust and fear for reprisals were often mentioned by 
research participants as a reason for not testifying:
eva: After all of this happened here, the Truth Commission 
came to investigate? Suyana: Yes, an expert of the Truth 
Commission came to investigate. After that, they have 
investigated, and they have taken declarations. [...] But the 
majority was afraid, they did not want to declare. We were 
afraid, pues, ‘maybe this group is coming with  lies, why are 
148  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
149  My translation of original citation: “En Sacsamarca, con relación a las otras 
comunidades encontramos mayores dificultades para acceder a la población. Esto se debe 
principalmente a la falta de información acerca de los objetivos de la Comisión de la Verdad 
y Reconciliación, el campesino promedio no tenía conocimiento de qué era y por el contrario no 
querían hablar con nosotros aduciendo falta de tiempo y que no habían estado presentes en aquellos 
años de violencia.” CVR.
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we going to inform them?’, that’s what we said. Others were 
scared.150 
This general climate of fear demonstrates that, although the war had 
already calmed down for several years at the time of the mandate of 
the TRC, the villagers had their reasons to believe that the circle of 
violence and vengeance could easily be sparked again - especially 
in a context of close proximity between (former) enemies. Another 
reason to be afraid to testify was the fear that the investigations of the 
TRC, despite its lack of legal mandate, would lead to prosecutions. 
During my fieldwork, this was specifically mentioned by research 
participants involved in the events of February 1983. One of the 
leaders of the rebellion explicitly wanted to make sure that my 
research did not serve any legal purposes, probably because there 
had been investigations by the prosecutor’s office concerning the 
exhumation of one of the mass graves in Putaccasa shortly before 
the interview took place: 
The Truth Commission, and I don’t know who else, all of them 
always come to ask me. Sometimes it makes me bitter, what do 
I still have to say? Now lately, for example, people are getting 
uncomfortable. On the basis of their report [the final report of 
the TRC] they start to analyze, and they start saying: ‘No, but 
you told me this, and that...’, and then the judicial investigation 
begins, and one compromises oneself, I would not want that, 
señorita Eva.151
150  My translation of original citation: “Eva: Después de que pasó todo eso, vinieron 
a investigar aquí, de lo que pasó, de la comisión de la verdad? Suyana: Si pues, un perito ha 
venido de la comisión de la verdad a investigar. Después ellos han investigado, han tomado 
manifestaciones. [...] Pero mayoría se han quedado de miedo, no querían avisar. Teníamos miedo 
pues, quizá ese grupo nomas con mentira está viniendo, para que vamos avisar, diciendo. Otros 
tenían miedo” Interview with Suyana, widow whose husband was disappeared by the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 16.04.2015.
151  My translation of original citation: “Comisión de la Verdad, y no se quiénes ya y todo 
el mundo siempre me viene. A veces ya me amarga y ¿qué cosa ya digo? Ahora últimamente está 
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Another reason mentioned by Caroline Yezer in her research on 
opposition to the TRC, which was conducted in an anonymized 
village in Ayacucho at the very moment the TRC started to take 
shape, is that people did not see the purpose of testifying. The 
villagers already knew what happened, why would they be interested 
in finding the truth? The commissioner’s argument in function of 
national reconciliation, that they should speak so that ‘people in 
the city would know their story’, made the villagers feel that their 
testimony was in the first place extracted for others, and that their 
‘memory work’ was being exploited, thus Yezer.152 Moreover, the 
fact that the mobile teams took individual private testimonies 
- in contrast to the public hearings - based on standardized 
questionnaires, contributed to the feeling that their testimony had 
no visibility.153 If we extrapolate this motivation to Sacsamarca, 
in addition to the climate of fear for reprisal and prosecution that 
characterizes the aftermath of intimate violence, villagers thus most 
likely made a deliberate consideration that they had more to lose 
than to win by talking about the violence. In addition, at the time 
of the TRC’s mandate, it was not yet clear whether its work would 
lead to any (monetary) compensations for victims. In case they did 
testify, the villagers’ expectation that they would receive something 
in return was a very strong incentive to talk, as is mentioned in the 
in-depth report: 
The first reaction of the people was to ask us what we would 
give in return if they would tell us; the expectations of 
individual economic reparations are very big [...]154
surgiendo por ejemplo incómodos a la gente. Ya acorde a su informe comienzan a analizar y te 
dicen: ‘No, tú me has dicho este, que esto...’ y comienza la investigación judicial, entonces uno 
mismo se compromete, eso no quisiera señorita Eva.” Interview with Mauricio, one of the 
leaders of the rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
152  Yezer, “Who Wants to Know?,” 280.
153  Yezer, 277.
154  My translation of original citation: “La primera reacción de la gente fue preguntarnos 
qué es lo que les íbamos a dar a cambio de lo que nos contaran; las expectativas de reparación 
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Yezer points out how the investigators of the TRC, in the case of 
the village where she conducted research, reduced the villagers’ 
reluctance to talk to a symptom of PTSD (‘they are afraid because 
they don’t understand that the war is over’), and did not consider the 
rational considerations or political struggles behind the silences.155 
This does not entirely seem to be the case for the TRC’s investigations 
in Sacsamarca. Despite the fact that the in-depth report indeed pays 
a lot of attention to notions of trauma, and that it lists mental health 
care as its first recommendation while the population does not really 
seem to prioritize it, it also explicitly points to the limitations of a 
PTSD-based model of analysis - albeit without further specifying 
these limitations:
We found that a medical-psychological “posttraumatic stress” 
model which focuses on short term traumatic events and takes 
the individual as the unity of analysis and intervention, has its 
limitations.156
Furthermore, the investigators did look for explanations beyond 
PTSD or misinformation for the villagers’ mistrust. The in-depth 
report clearly indicates an awareness of the tense coexistence 
between victims and perpetrators as a pragmatic incentive to keep 
silent:
The great distrust to talk about the period of the political 
violence and the fear for reprisals makes us think that we are 
in a community where victims and perpetrators from both 
económica de forma individual son muy grandes [...]” CVR, “Violencia Política En La 
Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
155  Yezer, “Who Wants to Know?,” 271.
156  My translation of original citation: “Encontramos que existen limitaciones de un modelo 
médico-psicológico de “estrés post-traumático” que enfoca sucesos traumatizantes de corto plazo y 
toma al individuo como unidad de análisis y de intervención.” CVR, “Violencia Política En 
La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
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sides live together. This has provoked important changes in 
the community and although in the formal discourse they talk 
about reconciliation, the conflicts and resentments are still 
very present.157
The investigators moreover reflected on their position as outsiders 
and potential disturbers of a tense equilibrium in Sacsamarca: 
 The resentment is so strong [...], they recognize their enemies 
and yet they live together in the same village. The coexistence is 
complex; in this case all the conflicts, grudges and accusations 
are so present in the everyday that we don’t have to believe 
that we disturb the “equilibrium” of the community because 
this is a fictitious equilibrium in which they try to believe, but 
nevertheless, it stands out in all its dimensions in front of the  
presence of strangers, like us.158
The tense coexistence between ‘intimate enemies’ was thus 
something that the investigators of the in-depth report were very 
aware of. Moreover, the presumption that the escalation of the 
violence was the result of a “war between peasants” (“guerra entre 
campesinos”), shaped by preexisting conflicts and power struggles, 
was one of the main hypotheses of investigation formulated at the 
beginning of the investigation. The in-depth report furthermore 
157 My translation of original citation: “La gran desconfianza para hablar sobre la época 
de la violencia política y el miedo a represalias, nos hace pensar que estamos en una comunidad 
donde viven víctimas y victimarios de ambos lados. Esto ha provocado cambios importantes en la 
comunidad y aunque en el discurso formal se habla de una reconciliación, aún los conflictos y los 
rencores están presentes en la vida cotidiana.” CVR.
158  My translation of original citation: “El resentimiento es tan fuerte, como podemos ver 
en las citas anteriores, reconocen a sus enemigos y sin embargo viven en la misma localidad con 
ellos. La convivencia es compleja; en este caso todos los conflictos, rencores y acusaciones están tan 
presentes en el día a día, que no debemos creer que perturbamos el “equilibrio” de la comunidad 
porque este es una [sic] equilibrio ficticio en el cual tratan de creer, pero sin embargo resalta en toda 
su amplitud ante la presencia de extraños, como nosotros.” CVR.
237
IV Open Secrets
mentions that this hypothesis gained importance throughout 
the research process in the sense that micro conflicts and power 
dynamics within the communities even played a much bigger role 
than expected.159 At the same time, the standardized format of 
the questionnaires used by the mobile teams to collect testimonies 
reflects a rather rigid categorization of victims and perpetrators and 
of the type of violations, which is also predominant in the reparation 
program that followed from the recommendations of the TRC.160
From ‘intimate enemies’ to innocent victims: The reparation program
The recommendations of the TRC resulted in the design of a 
reparation plan and the opening of a victim register (Registro Único 
de Víctimas, RUV) in 2004 (cfr. chapter 3.2). While there was still 
some room in the in-depth report to touch upon the complexity 
of agency that characterizes intimate violence, the reparation 
program manages strictly delineated categories of victimhood and 
violation to define beneficiaries. Registration in the RUV is the 
first necessary prerequisite to be eligible for reparations and can 
be done by declaring before one of the offices of the RUV. This 
declaration needs to be confirmed by three witnesses in the form of 
a declaration of honor. Individual economic reparations are limited 
to family members of victims who died or disappeared, victims 
with mental or physical disabilities as a consequence of (sexual) 
violence or torture, victims of wrongful imprisonment, victims 
159  CVR.
160  The first page of the questionnaire consists of multiple-choice boxes indicating 
the ‘responsable groups’ (‘grupos responsables’, choice between: ‘state forces’, ‘self-
defense committees’, ‘paramilitary groups’, ‘terrorist organizations’, ‘civilians’, 
‘others’ and ‘undefined’); the ‘type of declarant’ (‘tipo de declarante’, choice between 
‘family member of victim’, ‘victim’, ‘perpetrator or agent’, ‘direct witness’ and 
‘other’); and the ‘topics of the interview’ (‘temas de entrevista’, choice between: ‘death’, 
‘disappearance’, ‘torture or abuse’, ‘detention or kidnapping’, ‘sexual violence’, 
‘judicial processes/judicial problems’, ‘destruction of goods and properties’, ‘forced 
use of persons’, ‘graves’ or ‘other topics’). 
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of rape and children born from rape. The reparation program 
furthermore applies a clean hands doctrine which implies that 
(family members of) victims who belonged to the Shining Path are 
automatically excluded from the right to reparations (cfr. chapter 
3.3). In Sacsamarca, 482 direct victims (of whom 190 men and 292 
women) and 373 family members of victims (of whom 221 men and 
152 women) had registered in the RUV by 2014.161 The combination 
of this clean hands doctrine and the clear-cut categorization of 
victims and perpetrators provided a strong incentive for potential 
beneficiaries of the reparation program to transform the narrative 
of intimate violence into one of a victimized population caught 
between two fires, as María Eugenia Ulfe and Ximena Málaga state 
in their analysis of the relation between the condition of victimhood 
and the implementation of the reparation program in Huancasancos 
and Lucanamarca:
Through the metaphor of “between two fires”, the victim makes 
his/her way in this great national context as a depoliticized 
subject that is located in the middle of the crossing of violence 
[...] This metaphor helps to draw a defined line between 
victim and perpetrator, and as a way of dignifying the one 
who suffered, (s)he is given centrality in the story. [...] The 
perpetrator is not defined in positive terms, but in opposition 
to the victim.162
161  Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de la Pontífica Universidad 
Católica del Perú, “Diagnóstico Socioeconómico y Psicosocial de La Comunidad y 
Distrito Sacsamarca” (Lima: Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de la 
Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014), 91.
162  My translation of original citation: “Sirviéndose de la metáfora “entre dos fuegos”, la 
víctima se abre paso en este gran texto nacional como un sujeto despolitizado que se encuentra 
ubicado al medio del cruce de violencia [...] Esta metáfora ayuda a trazar una línea definida entre 
víctima y perpetrador, y como forma de dignificación del sufriente, se le otorga centralidad en el 
relato. [...] El perpetrador no es definido en términos positivos, sino en oposición a una víctima.” 
Maria Eugenia Ulfe and Ximena Málaga Sabogal, “Los Nuevos Suplicantes Del 
Estado Peruano: Las Víctimas y El Programa Integral de Reparaciones (PIR),” in 
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Indeed, this narrative of innocent victimhood leaves little room 
to elaborate on the initial involvement and collaboration of many 
Sascamarquinos with the Shining Path. The murderers of the leaders 
of the popular committee on their turn, most of whom also initially 
sympathized or collaborated with the Shining Path, were further 
encouraged to cover up their role in the killings in order to present 
themselves in the first place as victims. At the same time, the family 
members of the leaders who were killed by their fellow-villagers, or 
of those alleged Shining Path members who were executed by the 
state forces in the aftermath of the rebellion, are not considered as 
victims and cannot claim reparations for the loss of their relatives. 
Despite the rigid categorization of victims and perpetrators, the 
implementation of the reparation program in Sacsamarca is thus 
inevitably intertwined with the intimate nature of the violence which 
now divides the population in beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of 
the program. As Ulfe and Málaga put it, the category of victimhood 
is thus not abstract and has tangible repercussions for social relations:
On the one hand, you become a potential beneficiary [...] of 
an individual economic reparation. On the other, your fellow-
citizens [paisanos] will never see you in the same way - they will 
want to know what happened to you, or why you received some 
money from the State and they didn’t. The rumors emerge like 
a dust-cloud and revive the moments before, during and after 
the internal armed conflict.163
In Sacsamarca, this has resulted in discontent and mutual accusations 
Políticas En Justicia Transicional. Miradas Comparativas Sobre El Legado de La CVR., ed. 
Ludwig Huber and Ponciano Del Pino, IEP, 2015, 174.
163  My translation of original citation: “De un lado, te vuelves potencial beneficiario [...] 
de una reparación económica individual. Por otro lado, tus paisanos nunca te verán de la misma 
forma - querrán saber qué te sucedió, o por qué tú recibiste un dinero del Estado y ellos no. Los 
rumores emergen como una polvareda y reviven los momentos antes, durante y después del conflico 
armado interno.” Ulfe and Málaga Sabogal, 179.
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among villagers concerning false declarations or alleged unjust 
claims of victimhood. According to one villager, for example, the 
leaders of the rebellion tried to clear their names by making twisted 
statements:
Manuel: These are twisted versions that are not real, and they 
did this simply to clean their hands, they have cleaned their 
hands. eva: Who? Manuel: Those responsible of the massacre, 
let’s say [...] eva: So, some people have declared things that are 
not true? Manuel: That is how it is, things that are not true.164
Another recurring accusation is that the family members of people 
who were involved with the Shining Path are receiving reparations, 
despite the fact that they are not eligible: 
Here also, there were those who participated [in the Shining 
Path]. Now, oh god, they even receive reparation! They killed 
Walter Huaccachi and Jelacio Auccasi [Llacsa]. They were the 
youngsters that dictated us. Now they are receiving, they are 
the first afectados [affected] and the first to receive, the wife of 
the terrorist leader has received [reparation].165
164  My translation of original citation: “Manuel: Son versiones tergiversadas que no 
son reales y eso han hecho porque simplemente han limpiado, se han limpiado la mano. Eva: 
¿Quiénes? Manuel: Los responsables, digamos de la matanza [...] Eva: Ósea ¿Que algunos han 
declarado cosas que no son ciertas? Manuel: Así es, cosas que no son ciertas.” Interview with 
Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015
165  My translation of original citation: “Aquí también pues hubo los que participaron. 
Ahora, ay Dios, ellos todavía reciben reparación! Ahí pues mataron a Walter Huaccachi y 
Jelacio Auccasi [Llacsa]. Ellos fueron los jóvenes que nos mandaban bastante. Ahora ellos están 
recibiendo, ellos son los primeros afectados y los primeros en recibir, la mujer de la cabeza terrorista 
ha recibido pues.” Interview with Barbara, widow, Sacsamarca, 20.05.2015. Family 
members of Shining Path militants might be eligible for reparations relating to 
violations others than the ones involving a Shining Path family member, such as the 
death or disappearance of another non-involved family member, or sexual violence. 
This can subsequently falsely be perceived by other villagers as a reparation for the 
death of the Shining Path family member. 
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On the other hand, for those who were (in)directly involved in the 
rebellion, the reparations are perceived as a poor compensation and 
an insufficient recognition for the sacrifices that they made to resist 
the Shining Path: 
eva: What do you think about the economic reparations that 
they are giving to the victims? elena: Totally bad, and that 
is what we complain about. Why doesn’t the Peruvian people 
say: ‘Thank you, thanks to them at least the people rebelled’? 
Why not recognize it, right? And we are humble people who 
did this, we have fought until the last sob, we are still fighting. 
Why is the Peruvian government not capable of recognizing 
this? [...] And now what they gave us, what is this? It is nothing 
more than a tip [...]166
Reparation? No, it is not enough compared to what we have 
realized, it is not enough. At least there are illegitimate persons 
there [in the victim register] that are making claims, and the 
four persons that have organized [the rebellion] they are not 
even in that reparation, that bothers me.167
The latter frustration concerning some of the leaders of the rebellion 
166  My translation of original citation: “Eva: ¿Qué opina sobre la reparación económica, 
que están dando a las víctimas? Elena: Totalmente mal, y eso es lo que reclamamos. ¿Porqué no 
dice el pueblo peruano: ‘Gracias, por ellos siquiera hubo que la gente se han rebelado’. ¿Porqué 
no reconocerlo, no? Y gente humilde hemos hecho eso, hemos luchado hasta este último, estamos 
luchando. ¿Porqué no es capaz de reconocer el gobierno peruano? [...] Y ahora a nosotros, qué es 
eso, una propina nomas [...]” Interview with Elena, widow whose husband was killed 
by the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
167  My translation of original citation: “¿Reparación? No, no es suficiente de acuerdo a 
lo que hemos trabajado, no es suficiente. Por lo menos hay personas que no son legales que están 
ahí correteando, los cuatro que han organizado ni siquiera están en esa reparación, eso a mí me 
preocupa [...]” Interview with Pablo, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015.
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who are not receiving reparations relates to a recurring fundamental 
problem with the reparation program, which is the fact that victims 
of torture are hardly eligible for individual economic reparations. 
Some of the leaders of the rebellion were, however, direct victims 
of severe physical punishments and tortures by the Shining Path 
when they were taken as prisoners to Huancasancos. As one of them 
states:
Only those who suffered the death of their father, of their 
mother [are receiving reparations]. But other people who have 
been tortured, morally, psychologically, those who were beaten 
up, knocked about, whose goods were plundered, no. [They] 
never [received].168
Some other villagers who encounter problems with their reparation 
claims suspect that these difficulties are entangled with personal 
animosities between them and other villagers, like one woman whose 
husband was first involved with and later killed by the Shining Path: 
Gabriela: Did you receive a reparation? Daniela: No. They 
told me I would, but I did not receive. Gabriela: But are you 
in the victim register? Daniela: Yes, I was registered. But I 
don’t know, we have sent documents, and nothing. [...] Maybe 
it doesn’t work out because they hate me, if not, why didn’t I 
receive? The [XX] family did receive, like [YY], the wife of my 
cousin. We are all family...169
168  My translation of original citation: “Pero solamente aquellos que sufrieron la muerte 
de su papá, de su mamá [...]. Pero otra gente que han sido realmente maltratados, moralmente, 
psicológicamente, los que han sido golpeados, pegados, sus bienes han sido arrasados, no. Nunca 
[recibieron].” Interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
169  My translation of original citation: “Gabriela: “¿Recibió una reparación? Daniela: 
No. Decían no ya va llegar la reparación pero yo no recibí. Gabriela: ¿Pero está en el registro de 
víctimas? Daniela: Sí, hubo empadronamiento. Pero no sé, hemos enviado documentos, y nada. 
[...] Tal vez no sale porque me odian, ¿sino porqué no recibí? Los [XX] si recibieron, como 
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The fact that declarations of additional witnesses are needed to 
register in the RUV furthermore implies that those who want to 
register need to count with the willingness of others to overcome 
their fears or break certain silences. This can be challenging, 
especially for cases with few witnesses, such as the disappearance 
of Suyana’s husband by the Shining Path. The only witness of the 
events refuses to speak out until today:
Up until now he is here, and he has never wanted to tell. [...] To 
register myself for the unique victim register [RUV] they asked 
us for a witness, and we asked the man: ‘Please, they are asking 
us for a witness, you have to testify.’ He did not want to.170 
These internal tensions, mutual accusations and discontent come on 
top of the already existing problems with the implementation of the 
reparation program, such as procedural errors, corruption of bank 
clerks who manage the funds, and general dissatisfaction with the 
low amounts of the individual economic reparations. As in most 
communities affected by the civil war, in Sacsamarca a local victims’ 
association was founded in the wake of the launch of the reparation 
plan in order to support the procedures of individual reparation 
claims. However, the abovementioned problems, which emerge on 
the intersection of the reparation plan’s criteria for eligibility and 
the intimate nature of the violence, also disconcert the unity of 
the association. Some of the members of the association are said 
to be ex-Shining Path members who want to take advantage of the 
association to clean their hands and receive reparations.171 One of 
[XX] la esposa de mi primo. Todos somos familia...” Interview with Daniela, widow, 
Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
170  My translation of original citation: “Hasta ahora está aquí y nunca ha querido decir. 
[...] Para registrarme, para el registro único de víctimas, ahí pues nos ha pedido testigo y al 
señor hemos dicho: ‘Por favor, testigo nos está pidiendo, tu pues manifiéstate.’ No ha querido.” 
Interview with Suyana, widow whose husband was disappeared by the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 16.04.2015.
171  Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de la Pontífica Universidad 
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the leaders of the rebellion furthermore accused the association of 
being a bunch of opportunists who are not interested in the real 
history of the resistance against the Shining Path.172 Furthermore, 
the criteria for eligibility for individual economic reparations have 
created a kind of victim hierarchy, which results in the fact that 
certain groups of victims, such as the tortured, have no incentive 
to participate in the association.173 Others have abandoned their 
membership of the association out of frustration over the procedures, 
or because they have already received their reparation and don’t have 
another incentive to participate.174 Furthermore, the association has 
a continuous problem with lack of leadership and commitment, and 
seems likely to die out in the course of the following years.175
(Un)covering open secrets: Exhumations of clandestine burial sites
Another recommendation of the TRC that reached Sacsamarca is 
the exhumation of clandestine burial sites from the civil war. As 
mentioned in chapter 3.2, the TRC’s preoccupation with the search 
for the disappeared resulted in a National Register of Burial Sites 
and a National Plan for Forensic Anthropological Investigations.176 
As I will further explain in chapter five, the implementation of this 
plan has been facing many difficulties due to, among other factors, 
Católica del Perú, “Diagnóstico Socioeconómico y Psicosocial de La Comunidad y 
Distrito Sacsamarca,” 88.
172  Interview with Pablo, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015.
173  Fieldnotes, Conversation with the mayor of Sacsamarca and representatives of the victims’ 
association, Sacsamarca, 27.06.2014. 
174  Fieldnotes, Conversation with representatives of the victims’ association, Sacsamarca, 
28.06.2015.
175  Fieldnotes, Conversation with the ex-president of the victims’ association, Sacsamarca, 
19.05.2017.
176  During its mandate, the TRC registered 4.644 burial sites. Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final,” Tomo IX, 209. Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, “Informe Final,” Tomo IX, 209.
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a lack of coordination between the Public Ministry and civil society 
organizations and frictions between the judicial and humanitarian 
dimensions of the exhumation processes. The new legal framework 
that is in place since 2016 has nevertheless brought some hopes for 
improvement 
As in the entire Ayacucho department, in Sacsamarca and its 
surroundings steps have been taken to exhume mass graves from 
the civil war in order to identify and rebury the bodies they contain. 
According to an update of the TRC’s register of burial sites, 
performed by the Commission of Human Rights (COMISEDH) 
in 2011, 158 of Ayacucho’s 4052 presumed clandestine burial sites 
are located in the province of Huancasancos.177 As mentioned in 
chapter 3.2, one of the three mass graves which were exhumed 
during the mandate of the TRC was the one containing the victims 
of the massacre perpetrated by the Shining Path in Lucanamarca 
in April 1983 (cfr. chapter 4.2).178 The exhumation provided the 
commission with forensic evidence for the cruelty of the Shining 
Path and, in this way, Lucanamarca became an emblematic case of 
the civil war.179 For the district of Sacsamarca, the TRC registered 
22 clandestine burial sites.180 Since 2010, the EPAF has conducted 
preliminary investigations on a number of cases throughout the 
district and the Public Ministry has carried out several exhumations. 
Between 2007 and 2009, for example, exhumations were carried out 
in relation to the range of extrajudicial executions committed by the 
177  COMISEDH, Los Muertos de Ayacucho. Violencia y Sitios de Entierro Clandestinos, 
74.
178  On the process of exhumation and reburial in Lucanamarca, see: Rojas-Perez, 
Mourning Remains, 45.
179  Bunselmeyer, “Trust Repaired? The Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Reparation Program on Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict 
Communities of Peru,” 65.
180  Centro de Información para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos. 
Clandestine burial sites are graves containing corpses without death certificate. 
These can be individual or collective graves; the identity of the buried persons can 
be known by the community or not.
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military in February and March 1983 throughout the province of 
Huancasancos, among which the case of the three men who were 
shot in their backs on the bridge at the entrance of the village of 
Sacsamarca (cfr. chapter 4.2).181 However, the narratives surrounding 
some of these graves are less clear-cut than in the emblematic case 
of Lucanamarca, where the population’s role in collaborating with 
the local popular committee was backgrounded in comparison with 
the immensity of the massacre perpetrated by the Shining Path.182 
Indeed, some of Sacsamarca’s burial sites are the material remainders 
of the complex encounter between villagers, the Shining Path and 
the state forces. These graves are spatial points of reference in the 
villagers’ narratives on the civil war; open secrets that rest beneath 
the surface of the highlands. For example, the mass grave on the 
outskirts of the village, which holds the corpses of the prisoners 
who were taken during the battle of May 21st, executed by the police 
and buried by the villagers, remains covered until today but is often 
referred to by villagers in conversations. 
The prospect of uncovering these open secrets provoked tensions 
and unrest among some villagers during my fieldwork in 2015. 
In June, I participated in the exhumation of a mass grave in the 
highlands of Sacsamarca’s annex of Putaccasa. Together with Oscar 
Loyola, forensic archeologist of the EPAF, I was part of the process 
as expert on behalf of the relatives of the victims. While the actual 
exhumation was carried out by the Public Ministry, it was the EPAF 
that documented and presented the case on the basis of years of 
preliminary research in the region. The mass grave contained 
the victims of a violent confrontation between the military and a 
group of Shining Path militias which took place on August 7th, 
181  COMISEDH, Los Muertos de Ayacucho. Violencia y Sitios de Entierro Clandestinos, 
96.
182  Isaias Rojas-Perez describes how in Lucanamarca it became clear during the 
exhumation that, as in Sacsamarca, the villagers resisted the victim subject position 
offered by the TRC and preferred to inscribe themselves in a discourse of heroic 
nationalism. Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 49.
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1985. The Shining Path militias were recruited in the villages of 
Arapacancha and Upiray, both in the province of Vilcashuamán. 
The confrontation resulted in the execution of a group of recruits 
by the military, after which the corpses were left unburied on the 
side of the river. The villagers of Putaccasa, who found the bodies 
the day after the execution, decided to bury them on the spot in 
a mass grave, which they dug secretly - out of fear for being held 
responsible for the massacre - during the two following nights.183 
Notwithstanding the fact that the exhumed burial site contained 
remains belonging to approximately sixteen corpses, the witness 
statements in the preliminary investigation mentioned numbers 
ranging from eleven to thirty-two victims.184 The exhumation lasted 
for four days and was thwarted by the bad state of conservation of 
the remains. As the victims were recruits coming from different 
places and marched for several days to reach Putaccasa, it is hard to 
reconstruct the exact course of the events and to identify the victims. 
Several family members of the presumed victims were involved in 
the process, but the corpses remain unidentified and stored in the 
public ministry in Huamanga up until today.185
In the months before the exhumation was about to take place, 
the public prosecutor’s office payed several visits to Sacsamarca in 
order to conduct preliminary research in relation to the case. These 
visits inspired distrust and fear among some villagers. For example, 
during one of my visits in April 2015, I talked about my research 
183  EPAF, Informe Preliminar Forense Putaccasa II; fieldnotes, exhumation 
Putaccasa II, Putaccasa, 16-19.06.2015.
184  A report found by the EPAF in the community archive of Sacsamarca, which 
dates from the week after the execution and describes the events in Putaccasa, 
speaks of twenty-six victims (twenty men and six women). Other witnesses speak of 
eleven to eighteen victims. According to the anthropologist of the Public Ministry, 
the local authorities might have exaggerated the number of victims to glorify 
the death of Shining Path members. Another explanation might be that there is 
a second burial site holding the other corpses. Fieldnotes, exhumation Putaccasa II, 
Putaccasa, 16-19.06.2015.
185  Fieldnotes, exhumation Putaccasa II, Putaccasa, 16-19.06.2015.
Exhumation of mass grave in Putaccasa (2015)
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with one of the village authorities. During this conversation, the 
man expressed concern that my research would be thwarted by the 
fact that people would be reluctant to talk me. When I asked him 
why this would be the case, he explained that the prosecutor’s office 
had recently come by to conduct investigations in relation to the 
mass grave in Putaccasa. “We only defended ourselves”, he added 
on a whisper.186 This reference to the villagers’ involvement in the 
crime indicated that the Sacsamarquinos seemed to associate the 
investigations of the prosecutor’s office with another series of graves 
in the highlands of Putaccasa. As described in 4.2, in the aftermath 
of the rebellion in February 1983, the fugitive leaders of the popular 
committee of Sacsamarca’s annex of Colcabamba were persecuted 
and killed by villagers of Sacsamarca in Putaccasa. The family 
members of the victims were prevented from burying the corpses of 
the eight victims - two of which were relatives of Walter Huaccachi 
- on the cemetery of Colcabamba, which is why they were buried 
in individual clandestine graves close to the place of the massacre, 
in the highlands of Putaccasa. The case goes unmentioned in the 
in-depth report of the TRC but was documented in subsequent 
years by the EPAF.187 Until today, the graves remain unexhumed, 
despite the desire of several family members living in Sacsamarca 
and Hualla to recover the bodies of their loved ones and bury them 
at the cemetery. Some of the perpetrators of the killings still live in 
Sacsamarca; the family members know very well who they are.188 
An exhumation process can only be started by filing a complaint 
and initiating a legal investigation. However, Manuel, who is one of 
the family members of the victims, explicitly states that he does not 
186  Fieldnotes, conversation with local authority, Sacsamarca, 10.04.2015.
187  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 63–98.
188  Fieldnotes, visit to the graves of Putaccasa I y II, Sacsamarca, 28.03.2015; interview 
with Sara, direct witness of the events of February 1983, Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015; 
interview with Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015; conversation with relatives grave 
Putaccasa I, Hualla, 18.05.2017.
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want to denounce the killers. To some extent, he seems to consider 
the perpetrator(s) also as victim(s) of circumstances caused by the 
civil war: 
We were going to denounce, but why would we denounce if 
these people [that person] against their will, fell to a miserable, 
very poor life, failed, fucked up? [...] If we denounce, (s)he will 
be there in prison, nothing more, just that.189 
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the news of exhumations in 
Putaccasa - albeit of another burial site - sparked some villagers’ 
fear that the forensic evidence of the killings perpetrated by the 
Sacsamarquinos against their neighbors from Colcabamba would be 
uncovered as well. Moreover, if the exhumation of the other grave 
already sparked mistrust, the possibility of digging up the remains 
of the Colcabambinos that rest in Putaccasa is likely to pave the way 
for accusations, bitterness or feelings of vengeance. Despite the 
fact that the two cases are unrelated, the shared geography of their 
physical remainders casted a shadow of secrecy and tension over 
both burial sites. While the forensic evidence of the case of August 
1985 was uncovered through the exhumation, the existence of the 
graves of the Colcabambinos in Putaccasa remains an open secret that 
supports a tense coexistence. The question remains, then, which 
power relations are at play in this coexistence and which or whose 
motivations gain the upper hand in the decision whether or not to 
uncover certain open secrets. For example, at first sight, Manuel 
seems to show some mercy with the perpetrators. Nevertheless, 
other reasons might be at play not to denounce the killers; such 
as fear for reprisals, the social cost of stirring up old conflicts or 
a general lack of trust in the judicial system. The decision not to 
189  My translation of original citation: “Íbamos denunciar ya, pero ¿para qué ya vamos 
a denunciar si esta gente otro por su propio peso han caído a una vida lastimosa, paupérrimo, 
fracasados, jodidos? [...] Si vamos a denunciar, ahí va estar en prisión nada más solo eso.” 
Interview with Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015.
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file a complaint should therefore not too easily be understood as a 
positive choice for reconciliation or forgiveness. When I asked the 
man in question about his thoughts on the idea of reconciliation, he 
was skeptical and stated that until today, he endures stigmatization 
because of his family’s collaboration with the Shining Path: 
There can always be reconciliation when the persons who 
affected you understand and change their conduct. If that 
family that killed my family still has the same intention of 
hurting you, then there will never be reconciliation, ever, 
because they always look at you in a bad way [...] How can there 
be reconciliation? There can never be, even if I leave it to God 
it will be impossible. That’s how it is, señorita, reconciliation is 
nonsense. There are always persons that judge you with bad 
intentions; their children are always screwing you.190
4.4 Appropriation, reaffirmation and contestation of 
transitional justice 
The public narrative: A memory of resistance 
Notwithstanding the fact that the investigations of the TRC in 
Sacsamarca were surrounded by silence, suspicion and secrecy, the 
truth-finding process generated a space which was appropriated by 
the Sacsamarquinos to publicly commemorate and give meaning to 
190  My translation of original citation: “Reconciliación puede haber siempre en cuando 
las personas que te han afectado que comprendan, que cambian su conducta. Si esa familia que 
ha matado a mi familia y va tener ese mismo pensamiento siempre de fregarte, hacerte daño, 
nunca va haber reconciliación, jamás, porque siempre te está viendo mal [...] ¿Cómo puede haber 
reconciliación? Nunca puede haber, aunque yo lo dejo así a Dios, y no se puede haber. Así es pues 
señorita, reconciliación es por gusto. Siempre hay personas que te juz gan de mala fe, los hijos de 
estos siempre te están fregando.” Interview with Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015.
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the past through a narrative of resistance against the Shining Path. 
The roots of this heroic narrative however predate the final report 
of the TRC. Already in 1984, during their presence in the village, 
the Sinchis remodeled and renamed the central town square. The 
eucalyptus tree standing in the middle, which had been a place of 
punishment and execution under the rule of the popular committee, 
was cut down and the square was named after Telesforo Dueñas, 
the policeman who lost his live during the battle, representing him 
as the martyr of Sacsamarca’s victory over the Shining Path.191 
Nevertheless, in 1998, when the state forces had permanently 
withdrawn from the region, the Sacsamarquinos reclaimed their share 
in the story by renaming the square Plaza 21 de Mayo and putting up 
a new commemorative plaque with the names of the ten villagers 
who died during the confrontation with the Shining Path in 1983. 
The role of the police was downplayed as the villagers put their 
own martyrs center-stage with name and surname, while the police 
officer was mentioned sideways as ‘a military man, Dueñas’.192 
Despite its focus on the intimate nature of the violence, the work of 
the TRC further strengthened and legitimized this heroic narrative 
by giving a detailed account of the resistance of the Sacsamarquinos in 
its final report. Moreover, the TRC provided the immediate trigger 
for this narrative to become the subject of public commemoration 
practices through the personal experience of Orlando Janampa, 
a young Sacsamarquino migrant living in Ica. Orlando Janampa 
worked as a volunteer with the local teams of the TRC and got 
directly inspired by the memory duty underlying the commission’s 
truth-finding mission to set up the primer homenaje de reconocimiento 
191  Caro, “Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca,” 182; One of the testimonies 
recorded by SER slightly contradicts Caro’s information by stating that the 
policemen named the square after José Cotrina Elorriada, a captain who died 
during an attack of the Shining Path in Huancasanos. Servicios Educativos Rurales 
(SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las 
Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 114.
192  Caro, 182.
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a las víctimas por la violencia política193 on May 21st, 2003, on the 20th 
anniversary of Sacsamarca’s confrontation with the Shining Path. 
Janampa himself described his motivation to take the initiative for 
the commemoration as follows: 
The symbolic recognition [through public commemoration] 
proposed by the TRC seemed interesting to me. Therefore, 
I internalized these ideas, thought a lot and reflected. My 
motivation grew stronger that this was the only way to talk 
about the topic of the political violence, as a way of approaching 
one another among Sacsamarquinos.194
Using the final report of the TRC as a legitimation, Janampa 
succeeded in convincing the municipal authorities of the importance 
of installing a new tradition and setting up a commemoration day 
in his hometown. The event was furthermore supported by the 
TRC’s regional office in Ayacucho, the Regional Front of Grassroots 
Organizations for Truth and Justice, local and regional victims’ 
associations and the Christian NGO Paz y Esperanza195.196 The 
program of this first edition of the commemoration included a mass 
dedicated to all the victims of the war, a reenactment of the battle 
against the Shining Path and a pilgrimage to the cemetery in honor 
of the death and disappeared victims.197 In line with the objectives of 
the TRC, the goal of the commemoration, thus Orlando Janampa, 
193  First tribute of recognition to the victims of the political violence
194  My translation of original citation: “El reconocimiento simbólico como propuesta de 
la CVR, me pareció interesante, por lo tanto interoricé estas ideas, pensé mucho y reflexioné. 
Mi motivación fue creciendo toda vez que era la única manera de hablar del tema de la violencia 
política como una forma de acercamiento entre nosotros los Sacsamarquinos.” Servicios 
Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En 
El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 120.
195  Peace and Hope
196  Caro, “Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca,” 184.
197  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 12.
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was to 
[...] obtain a real pardon and internal reconciliation in 
Sacsamarca, as we are brothers and we will be heirs of one 
single history, we are part of one single family.198
However, the celebration of the first edition immediately sparked 
a conflict over who could be subject of the tribute. While the 
commemoration was set up - with Janampa’s reconciliatory ideas in 
mind - to include all the victims of the period of 1980 to 2000, some 
villagers had imagined that the commemoration would be exclusively 
dedicated to the heroes and martyrs of May 21st. Among other things, 
Janampa was accused of honoring those villagers who had pertained 
to the Shining Path. The mayor at that time - one of the leaders of 
the rebellion of February 1983 - refused to support the organization 
of the next edition of the commemoration in 2004. Nevertheless, 
Janampa persisted and set up the second edition with the support 
of the TRC and several NGOs from Ayacucho and Lima, including 
SER, Paz y Esperanza, COMISEDH, APRODEH, the ICRC, 
Christian Aid and the citizen platform Para Que No Se Repita199.200 
The ‘Second Tribute to the Victims of Political Violence’ lasted for 
four days (May 18 to 21, 2004) and was attended by representatives 
from the supporting NGOs, representatives from the national 
Ombudsman office, exchange students from a secondary school in 
Lima and a press team of the national television program Sin Rodeos. 
The nine minute reportage broadcasted by Sin Rodeos reproduces the 
heroic narrative of resistance.201 Art competitions in music, poetry, 
198  My translation of original citation: “[...] lograr en Sacsamarca un verdadero perdón y 
una reconciliación interna, ya que somos hermanos y seremos herederos de una sola historia, somos 
parte de una sola familia.” Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 12.
199  So It Does Not Repeat
200  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), 12.
201  “Sacsamarca - Programa Sin Rodeos - YouTube,” accessed August 2, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4Nncj3yrLE.
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drawing and history writing as well as a running contest were added 
to the program of the second edition.202 According to Ricardo Caro, 
the reinforcement of Sacsamarca’s heroic narrative became the 
central aim of the second edition of the commemoration: 
[...] Janampa and the team organizing the tribute hoped to 
build stronger consensus about the heroic meaning of May 
21 for the community and about the shared memory of the 
residents of Sacsamarca who died, whether they had died while 
opposing Shining Path or had belonged to or been perceived 
as close to the insurgent cause.203
The meaning and purpose of the commemoration thus gradually 
shifted to favor a narrative of heroism directed to an external 
audience of NGO and state representatives over one of reconciliation 
between ‘intimate enemies’. However, due to the persisting conflict 
between Orlando Janampa and the mayor, no commemoration 
was organized in 2005 and 2006.204 The tribute was revived by the 
newly elected mayor Edgar Olivares in 2007, shortly after president 
Alan García had launched the collective reparation program. The 
mayor saw the commemoration as an opportunity to emphasize 
Sacsamarca’s contribution to the defeat of the Shining Path in order 
to enhance the village’s opportunity to benefit from the program. 
In contrast to the previous editions, the 2007 commemoration was 
entirely organized by the municipal authorities.205 However, since the 
EPAF started its work in Sacsamarca in 2010, it actively encouraged 
the local authorities and the victims’ association to commemorate 
the past 
202  Caro, “Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca,” 185. The submission to the art 
competitions are compiled in the publication ‘Rescate Por La Memoria’ of SER cited 
in this chapter. 
203  Caro, 185.
204  Caro, 189.
205  Caro, 190.
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[...] because Sacsamarca constructs its future without forgetting 
its past, because a pueblo [village/people] without memory 
definitely is a pueblo without history.206
In April 2013, Sacsamarca was one of the villages in the region where 
the EPAF took the initiative to plant a “bosque de paz y esperanza” 
(“forest of peace and hope”), each tree representing a victim of the 
violence.207 On May 21st of that year, thirty years after the battle, 
the EPAF was also present during the commemoration ceremony 
and supported the demand of the victims’ association to reopen 
the victim register and enable new claims for individual economic 
reparations.208 For the first time, the commemoration was combined 
with the festivities of the Pachapupum festival, an agricultural 
fair celebrated in the highlands which, according to the EPAF, 
represented Sacsamarca’s “search for development alternatives in 
absence of a state that supports them” and could therefore be seen 
as “a symbol of struggle and resistance”.209 In 2015, there initially 
was little enthusiasm to organize the commemoration. Eventually, 
after some quarrels between the municipal authorities and members 
of the victims’ association, the event did take place and was relatively 
well-attended by the villagers. However, no external state or NGO 
representatives were invited. In the morning, a Catholic mass was 
held in honor of the victims of the civil war, whose names were 
206  My translation of original citation: “[...] porque Sacsamarca construye su futuro sin 
olvidar su pasado, porque un pueblo sin memoria definitivamente es un pueblo sin historia.” 
“EPAF: Sacsamarca - YouTube,” accessed August 2, 2019, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?time_continue=7&v=KN5c9CnybuQ.
207  “EPAF: Sacsamarca - YouTube.”
208  The RUV had been closed by the Supreme Decree 051-2011 issued under Alan 
García’s presidency but was reopened under Ollanta Humala. EPAF, “Sacsamarca 
conmemora ‘Día de la Memoria’ diciendo No a la violencia,” accessed August 2, 
2019, http://epafperu.org/sacsamarca-conmemora-dia-de-la-memoria-diciendo-
no-a-la-violencia/.
209  EPAF, “Sacsamarca en la memoria… 30 años después,” accessed August 4, 
2019, http://epafperu.org/sacsamrca-en-la-memoria30-anos-despues/.
Commemorative mass on May 21st in Sacsamarca (2015)
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mentioned chronologically by date of death or disappearance. 
Remarkably, the names of Jelacio Llacsa and Walter Huaccachi, 
the leaders of the popular committee who were murdered, were 
mentioned among the others. Furthermore, the priest - who for 
the occasion had come from Huancasancos as there is no catholic 
priest in Sacsamarca - sharply criticized the work of ‘well-meaning 
outsiders’ in his homily, hereby referring to the well-known case of 
Lucanamarca:
Until today, we, poor people, are being used by a lot of NGOs 
[...] who are often enriching themselves by using our name, 
the tears of these families [...] and we cannot tolerate that 
here. [...] We cannot sell the dignity of our brothers, of our 
fathers and their pains. For example, how much talking has 
been done about the most famous case, Lucanamarca? They 
have even made documentaries, videos, everything, and they 
have been sold in a lot of parts of the world. But if we go 
to Lucanamarca, what has changed? What have these persons 
done for Lucanamarca? Almost nothing! Therefore, brothers, 
we don’t have to wait for the help from outside. Let’s stand up 
ourselves.210 
The ceremony that followed the mass included a tribute to the 
Peruvian flag, a civic parade, a reenactment of the battle by students, 
poetry reading, a speech by the mayor and an historical narration of 
the events by Sósimo Chavez, one of the oldest men of Sacsamarca 
210  My translation of original citation: “Hasta hoy día, los pobres, seguimos siendo usados 
por muchas ONG [...] usando nuestro nombre, muchas veces las lágrimas de esas familias, están 
haciéndose ricos [...] y eso no podemos permitir aquí. [...] No podemos vender la dignidad de 
nuestros hermanos, de nuestros padres y sus dolores. [...] Por ejemplo, ¿cuánto se ha hablado 
del caso más conocido, de Lucanamarca? Hasta se han hecho reportajes, videos, todo, y han 
sido vendidos en muchas partes del mundo. Pero vayamos a Lucanamarca, ¿qué ha cambiado? 
¿Qué han hecho esas personas para Lucanamarca? Casi nada! Por eso, hermanos, no hay que 
esperar la ayuda de afuera. Nosotros levantémonos.” Field recordings, Mass for the victims, 
Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
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and the village’s living memory.211 In 2017, the Pacha Pupum 
festival was organized by the authorities between May 19-21 and the 
commemoration ceremony was integrated in the program of the last 
day. Once again, however, there had been disagreements between 
the victims’ association and the authorities on who should assume 
responsibility over the organization of the event; the former being 
frustrated with the lack of enthusiasm of the latter.212 While, by 
then, the commemoration seemed destined to die out in subsequent 
years, it surprisingly took new turns in 2018 under the auspices of 
congresswoman Tania Pariona. Pariona, a native from the town of 
Cayara in the province of Victor Fajardo, was elected to congress 
for the progressive party Frente Amplio (currently Nuevo Perú) in 
2016. Having lived through the war during her youth in Huamanga, 
Pariona puts the struggles of the victims and the implementation 
of transitional justice mechanisms such as the reparation program 
high on her political agenda. In June 2018, Pariona presented a bill 
in congress containing two articles; the first one proposing the 
recognition of Sacsamarca as cuna de rebellión contra el terrorismo, para 
pacificación nacional213 and the second one ordering: 
[...] the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Ministry 
of Culture, the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Regional 
Government of Ayacucho, the Provincial Municipality of 
Huanca Sancos and the District Municipality of Sacsamarca, 
according to their competences and functions, to make the 
necessary arrangements to realize an homage to the persons 
who fought and rebelled against the terrorism in Sacsamarca 
each 15th of February.214
211  Fieldnotes, Commemoration ceremony, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
212  Fieldnotes, Pacha Pupum festival, Sacsamarca, 19.05.2017.
213  Cradle of rebellion against the terrorism, for the national pacification
214  My translation of original citation: “Ordenar al Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos 
Humanos, el Ministerio de Cultura, el Ministerio del Interior, así como el Gobierno Regional 
de Ayacucho, la Municipalidad Provincial de Huanca Sancos y la Municipalidad Distrital de 
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The motivation of the proposal leans on two central arguments: “the 
right to truth” (“el derecho a la verdad”) and “tolerance as content of the 
democratic State” (“la tolerancia como contenido del Estado democrático”).215 
The Peruvian Ombudsman Office explicitly expressed itself in favor 
of the law, framing it as part of the symbolic reparation plan and 
stating that:
[...] the collective treatment of a violent past and massive 
human rights violations can  be addressed through processes 
of truth-finding and collective memory work.216
The revision of the proposal by the Commission of Justice and 
Human Rights of the congress concludes that the proposal 
constitutes:
[...] a legal contribution in line with the recognition of the 
courageous behavior as a response of the most vulnerable 
citizens in the face of terrorism, who with their sacrifice gave 
us a free future, they gave us an example of patriotism so that 
all Peruvians can become aware of this example, and in this 
way contribute to the mechanism of memory for national 
pacification and to a permanent national commitment to the 
strengthening of democratic institutions.217
Sacsamarca, conforme a sus competencias y funciones, dispongan las acciones pertinentes para 
realizar cada 15 de febrero un homenaje a las personas que lucharon y se rebelaron contra el 
terrorismo en Sacsamarca.” Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, “Dictamen 
Proyecto de Ley 3047/2017-CR,” December 5, 2018, 3.
215  Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 5.
216  My translation of original citation: “[...] el tratamiento colectivo de un pasado de 
violencia y masivas violaciones de derechos humanos, pueden encausarse a través de procesos de 
búsqueda de la verdad y de trabajo colectivo de memoria.” Comisión de Justicia y Derechos 
Humanos, 10.
217  My translation of original citation: “[...] aporte legal en la línea de reconocer la valerosa 
conducta como respuesta de los ciudadanos más vulnerables frente al terrorismo, los que con su 
sacrificio nos legaron un porvenir libre, nos dieron ejemplo de patriotismo a fin que todos los 
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The proposal received a final positive advice in May 2019, but has 
not yet been approved at the time of writing.218 Despite the fact 
that the bill somewhat remarkably proposed February 15th as a 
commemorative date, the 2018 commemoration, entitled “35th 
homage to the martyrs and heroes of May 21st 1983”, was held 
again on May 21st. The event was co-organized by the CMAN 
(the institution within the Ministry of Justice responsible for the 
implementation of the reparation program), the Pontific Catholic 
University of Lima (PUCP) and an organizational committee of 
villagers, which in addition to Orlando Janampa included several 
villagers who had played a prominent role in the events of February 
and May 1983. Among the special invitees were the president of the 
Regional Government of Ayacucho; Fernando Muñoz, one of the 
police officials who fought in the battle; Gustavo Gorriti, renowned 
journalist of IDL-reporteros and Salomón Lerner Febres, president of 
the TRC.219 The event was furthermore reported on by the national 
newspaper La República.220
Sacsamarca’s trajectory of public remembrance has thus been 
characterized by varying levels of intensity depending on the initiative 
and support of both insiders and outsiders as well as the dynamics 
generated between them. Notwithstanding this heterogeneity, two 
aspects can be highlighted to better understand the significance 
of the commemoration and its dominant narrative. The first one 
concerns the way in which the narrative of the commemoration 
peruanos tomen conciencia de su ejemplo, de esta forma coadyuvar al mecanismo de memoria para 
la pacificación nacional y a un permanente compromiso nacional para con el fortalecimiento de las 
instituciones democráticas.” Comisión de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 12.
218  Servindi - Servicios de Comunicación Intercultural, “Avanza Proyecto de 
Ley Que Declara a Sacsamarca Pueblo Benemérito,” accessed August 4, 2019, 
https://www.servindi.org/actualidad-noticias/21/05/2019/aprueban-dictamen-
de-proyecto-de-ley-que-declara-sacsamarca-pueblo.
219  Leaflet Invitación XXXV Homenaje a Los Mártires y Héroes Del 21 de Mayo 1983 
(Comisión Organizadora, 2018, personal archive of the author).
220  La República, “Fernando Muñoz, el héroe de Sacsamarca,” May 28, 2019, 
https://larepublica.pe/domingo/1258451-heroede-sacsamarca/.
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represents the agency of the peasantry in relation to the Peruvian 
state. In a meeting with the authorities and representatives of the 
victims’ association, the mayor stated that Sacsamarca wanted “to 
commemorate, but not victimize” (“conmemorar pero no victimizar”).221 
By putting an active narrative of resistance center stage, the 
Sacsamarquinos aim at highlighting their deliberate choice to stand 
up against the injustices caused by the presence of the Shining Path. 
Therefore, as Ricardo Caro also remarks, they prefer to identify 
the dead of the war as martyrs rather than victims.222 The heroism 
of the Sacsamarquinos is furthermore framed by several research 
participants in a longer history of Sacsamarca as a “pueblo rebelde” 
(“rebellious village/people”) which actively seeks to rectify the 
relation with its oppressors, hereby referring to the fact that it was 
the first community in the valley of the Qaracha river to struggle 
for and obtain recognition from the state as a comunidad campesina in 
1936.223 Through commemoration, Sacsamarca wants to conquer its 
place in the history of the Peruvian nation. As one of the research 
participants explains the importance of the ceremony:
[...] for me it is important because [...] we Peruvians always 
remember the battle of Arica, the battle of Tarapacá, July 
28th, 1821, independence.... Why would we forget? That is 
our communal sense, the patriotism, because that way Peru 
has made history. [...] Obviously not you yourself, but your 
forefathers, they died. In a similar way, Sacsamarca stood up, 
to die or to live, in defense of its interests, in defense of its 
people, in defense of its children and women, of its mothers 
221  Fieldnotes, Conversation with the mayor and representatives of the victims’ association, 
Sacsamarca, 27.06.2014.  
222  Caro, “Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca,” 185.
223  Interview with Pablo, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015; interview with Francisco, one of the leaders of 
the rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 10.04.2015; interview with 
Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 
15.04.2015.
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and wives. Several have died and why forget that?224
The heroic narrative thus not only goes against victimization, it 
also stands in function of the recognition of Sacsamarca as ‘the 
(first) village that rebelled against the Shining Path’. While the 
Fujimori government systematically glorified the merit of the state 
forces in defeating the Shining Path, the Sacsamarquinos succeeded 
in “highlighting the community’s role and thus downplaying 
the emphasis on the military and the Fujimori regime as the sole 
heroes”.225
Secondly, the narrative of resistance provides a clear rupture in time, 
marking a before and after in Sacsamarca’s history of the civil war. 
The killing of the leaders during the rebellion and the final defeat of 
the Shining Path through the battle mark a kind of purification ritual 
that cleans the village from its initial involvement with the Shining 
Path, transforming Sacsamarca from a hotspot of collaboration 
into one of resistance. While in reality some villagers collaborated, 
some resisted and some switched roles over time, these individual 
decisions are now represented as collective and homogenous, as one 
research participant states it:
[...] at first the entire population was compromised, then they 
all rebelled.226
224  My translation of original citation: “[...] para mi es importante, porque [...] los 
peruanos recordamos siempre la batalla de Arica, la batalla de Tarapacá, el 28 de Julio de 1821, 
la independencia, ¿por qué vamos a olvidar? Ahí está el civismo, el patriotismo, porque con eso 
Perú ha hecho historia. [...] Claro que no uno mismo no, sino nuestros antepasados murieron. 
Así igualito Sacsamarca ese día se enfrentó, realmente morir o vivir, en defensa de sus intereses, en 
defensa de su gente, en defensa de sus niños y mujeres, de sus mamás y esposas. Varios murieron 
y ¿por qué olvidarlo?”, interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion 
against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
225  Caro, “Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca,” 188.
226  My translation of original citation: “Toda la población se ha comprometido, después 
todos se han revelado.” Interview with Veronica, widow whose husband was killed by 
the military, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
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Emphasizing the resistance allows the villagers to clear their names 
and demonstrate that they were on ‘the right side’ of history. Hereby, 
the Sacsamarquinos do not only show themselves as defenders of the 
Peruvian nation against the insurgents of the Shining Path; they 
also justify their entitlement to reparations. In function of these two 
aims, the villagers seem to shift their identity on the axis between 
heroism and victimization, depending on who they address. While, 
as stated above, they present themselves foremost as heroes when 
claiming their position in relation to the Peruvian state, this does 
not necessarily prevent the Sacsamarquinos from appropriating 
the victim identity extended to them by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
involved in the transitional justice process, for example when 
claiming reparations or demanding the exhumation of clandestine 
burial sites. This fluidity becomes visible in the shifting meanings 
and purposes of the commemoration ceremony: from obtaining 
reconciliation between all the victims of the civil war, over paying 
tribute to a specific selection of heroes and martyrs, to claiming 
reparations and recognition. The disagreements over whether the 
commemoration ceremony should be dedicated to all the victims or 
exclusively to the heroes and martyrs of the rebellion and the battle 
also reflects this diversity in significance. During my fieldwork in 
2015, the two leading figures of the victims’ association expressed 
diametrically opposite opinions on the matter.227
The appropriation of these shifting meanings between victimhood 
and heroism is no one-way traffic but a mutual process between 
the villagers and the well-meaning outsiders of transitional justice, 
i.e. the different NGOs that over the years were involved in the 
commemorative practices, but also state representatives concerned 
with transitional justice, such as congresswoman Tania Pariona 
or members of the CMAN. By supporting and encouraging 
the villagers’ commemorative practices, these ‘well-meaning 
227  Interview with Suyana, widow whose husband was disappeared by the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 16.04.2015; interview with Carlos, victim whose father was 
assassinated by the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 11.04.2015.
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outsiders’ reinforced the heroic narrative and, in some cases, 
started reproducing it. The design of the law that strives for the 
official recognition of Sacsamarca’s courageous resistance against 
the Shining Path demonstrates how these outsiders on their turn 
appropriated the heroic narrative extended by the villagers, in 
function of transitional justice’s general aims of obtaining truth, 
justice and reparation for the victims of the civil war. In other words, 
it seems that the villagers’ public narrative of resistance against the 
Shining Path eventually succeeded in backgrounding the narrative 
of violence between intimate enemies provided in the final report of 
the TRC as well as the narrative of victimization extended through 
the reparation program. 
Beneath the surface: Open secrets
Sacsamarca’s heroic narrative is, however, entangled with open 
secrets that lie beneath the surface of the public narrative of 
resistance. These open secrets are facts that are known within the 
community but concealed to certain outsiders. Depending on the 
context, the audience, and the purpose, these facts can be openly 
talked about or not, partially revealed or downplayed in favor of 
another narrative plot. In the case of Sacsamarca, the public heroic 
narrative serves as a curtain that gradually opens or closes, and 
behind which certain aspects of the violent past are put to rest by the 
keepers of its memory when they consider it convenient.228 These 
open secrets do not necessarily have a fixed character; rather they 
are fluid and dynamic and can serve varying purposes. The common 
thread linking Sacsamarca’s open secrets is, however, the villagers’ 
involvement with the Shining Path and the intimate nature of the 
violence resulting from this involvement.229 
228  Or as Ricardo Caro states: “[...] amnesia, omission, and remembering differently 
serve a collective convenience as a discursive compromise in this process of writing 
a narrative of their past.” Caro, “Commemorative Paths in Sacsamarca,” 193.
229  As Ponciano Del Pino states, the involvement of the rural population with 
266
IV Open Secrets
To better understand the origins of this intimate violence, it is 
necessary to take a look at certain tensions and power struggles 
that predated the conflict and escalated through the emergence 
of the Shining Path, be it through collaboration with or resistance 
against the new rulers of the popular committee. To begin with, 
as mentioned in 4.1, land possession in the Southern provinces of 
Ayacucho was not concentrated in the form of haciendas but scattered 
among multiple communities who disputed the control over their 
territories. Conflicts over agricultural resources - land but also cattle 
- caused ongoing tensions between Sacsamarca and its neighboring 
communities, but also within the community. The struggle to gain 
control over these resources was slightly different in Sacsamarca 
than in its surrounding communities. According to the in-depth 
report of the TRC, socio-economic inequalities between the elite 
and the rest of the population were less pronounced in Sacsamarca 
than in Lucanamarca and Huancasancos. This is why in Sacsamarca, 
more than in other communities, literacy was a way to stand out. The 
power and legitimacy of the elite were thus also based on education, 
a resource controlled in first instance by the intellectuals of the 
community. Control over both economic as intellectual resources 
thus became a gateway to power, which in Sacsamarca was dominated 
by an elite of teachers. These teachers not seldomly abused their 
power to further enrich themselves, for example by asking quota 
from students and their families in the form of food.230 The gradual 
process of social mobility that was set in motion by the availability 
of education at Colegio Los Andes in some cases generated tensions 
between an old and new generation of teachers. The emergence 
of the Shining Path intersects with this generational shift, which 
traversed the personal aspirations of Walter Huaccachi, one of the 
key figures in Sacsamarca’s history of the conflict. As mentioned 
the Shining Path has long been under exposed. Del Pino, “En El Nombre Del 
Gobierno”: Políticas Locales, Memoria y Violencia En El Perú Del Siglo XX,” 94.
230  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
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before, Walter wanted to become a teacher in his hometown after 
his studies at the UNSCH but was denied a position by the teachers 
of the old generation.231
Walter’s story, however, is not that of a poor man fighting the elite 
and running into the economic boundaries of social mobility. 
When Sacsamarca was founded by Spanish colonizers in 1574, they 
organized the village according to the three leading ayllus or family 
clans, one of which were the Huaccachi’s. In 1980, Walter’s family 
of cattle breeders was still one of the wealthiest of the village and 
belonged to the economic elite. Which role did these local elites 
- whose legitimacy was based on both economic and intellectual 
resources - play in the emergence of the Shining Path and its ideology? 
How did they relate to the ideas of redistribution and social justice? 
While the explanation of a struggle of the poor peasant mass against 
a rich minority might tell us something about the general nature of 
the civil war on a national scale, it proves unsatisfactory to explain 
processes of violence on a micro-level. The position of the local 
elites can in this case only be understood when looking at how they 
related to other groups in society. Walter may have been nothing 
more than a poor highland peasant in the eyes of the middle-class 
in Lima, but for his fellow-villagers he was a man of power. On 
the other hand, the local elite may have been wealthier than their 
poorer fellows, but they still had a lot to fight for. What we see in 
Sacsamarca is that most of the members who were involved with 
the popular committee, like Huaccachi, had been leading figures 
in the community before or came from families who had played 
key roles in local and regional politics and community organization 
for a long time. This appeal of the Shining Path to the elites can 
have several possible explanations, resulting in different personal 
motivations to join or support the new regime. In the first place, 
through their greater access to education, members of the elite were 
among the first to get in touch with the ideas of the Shining Path at 
231  CVR. The in-depth report also more generally mentions generational conflicts 
as a cause for escalation of violence but does not further specify this.
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the UNSCH. The elite’s interest in education moreover originated 
from a political awareness of rights and recognition to be claimed 
from the national government. The Shining Path’s discourse on 
redistribution and social justice was furthermore not new: since the 
re-opening of the UNSCH in 1959, several left-wing movements and 
(maoist) fractions of the communist party rapidly gained support 
on the countryside.232 Many members of the elite thus undoubtedly 
joined or supported the Shining Path out of ideological conviction. 
The in-depth report of the TRC furthermore suggests a more 
pragmatic motivation in the case of Walter Huaccachi, namely that 
he would have joined the Shining Path to protect the interests of 
his family and prevent its properties from being expropriated or 
redistributed among the population.233 In general, the fear to lose 
privileges is a plausible motivation for the elite to ally with a new 
emerging power. 
In any case, it is not really a secret that the Shining Path initially 
appealed to the Sacsamarquinos. As mentioned before, the in-depth 
study of the TRC speaks of an initial “massive reception”, which 
is openly confirmed by most of my research participants.234 It is 
important to mention here that several (if not most) of the men 
who would lead the rebellion initially also supported or collaborated 
with the Shining Path.235 How, then, did this initial support turn 
into resistance so quickly? First of all, the emergence of the Shining 
Path challenged and disrupted the existing intracommunal (power) 
relations and created new alliances. As one research participant puts 
it:
232  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 31.
233  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
234  CVR.
235  Interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
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There was division, everyone wanted to be the boss.236
On the micro-scale of a community with a tight network of social 
relations, these new alliances turned family members and former 
friends into ‘intimate enemies’. The Shining Path’s focus on 
redistribution of land and cattle furthermore paved the way for 
long existing conflicts over these resources to escalate. Second, the 
abusive behavior of the new leaders of the popular committee and 
their use of extreme violence - justified by the Pensamiento Gonzalo - 
played a key role in how things got out of hand. The most recurring 
motivation for the rebellion mentioned by research participants in 
this respect is that ‘they started killing’ (‘empezaron a matar’) instead 
of punishing, but also that the new leaders did not practice what they 
preached because they enriched themselves instead of redistributing 
resources to the poor:
They robbed [arrasar] all the sheep in the highlands, they ate it, 
they were like that. They robbed everything, they robbed like 
four houses. [...] During nighttime they took all the good stuff, 
and they only gave the useless things to the poor. They handed 
out the useless stuff! Is that politics?237 
So, I don’t know whether it was among brothers or among 
brothers-in-law, but there was some discord about the interests 
of his father. Walter Huaccachi was prosperous, so because he 
236  My translation of original citation: “Ha habido división, pues, todos ya querían 
mandarnos.” Interview with Victor, one of the participants in the battle against the 
Shining Path on 21 May 1983, Sacsamarca, 28.03.2015.
237  My translation of original citation: “Después arrasaban todo el carnero de arriba, 
comían y así eran pues. Todas las casas arrasaron, arrasaron como cuatro casas pues. [...] En la 
noche ellos llevaban todas las cosas buenas. Y lo que no sirve nada más para el pobre. Reparten 
lo que no servía! ¿Eso es política?” Interview with Julio, participant in the rebellion 
against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015.
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was prosperous [...] he also was a lettered teacher. [...] So the 
community said: ‘This guy cannot be our leader because he 
has economic ambitions’. So, they started to organize, and they 
killed him. [...] They told him: ‘Although you are a nobody, 
you are appropriating the things of your father, defending the 
interests of your family so that the Shining Path cannot affect 
them. That is why you entered; you don’t defend the Shining 
Path’.238
Taking into account that the leaders of the rebellion also sympathized 
with the ideas of the Shining Path, the argument that the local 
popular committee did not implement the ideology correctly seems 
to point in the first place to an internal struggle between supporters of 
the Shining Path rather than to a struggle against the Shining Path. 
In other words: the rebellion was directed against the local popular 
committee, but not necessarily against the revolutionary ideas of the 
Shining Path. The in-depth report of the TRC formulates a similar 
hypothesis of the rebellion as a struggle over the rule over the 
popular committee and hence over the community and its resources. 
The report furthermore emphasizes the generational component 
of this struggle, which takes place between the old generation of 
teachers and a new group of educated villagers.239 While the old 
generation considered itself better prepared for leadership, the young 
generation accused them of being gamonales240.241 This generational 
238  My translation of original citation: “No sé si entre hermanos o cuñados, se llevan 
disgustos sobre interés de su padre. Era de tener Walter Huaccachi, entonces como era de tener 
[...] también es leído, es profesor. [...] Y la comunidad diciendo: ‘Este no nos puede liderar porque 
tiene ambición económica’. [...] Empezó a organizar pues, y matan. [...] Dijeron: ‘Aunque tú no 
eres nada, tu estas apoderando las cosas de tu papá, viendo los intereses de tu familia para que el 
senderismo no pueda afectar. Para eso nomas has entrado, tu no defiendes a la organización del 
senderismo’.” Interview with Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015
239  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
240  Term used to refer to large landowners who exploit the indigenous population
241  Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de la Pontífica Universidad 
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power struggle was furthermore fueled by the historical conflict 
between Sacsamarca and Huancasancos. In line with the new 
political structures introduced by the Shining Path, the popular 
committee of Sacsamarca was subordinate to the regional committee 
of Huancasancos. For the old generation, whose (grand)parents had 
struggled to obtain the village’s autonomy, this was unacceptable.242
Another factor that needs to be taken into account to understand 
the quick escalation of violence between ‘intimate enemies’ is the 
presence of the state forces and their severe repression against 
(presumed members of) the Shining Path throughout the zona 
liberada. As mentioned in 4.2, several research participants point to 
a threat received by a general of the army as a direct cause for the 
killing of the leaders of the popular committee. As Sacsamarca was 
marked as a ‘red zone’ infiltrated by the Shining Path, the villagers 
had to demonstrate which side they were on. In addition to killing 
Walter and Jelacio, Sacsamarquinos killed the leaders of the popular 
committee of the annex of Colcabamba, among whom Walter’s 
brother- and sister-in-law. According to some research participants, 
Walter’s father-in-law, who was one of the three men who were 
shot in the back by the military on the bridge at the entrance of the 
village, was falsely accused by some villagers in order to prevent him 
from taking revenge for Walter’s death.243 In general, denouncing 
fellow-villagers to the military in order to settle conflicts or to save 
one’s own skin became a strategy which contributed to the circle of 
violence and vengeance. This external pressure of the state forces on 
the Sacsamarquinos to demonstrate their loyalty to the nation is mostly 
downplayed in the public narrative. 
Católica del Perú, “Diagnóstico Socioeconómico y Psicosocial de La Comunidad y 
Distrito Sacsamarca,” 87.
242  CVR, “Violencia Política En La Provincia de Huancasancos: Los Casos de 
Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca.”
243  Interview with Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015; interview with Victor, one of the 
participants in the battle against the Shining Path on 21 May 1983, Sacsamarca, 
28.03.2015.
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The consequences of the intimate violence live on today in the form 
of feelings of resentment, bitterness or fear between members of 
the community. One research participant, for example, expresses 
his “fury” [“rabia”] about the fact that some former members of the 
popular committee now take up political functions in the municipal 
board or work as teachers.244 In the wake of the commemoration 
ceremony in 2015, one of the leaders of the rebellion stated that 
he felt “bitter” [“amargo”] because some villagers were representing 
themselves as “innocents, fighters, while in fact they were traitors” 
[“inocentes, luchadores cuando eran unos vendepatrias”]. He also stated 
that he could not talk freely because he still feared reprisals.245 
Walter Huaccachi’s wife, on her turn, still lives in the village and 
is confronted daily with people who were involved in the death of 
her husband, her father, her sister with her unborn child, and her 
brother-in-law. Her silence is one of many which resounds behind 
the public narrative of resistance.
Concealment, coexistence and citizenship
Sacsamarca’s history of intimate violence and its heroic memory of 
resistance are thus separated by processes of concealment which have 
varying degrees of intensity depending on the context in which they 
take place and the purposes they serve. The agents of these processes 
of concealment are, in the first place, the villagers themselves. 
During the communal assembly in April 2015, representatives of the 
DARS presented the community project that they wanted to set up 
with their students in Sacsamarca. Among their proposals was that 
history students of the PUCP would come to investigate and write 
the history of the community. One of the leaders of the rebellion 
intervened and set a condition: the students should only investigate 
244  Interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
245  Interview with Pablo, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015.
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the history of Sacsamarca before the arrival of the Shining Path.246 
His demand was respected and in the final publication of the 
project, 1980 is taken as an endpoint because - thus the author - 
the TRC already described the events of the civil war.247 The brief 
description of the rebellion in the epilogue of the publication follows 
the heroic narrative of the commemoration.248 The Sacsamarquinos 
again succeeded in putting resistance center-stage and downplaying 
their own involvement. The fact that the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
have access to information that reveals certain open secrets does 
not seem to impede the villagers’ concealment. The in-depth report 
of the TRC describes the intimate nature of the violence; yet this 
knowledge is given little weight by the outsiders who welcome the 
narrative extended by the villagers. The process of concealment is 
thus, to a certain extent, reinforced by a mutual approach between 
the two parties. The (post-)conflict identity between heroism and 
victimhood which is put forward by the villagers stands in function 
of recognition and reparation; goals which are promoted by the 
‘well-meaning outsiders’. From the point of view of the outsiders, 
this post-conflict identity is more convenient and indeed better 
fits their aims than an identity of ‘intimate enemies’ who try to 
maintain a tense coexistence. The categories of victimhood and 
violation put forward in the reparation program contributed to this 
construction of delineated post-conflict identities at the expense of 
the complexity of agency which characterizes intimate violence, as 
already mentioned in 4.3.
Of course, the man who intervened during the assembly did 
not represent the entire community. The dynamics between 
concealment and revelation are not only traversed by the way in 
which the villagers seek to relate themselves to the state and to 
the ‘well-meaning outsiders’, but also by relations of power and 
246  Fieldnotes, Communal assembly, Sacsamarca, 12.04.2015.
247  Espinoza Portocarrero, “5. La Comunidad de Sacsamarca En El Siglo XX,” 97.
248  Espinoza Portocarrero, Historia de La Comunidad Campesina de Sacsamarca. 
Diálogo, Memoria y Reconocimiento, 167.
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interdependency between villagers. On their turn, these relations 
- which were often already characterized by conflict and struggle 
before the arrival of the Shining Path - are now in many cases 
burdened with feelings of resentment, revenge, bitterness and fear 
as a consequence of the civil war. Sacsamarca is, in other words, a 
(post-)conflict community where former ‘intimate enemies’ bump 
into each other on the main square on a daily basis. Commemorating 
the past through a unifying narrative of resistance which conceals 
the intimate nature of the violence can also be seen as a pragmatic 
strategy to maintain a tense coexistence between these former 
‘intimate enemies’. For villagers living together in a subsistence 
economy characterized by a significant dependence on both people 
and places, this coexistence is a necessity for survival. Suzanne 
Buckley-Zistel identifies similar processes in post-genocide Rwanda 
under the term “chosen amnesia”.249 Paul Connerton speaks in this 
respect of “forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new 
identity”:  newly shared memories can replace the old ones “that 
serve no practicable purpose in the management of one’s current 
identity and ongoing purposes”.250 As one villager states in his or her 
contribution for the history writing contest set up in the mark of the 
commemoration ceremony in 2004:
We are eye-witnesses of the criminal acts of the past, but in the 
present,  we always  have to keep unity and reconciliation in 
mind, forgetting all the suffering that we have  lived.251
249  Suzanne Buckley-Zistel describes similar processes of coexistence in local 
communities for post-genocide Rwanda. See: Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to 
Forget.”
250  Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting,” 62.
251  My translation of original citation: “Somos testigos presenciales de los actos criminales 
del pasado, pero en el presente siempre debemos de pensar en la unidad y reconciliación, olvidando 
todo el sufrimiento que hemos vivido.” Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por 
La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La 
Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 105.
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When I asked the question how the villagers manage to live together, 
one research participant stated that:
We can’t be estranged for the rest of our lives. Who doesn’t 
make mistakes? Maybe involuntarily, or voluntarily, maybe 
forced, obliged. By understanding all of this we managed to 
forgive each other. Yet this will only be erased when we die, 
that’s how it is.252
Strengthening this coexistence by obtaining reconciliation between 
Sacsamarquinos was Orlando Janampa’s initial motivation to set up 
the commemoration ceremony. The conflicts and negotiations 
over who could be the subject of the subsequent editions of the 
commemoration - the heroes and martyrs of 1983 or everyone 
who died as a consequence of the civil war, including those who 
belonged to the Shining Path - are an example of how the relations 
between villagers influence the dynamics between concealment and 
revelation. 
Lastly, the pursuit of recognition as defenders of the Peruvian 
nation is one the main motivations behind the villagers’ processes 
of concealment. Their claim represents a demand for full citizenship 
from an historically marginalized population group and fits the TRC’s 
idea of reconciliation between the Peruvian state and its citizens 
as one of the main desirable outcomes of the transitional justice 
process. Despite the villagers’ success in emphasizing their heroic 
narrative of resistance, they still feel that the government falls short 
in recognizing the merits of the Sacsamarquinos. The villagers mostly 
link this feeling of being abandoned [abandonado] by the government 
to a contemporary past of ongoing structural violence in the form 
252  My translation of original citation: “No toda la vida nos podemos mirar distanciados. 
¿Quién no comete errores? Quizás no voluntariamente, o voluntariamente, pero, quizás exigido, 
obligado. Todo eso comprendiendo sí nos hemos disculpado, pero eso va a borrase solamente con la 
muerte, así es.” Interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against 
the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
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of poverty and socio-economic exclusion: despite their heroism and 
suffering during the conflict, they still face the same difficult living 
conditions. While the reparation program has failed to fulfill the 
expectation of improving these conditions in the perception of most 
of the villagers, some believe that the recognition of a past in which 
Sacsamarca has showed itself as the ‘cradle of the pacification’, will 
lead to more development projects by government institutions or 
NGOs.253 The villagers’ strategies of concealment are thus not only 
a way of dealing with the past; they are also a way of denouncing 
present injustices and raising expectations for the future. 
Conclusion: The microhistory of a struggle for survival and 
inclusion
This chapter aimed at grasping processes and strategies of dealing 
with a violent past that only become visible through the magnifying 
glass of the microstoria.254 The scenery of this microhistory was 
Sacsamarca, a village in which the Shining Path’s revolutionary 
struggle got entangled with existing power imbalances and 
slumbering conflicts over land and resources, as was the case in 
many peasant communities in Ayacucho in the 1980s. The tension 
between involvement with and resistance against the Shining Path 
which marked Sacsamarca’s position during the civil war resulted in 
a particular (post-)conflict dynamic between the public narrative on 
the past on the one hand, and the (open) secrets and silences that 
surround it on the other. This chapter scrutinized how this dynamic 
between revealing and concealing that characterizes the villagers’ 
way of dealing with the past relates to, differs from, or contests the 
ideas diffused by official transitional justice mechanisms.
The first of these mechanisms to reach Sacsamarca was the process 
253  Interview with Victor, one of the participants in the battle against the Shining 
Path on 21 May 1983, Sacsamarca, 28.03.2015.
254  Carlo Ginzburg, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It,” 
Critical Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1993): 10–35.
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of truth-finding which was set up by the TRC. This process was 
marked by silence and suspicion of the villagers towards both the 
mobile teams which collected testimonies and the research team 
of the in-depth report on the province of Huancasancos. The 
idea of finding redemption through truth-telling did not appeal to 
the villagers, who in the first place expressed the expectation of 
receiving monetary compensations in return for their testimony. 
The in-depth report did not overlook the tense coexistence between 
‘intimate enemies’ and framed the escalation of the violence in 
the region as the result of, among other factors, a “war between 
peasants”. The complexity of the agency and motivations of these 
‘intimate enemies’ was, however, nullified by the design and 
implementation of the reparation program. The combination of the 
clean hands doctrine and the clear-cut categorization of victims and 
perpetrators provided a strong incentive for potential beneficiaries 
of the reparation program to transform the narrative of intimate 
violence into one of a victimized population caught between two 
fires. The categorization of villagers in beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of the program, in addition to existing feelings of 
resentment and revenge as a consequence of the intimate nature of 
the violence, resulted in discontent and mutual accusations among 
villagers concerning false declarations or alleged unjust claims of 
victimhood. The implementation of the TRC’s recommendations 
with regards to exhumations of clandestine burial sites also sparked 
unrest in the community. The tense atmosphere surrounding the 
exhumation in Putaccasa made clear how some of the open secrets 
related to the involvement of the villagers in the violence were 
literally buried. The prospect of digging up this contentious past was 
received by some with mistrust and fear, while others still cherish 
the desire to find the remains of their loved ones. In sum, the work 
of the TRC, the implementation of the reparation program and the 
exhumation of clandestine burial sites were all intersected by the 
tense coexistence between ‘intimate enemies’ and at first sight seem 
to have fomented confrontation rather than reconciliation or unity 
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among the villagers. 
Nevertheless, the Sacsamarquinos appropriated their own space within 
the transitional justice process to create a heroic narrative in which 
their resistance against the Shining Path stands center-stage. Putting 
forward this narrative of resistance allows the villagers to shift their 
(post-)conflict identity on the axis between victimhood and heroism 
in function of their claims for recognition and reparations directed 
to the state and the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ of transitional justice. 
The public heroic narrative serves as a curtain behind which the 
open secrets concerning the villagers’ involvement with the Shining 
Path and the intimate nature of the violence are kept. Depending on 
the context, the audience, and the purpose, a new dynamic between 
revealing and concealing these open secrets emerges. Giving shape 
to these shifting (post-)conflict identities between victimhood and 
heroism is a mutual process between the villagers and the ‘well-
meaning outsiders’. The latter reproduce the heroic narrative by 
encouraging the villagers’ commemorative practices and they 
support their claims for reparation and recognition. The central 
tenet of these claims, which are both past- and future-oriented, is 
the pursuit of full citizenship. In addition to these claims directed to 
outsiders, relations of power and interdependency between villagers 
define the process of concealment, as the unifying narrative serves 
to maintain a tense coexistence between former ‘intimate enemies’. 
The findings in this chapter thus show that the diffusion of transitional 
justice’s ideas on memory, victimhood and time generates mutual 
processes of appropriation and contestation between the ‘well-
meaning outsiders’ and the public that is addressed through their 
mechanisms. The Sacsamarquinos were inspired by the memory duty 
to set up their own way of dealing with the past. Concealment and 
secrecy - notions which go against the idea of finding redemption 
and recognition through truth-telling - became essential features of 
this practice, which on its turn is received and sponsored by the 
‘well-meaning outsiders’. 
Lastly, by writing a microhistory, I have demonstrated that these 
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local post-conflict strategies of remembrance, concealment and 
coexistence cannot and should not be separated from the (pre)
history of the conflict. The Sacsamarquinos were not the subject of 
a coincidental outbreak of violence caused by external forces. They 
are the protagonists in a struggle for survival and inclusion which 
reaches far beyond the time frames of transitional justice.  
Widows of the disappeared at the Día de la Memoria in Hualla (2014)
V 
ABSENT BODIES
The Contemporary Past of Enforced Disappearance in Hualla
Hualla (2015)
Map of the province of Victor Fajardo
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Son: Who buried those who died? 
Father: They buried themselves, I guess. Who was going to bury them then?
Son: Those who could...?
Father: Those who could? I don’t know, we couldn’t...
Mother: They probably just threw them over there.
Father: The dead probably piled themselves up. Who was going to bury them?
Mother: Where would they even be? They probably rotted away, the condors 
also...1
Introduction
In the Peruvian Andes, there is almost no twilight. Soon after the 
burning sun has set, complete darkness falls abruptly, marking the 
relentless separation between day and night. During my first night 
in Hualla’s communal hostel in the municipality building on the 
main square, I was wide awake while imagining how during the 
civil war, the tuta puriqkuna2 found their way to the village through 
this darkness to recruit youngsters or menace the population 
by killing dogs in the streets. While the tuta puriqkuna came after 
sunset, the soldiers of the nearby military bases held their razzias 
in search of Shining Path suspects during daytime, more often than 
not resulting in arbitrary detentions, plundering and rape. One of 
the victims of these detentions was Herminda’ s father. On Sunday 
4th of November 1984, he was detained by the military after being 
accused of sympathizing with the Shining Path by someone of the 
neighboring village of Cayara. Because Herminda’s father resisted 
his detention, he was beaten to death by the soldiers and left on 
1  My translation of original citation: lucho: “¿A los que han muerto, quiénes han 
enterrado?” Flavio: “Ellos solo ya será. ¿Quién va enterrar ya?” lucho: “¿El quién puede...?” 
Flavio: “¿El quién puede? No sé, nosotros no...” lena: “Por allí lo habrán botado.” Flavio: 
“Ellos se habrán amontonado. ¿Quién va enterrar?” lena: “¿Dónde estarán también? Se 
habrán podrido, los cóndores también...” Interview with Flavio, Lena and their son 
Lucho, victims of torture and internal displacement, Hualla, 02.05.2015.
2  Quechua for ‘those who walk at night’, reference to Shining Path militias
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the side of the road, where he was later buried hastily by two other 
villagers under a pile of stones. I met Herminda during this first 
visit to Hualla in March 2012, together with Percy Rojas of the 
EPAF). After a meeting with the Asociación de Familiares Víctimas de la 
Violencia Sociopolítica de Hualla (AFAVISPH)3, Herminda approached 
us and expressed the desire to recover the remains of her father. 
The next day, Percy and I accompanied her to the place where her 
father was buried. Herminda carried a pickaxe, which she used to 
dig out the rocky soil and remove the stones upon our arrival to 
the presumed burial site. After a few slashes, some pieces of her 
father’s clothes and bones appeared. Herminda remembered exactly 
what he had been wearing that day: green trousers, a yellow t-shirt, 
a dark blue jacket and blue shoes. Percy stopped her from further 
excavating the grave and explained that the actual exhumation could 
only be carried out legally by the Specialized Forensic Team of the 
public ministry after initiating a judicial process.4 When I returned 
to Hualla in 2015, the exhumation had taken place and Herminda 
had reburied her father on the cemetery at the outskirts of the 
village. Nevertheless, as he had been accused of pertaining to the 
Shining Path, Herminda’s registration in the victim register was not 
accepted. She did not receive her victim certificate and hence cannot 
claim reparations.5 
Herminda’s father is one of the approximately 15.000 to 20.000 
victims of the civil war buried in individual or collective clandestine 
burial sites - the so-called desaparecidos or disappeared persons.6 They 
have no death certificate and are hence not officially deceased. Of 
some of these, like Herminda’s father, the burial place is known by 
3  Association of Relatives Victims of the Socio-political Violence of Hualla
4  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 16.03.2012.
5  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 05.03.2015, 30.04.2015.
6  Between 1989 and 1991, Peru became the country with the highest number of 
reported enforced disappearances in the world. Carlos Iván Degregori, Qué Difícil 
Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - Sendero Luminoso y El Conflicto Armado Interno 
En El Perú: 1980-1999, 94.
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witnesses.7 Of others, every trace is missing since the moment they 
were detained by the military or recruited by the Shining Path. In 
the 20th century Latin-American context, enforced disappearance 
is mainly associated with the military regimes of the Southern cone. 
Article two of the UN International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance defines enforced 
disappearance indeed in the first place as a crime perpetrated by 
state forces:
For the purpose of this Convention, “enforced disappearance” 
is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any 
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or 
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of the State followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of 
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place 
such a person outside the protection of the law.8
Article three of the convention however adds that:
Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to investigate 
acts defined in article 2 committed by persons or groups 
of persons acting without the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of the State and to bring those responsible to 
justice.9
According to article five of the convention, enforced disappearance 
7  During its mandate, the TRC registered 4.644 burial sites for the entire country. 
Until 2011, the COMISEDH located 4.052 presumed clandestine burial sites for 
the Ayacucho region only, containing the remains of approximately 8660 victims. 
COMISEDH, Los Muertos de Ayacucho. Violencia y Sitios de Entierro Clandestinos, 74.
8  United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,” December 20, 2006, A/RES/61/177.
9  United Nations General Assembly.
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is considered a crime against humanity when applied as a widespread 
or systematic practice.10 In Peru, a broad interpretation of the 
definition is used, considering enforced disappearance as a crime 
which was committed by both the state forces and the Shining Path, 
and denominating all victims who were buried in clandestine graves 
as desaparecidos. Law N°30470 on the Search of Persons Disappeared 
During the Period of Violence 1980-2000 (hereafter: Search 
Law), approved by the Peruvian congress in June 2016, defines a 
“disappeared person” (“persona desaparecida”) as:
[...] any person whose whereabouts are unknown by his relatives 
or of whom there is no legal certainty of their location, as a consequence 
of the period of violence 1980-2000.11 [My emphasis.]
I will follow this definition formulated in the Search Law when 
referring to the Peruvian desaparecidos. 
As mentioned in chapter 3.2, the search for the disappeared was 
among the main reasons of existence of the TRC. In line with the 
so-called ‘forensic turn’ in transitional justice12, finding, exhuming 
and identifying the disappeared was one of the priorities of the 
‘well-meaning outsiders’ involved in Peru’s initiatives of coming to 
terms with the legacies of the civil war. This chapter will focus on 
the process of dealing with the disappeared in the aftermath of the 
civil war. More specifically, I analyze how processes of searching 
and remembering the disappeared are shaped by the involvement 
of local, national and international actors and their respective ways 
of diffusing, appropriating and contesting transitional justice’s ideas 
on memory, victimhood and time. The district of Hualla, in the 
province of Victor Fajardo, Ayacucho, serves as the lens through 
10  United Nations General Assembly.
11  “Ley de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas Durante El Período de Violencia 
1980-2000,” Pub. L. No. 30470.
12  Colaert, “History from the Grave. Politics of Memory in Exhumations of Mass 
Graves from the Spanish Civil War,” 34.
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which I will address these questions. Nevertheless, the findings for 
Hualla can in many cases be extrapolated to the broader context of 
dealing with the legacies of enforced disappearance in Peru.
As in the previous chapter, I will first briefly sketch the geographical 
and demographical context of the village. The district of Hualla has 
one annex, the village of Tiquihua, and is known in the region as 
‘the capital of corn’ after its agricultural specialization, which is the 
cultivation of at least 33 different types of corn.13 Hualla is situated 
in the valley of the Pampas river, in the heart of the Comité Zonal 
Cangallo - Victor Fajardo, the main base from where the Shining 
Path waged its revolutionary struggle.14 
I will continue by describing how the crime of enforced disappearance 
affected Hualla in particular during the civil war. Because of its 
geographical location in the midst of the Shining Path’s zona liberada, 
Hualla was one of the villages where the Shining Path aimed to 
reinforce its support base by taking over the governance of the 
community, recruiting youngsters for its ejército guerrillero popular 
(popular guerrilla army) and terrorizing those who refused to 
support the armed struggle. As in Sacsamarca, the balance between 
collaboration and resistance is complex, as a significant part of the 
(intellectual) elite sympathized or was actively involved with the 
Shining Path.15 Because of the Shining Path’s prominent presence, 
Hualla also became the scene for the violent repression of the state 
forces, who set up a network of military bases throughout the region 
as part of their counter-subversive strategy. The crime of enforced 
disappearance was perpetrated by the Shining Path in the form of 
enforced recruitment or kidnapping, as well as by the state forces 
in the form of clandestine detention, torture and extrajudicial 
13  FAO Perú and GAUSS VIDEO, “Documental Hualla,” 2011, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=P6qz7NHzaw4.
14  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 41.
15  For an analysis of the participation of Huallinos in the Shining Path, see: 
Devin Finn, “Civilian Participation in Politics and Violent Revolution: Ideology, 
Networks, and Action in Peru and India” (Georgetown University, 2016), 173–235.
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execution in the military bases. 
Then, I will turn to the diffusion of transitional justice in Hualla. First, 
I will analyze how the work of the TRC and the implementation of 
the reparation program shaped (post-)conflict identities in Hualla. 
I argue that the ‘ideal’ victim identity extended by ‘well-meaning 
outsiders’ and appropriated by survivors is based on disempowering 
characteristics, reasserts existing gender structures that facilitate 
sexual violence (mainly against women), and prevents certain 
survivors (mainly men) from claiming their rights. It therefore 
obfuscates the political agency of the villagers in the past and 
weakens their struggle for justice in the present. Understanding 
(the limitations of) the subject position of survivors is crucial 
to understand the search for the disappeared, as it is part of the 
presuppositions underlying the design of the process and defines 
the conditions on which relatives of the disappeared are invited to 
be part of it.16
Second, I will look at how the search for the disappeared takes shape 
at the intersection of international, national and local policy. I claim 
that the tension between the humanitarian and legal purposes of 
the ‘forensic turn’ in transitional justice generates frictions in the 
interactions between the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ and the state, 
which obstruct the search for the disappeared. The process is 
further thwarted by the inefficiency of what Deborah Poole calls the 
“drifting state”, or what Hannah Arendt refers to as the “tyranny” 
of bureaucracy.17 I will furthermore describe one specific case of 
exhumation in Hualla to demonstrate that the relation between 
the relatives of the disappeared and the state representatives who 
coordinate the search process is characterized by mechanism of 
16  On these presuppositions, see: Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 43.
17  Deborah Poole, “Between Threat and Guarantee. Justice and Community in the 
Margins of the Peruvian State,” in Anthropolog y in the Margins of the State, ed. Veena 
Das and Deborah Poole (Santa Fe, N.M.; Oxford [England]: School of American 
Research Press ; James Currey, 2004), 42; Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Orlando, 
Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 63.
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socio-economic exclusion and racism that are deeply engrained in 
Peruvian society.
Subsequently, I will look into the appropriation, reaffirmation and 
contestation of transitional justice through a closer analysis of 
processes of searching, mourning and remembering the disappeared 
in Hualla. 
First, I will point to what I call the contemporary past of enforced 
disappearance. Herewith I refer to the structural and ongoing 
violence underlying the crime of enforced disappearance as well as 
the process of coming to terms with it. This notion of a contemporary 
past challenges transitional justice’s linear temporality, in which 
the search for the disappeared is conceived as a means to achieve 
closure, and promoted by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ as such. This 
focus on closure cannot only collide with the relatives’ experiences 
of a contemporary past, it also runs the risk of depoliticizing and 
even weakening their struggle for inclusion and citizenship. 
Lastly, taking into account all the difficulties encountered in the 
current policies regarding the disappeared in Peru, I will reflect 
upon an alternative approach to the problem of the desaparecidos that 
shifts away from the narrow focus on recovering bodies and that 
intends to maximize the emancipatory potential of the disappeared 
for transforming the relation between the state and the survivors 
in the present and future. I take Judith Butler’s notion of “grievable 
life” as a starting point to shift the emphasis from ‘how can we find 
the bodies of the disappeared?’ to ‘how can we achieve recognition 
and citizenship for the relatives of the disappeared in absence of the 
bodies?’. According to Butler, grievability is a precondition for the 
recognition of life: lives that remain ungrieved when lost “are never 
lived nor lost in the full sense”.18 I argue that it is not enough to 
make the disappeared ‘mournable’; this is to facilitate the process 
of mourning for the relatives by finding and reburying the body. 
Instead, the disappeared should become grievable. This grievability 
can be achieved retrospectively by recognizing the loss of the life 
18  Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, 1.
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of the desaparecido for the relative. At the same time, this process 
of recognition of loss can be a way to achieve the grievabilty of the 
relatives, which is a necessary precondition to prevent the crime 
from happening again. In other words, recognizing the grievability 
of the desaparecidos, I argue, holds the potential to become a way of 
recognizing the lives of the relatives as grievable
Methodology and sources 
Fieldwork
My arrival to Hualla as well as my interest in dealing with the 
aftermath of enforced disappearance were incited by my close 
collaboration with the EPAF since 2012 (cfr. general introduction). 
As Sacsamarca, Hualla was one of the communities where the 
EPAF had been doing preliminary investigations concerning cases 
of enforced disappearance since 2010. After visiting Hualla for the 
first time in 2012 with the EPAF, I went back nine times to conduct 
fieldwork for this dissertation: once in 2014, seven times in 2015 
and once in 2017. Six of these stays were visits from two to three 
days together with the EPAF. In addition to these short visits, I 
traveled three times for longer stays of seven to ten days without the 
EPAF. Karina Barrientos, Alicia Noa Alfaro and Gabriela Zamora 
Castellares respectively accompanied me as research collaborators 
on these three stays, during which most of the interviews were 
conducted. Doing field research in an Andes community such as 
Hualla means following the daily routine of the villagers, who 
get up between five and five in the morning to cook and do their 
household, after which they go to their lands in the surroundings 
of the village, to return around five in the afternoon. This implies 
that, apart from the people working in the municipality, the health 
post or the schools, the village is mostly empty during daytime, 
especially during sowing and harvesting periods. Most of the 
interviews took place between four and nine in the morning and 
Fieldwork in Hualla (2015)
Hualla shortly before sunrise (2015)
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between five and seven in the afternoon, or on some occasions 
when I accompanied villagers to their lands. In total, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with 38 different research participants in 
Hualla, some of which were interviewed several times. Ten of these 
interviews were (partly) conducted in Quechua with translation 
provided by one of the research collaborators. Twenty-one research 
participants were female and five were communal authorities. All 
interviewees were directly affected by the violence of the civil war: 
at least eight were victims of torture and sexual violence perpetrated 
by the military, at least nineteen were direct relatives of victims of 
enforced disappearance perpetrated by either the Shining Path or 
the state forces, others were victims of forced displacement or direct 
relatives of villagers who were assassinated by the Shining Path. I 
visited Hualla’s annex of Tiquihua on several occasions, but I did not 
conduct interviews there. The interviews were complemented with 
many informal conversations during participant observation in daily 
activities, as well as on specific occasions such as meetings of the 
victims’ association and the Día de la Memoria19 which is celebrated 
yearly at the end of June during the Mama Sara20 harvest festival and 
which I attended in 2014 and 2015. Furthermore, I followed the 
inquiry into one case of enforced disappearance from the moment 
the EPAF started its preliminary investigations in June 2014 until 
the remains were recovered and reburied in November 2016. The 
relatives of the victims of this case were forcibly displaced and 
now live in Lima, where I visited them several times in the suburb 
district of Lurín, which is where the biggest community of Huallino 
migrants lives.  
Apart from this fieldwork focused on Hualla, my understanding 
of the general procedures of searching, exhuming and identifying 
the disappeared in the Peruvian context was shaped in many 
different ways during my stays in Peru in 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2017. 
Throughout this chapter, I will contextualize the case of Hualla 
19  Day of Memory
20  Mother Corn
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within this broader context. The approach is thus slightly different 
than that of the previous case study: I will not write a microhistory 
of Hualla; rather I will use the lens of a local context to look at (the 
aftermath of) enforced disappearance. The fieldtrips conducted with 
the EPAF in 2012, 2014 and 2015 to Sacsamarca, Hualla and other 
communities in the valley of the Pampas and Qaracha rivers all had 
the purpose of doing preliminary investigation concerning potential 
burial sites. These fieldtrips in first instance immersed me in the 
particular problematic of truth-finding in the aftermath of enforced 
disappearance: the difficulty of finding clues and dealing with the 
uncertainty of what has happened. Subsequently, I was involved in 
one actual exhumation of a mass grave carried out by the forensic 
anthropologists of the EFE of the Public Ministry in Sacsamarca 
(cfr. chapter 4). I furthermore became familiar with the identification 
process through participating in a so-called exhibición de prendas21 in 
Huamanga, which is an occasion on which (presumed) relatives are 
given the opportunity to recognize the clothes and objects that were 
found in an exhumed mass grave in order to identify the victim. 
Also, I assisted the EPAF for one week in the laboratory of the Public 
Ministry in Lima in doing the forensic analysis of human remains 
pertaining to the case of the 1986 prison massacre.22 In Huamanga, 
I attended several collective restitutions of remains: ceremonies 
organized by the CMAN and the Public Ministry during which the 
remains pertaining to several cases are collectively returned to their 
relatives, after which they are transported back to their respective 
hometowns by the relatives themselves for reburial. 
In addition, I followed the debate on an academic and institutional 
level by participating in several seminars organized by the EPAF, 
the Institute of Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontifical 
21  Exhibition of clothes
22  On June 19th, 1986, the state forces executed at least 124 presumed Shining 
Path members in the prisons of El Frontón and San Juan de Lurigancho after a 
revolt. See: CVR, Las Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales del penal de el Frontón y el Lurigancho 
(1986), Lima, 2003.
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Catholic University of Peru (IDEHPUCP) and the French Institute 
of Andean Studies (IFEA) on the topic of enforced disappearance, 
which were attended by NGO representatives, state representatives 
as well as (inter)national academics. I furthermore engaged in 
personal conversations with representatives of the CMAN in Lima 
and Ayacucho as well as of the ICRC in Ayacucho, which apart 
from the EPAF is the only other non-governmental actor actively 
involved in the search for missing persons in Peru. In June 2015, the 
UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 
visited Peru to evaluate the initiatives of the state and civil society 
concerning the search for the disappeared of the civil war. Through 
my affiliation with the EPAF, I had the opportunity to participate in 
one of the meetings with the working group representatives at the 
UN headquarters in Lima. 
Additional sources on Hualla
In addition to my own fieldwork data, I consulted the available 
testimonies given by Huallinos23 to the TRC in the Centro de Información 
para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos24 in the ombudsman 
office in Lima. Of the 92 villagers who gave their testimony to the 
TRC, 58 gave permission for public consultation in the archive.25 
In contrast to the province of Huancasancos, the TRC made no in-
depth report on the province of Victor Fajardo. The events in Victor 
Fajardo are part of the first chapter of the fourth volume of the final 
report of the TRC, more specifically of the paragraph Zona 1: El comité 
zonal fundamental: las cuencas de los ríos Pampas-Qaracha.26 Furthermore, 
I consulted the TRC’s list of cases for the department of Ayacucho 
23  Villagers of Hualla
24  Information Center of Collective Memory and Human Rights
25  Of these available testimonies, 34 were given to the mobile testimony team of 
the TRC in Hualla, five were given in Lima, seven in Ica, nine in Huamanga, two 
in Cayara and one in Putaccasa.
26  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4.”
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which includes 77 cases related to events that took place in Hualla.27 
Mauro Tucta Crisante, one of Hualla’s oldest inhabitants and the 
living memory of the village, published the book Willakuy Qorillaccta. 
Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla28, which gives an overview of Hualla’s 
history and culture and recounts the events of the civil war.29 Another 
interviewee also shared his handwritten logbook of these years. The 
EPAF’s publication De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de la Violencia 
Política en Comunidades de la Cuenca del Río Pampas30 includes a chapter on 
enforced disappearances in Hualla co-authored by Mauricio Cerna 
Rivera and Renzo Aroni Sulca.31 Renzo Aroni is an historian who 
conducted research on the role of Hualla’s typical pumpín music in 
post-conflict Huallino migrant communities in Lima.32 Devin Finn’s 
doctoral dissertation on civilian participation in politics and violent 
revolution furthermore includes an extensive case-study on wartime 
violence and memory in Hualla.33 I had the opportunity to discuss 
some of my research findings with both Renzo and Devin during my 
stays in Peru. Kimberly Theidon’s book Intimate Enemies furthermore 
includes several references to (post-)conflict coexistence and sexual 
violence in Hualla, which are based on fieldwork conducted before 
and during the mandate of the TRC.34 Lastly, Peruvian historian 
Percy Rojas is the one who facilitated my research by introducing me 
to Hualla. During our many trips together, Percy did not only share 
27  CVR, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La CVR,” 2003.
28  The History of the Golden Village. The Village of Saint Peter of Hualla
29  Mauro Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla (Editorial 
Ritisa, 2009).
30  From Victims to Citizens: Memories of the Political Violence in Communities 
in the Valley of the Pampas River
31  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas.
32  Renzo Aroni, “Crónicas Del Migrante Andino: Múisca, Migración y Violencia 
Política En Perú,” Nueva Corónica 2 ( July 2013): 525–55.
33  Finn, “Civilian Participation in Politics and Violent Revolution: Ideology, 
Networks, and Action in Peru and India.”
34  Theidon, Intimate Enemies.
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his thorough knowledge of the village and the region with me; he 
also provided many answers to the endless series of questions that 
emerge when in the field. 
5.1 ‘Capital of corn’: Geography, demography and political 
organization
From Sacsamarca, it takes a three-hour drive on a dust road through 
the emptiness of the puna to get to Hualla.35 In the past few years, 
the trajectory of the road between Huamanga - Pampa Cangallo 
- Huancapi - Hualla has been asphalted piece by piece, which has 
now reduced travel time from six to approximately four hours when 
travelling from Huamanga. Hualla lies at 3340 meters AMSL in 
the fertile valley of the Pampas river and is closed in by rounded 
mountain peaks that change colors from sand-brown during the dry 
season to all kinds of shades of green when the rain sets in. The 
territory of the entire district, which includes Hualla and its annex 
Tiquihua, stretches out over 162 km2.36 Tiquihua lies at about 8 km 
to the South of Hualla and historically maintains a rather hostile 
relation with its district capital, which, according to the inhabitants 
of Tiquihua, does not look after its annex. Disputes over territory 
between the two communities were also played out by the Shining 
Path during the war. Today, most conflicts between the two villages 
appeased. Nevertheless, I remember a drunk fight between villagers 
of Hualla and Tiquihua during the late hours of the Mama Sara 
festival in 2014, after which the mayor had to intervene to calm 
35  The spelling “Huaya” is used in the sources of the TRC as well as sometimes 
in official government administration. The villagers nevertheless consistently use 
the spelling with “ll” instead of “y”. The name Hualla is derived from “Guaylla”, 
a typical regional plant with a golden shine. Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. 
Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 11.
36  PNUD Perú, “La Provincia de Víctor Fajardo En Ayacucho: Información Para 
El Desarrollo Humano” (Lima: PNUD/UNDP, 2006), 111.
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things down.37 
Hualla was founded as a conglomeration of indigenous communities 
in 1589 and organized in four ayllus or family clans: the Curma, Sanca, 
Tocta and Ñamcca family.38 Today, the village consists of four barrios 
or neighborhoods: Andamarca, San Pablo, San Cristóbal and San 
Miguel. The main square with the church reflects the typical colonial 
ground plan. On November 18th, 1823, the battle of Trigopampa was 
fought on Hualla’s territory during which the villagers granted their 
support to the Peruvian independence fighters in the war against 
the Spanish crown. Simón Bolívar recognized Hualla for its loyalty 
to the cause of independence by giving the village the official title 
of Benemérita Villa de San Pedro de Hualla39, which the Huallinos carry 
with proud until today, especially during the yearly commemoration 
of the battle of Trigopampa in November.40 
Over the past decades, Hualla’s population has strongly declined: 
from 4.440 inhabitants in 1981, to 2.732 inhabitants in 199141, and 
2092 inhabitants according to the census of 2017. The majority of 
the current population is either younger than fifteen (903 villagers) 
or older than 45 years old (831 villagers).42 The decline in population 
is due to forced displacement during the civil war and economic 
migration from the countryside to the cities. Hualla’s largest migrant 
communities live in Lima, Ica, Huamanga, Cañete and Pisco and are 
organized in associations that maintain close ties with the hometown 
by actively fostering the traditions of the village. Apart from its 
typical costume characterized by jackets and skirts with yellow, sky 
blue and red embroidery, Hualla has a strong musical tradition of 
harp, violin and guitar players that perform pumpín, a musical genre 
37  Fieldnotes, Mama Sara festival, Hualla, 25.06.2014.
38  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 23.
39  Deserving Town of Saint Peter of Hualla
40  Fieldnotes, Conmemoración batalla de Trigopampa, Hualla, 18.11.2015.
41  Aroni, “Crónicas Del Migrante Andino: Múisca, Migración y Violencia Política 
En Perú,” 528.
42  INEI, “Ayacucho Resultados Definitivos, Tomo I,” 454.
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typical of the Victor Fajardo province which is characterized by 
testimonial songs that recount historical events.43 San Pedro and San 
Pablo are the village’s patron saints, which are celebrated at the end 
of June during the Mama Sara harvest festival.  
Hualla’s political organization today is similar to that of Sacsamarca 
and most peasant communities in Ayacucho (cfr. 4.1). The village is 
governed by the municipal government authorities on the one hand, 
and the comunidad campesina on the other. In contrast to Sacsamarca, 
the varayocs or varados still played a significant role in community 
governance at the beginning of the civil war. The varados were a 
governing body of elderly members of the community that existed 
since colonial times and watched over the maintenance of land and 
cattle - a function which is now performed by the directiva comunal of 
the peasant community.44 The main economic activity in the village 
is subsistence agriculture, and, to a lesser extent, fish and livestock 
farming. Like in the area of Huancasancos, in the Victor Fajardo 
province land was owned by indigenous communities since colonial 
times, and at the moment of the agrarian reforms in 1968 there was 
only one hacienda in the entire province. Nevertheless, Victor Fajardo 
is historically poorer than Huancasancos because of its geographical 
location which impedes direct connection to coastal markets and 
implies very low access to public services.45 Unlike Huancasancos, 
Victor Fajardo does not have a strong tradition of cattle breeding. 
Moreover, in Hualla, the entire livestock was plundered and killed 
by the Shining Path during the civil war. According to Mauro Tucta, 
“not one sheep was left in the village”.46 As explained in chapter 4.2, 
education was perceived as an important means for social mobility 
43  For an analysis of the role of testimonial music and poetry in Hualla’s migrant 
community in Lima, see: Aroni, “Crónicas Del Migrante Andino: Múisca, 
Migración y Violencia Política En Perú.” For an example of pumpín Huallino, see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MR4l_CABJa8.
44  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 52.
45  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 42–44.
46  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 85.
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from the 1960s onwards, and children from the region of Hualla 
went to study at the secondary school Los Andes in Huancasancos 
which became a hotbed of Shining Path militancy throughout the 
1970s. Hualla has a primary school for boys since 1825, a primary 
school for girls since 1935, and a nursery and secondary school 
since 1975.47 Hualla’s secondary school is named after José Carlos 
Mariátegui, one of the most famous Marxist thinkers of Peru and 
Latin America. 
According to research conducted by the UN Development Program 
(UNDP) between 2004 and 2006, 174 villagers had completed 
secondary education while 614 villagers above the age of fifteen 
were illiterate. The majority of the population (68%) is bilingual 
in Spanish and Quechua, with 2% speaking only Spanish and 30% 
only Quechua.48 The average yearly income per capita is 320 PEN 
(€86) and 42% of the children suffers from chronic malnutrition.49 
A health post with nurses and a doctor was established in 1970, 
but the personnel abandoned the post when the village was taken 
over by the Shining Path in 1982, after which it was reestablished in 
1997.50 Electricity and water supplies were installed in respectively 
2001 and 2002; nevertheless, approximately 30% of the villagers has 
no access to these services in their houses according to a publication 
of the EPAF in 2012.51
The study of the UNDP identified alcoholism52, health problems, 
47  Tucta Crisante, 104.
48  PNUD Perú, “La Provincia de Víctor Fajardo En Ayacucho: Información Para 
El Desarrollo Humano,” 121.
49  FAO Perú and GAUSS VIDEO, “Documental Hualla.”
50  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 120.
51  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 15.
52  Alcoholism is a widespread problem in the entire Ayacucho department and is 
mostly directly linked by research participants to the aftermath of the violence of 
the civil war. In Hualla, during my fieldwork in 2015, I was told that the previous 
mayor had prohibited the sale of alcohol in the entire village, but this ban was 
certainly not always respected. Fieldnotes, Hualla, 03.05.2015.
Plaza de Armas of Hualla (2012)
Commemoration of the battle of Trigopampa (2015)
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lack of access to higher education, insecurity, unemployment and 
environmental impact of mining and petrol extraction as the main 
obstructions to development in the district of Hualla.53 Mental 
health problems as a consequence of the violence of the civil war 
were mentioned  by almost all informants, and in a conversation the 
mayor stated that Hualla urgently needed psychologists.54 In general, 
access to mental health care for survivors in rural communities in 
Ayacucho is very poor to non-existent, and there is a great lack of 
psychologists who speak Quechua.
5.2 Enforced disappearances in Hualla during the civil war 
Killings and enforced recruitment by the Shining Path
In the late afternoon of Sunday, 11th of July 1982, the villagers of 
Hualla had completed the faena, a day of collective work to plant the 
eucalyptus trees donated by the Ministry of Agriculture. They were 
in the middle of a football competition when four men and a little boy 
wearing balaclavas and armed with a machine gun, three revolvers 
and a big stick entered the field in search of Juan Inca Allccaco and 
Blas Quispe Inca, the mayor and governor of the village. While the 
governor was released, the armed men took the mayor downtown to 
the central square and tied him up in front of the church together 
with his compadre55 Demetrio Ipurre García, who together with the 
mayor was one of the wealthiest merchants in town. Through a loud-
speaker, the villagers were summoned to the square to witness the 
53  PNUD Perú, “La Provincia de Víctor Fajardo En Ayacucho: Información Para 
El Desarrollo Humano,” 146.
54  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 30.04.2015. Kimberly Theidon describes a similar anecdote 
from when she was working at the TRC office in Huamanga, where she was 
approached by an ex-Shining Path member from Hualla who insisted that the 
village needed psychologists. Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 33.
55  The compadre or comadre is the godfather or godmother of one’s child, mostly 
an intimate friend. 
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juicio popular that was about to take place. The judgment would not 
take long. After being accused of authoritarianism and power abuse, 
Juan Inca and Demetrio Ipurre were shot through their heads while 
the villagers were incited to join the killers in chanting revolutionary 
slogans. The masked men headed to the house of the mayor where 
they plundered his grocery store and distributed the loot among 
the villagers. The five-headed Shining Path militia left as quickly 
as it came, leaving the villagers in shock. When the latter sent a 
commission to the police post in Huancapi to denounce what had 
happened, they found out that the post had been abandoned after 
attacks from the Shining Path and that they had to go all the way to 
Cangallo for help.56 After five days, the judge in Cangallo ordered 
the villagers to carry out the autopsy and gave permission to bury 
the corpses, but no police reinforcement was sent to Hualla.57 The 
villagers later found out that one of the five masked men had been 
camarada Arturo, one of the main regional Shining Path leaders.58
In the villagers’ narrative of the civil war, the execution of the mayor 
and his compadre marks the beginning of the Shining Path’s presence 
in Hualla. With the promise of equality and redistribution from the 
rich to the poor, Hualla became part of the liberated zone of the 
Base Committee Cangallo - Victor Fajardo, the Shining Path’s main 
focal point in the Ayacucho department during the first years of the 
war. As there were no big landowners in the Victor Fajardo province, 
it were the local authorities and the (relatively) rich elite who were 
accused of being gamonales ‘representing the old state’. Juan Inca 
and Demetrio Ipurre became the first targets of the Shining Path’s 
revolutionary struggle, which initially gained support of a significant 
56  Between 1981 and 1982, the Shining Path attacked police stations all over the 
region, which lead to the withdrawal of the police and the population being left 
unprotected. CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 47.
57  Interview with Luís, village authority and witness of the events of 11 July 1982, 
Hualla, 06.03.2015; fieldnotes, Hualla, 02.05.2015; Tucta Crisante, 57; caso 1003020 
CVR, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La CVR,” 2003, 906.
58  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 58.
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part of the villagers.59 As one research participant recounts: 
The village trusted the senderistas. There were a lot of gamonales 
and some villagers complained about them to the senderistas. 
They declared that the mayor was a gamonál. The Shining Path 
disappeared all the gamonales.60 
Don Floriano, one of the village authorities, tells the story of his 
father, who was persecuted by the Shining Path because he was one 
of the varayocs. The senderistas accused him of being a soplón: a traitor 
who turned in villagers to the military. The Shining Path came after 
him on several occasions and eventually succeeded in capturing him 
when he was drunk. Floriano never saw his father again and does 
not know what happened to him.61 
Similar to the role of Walter Huaccachi in Sacsamarca, the story of 
Hualla’s involvement with the Shining Path as recounted by research 
participants as well as in the testimonies of the TRC has a clear 
protagonist: Flavio Claudio Pariona Villagaray, nicknamed camarada 
Rolando.62 Flavio was the son of Eustaquio Pariona, who together 
with Juan Inca and Demetrio Ipurre was the third richest man in 
town. According to Mauro Tucta, Eustaquio’s livestock consisted of 
no less than 1570 sheep, 350 alpacas, 40 cows and twenty horses.63 
As a teacher in Hualla’s secondary school, Flavio became familiar 
with the pensamiento Gonzalo through the intellectual network of 
teachers in the region. According to Tucta, most of Hualla’s primary 
and secondary school teachers were involved with the Shining Path 
59  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 44.
60  My translation of original citation: “El pueblo tenía confianza con los senderistas. 
Hubo bastantes gamonales y algunos pobladores se quejaron sobre ellos con los senderistas. Así 
declararon que el alcalde era gamonal. Sendero desapareció a todos los gamonales.” Interview 
with Tomás, victim of forced displacement and returnee, Hualla, 03.05.2015.
61  Fieldnotes, Conversation with village authority, Hualla, 04.03.2015.
62  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 101.
63  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 85.
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and changed their curriculum to teach the pensamiento Gonzalo.64 
One research participant also suggests that Flavio - like Walter 
in Sacsamarca - primarily joined the Shining Path to protect the 
interests of his own family and to prevent his father’s livestock from 
being redistributed by the insurgents.65
The fate of Flavio and his family would, however, take dramatic 
turns in the bloody months of August and September 1984. In the 
night of August 9, 1984, more than sixty Shining Path militants 
armed with bladed arms raided Hualla and massacred 26 villagers, 
among whom Flavio’s father Eustaquio.66 In a second raid in the 
night of August 20, Shining Path militants entered the house 
of Flavio’s mother Felicitas Villagaray García, stoning her and 
Flavio’s pregnant sister Luzmila to death. That night, eighteen 
other villagers were killed.67 The night before, the Shining Path had 
burned down the municipality building, reducing the entire village 
archive to ashes.68 The bodies of twelve merchants, coming from 
outside the village to sell their goods, were found on September 
3th in the abandoned house of Eustaquio Pariona, which after his 
death was used as a depot by Shining Path members.69 On the 13th 
of September 1984, Flavio himself was eventually captured by a 
group of villagers and handed over to soldiers of the military basis 
of Canaria.70 According to some accounts, the villagers who turned 
64  Tucta Crisante, 58. According to Tucta, Flavio was one of the few teachers 
who was a native from Hualla. Until today, teachers in rural towns in the Andes 
are mostly not natives from the town where they teach, because their assignment 
depends on where they are sent by the Ministry of Education. 
65  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 02.05.2015.
66  Caso 1004745 CVR, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La 
CVR”; Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 62.
67  Caso 1004639 CVR, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La 
CVR.”
68  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 62.
69  Tucta Crisante, 63; CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 39.
70  The exact chronology of the events is not clear, and testimonies contradict each 
other. According to the TRC (case 1003271), Flavio’s capture took place between 
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Flavio in had been tortured by the military until agreeing to deliver 
the local Shining Path leader.71 In the military basis of Canaria, 
Flavio on his turn was tortured, after which the soldiers took him 
on a tour through the neighboring villages, where he was forced 
to identify the Shining Path’s support bases and weapons depots. 
Thereafter, Flavio and another Shining Path leader from Hualla, 
Crisiliano Tacsi, were executed by the military. Their heads were 
shown to the villagers as a war trophy.72 It remains unclear who were 
the Shining Path militants that targeted Flavio’s family, or whether 
Flavio himself was involved in the killings. Apart from Flavio, 
several other villagers were known as active Shining Path militants 
and it is not unlikely that internal conflicts and struggles over power 
within the party’s governance played a role in things turning against 
him. Kimberly Theidon’s fieldwork data from Hualla moreover 
make reference to two other Shining Path leaders from Hualla with 
the surname Pariona - Amador and Hernán - which might point to a 
family feud.73 The fact that Flavio, his parents and his sister did not 
survive might also shape the centrality they are ascribed a posteriori 
in the stories of the villagers. Like in Sacsamarca, the post-conflict 
narratives of the Huallinos are characterized by concealment when it 
comes to the villagers’ involvement with the Shining Path and the 
intrigues and conflicts that led to the escalation of violence between 
‘intimate enemies’. 
As part of the Shining Path’s main ideological and military epicenter 
during the initial phase of the armed struggle, Hualla was one of 
the districts where the party actively recruited youngsters to join 
the ejército guerrillero popular. It is hard to establish exact numbers on 
how many villagers were forced to join the guerilla army, but one 
August 10 and December 12, 1984. I here follow Tucta’s version of the events. 
Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla.
71  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
72  Caso 1003271 CVR, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La 
CVR.”
73  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 33, 129.
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village authority speaks of at least 200 Huallinos who were forcedly 
recruited by the Shining Path, many of whom remain disappeared 
until today.74 In first instance, students were recruited by their 
teachers to join the Shining Path - whether voluntarily or not. One 
of the many cases of recruitment reported to the TRC, for example, 
concerns the young Huallina Divina Crisianti Tacsi, who came to 
say goodbye to her parents in June 1982, telling them that she was 
now with the Shining Path and that she feared for her life if she 
did not go back to join her comrades. Her parents never saw her 
again and every trace is missing since that last goodbye.75 Valentín 
Loayza Cuya from Tiquihua was in her second year of high school 
when she was kidnapped by the Shining Path, despite the pleas of 
her mother, who until today does not know what happened to her 
daughter.76 The nightly arrivals of the Shining Path to the village 
mostly also had the purpose of recruiting youngsters, resulting 
in violent repression against those who refused to join or let their 
children go. One villager states in his testimony to the TRC that:
They [the Shining Path] took away the children, so I had to pay 
potatoes and corn so that they wouldn’t take mine.77
Another case of the TRC makes mention of a girl who was 
kidnapped together with her two parents in September 1982 - the 
three of them were never seen again.78 Due to the nightly incursions 
of the Shining Path, many villagers left their houses to spend the 
night in caves, trees or in the puna.79 The recruits received military 
74  Fieldnotes, Conversation with village authority, Hualla, 04.03.2015.
75  CVR, Caso 1014517.
76  CVR, Caso 1001246.
77  My translation of original citation: “Ellos quitaban a los hijos, entonces tenía que pagar 
papa y maíz para que no me quiten el mío.” CVR, testimonio 201723.
78  CVR, Caso 1005392, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La 
CVR.”
79  Interview with Carolina, mother of two disappeared children, 03.05.2015; Tucta 
Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 59.
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training in camps outside the village. Nevertheless, the Shining 
Path’s popular army was mostly armed with peasants’ tools: axes, 
machetes, sticks and knives. Firearms were a privilege of the few 
leaders only.80 The Shining Path often recruited forces in function 
of specific missions or attacks. The assault of the communal farm 
of Huancasancos in December 1982 (cfr. chapter 4), for example, 
was carried out by recruits from Hualla and surroundings.81 For 
the attack on Sacsamarca in May 1983, the Shining Path recruited 
people from several villages, including at least twenty Huallinos.82 Of 
this group of recruits, only one survivor lives in the village today.83 
According to Mauro Tucta, in total approximately 200 villagers 
from Tiquihua, Chincheros, Cayara, Accomarca and Hualla were 
recruited to participate in the attack on Sacsamarca.84 Zósimo 
Chavez states that Flavio Pariona participated in the battle as well, 
and that he «wanted to take revenge on Sacsamarca».85 Today, the 
participation of recruits from Hualla in the battle of May 21st, 
1983, is remembered with bitterness by the Sacsamarquinos, who still 
often refer to people from Hualla as terrucos. The relation of trueque 
(exchange) of corn, cheese and pottery between the two villages that 
dated from ancient times, seized to exist ever since.86
Clandestine detention, torture, sexual violence and extrajudicial execution by 
the state forces 
Because of its location in the heart of the Shining Path’s zona liberada, 
the Victor Fajardo province became a priority area for military 
80  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 47.
81  CVR, 49.
82  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 23.06.2014.
83  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
84  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 60.
85  Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), Rescate Por La Memoria. Sacsamarca: Trabajos 
Presentados En El II Homenaje a Las Víctimas de La Violencia Política, Mayo 2004, 101.
86  Fieldnotes, Sacsamarca, 27.06.2014.
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intervention. According to the TRC, the entry of the state forces 
into the scenery in 1983 marked the beginning of the most bloody 
phase of the war, and Victor Fajardo was the most deadly area of the 
conflict between 1983 and 1984.87 The soldiers were badly prepared 
for guerrilla warfare and had no strategy to differentiate between 
combatants and civilians apart from ethnic profiling the local 
Quechua speaking population as potential terrorists. The cultural 
distance between the representatives of the state and the citizens 
it was supposed to protect resulted in racism, discrimination and, 
ultimately, a total escalation of violence from the military towards 
the Andean population. Moreover, the state forces did not succeed in 
controlling the increasing number of violent actions of the Shining 
Path.88 As part of the counter-subversive intervention, a network 
of military bases was installed all over the Ayacucho region, with 
the base of Los Cabitos in Huamanga serving as the headquarter and 
main center of detention and extrajudicial execution of Shining Path 
suspects. As indicated on the map, Hualla was surrounded by the 
military bases of Canaria, Accomarca and Cayara. In September 1984, 
in the aftermath of the massacres perpetrated by the Shining Path, 
a military base was set up in Chimpapampa, at the outskirts of the 
village of Hualla.89 As the community was a hotbed of recruitment 
by the Shining Path, it also became a focal point for repression from 
the military. As Kimberly Theidon writes on the presence of the 
military in Hualla, the soldiers “came to castigar el pueblo (to punish 
the town)” for being a support base for the Shining Path rather 
than to protect the villagers.90 Enforced disappearance became one 
of the state forces’ main strategies to eliminate potential Shining 
87  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 35.
88  Finn, “Civilian Participation in Politics and Violent Revolution: Ideology, 
Networks, and Action in Peru and India,” 201; Equipo Peruano de Antropología 
Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia Política En 
Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 25.
89  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
90  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 125.
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Path members and, most importantly, also eliminate every trace of 
war crimes perpetrated by the soldiers. Suspects were unlawfully 
arrested during razzias and taken to one of the nearby military bases 
where they were tortured in order to make confessions. Frequent 
torture techniques included waterboarding, sexual torture and food 
and sleep deprivation.91 One research participant who witnessed the 
tortures in Chimpapampa, recounts:
[...] he [the soldier] brought in an old man, saying that he was 
a terrorist. The man was wearing a white t-shirt. They started 
to beat him, they made him spit blood and they undressed 
him and rinsed the poor man with water time and again, they 
grabbed him and hanged him from his genitals, they hanged 
him from his genitals, the old man was screaming.92
While some prisoners were released after being tortured, others 
did not survive their injuries or were executed, after which their 
bodies were burned, buried in mass graves or - in the case of 
Chimpapampa - thrown of the mountain cliffs.93 To erase evidence 
and thwart post-mortem identification, detainees were exchanged 
between different military bases, they were forced to swap clothes, 
corpses were unrecognizably mutilated or burned, or body parts 
were buried in different places.94 The lieutenants in charge of the 
91  Interview with Emilio, victim of torture by the military, Hualla, 02.05.2015; 
interview with Isabel, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, Hualla, 
05.03.2015; interview with Tania, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, 
Hualla, 05.03.2015.
92  My translation of original citation: “[...] trajo a un anciano, diciendo que era terrorista. 
Estaba con su polito blanco. Empezaron a golpearle, le hacían escupir sangre y le desnudaron 
todo y le bañaron cada rato con agua al pobre anciano y agarraron y lo colgaron de su genital, 
le colgaron de su genital, gritaba el anciano.” Interview with Juan, witness of torture, 
relative of victims of enforced disappearance, victim of forced displacement, 
Hualla, 04.05.2015.
93  Fieldnotes, Visita a Chimpapampa, Hualla, 25.06.2015.
94  José Pablo Baraybar et al., Desaparición Forzada En El Perú. El Aporte de La 
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bases were only known by the villagers by their nicknames: “Gusano” 
(“Worm”), “Leopardo” (“Leopard”)  and “Scorpión” (“Scorpion”) 
are most often named in relation to the base of Chimpapampa.95 
During my fieldwork in 2015, investigations against the responsible 
lieutenants of the base of Chimpapampa had recently been opened; 
nevertheless, the case was proceeding slowly as one of the main 
suspects fled the country to the United States.96 While it is one of the 
characteristics of enforced disappearance that it is hard to measure 
the exact scale on which the crime took place, the EPAF identified 
the names of at least 65 villagers from the district of Hualla who 
disappeared after being detained by the military and taken to the 
military bases of either Canaria or Chimpampa between May 1983 
and September 1984.97 
The soldiers have done more [harm] to the people. They came 
from Canaria, they saw a person and they took him, and that 
person never came back, not one of them, they didn’t come 
back, I don’t know how many they took.98
One of the razzias engraved in the collective memory of the Huallinos 
is the one held by the military during the village’s patron saint 
celebration on June 29th, 1983. In the middle of the party, a group of 
Investigación Antropológica Forense En La Obtención de La Evidencia Probatoria y La 
Construcción de Un Paraguas Humanitario (Lima: EPAF, CNDH, 2009), 35.
95  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 05.03.2015; CVR testimonio 201723.
96  Fieldnotes, Putaccasa, 17.06.2015.
97  This number is based on research conducted by the EPAF as well as on data 
from the TRC. The actual number is likely to be a lot higher due to underreporting 
and internal displacement. Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De 
Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca 
Del Río Pampas, 50.
98  My translation of original citation: “Los militares ha hecho más a las personas. De aquí 
ha venido de Canaria, han visto a una persona y se lo llevaron y él nunca más regreso, ni uno, no 
ha regresado, no sé cuántos habrá llevado.” Interview with Flavio, victim of torture by the 
military, Hualla, 02.05.2015.
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about fifteen soldiers entered by force. After obliging the population 
to gather on the main square and separating women from men, the 
men were lined up, shackled and forced to lie down while they were 
ran over and beaten by the soldiers, who sorted out and detained at 
least eighteen villagers. The prisoners were forced to enter a military 
truck that took them to the base of Canaria, after which they were 
never seen again. Their bodies were not found - according to rumors 
they were dumped in a spot close to the base.99
[...] one time, we were in the celebration of Saint Peter, and 
they [the military] came like that. We were with the carqulloq 
[the person in charge of the organization of the party], so they 
came: “Goddamn shitty terrucoy [terrorists], go to the square”. 
They took us to the square, on the square, damn, they let us lie 
down, they let us lie down, so we lay down from two to seven 
PM. [...] They picked out the suspects and took them away. [...] 
They did not return, they took them to Canaria, they did not 
come back, they took several people there.100
Killings by the military did not only take place inside the military 
bases. During their incursions in the village or during their passage 
through the puna where peasants have their estancias, soldiers also 
executed civilians and left their bodies lying around to be buried 
on the spot. One research participant recounts how her husband 
99  CVR, Caso 1000345, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a 
La CVR”; The case in the TRC speaks of 1982, while other testimonies situate 
the event in 1983 or 1984. I follow Tucta’s chronology, which I consider the most 
reliable. Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 61.
100  My translation of original citation: “[...] una vez también estamos en una fiesta de San 
Pedro, y han venido así.  Nosotros estábamos con el carqulloq (mayordomo), entonces ha venido: 
“Carajo terrucoy mierda, vamos a la plaza”. Nos llevaron a la plaza, en la plaza, pucha, nos 
hacía echar, nos hacía echar, entonces estamos echados desde las 2 de la tarde hasta las 7 de la 
noche. [...] A los sospechosos ya los escogía y ya llevaba. Ya no regresaron ya, llevaron pa’ Canaria, 
ya no regresaron ya, varios han llevado allí.” Interview with Emilio, victim of torture by 
the military, Hualla, 02.05.2015
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and her three daughters of fourteen, seven and two and a half years 
old were killed in her house while she was forced to go outside. 
According to the woman, the soldiers accused her of “breeding little 
terrorists” [“criar terrucos”]. The soldiers buried the bodies in the 
courtyard of the house.101 
In addition, as in most villages where the military was present, 
rape against women was perpetrated on a large scale by soldiers in 
Hualla, both inside the military bases as well as downtown in the 
houses of the villagers.102 Juan, a war orphan who was kidnapped by 
soldiers and raised in the military base of Chimpapampa together 
with another boy from the village, recounts how he was forced to 
witness and participate in rape against female detainees:
We have seen so many things, señorita [...] Listen carefully, 
señorita, at that age we did not know about sexuality, about sex, 
but these soldiers they threw us on top of these naked girls 
and we stayed on top them, what kind of scum were they [the 
soldiers], really señorita, I don’t know if they were persons or if 
they were beasts, now that I understand [...] They tied both feet 
of the girls with a rope so that they would not move while they 
raped them, and they opened them and anyone entered, señorita 
[...] That’s what the soldiers did.103
101  CVR, Caso 1006505, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados 
a La CVR;” Interview with Milushka, Hualla, victim whose husband and three 
daughters were killed by the military, 03.05.2015.
102  The testimonies given to the TRC made clear that gender-related and sexual 
violence took place on a large scale during the civil war. The TRC registered 538 
cases of penetrative rape, which is estimated to be only 7% of the total amount of 
rape cases. The vast majority (83%) of these rape cases were perpetrated by the army, 
the police or the CADs, and 527 of the 538 reported cases were perpetrated against 
women. For an exhaustive analysis of the legacies of sexual violence perpetrated by 
the military in rural communities in Peru, see: Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 103–42.
103  My translation of original citation: “Nosotros hemos visto tantas cosas, señorita [...] 
Fíjate señorita que a esa edad no sabíamos de sexualidad, de sexo, pero esos militares nos tiraban 
encima de esas chicas calatas y nosotros quedábamos encima de ellas, que basuras eran, señorita 
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Gisela described how she was raped up to three times by soldiers 
who entered her house in the village. She blamed herself for nothing 
having put the padlock on the door, that first night they entered. 
While showing the scars of mutilations on her arms, she described 
how on the next occasion, she tried to defend herself with the help 
of the ladies next door. Her defense resulted in permanent back 
injuries. At that time, she was thirteen years old. She states that the 
soldiers have ruined her life and that of many other villagers:
[...] we have lost everything, even in the puna they burned our 
houses, they even ate our sheep, they took them to the base 
to eat them, they burned things down, there was nothing left, 
absolutely nothing, nothing, like that, completely poor, they 
left us. They killed our family, burned our house and on top of 
that they beat us, they hit us, they raped us. They brought us 
complete disaster; they did anything to us.104
Carmen told how soldiers raped her at her home in the village while 
her four-year-old daughter was watching. When the little girl started 
crying, the soldiers threw her into the open fire inside the house 
which, until today, many women in Hualla use to cook their food on. 
The burnings permanently damaged two fingers of the girl’s hand. 
Carmen had never told anyone about the rape before.105 
en verdad, no sé si esos eran personas o eran unas bestías, ahora que entiendo [...] Las chicas 
para que ellas no se mueven al violar le amaraban de los dos pies con soga y las abrían y entraba 
cualquiera, señorita [...] Eso hacían los militares.” Interview with Juan, witness of torture, 
relative of victims of enforced disappearance, victim of forced displacement, 
Hualla, 04.05.2015.
104  My translation of original citation: “[...] hemos quedado fracasado todo, hasta en la 
puna nos quemaba nuestra casa, hasta comían carnero, llevaban a la base a comer, quemaban, no 
había, no quedaba nadita, seguramente nada nadita, así total pobre nos dejó; mataron nuestra 
familia, quemaron nuestra casa y todavía remate nos golpea, nos pega, nos viola. Todo desastre 
nos ha hecho, todo nos ha hecho.” Interview with Gisela, victim of sexual violence 
perpetrated by the military, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
105  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 18.11.2015.
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Many women who went asking for their detained relatives at the 
military bases were forced to barter sex in exchange for information 
about their loved ones.106 This was a strategy set up by the military: 
ex-soldiers explained how they sorted out the prettiest young 
women of the village and detained their brothers or fathers, after 
which the girls could set them free by offering their body.107 In the 
villagers’ narratives on the civil war, rape is most often referred to as 
a systematic characteristic of the intervention of the state forces that 
affected the female population of the village, while rape perpetrated 
by the Shining Path is referred to as sporadic:
It’s the military that has also left children [born from rape] 
here, but the senderistas they did not [sexually] abuse, not often, 
it were the soldiers who abused the girls. The senderistas they 
did not abuse just to abuse, they killed people, they killed with 
stones and axes, that’s how they killed, albeit with a knife; 
while the soldiers, of the women, they abused the majority of 
them, they also abused the women.108 
The crimes of enforced disappearance (including the extrajudicial 
detention and torture preceding it) and rape perpetrated by the 
military were thus entangled in the sense that they appeared together 
and are closely associated with one another in the narratives of 
survivors. Especially in the context of an extremely machista society, 
widows or single women - unprotected by their husbands - proved 
106  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 30; 
Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 104.
107  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 130.
108  My translation of original citation: “De los militares es lo que ha quedado sus hijos 
también, pero no abusaban los senderistas poco era, pero los militares eran los que se abusaban a 
las chicas. Los senderistas no se abusaban de abusarse solamente, mataban a la gente, mataban 
con piedra con hacha asi lo mataban, aunque sea con cuchillo, mientras lo militares a las señoras 
casi a la mayoría se han abusado, se han abusado de las señoras también.” Interview with 
Tania, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, Hualla, 05.03.2015.
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most vulnerable to the abuses of the state forces.109 Hence, the 
disappearance of men resulted in women’s increased exposure to 
(sexual) violence. 
5.3 Diffusion of transitional justice
The construction of gendered survivor identities
The gendered character of these crimes inevitably marks the (post-)
conflict socio-economic fabric of Hualla and the way certain roles 
and identities are attributed or appropriated in the village. In a 
society organized alongside traditional gender roles, the loss of a 
male head of family constitutes an economic loss and affects the 
family’s social capital. As the widows in Hualla often state during 
interviews, all of the sudden, they had to be ‘a man and a woman 
at the same time’.110 The violence of the civil war moreover created 
the new social category of the disappeared: men who “exist but are 
not here” [“son, pero no están”]111, who in the representations by their 
relatives often find themselves at the verge of life and death, but who 
are physically absent.112 The absence of their bodies contrasts sharply 
with the vivid presence of their souls in popular imagination. The 
pre-occupation with ghosts and spirits of the dead in Andean society 
is strong and reflects “a deep temporality that not only connects 
generations, but also crosses the frontier between life and death.”113 
They are part of daily life and can inspire both fear and confidence. 
For example, one research participant in Hualla described how, while 
hiding in the puna after an attack of the Shining Path, she performed 
109  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 119.
110  Interview with Erika, widow of disappeared husband, Hualla, 01.05.2015.
111  I borrow this expression from José Pablo Baraybar. Equipo Peruano de 
Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia 
Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 15.
112  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), 15, 28, 33.
113  Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 72.
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a ritual to calm down her sheep that were upset by the presence of 
ghosts who were wandering around after the massacre.114 
The women - the widows, the mothers - are the present counterparts 
of the disappeared; they evoke the ghosts of their relatives through 
memory and search their bodies in an attempt to bring them peace. 
As Isaias Rojas-Perez points out, women traditionally play a leading 
role in performing funerary rites, as during the wake “women are 
vocal and openly demonstrate their grief while men are silent and 
inhibited”.115 In her ethnography on representations of the Peruvian 
civil war in dreams, Arianna Cecconi describes the nightly visits of 
the ghosts of the disappeared in the dreams of their relatives, often 
providing information about their fate and their whereabouts.116 
The post-conflict identity of the villagers is, however, not only shaped 
by the gendered character of the crimes. The way in which particular 
subject positions are constructed by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
involved in the transitional justice process highly influences the 
survivor identities assigned to and appropriated by the villagers in 
the aftermath of the crimes. The ‘ideal’ victim identity that emerges 
from transitional justice’s ideas on victimhood and trauma, and 
which is characterized by innocence, purity and lack of responsibility 
(cfr. chapter 2), coincides with a gendered dichotomy: the dominant 
victim identity that is being constructed is female, and the dominant 
perpetrator identity is male. This construction of an ‘ideal’ female 
victim identity was made explicit through the TRC’s one-sided 
approach to gender, which in this case was understood as a focus on 
women. In line with the growing international attention for sexual 
violence in conflict settings in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Congo, and 
in transitional justice processes in Guatemala and South Africa, the 
114  Interview with Elsa, widow whose husband disappeared, Hualla, 02.05.2015.
115  Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 69.
116  Arianna Cecconi, “Cuando Las Almas Cuentan La Guerra: Sueños, Apariciones 
y Visitas de Los Desaparecidos En La Región de Ayacucho,” in Las Formas Del 
Recuerdo Etnografiías de La Violencia Política En El Perú, 2013, 179.
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TRC adopted a so-called gender-sensitive approach.117 Women were 
actively encouraged to testify, resulting in 64% of the testimonies 
in the Ayacucho department being given by female survivors.118 
However well-intended, and despite the fact that scholars like Pascha 
Bueno-Hansen argue that the gender sensitive approach of the TRC 
constituted an important international example for the integration 
of gender in transitional justice policies119, this one-sided approach 
to gender, which characterizes the narrative of the final report as 
well as the recommendations that followed from it, also has serious 
implications. 
Some of these implications can be identified by looking at how 
this victim identity is propagated by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ and 
appropriated by survivors in Hualla. The work of the TRC and the 
implementation of the reparation program were the main mechanisms 
which familiarized survivors of the civil war in Hualla with the kind 
of victim identity that stood center-stage in the transitional justice 
process. Teams of the TRC visited Hualla on at least three different 
occasions: in August 2001 for preliminary research, in June 2002 
to take testimonies and in April 2003 to localize clandestine burial 
sites.120 Many Huallinos seemed eager to testify before the TRC: 92 
villagers gave their testimony and 77 cases of violence registered 
by the TRC relate to Hualla.121 The tick boxes on the files of the 
testimonies show how the TRC identified four possible “types of 
declarants”: “relatives of victims”, “victims”, “perpetrator or agent” 
and direct witness”. The category of relatives of victims contains 
one sub-category: “direct relative of victim of disappearance”. The 
117  J Boesten, Sexual Violence during War and Peace. (S.l.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
6; Bueno-Hansen, Feminist and Human Rights Struggles in Peru, 53; Theidon, Intimate 
Enemies, 107.
118  On a national level, 54% of testimonies were provided by women. Theidon, 
Intimate Enemies, 106.
119  Bueno-Hansen, 79.
120  Tucta Crisante, Willakuy Qorillaccta. Pueblo de San Pedro de Hualla, 67.
121  In comparison, in Sacsamarca the TRC registered 33 testimonies and 35 cases. 
CVR, “Casos Del Departamento de Ayacucho Reportados a La CVR.”
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category of victims is divided into five sub-categories: “victims of 
torture”, “victims of rape”, “victims of forced recruitment”, “victims 
detained in jails and prisons” and “survivor of massacres”.122 As the 
‘well-meaning outsiders’ translated narrated experiences of the civil 
war into this vocabulary, the villagers were expected to identify with 
one of the proposed categories. 
Let me single out two of these categories which have a remarkable 
bodily impact for the survivor in the aftermath of the respective 
crime, and which are highly gendered: victims of rape and victims 
of torture (hereby not overlooking the fact that most survivors of 
course correspond to more than one category). Despite the fact that 
the TRC initially adopted a broad definition of sexual violence, this 
was largely reduced to a narrow (legalistic) definition of penetrative 
rape perpetrated by men on women in the narrative of the final 
report and in recommendations such as the reparation program.123 
As explained in chapter three, in theory, individual economic 
reparations are granted to family members of victims who died 
or disappeared, victims with mental or physical disabilities as a 
consequence of (sexual) violence or torture, victims of wrongful 
imprisonment, victims of rape and children born from rape. In 
practice, however, due to the priorities set by the government in 
the implementation of the reparation program, only family members 
of victims who died or disappeared and victims of rape are held 
eligible.124 Both categories of victims receive an individual economic 
122  The use of singular and plural forms in the description of these categories strikes 
me: ‘victims’ is always put in plural, while ‘witness’, ‘survivor’ and ‘perpetraror’ are 
singular forms - as if the former were a group and the latter individuals.
123  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 106; Boesten, Sexual Violence during War and Peace, 
154; Bueno-Hansen, Feminist and Human Rights Struggles in Peru, 54. Hereby other 
forms of sexual violence such as sexual slavery (including forced marriage, forced 
prostitution and forced pregnancy), forced sterilization, sexual torture and violence 
against LGBTQ were excluded.
124  By 2018, 4.623 victims of sexual violence had registered in the RUV but 
only the rape victims receive economic reparations. Andrea Carrasco, “Las 
víctimas ausentes en la obligación de reparar del Estado peruano, por Andrea 
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reparation of 10.000 PEN (€2.600), which in case of death or 
disappearance has to be shared between all members of the family. 
While all victims certified by the RUV can access benefits such as 
health care insurance and scholarships for their (grand)children, 
obtaining individual economic reparations therefore is a privilege 
preserved for particular groups of victims.
It has to be noted that, at the moment the Huallinos gave their 
testimonies to the TRC, their expectations concerning economic 
reparations were very high.125 As one research participant stated 
when asked whether she had declared before the TRC:
The governor [of the village] took us and he said: ‘Testify!’, 
and I didn’t want to. What was I going to testify for? What 
was I going to say? It’s in vain. He told me: ‘Be careful, maybe 
you are going to regret afterwards that you didn’t do it. There 
might going to be something [a compensation], maybe you can 
use it to educate your children’, that’s what they told me, that’s 
how they took us [to testify] [...]126
The collaborators of the TRC insisted to the villagers that giving 
their testimony would “bring something good” and that they 
had “to talk so these things never happen again” - even when 
some women stated that they felt better when they forgot.127 The 
Carrasco,” IDEHPUCP (blog), August 27, 2019, http://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/
notas-informativas/las-victimas-ausentes-en-la-obligacion-de-reparar-del-estado-
peruano/.
125  Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 41; 
Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 109.
126  My translation of original citation: “El gobernador nos ha llevado ‘¡declárate!’ diciendo, 
y yo no quería, ¿cómo voy a declarar, como voy a hablar, qué voy hablar?, es por gusto. Me dijo: 
‘Cuidado, posteriormente te arrepientas de no hacerlo. Va haber cualquier cosa, siquiera para así 
siquiera eduques a tus hijos’, así diciendo me han dicho, a todos nos ha llevado [...]” Interview 
with Erika, widow of disappeared husband, 01.05.2015.
127  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 113.
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differentiation according to categories of victimization has serious 
implications regarding the benefits that are granted to some and 
denied to others, but also for the way in which villagers (have to) 
organize to claim their rights. Like most communities in Ayacucho, 
Hualla has its own victims’ association which, in this case with the 
sporadic support of NGOs such as the EPAF, keeps watch over the 
rights of those villagers inscribed in the victim register. In Hualla, 
participation in the victims’ association is highly gendered due to 
the victim categories which were created by the TRC and reaffirmed 
by the implementation of the reparation program. Men who 
suffered torture feel that they have no incentive to participate in the 
association because they are not eligible for economic reparations. 
Accordingly, with few exceptions, the association is mostly made 
up of widows or mothers of the disappeared. Several male research 
participants who had been victims of torture, extrajudicial detention 
and/or forced recruitment indicated that they found the reparation 
program unfair or that they felt abandoned.128 During one of my 
stays in Hualla, the municipality handed out some wheelchairs 
to victims of torture which were donated by the US-based NGO 
China Aid. One of the receivers was an old man who had been 
continuously tortured for eight days in the base of Chimpapampa, 
after which he remained cripple. He was inscribed in the victim 
register but had not received any economic reparations. The old 
man - surprised by the sudden attention - was told he should be 
grateful for this unexpected gift from foreign donors. The whole 
scene felt absurd, even more so because one could not think of a 
less wheelchair-friendly environment than Hualla, with its steep and 
mostly unpaved rocky dust roads and deep abysses on every edge of 
the village.129 
Many male survivors thus disappear into the background of the 
struggle for justice and reparations as they feel the transitional 
justice mechanisms are not for them, or as one of them put it: “No 
128  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 30.04.2015, 17.11.2015, 18.11.2015.
129  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 18.11.2015.
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one has helped me” [“a mi nadie me ha ayudado”].130 The women on 
their turn become the protagonists of these struggles, but only 
on the condition that they identify with certain characteristics 
that fit the ‘ideal’ victim and inscribe themselves in the passive 
narrative of undergoing violence rather than an active narrative of 
participation, resistance or protection. As Kimberly Theidon points 
out, the war widows - in this case more specifically the wives of the 
disappeared - are the “archetypal personae” of this passive narrative 
of victimhood.131 In the case of sexual violence, women can only 
receive reparations if they explicitly step forward as rape victims, 
which is not a self-evident thing to do, and even less so in a highly 
machista environment where victims of sexual violence and children 
born from rape are in many cases repudiated by their family or even 
the entire community. One research participant in Hualla stated that 
her husband had recently found out that she had been raped by the 
military during the war, after which he left her because he considered 
her a “soldiers’ leftover” [“sobra del militar”].132 During a meeting of 
the victims’ association, a woman sitting next to me suddenly started 
whispering in my ear, asking where she could register in the RUV. I 
told her that they had recently reopened the registration process in 
the village so that she didn’t have to go all the way to Huancapi, and 
I indicated the man in charge of the registration office. She shook 
her head and whispered that it was impossible to talk to him because 
he was “male and from the same village” [“varón y paisano”].133 Of the 
rape victims we spoke to in Hualla, only very few had mentioned in 
their declarations before the victim register that they were victims of 
sexual violence. As one research participant states:
130  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 17.11.2015.
131  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 144.
132  Interview with Gisela, victim of sexual violence perpetrated by the military, 
Hualla, 04.05.2015. This seems to have been a common insult for raped women in 
Hualla, as Theidon also encountered it during her fieldwork. See: Theidon, Intimate 
Enemies, 125.
133  Fieldnotes, Meeting of the victims’ association, Hualla, 18.05.2017.
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They did this [the rape] to me that time, by grabbing me. At 
first in my declaration I had forgotten, I didn’t remember, I 
only told about the terrorists, I only told it later, and then they 
told me: “You should have told us from the beginning”, but I 
hadn’t told them what they [the military] did to me.134
Theidon furthermore describes that in focus groups held by the 
TRC, women did not focus on rape during the war, but on their 
marginalization in the community before and after the war. The 
TRC’s focus on the category of rape limited the time frame of sexual 
violence to the period of the civil war instead of looking into the 
structural processes of violence and discrimination against women. 
Jelke Boesten has pointed out, however, how sexual violence against 
women during the civil war should be considered as a product of 
existing gender, race and class hierarchies and states that “impunity 
of wartime sexual violence reflects peacetime values regarding 
gender and gendered violence”.135 Boesten furthermore warns how 
the TRC’s narrow focus on gender holds the danger of reasserting 
gender stereotypes rather than questioning them.136 She states 
that “narratives of sexual violence were received from within a 
normative framework that emphasized feminine stereotypes such 
as motherhood, endurance, and sacrifice.”137 The work of the TRC 
thus contributed to the construction of a female survivor identity 
that responds to the paradigm of innocent, weak and passive 
victims whose suffering is pathologized rather than politicized. 
This victim identity was in many cases reinforced throughout the 
134  My translation from original citation: “A mi esa vez alcanzándome me han hecho eso. 
Por eso desde el inicio en mi declaración me había olvidado, no me recordaba, de los terroristas 
nada mas he dicho, ya después he contado, me dijeron: “Desde el principio te hubieras avisado”, no 
he avisado lo que me han hecho.” Interview with Elsa, widow of disappeared hsuband, 
Hualla, 02.05.2015.
135  Boesten, Sexual Violence during War and Peace, 5.
136  Boesten, 155.
137  Of the 538 rape cases reported to the TRC, evidence was provided for 16 cases 
but none of these has proceeded to trial. Boesten, 5.
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transitional justice process by the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ working 
with survivors. A clear example hereof is found in a leaflet entitled 
“Abusaruwanku. Violación Sexual Contra Mujeres Durante el conflicto armado 
interno”138, distributed and designed by the COMISEDH and the 
Manuela Ramos movement (a Peruvian NGO working on gender) 
with the financial support of the Project Counselling Service (a Latin 
American NGO working on trauma and human rights) and the 
Canadian International Development Agency. The leaflet intends to 
teach rural communities how they have to deal with women who 
were raped during the conflict. The last page consists of a list with 
eight guidelines “to prevent this from happening again” [“para que 
no vuelva a ocurrir”], the second of which is for the other villagers “to 
consider the raped woman as a woman in bad health conditions who 
needs care and help”.139 Another striking sentence states that “raped 
women do not feel pleasure in sexual relations with their husbands, 
which on a long-term causes problems of domestic violence”, hereby 
implying that raped women will be beaten by their spouse if they fail 
to meet their sexual demands. That the obstruction to enjoy sexual 
pleasure in the first place is a serious problem for the sexuality of 
the women themselves, is completely neglected. Furthermore, the 
need to “break the silence” [“romper el silencio”] and for counselling is 
stressed. This emphasis on the redemptive power of speaking out is 
not only problematic in a context where survivors have no access to 
psychological support, it also reasserts existing gender stereotypes 
as the female survivor is actively encouraged to talk, while men must 
stay strong and silent - which is exactly what they are expected to 
do in a machista environment where ‘big boys don’t cry’. The other 
way around, it can be very difficult for men in a masculine-value-
driven environment to ‘become’ a victim if this means that they 
138  They abused me. Rape Against Women During the internal armed conflict
139  My translation of original citation: “Considerar a la mujer violada como una mujer en 
mal estado de salud que necesita atención y apoyo.” COMISEDH and Movimiento Manuela 
Ramos, “Abusaruwanku. Violación Sexual Contra Mujeres Durante El Conflicto 
Armado Interno,” n.d.
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have to identify with ‘female’ vulnerability. In sum, the diffusion 
of a victim identity based on trauma and suffering intersects with 
the reassertion of existing gender stereotypes which has serious 
implications for both male and female survivors. 
In line with the categories employed by the TRC and the reparation 
program, there was another clear condition on which survivors in 
Hualla could appropriate victimhood: they had to assume innocence. 
In contrast with Sacsamarca, the Huallinos do not have a heroic 
narrative to use as a curtain to conceal that the village was a hotbed 
of Shining Path militancy. Research participants often state that 
the repression by the military was the villagers’ own fault, hereby 
implying that they shouldn’t have allied with the Shining Path. 
They also state that they did not denounce the crimes committed by 
both sides during the civil war because they were not believed, and 
because it was too dangerous.140 While this of course holds true, the 
villagers did most likely also refrain from denouncing the crimes 
perpetrated by the Shining Path because of their own involvement 
with the insurgents. When the TRC arrived with its depoliticized 
victim categories, this provided a space for the villagers to focus on 
the violence perpetrated by the military, obfuscate their implication 
in the violence of the Shining Path, and become eligible for 
reparations. While the Sacsamarquinos concealed their involvement 
with heroism, the Huallinos covered themselves with innocence. As 
in Sacsamarca, this narrative of innocence also serves the purpose 
of maintaining a tense coexistence between ‘intimate enemies’.141 
Survivors in Hualla thus appropriated an identity that was offered 
to them by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ during the transitional justice 
process. This identity, however, does not only obfuscate the political 
140  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 30.04.2015.
141  This corresponds to what Theidon has called the “narrative capital” of the 
villagers in front of the TRC, or what the EPAF describes as the “public use of 
memory”. Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 113; Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense 
(EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de 
La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 32.
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agency of the villagers in the past; it also weakens their struggle for 
justice in the present as it is based on disempowering properties, 
reasserts existing gender structures that facilitate sexual violence 
(mainly against women), and prevents certain survivors (mainly 
men) from claiming their rights.
The desaparecidos at the intersection of local, national and international policy
As mentioned in chapter three, the concern with the problem of the 
disappeared in the design and implementation of Peru’s transitional 
justice process directly relates to the international notion of the right 
to truth and to the ‘forensic turn’ in dealing with the legacies of 
mass violence. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances (1980),  the UN Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992) and eventually 
the UN International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance (2006) provided an international 
framework for dealing with the crime of enforced disappearance 
and recognized “the right of victims and their families to know 
the truth regarding the circumstances and fate of the disappeared 
person.”142 This right to truth is the main point of departure of 
transitional justice and underlies ideas and policies regarding (past-
oriented) accountability as well as (future-oriented) reconciliation, 
as described in chapter one and two.
In Latin America, the Argentinian disappeared stood center-stage 
in the CONADEP’s mandate of seeking truth concerning the faith 
of the political prisoners during the regime of the military junta. The 
Nunca Más report became a bestseller, and the Madres of the Plaza 
de Mayo became a worldwide icon of activism against enforced 
disappearance.143 Their imagery of representing the disappeared 
142  United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.”
143  On the activism of the Madres and their “resistance against the irreversible 
time of history”, see: Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence, 23–45.
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with black and white portrait photographs was copied by survivors 
and activists around the globe, among who the Peruvian mothers 
of ANFASEP, who started organizing themselves in Ayacucho 
in 1983.144 Accordingly, the transition in Argentina was not only 
a benchmark for transitional justice in general, but also for the 
application of forensic science in the wake of mass human rights 
violations. In the context of the CONADEP, the American forensic 
archeologist Clyde Snow trained Argentinean forensic specialists 
and hereby gave birth to the Equipo Argentino de Antopología Forense 
(EAAF). As mentioned in chapter one, the EAAF was the first of 
what became an international network of NGOs concerned with the 
application of forensic science in the search for the disappeared. The 
Peruvian counterpart EPAF was founded in Lima in 2001 by José 
Pablo Baraybar, Juan Carlos Tello, Aldo Bolaños and Carmen Rosa 
Cardoza, and its forensic experts carried out the TRC’s exhumation 
in Chuschi.145 The exchange of expertise within the international 
network of forensic teams led to a shared methodology for the 
search of missing persons, adapted according to the local contexts in 
which it is applied. In case of the EPAF, for example, the team took 
over the methodology of the ICTY and the ICTR, as its founders 
were Peruvian forensic experts who had worked in the exhumation 
of mass graves in Kosovo and Rwanda.146 In sum, the search for the 
disappeared, based on a forensic interpretation of the right to truth, 
became an elementary and standardized component of transitional 
justice contexts around the globe which landed in Peru in the 
aftermath of the civil war. 
Yet, the TRC’s initial strong engagement with the search for the 
disappeared fell flat due to disagreements between the various human 
144  For an analysis of the emergence of transnational activism concerning 
enforced disappearance and its aftermath, see: Gabriel Gatti, Desapariciones. Usos 
Locales, Circulaciones Globales, 2017, 13–33.
145  EPAF, “Historia Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense,” accessed 
September 2, 2019, http://epafperu.org/acerca-de-epaf/historia/.
146  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 24.06.2014.
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rights institutions involved in the process (EPAF, COMISEDH, 
CNDDHH, ICRC and CENIA) and the post-TRC monopoly of the 
Specialized Forensic Team (EFE) of the Public Ministry to carry 
out exhumations (cfr. chapter 3.2). The central tension that has been 
intersecting the process since the beginning is that between the legal 
purposes of finding forensic evidence to bring the perpetrators to 
trial on the one hand, and the humanitarian purposes of facilitating 
the relatives’ process of closure and mourning on the other. This 
directly reflects the tensions between retributive and restorative 
justice, and between accountability and reconciliation, that are 
inherent to transitional justice (cfr. chapter 1). In the wake of the 
design of the TRC’s National Plan for Forensic Anthropological 
Investigations (PNIAF), these diverging applications of the right to 
truth led to a schism between the EPAF and the other human rights 
institutions involved with the TRC. While the COMISEDH, the 
CNDDHH and CENIA advocated the application of the evidence 
obtained through exhumations for forensic purposes, the EPAF 
emphasized the need for a so-called humanitarian umbrella [paraguas 
humanitario] for the exhumations, hereby prioritizing the restitution 
of the bodies in order to facilitate mourning and closure for the 
relatives.147 According to the EPAF, “in a context such as Peru, 
the search, identification and restitution of the remains of missing 
persons cannot be subordinated to judicial deadlines” - hereby 
referring to the slow and overly bureaucratic judicial apparatus.148 
The other human rights organizations, however, accused the EPAF’s 
stance of going against the right to justice.149 The disagreements led 
to an open conflict, after which the EPAF aborted its collaboration 
with the TRC.150 In the following years, the EPAF lobbied for the 
147  Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
148  My translation of original citation: “En un contexto como el peruano, la búsqueda, 
identificación y restitución de los restos de personas desaparecidas no pueden estar subordinados 
a los plazos judiciales.” EPAF, “Historia Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense.”
149  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 25.06.2015.
150  EPAF, “Historia Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense.”
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transformation of the TRC’s PNIAF into an integrated national plan 
of search, hereby emphasizing the need for a shift from a “technical 
to a public policy approach”.151 
While the work of the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ was paralyzed by 
disagreements and a lack of coordination, the Public Ministry 
and the EFE handled a strictly legal and forensic approach by 
only initiating the exhumation of burial sites in response to legal 
complaints issued by relatives (mostly acting with the support of 
human rights NGOs), this is without an overarching plan and 
disregarding the prior work of the TRC. According to Rafael 
Barrantes, former coordinator of the missing persons program 
of the ICRC in Peru, the Public Ministry did not set priorities in 
cases and adopted a responsive rather than a proactive position. 
The relation between human rights organizations and the Public 
Ministry has mostly been tense. According to a representative of 
the Public Ministry, a cooperation agreement between the EPAF 
and the EFE was cancelled because the “critical position of the 
EPAF annoyed the public prosecutors”.152 The EPAF in its turn 
blames the EFE for its lack of self-reflection. The Public Ministry’s 
narrow legal approach furthermore has to be situated within the 
bureaucracy of what Deborah Poole calls the “drifting state”, in 
which legal cases “seem to drift more or less aimlessly from one 
office to the next, before finally being returned, unresolved and often 
years later, to their points of origin.”153 In case of the disappeared, 
this applies almost literally: the uncoordinated work of the Public 
Ministry has resulted in a big discrepancy between the number of 
excavated bodies and the ones that can actually be identified and 
151  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 25.06.2015.
152  Fieldnotes, Coloquio internacional IDEHPUCP: Impactos de las reparaciones 
a las víctimas en las sociedades posconflicto. Memoria de los cuerpos, conmemoración y 
patrimonialización, Lima, 24.08.2015.
153  Poole, “Between Threat and Guarantee. Justice and Community in the Margins 
of the Peruvian State,” 42.
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given back to their relatives.154 As a result, the remains of hundreds 
of so-called NN155 are piled up in cardboard boxes to be stored, 
forgotten and ‘disappeared’ for a second time in the basements of 
the laboratory of the Public Ministry in Huamanga.156 During one of 
the collective restitution ceremonies which I attended in Huamanga, 
representatives of the public prosecutor’s office admitted during 
their speeches that they were indeed “slow but committed to justice” 
and that it was “thanks to the leaders of the human rights movement 
that the hope for justice is still alive”.157 Hereby, they recognized 
to a certain extent that they were paralyzed by bureaucratization 
and pointed to the necessary watchdog function of civil society 
organizations in absence of a more responsive judiciary system. This 
admission of impotence relates to what Hannah Arendt describes as 
the “tyranny” of bureaucracy:
[...] the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no men, 
neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be 
held responsible, and which could be properly called rule by 
Nobody. (If, in accord with traditional political thought, we 
identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account 
of  itself, rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, 
since there is no one left who could even be asked to answer 
154  According to the EPAF, by 2015 around 3.200 bodies were exhumed of 
which ca. 1830 were identified. EPAF, “Una Política Para La Búsqueda de 
Personas Desaparecidas,” accessed September 24, 2018, http://epafperu.org/una-
politica-para-la-busqueda-de-personas-desaparecidas/.EPAF, “Una Política Para 
La Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas,” accessed September 24, 2018, http://
epafperu.org/una-politica-para-la-busqueda-de-personas-desaparecidas/.
155  NN, after the Latin phrase ‘nomen nescio’ (‘I don’t know the name’) is a 
common term to refer to the disappeared in Latin America.
156  Fieldnotes, Sacsamarca, 28.06.2014.
157  My translation of original citation: “[...] somos lentos pero tenemos compromiso con la 
justicia”; “[...] gracias a los líderes del movimiento de derechos humanos sigue viva la esperanza de 
la justicia”, Fieldnotes, Restitution massacre Chungui, Huamanga, 16.12.2015.
Restitution of remains at the public ministry in Huamanga (2015)
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for what is being done.)158
The descend of the search for the disappeared into the judicial 
apparatus also further corroded its restorative significance by 
hollowing out the restitution ceremonies. As Rojas-Perez points 
out, in contrast with the public and highly symbolical restitution 
ceremonies during the mandate of the TRC, during the post-TRC 
period “the legal restitution of exhumed bodies to relatives has 
become a bureaucratic affair conducted on the premises of the 
provincial branches of the Fiscalía [the public prosecutor’s office] 
[...] and the reburial of these victims has become almost exclusively 
a local affair”.159 Indeed, while the restitution of remains of the 
disappeared was included in the symbolic reparation program, the 
provided budgets were mainly invested in basic infrastructural items 
such as coffins to store the remains. According to a representative 
of the CMAN, the collective restitution ceremonies which 
were intended to give visibility to the relatives were “overdone” 
[“exagerado”] in an instrumental way by the public prosecutor’s office 
and lost their symbolic meaning. Psychological support for the 
relatives throughout the entire process of exhumation, identification 
and reburial - if any - was mostly provided by NGO’s.160 Due to 
all these factors, the search for the disappeared stranded in a 
deadlock in the first post-TRC decade. José Pablo Baraybar ended 
his presentation during a seminar in Huamanga in March 2015 with 
the words: “to conclude, it is a disaster”161, and according to former 
truth commissioner Sofía Macher “the disappeared are forgotten 
158  Arendt, On Violence, 38.
159  Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 49.
160 Fieldnotes, Coloquio internacional IDEHPUCP: Impactos de las reparaciones 
a las víctimas en las sociedades posconflicto. Memoria de los cuerpos, conmemoración y 
patrimonialización, Lima, 24.08.2015.
161  Fieldnotes, Seminario Desaparición Forzada y Ejecución Extrajudicial, Huamanga, 
14.03.2015.
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because of quarrels [peleas]”.162
Nevertheless, as already touched upon in chapter three, the EPAF 
eventually won its plea for the ‘humanitarian umbrella’. After the 
failure to implement the TRC’s PNIAF, human rights organizations 
jointly lobbied for the design of a new national plan for the search 
of the disappeared, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice in 
close collaboration with the Public Ministry, and with a primarily 
humanitarian focus on the “reparative effect for the families”.163 
The Law On the Search of Persons Who Disappeared During 
the Period of Violence 1980-2000 was approved by the Congress 
in June 2016 and created the General Directorate of Search for 
Disappeared Persons (DGBPD) within the Ministry of Justice to 
coordinate the process. Several people who used to work in the 
search for the disappeared from within civil society now work 
for the DGBPD, including former members of the EPAF. While 
the new legal framework has led to certain improvements such as 
sustained psychological support and a better-informed involvement 
of relatives throughout the entire process, relations between the 
EFE of the Public Ministry and the newly created DGBPD remain 
tense. The former proceeds with exhumations for legal purposes, 
while one of the DGPBD’s main concerns is the identification and 
restitution of the more than 1.500 already exhumed corpses piled up 
in the Public Ministry in Huamanga.164
162  Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima, 24.05.2017.
163  Plan nacional para la búsqueda de personas desaparecidas (1980-2000), p. 9, 
<https://www.minjus.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Plan__busqueda_
personas_desaparecidas.pdf>, last consulted 13.02.2017.
164  The Public Ministry’s legal purposes do not only include criminal justice, but 
also the so-called casos de ratificación de identidad (cases of ratification of identity), 
which comes down to the exhumation of clandestine cemeteries where people are 
buried whose identity is known but who, due to the emergency circumstances 
during the war, have no legal death certificate, which often brings administrative 
problems for relatives in the aftermath. In order for the relatives to yet obtain this 
death certificate they have to request exhumation. Personal communication with 
Gisela Ortiz, director of the EPAF and relative of the disappeared students of La 
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Turning back to the (subject position of) the survivors, it becomes 
clear how the search for their disappeared relatives has become a 
process of which they are only invited to be part on certain conditions 
set by the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ and the state actors involved.165 
On the one hand, the tense context described above has led to a 
‘scramble’ for the survivors among the different ‘well-meaning 
outsiders’ involved. Human rights NGOs claim ‘their’ cases and 
represent ‘their’ victims in order to legitimize their work, which 
takes place in a difficult context with scant resources.166 For example, 
after a restitution ceremony in Huamanga, it was unclear how the 
coffins with the remains would be transported back to the respective 
villages of the relatives. This is an essential part of the process which 
the state does not account for, which means that the relatives have 
to pay for the transportation themselves or depend on the goodwill 
of NGOs to do so. Moreover, finding bus drivers who are willing to 
take along the coffins with the remains is mostly difficult, because 
of superstition as well as practical concerns. While the relatives were 
discussing how to the handle the problem, they were surrounded by 
several representatives of different NGOs who were all individually 
offering their solutions, as if they were bargaining a sales deal.167 
Part of this ‘scramble’ for the survivors is the reproduction of the 
international imagery concerning the (relatives of) the disappeared. 
Taking into account the difference in socio-economic background 
between the often white or mestizo urban middle class NGO 
personnel and the rural and indigenous survivors, the reproduction 
of this imagery sometimes results in a problematic paternalism of 
the former towards the latter, and runs the risk of becoming an 
instrumentalization of the ‘ideal’ victim identity by well-meaning 
Cantuta, 02.09.2019.
165  I must reiterate here that most of my fieldwork data predates the new legal 
framework. Certain aspects of the process might have improved since 2016. 
166  Fieldnotes, Seminario Desaparición Forzada y Ejecución Extrajudicial, Huamanga, 
14.03.2015.
167  Fieldnotes, Restitution massacre Chungui, Huamanga, 16.12.2015.
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outsiders.168
On the other hand, the attitude of the state towards the relatives is 
hindered by the ‘tyranny’ of bureaucracy, but also by mechanisms 
of discrimination and racism towards the rural indigenous 
population which are deeply engrained in Peruvian society. In order 
to demonstrate how both factors manifest themselves concretely 
in the search for the disappeared, I will elaborate on one case of 
searching, exhuming and identifying six disappeared villagers in 
Hualla which I observed from the first preliminary investigations 
in June 2014, until the reburial of the corpses in November 2016. 
The case concerned a clandestine grave containing the remains of 
one man, three women (an older lady and her two daughters) and 
two girls of six and one and a half years old (the children of one 
of the daughters). They were executed by the military at the man’s 
estancia in the highlands in 1984 on the accusation of collaborating 
with the Shining Path. Other villagers were obliged by the soldiers 
to bury the corpses in the middle of the puna - one of them still 
lives downtown and is the only surviving witness of the events. The 
daughter of the murdered man went to localize the remains of her 
father in the direct aftermath of the execution and found the recently 
buried corpses. After that, she never went back to the burial site:
[...] There I found them, still fresh... They were only covered 
with soil. And there we found the sisters [...] with the daughters, 
a little one [...] We found the hair of one of them sticking out, 
168  An example hereof was provided by a representative of the CMAN who, during 
a seminar on enforced disappearance, recounted how after a restitution ceremony 
which took place in the Cathedral of Huamanga, relatives were asked by the ‘well-
meaning outsiders’ accompanying the process to take a walk around the square 
while carrying the coffins with the remains of their loved ones. This is a public 
symbolic act which is most likely inspired by the Madres’ walk around the pyramid 
on the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires. The survivors, however, refused their 
collaboration, stating that “we are not sheep” [“no somos ovejas”]. Fieldnotes, Coloquio 
internacional IDEHPUCP: Impactos de las reparaciones a las víctimas en las sociedades 
posconflicto. Memoria de los cuerpos, conmemoración y patrimonialización, Lima, 24.08.2015.
Localization of burial site in the highlands of Hualla (2014)
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their braids with their bolitas169. So, I put a cross on the spot 
where they were. Since that date, I didn’t go there anymore. 
Until now I never went again to that quebrada [fissure]. And 
they told me recently that when they were walking around 
there that the cross doesn’t exist anymore either. Because it 
is a bit downhill, quebradita, the water of the rain could have 
washed away the cross.170
The direct relatives of this case live in Lima, but like many other 
Huallino migrants, they returned to their hometown to participate in 
the yearly Mama Sara festival celebrations in June 2014. As the family 
had expressed the desire to exhume the corpses of their loved ones 
in order to provide them with a proper burial, the EPAF decided 
to conduct the necessary preliminary investigations and present the 
case with the support of the International Commission of Jurists 
to the public prosecutor’s office. Therefore, the EPAF needed to 
know the exact location of the grave, as this information needs to 
be included in the file presented to the prosecutor. The lady who 
had visited the burial site more than thirty years ago was not sure 
whether she would still be able to identify the spot. The witness 
living in the village was reluctant at first, but at the insistence of 
the family and the EPAF, he eventually agreed to collaborate. The 
morning after the last night of the festival, we left at five in the 
morning - the village still covered under the smell of chicha and the 
last drunks arguing at the square - to undertake the journey through 
the highlands to localize the grave. After 45 minutes by car on the 
169  Small balls of wool used by women in the Andes to decorate their braids
170  My translation of original citation: “Ahí encontré fresco... Había tierra tapado no mas. 
Y de ahí encontramos las hermanas [...] estaban su hijitas, una pequeña mas o menos esa eda. 
Una que hemos encontrado así que estaba afuera y sus caballitos, sus trenzas con sus bolitas [...] 
Por eso he puesto una cruz, ponemos donde estaban. De la fecha no llego ya. Hasta ahora no llegé 
mas a esta quebrada. Y dijeron ahora ’ultimo cuando ha ido andar por ahí que ya no existe cruz 
tampoco. Como está un poco medio bajado, quebradita, agua posiblemente cuando llueve que se lo 
ha llevado.” Interview with Alicia, relative of victims burial site Hualla, 25.06.2015.
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dust road to Sacsamarca, followed by two hours of descending by 
foot in a fissure, the witness indicated the spot, in the middle of a 
landscape which for an outsider like me appeared a yellow-green 
vastness without any clues for orientation. After carrying out the 
Pagapu to Pacha Mama171, we began our way back - four hours of 
steep climbing through thin air until reaching the top at 4400 
meters AMSL. The relatives and the witness made their way back to 
Hualla, while I accompanied the EPAF on their continuing journey 
to Putaccasa and Sacsamarca.172
Our paths crossed again in May 2015. Almost exactly one year after 
the EPAF and the ICJ had presented the case, the Public Ministry 
had planned the exhumation in the period that Alicia and I were 
conducting interviews in Hualla. Because nobody of the EPAF 
could come over, Alicia and I decided to accompany the relatives 
again, six of whom had travelled all the way from Lima. According 
to the notification sent out by the prosecutor’s office to the relatives, 
the exhumation was programmed to last for two days. On the eve 
of the first day, the public prosecutor and the forensic expert arrived 
to the village to notify the relatives that they would return the next 
morning at eight, and to order them to recruit some workmen to 
help with the excavations. After ten minutes they left again for 
Huancapi, where they would spend the night, without giving any 
further explanations on the process of the exhumation. The public 
prosecutor did not even get out of the pickup truck to greet the 
family members.173 
The next day, Alicia and I left the village by minivan with two 
workmen, a shovel and a pickaxe, the meat of a sheep that had 
been butchered for the occasion, tents and blankets to spend the 
night in the highlands, and five of the six relatives - one of them, a 
171  The Pagapu or Pago a la tierra is an Andean ritual to pay tribute to Mother Earth 
[Pacha Mama], which includes offering coca leaves, and sometimes also alcohol and 
cigarettes. 
172  Fieldnotes, Localization burial site, Hualla, 27.06.2014.
173  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 05.05.2015.
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woman who suffered from diabetes, had become ill and would stay 
downtown. The pick-up truck with the prosecutor and the forensic 
expert followed us to the place where we would start our descend 
by foot. We unloaded the van and borrowed three horses from the 
nearby estancia to take the material of the expedition into the fissure. 
Once arrived at the alleged spot of the grave around eleven in the 
morning, the forensic expert gave the order to dig a first hole, but 
no human remains were found. A second and a third hole were dug 
in the surroundings of the first one, but still no bones appeared. 
The prosecutor was visibly annoyed, and the forensic expert 
snapped to the relatives that other families actually searched for the 
bones before calling the prosecutor’s office. When the relatives 
tried to read the coca leaves in order to find some traces of their 
deceased family members, the prosecutor and the forensic expert 
rolled their eyes and openly mocked them. They sat down, while the 
relatives, stressed out and in despair, were randomly digging around 
and opening new holes. After a while, the prosecutor approached 
me and remarked that he really pitied the family members as they 
looked so desperate, looking around with the hope of finding their 
relatives. Around three thirty in the afternoon, the prosecutor and 
the forensic expert announced that they were leaving and would not 
come back. The family members and I objected the decision, stating 
that their mission was programmed for two days and that they 
should continue the search the next day. The prosecutor annoyedly 
pointed to his clipboard with the info sheet and remarked that 
their mission was to recover [recuperar] and not to search [buscar] the 
remains. He added that the family members could call them back 
when they thought they had found something, and then they would 
return to do the actual exhumation. In the meantime, the husband 
of the ill woman who had stayed downtown had received a phone 
call that his wife urgently needed to see a doctor. The man decided 
to walk back to the village, while the other relatives - tired and 
disappointed - wanted to stay and spend the night in the highlands. 
Alicia and I stayed with them and put up the tents, while the ladies 
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cooked soup of the head of the sheep. As soon as the night fell, one 
of the relatives started worrying about the jarjachas, the ghosts of the 
condemned who wander around the puna in search of revenge on 
the living.174 He felt afraid, and wondered how, as a child, he liked 
the peace and quietness of the puna. That night went by without 
much sleep. The relatives kept telling stories about their youth and 
the drastic changes caused by the war. The return to the village 
the next day took place in a tense and emotional atmosphere. Upon 
our arrival to the village by sunset, the relatives felt dispirited and 
frustrated but were determined to continue the search and decided 
to come back on another occasion. The next morning, Alicia and I 
were invited to share the remainder of the sheep for breakfast, after 
which we traveled back to Huamanga, and the family members went 
back home to Lima.175
Two days later, back in Huamanga, I received a phone call from one 
of the relatives. Their journey back to Lima took a dramatic turn: 
the lady who suffered from diabetes deceased during the bus ride 
- they could not reach a hospital in time. Until today, I cannot get 
rid of the thought that the emotional stress generated by the entire 
process became too much for her.176 Her death caused tensions 
among the relatives. Some wanted to continue the search, while 
others found that the prize they had payed was already too high, and 
that it was unlikely that they would still get something in return. The 
ones who wanted to continue, however, persisted, and in August I 
accompanied them again to the highlands, with new instructions of 
the witness who this time seemed more sober. Some of the remains 
were found after superficial excavations, and the Public Ministry 
came back to do the actual exhumation in September.177 The remains 
were recovered, but it took more than a year before they were finally 
174  On the notion of jarjachas, see: Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 215.
175  Fieldnotes, Exhumation, Hualla, 06.05.2015.
176  Fieldnotes, Huamanga, 09.05.2015.
177  Fieldnotes, Exhumation bis, Hualla, 11.08.2015; meeting relatives burial site 
Hualla, Lima, 27.08.2015. 
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given back to the relatives on November 11, 2016. During a collective 
ceremony in Huamanga, 58 remains of victims of different cases in 
the region were restituted to their families.  After the ceremony, the 
family members transported the coffins with the remains to Hualla, 
where they were buried at the cemetery in a mausoleum constructed 
by the municipality.178
5.4 Appropriation, reaffirmation and contestation of 
transitional justice 
Adding insult to injury: The contemporary past of enforced disappearance 
Now that I have discussed how the relation between the state 
and the relatives of the disappeared is intersected by mechanisms 
of discrimination and racism, I will take a closer look at these 
notions of structural violence that underlie the crime of enforced 
disappearance as well as the process of coming to terms with it. 
This enables me to point to what I call the ‘contemporary past’ of 
enforced disappearance and how it challenges the linear temporality 
of transitional justice in which the search for the disappeared is 
perceived as a way of finding closure. 
Therefore, I first want to turn to survivors’ statements on the value 
of life, and more specifically to their recurring claims that, in the 
eyes of those who inflicted violence, ‘life is worthless’ [‘la vida no 
vale nada’].179 The value of life testifies to the expense of death, and 
178  I was in Belgium at the moment of the restitution, but Gabriela attended 
the ceremony. Personal communication with Gabriela Zamora, 11.11.2016. La 
República, “Ministra Pérez Tello participó en entrega de restos de víctimas de 
terrorismo,” May 26, 2019, https://larepublica.pe/politica/820581-ministra-perez-
tello-participo-en-entrega-de-restos-de-victimas-de-terrorismo/.
179  Interview with Juan, witness of torture, relative of victims of enforced 
disappearance, victim of forced displacement, Hualla, 04.05.2015. This is a 
recurring statement throughout my interviews with survivors in Hualla, but also in 
Sacsamarca and the VRAEM.
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to how the bodies of the dead are treated. The way in which this 
value of life, and the capacity to mourn the loss of life, differentiates 
human beings from animals is a common thread in survivors’ 
narratives on the cruel forms of violence inflicted upon civilians by 
the Shining Path and the military. Survivors state that, during the 
war, people were treated like animals, killed like animals and buried 
- or thrown away [botado] - like animals.180 The state intervention 
which was expected to restore the ‘normal’ value of life, on the 
contrary facilitated a further devaluation of the lives of indigenous 
peasants.
Do you know what they [the soldiers] did with the dead? They 
left them scattered  on the streets, the pigs ate them. [...] Once 
they cut a girl’s breast, they cut her breast and when she started 
screaming, they put a cloth in her mouth to keep her silent. 
The dogs and the pigs out there finished her, in that street, a 
bit further down the road from the school, they finished her. 
Señorita, these times, you would bump into a dead body over 
here, and another one over there, and another one a bit further, 
being eaten by a dog. It almost didn’t frighten us anymore; it 
was almost normal.181 
180  Interview with Zaïra, survivor whose father was killed by the Shining Path 
during the massacre of August 1984, Hualla, 26.06.2015; interview with Katarina, 
widow whose husband was kidnapped by the Shining Path, Hualla, 26.06.2015; 
interview with Elsa, widow of disappeared husband, Hualla, 02.05.2015. See 
also: Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: 
Memorias de La Violencia Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 26.
181  My translation of original citation: “¿Sabes que hacían con los muertos? Los muertos los 
aventaban a la calle, a los caminos, los chanchos se lo comían. [...] Una vez a una chica le cortaron 
el seno y la chica empezó a gritar y le metían trapo a la boca para que no grite, y a esa chicha se lo 
terminó los perros y los chanchos de allí, de la escuela más abajo en la calle, se lo terminó. Señorita, 
tú caminabas en ese tiempo te encontrabas con cadáver en ese tiempo más allá otro, más allá que 
está comiéndose el perro, ya no era, ya no era miedo, ya era casi normal.” Interview with Juan, 
witness of torture, relative of victims of enforced disappearance, victim of forced 
displacement, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
343
V Absent Bodies
We are demanding the state to do more [for the survivors], 
because our life is worth more than gold [ref. to reparation 
program]. Why did these people [the soldiers] do this to us? 
Why? If we were the same as them, why did they mistreat us? 
Until now, when I remember how they beat me, I ask myself: 
Why? What did I do to these  persons so that they would 
do this to me, so that they would beat me, what did I do  
wrong?182
Racism and discrimination against Andean indigenous peasants 
intersect this value of life and are closely connected to skin color 
and the ‘value’ of whiteness in Peruvian society. As the TRC’s final 
report states, racism played an important role in the justification of 
violence during the civil war:
Many times, ethnic and racial differences - converted into 
criteria for naturalizing social inequalities - were invoked by 
the perpetrators to justify actions committed  against those 
who were their victims.183
It is important to understand that racism in Peruvian society is a 
multidirectional phenomenon that does not necessary take place 
between clearly delineated socio-economic or ethnic strata, but that 
it intersects class and social relations from the micro to the macro 
level. For example, Kimberly Theidon has demonstrated how, in the 
case of sexual violence perpetrated by the military, “rape was raced” 
in the sense that women were selected and ‘distributed’ among the 
182  My translation of original citation: “Estamos reclamando para que haga más, por que 
nuestra vida vale más que oro. ¿Porqué nos ha hecho ese tiempo esa gente? ¿Porqué?  Si como ellos 
éramos igual, ¿porqué nos maltrataba? Le digo yo, hasta ahorita cuando me recuerdo lo que me 
pegado. ¿Porqué? ¿Qué he hecho a esas personas para que me hagan eso, para que me golpee, qué 
cosa le he hecho?” Interview with Gisela, victim of sexual violence perpetrated by the 
military, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
183  CVR, Informe final, Tomo 8, cited in: Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 123.
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soldiers according to their skin color: The mestizas were preserved 
for the captains, while the cholas were handed over to the troops.184 
These troops were mostly darker-skinned Peruvians themselves. 
As Theidon states: “Raping, combined with the ethnic insults, was 
a means by which these young men “whitened” themselves and 
transferred ethnic humiliation to their victims.”185 The mechanisms 
through which the rural Andean population was a priori stigmatized 
as ‘terrorists’ also testifies of racism. Research participants state, for 
example, how the military justified the killing of an entire family by 
stating that they had to “root out” [“sacar de raíz”] the Shining Path, 
or by accusing villagers of “breeding terrorists” [“criar terrucos”], 
hereby adopting a racist approach to political affiliation.186 In case 
of the crime of enforced disappearance, the erasure of all traces of 
existence and the denial to a dignified burial [entierro digno] testify to 
the ultimate devaluation of the life of the victim. This devaluation 
of life during the civil war, especially when inflicted by the state 
upon civilians, cannot be separated from the historical and socio-
economic context of discrimination and structural inequality in 
which it takes place. The state did not just fail to protect civilians; 
its representatives systematically violated the basic rights of the 
people they were supposed to protect in a context of complete 
impunity. For the victimized population, “the image of the State 
as an institution that manages and ensures the welfare of citizens 
became more distant.”187
184  Mestizo,-a is a term used in Latin America to refer to persons who have 
combined European and indigenous American descent. Cholo,-a is a term that is 
used in Peru to refer to the Andean population. It can have a derogatory meaning 
depending on the context in which it is used.
185  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 135.
186  Interview with Emilio, victim of torture, Hualla, 02.05.2015; interview with 
Lucho, victim of displacement, Hualla, 02.05.2015.
187  My translation of original citation: “[...] la imagen del Estado como instución que 
administra y vela por el bienestar de los ciudadanos, se hizo más distante.” Equipo Peruano 
de Antropología Forense (EPAF), De Víctimas a Ciudadanos: Memorias de La Violencia 
Política En Comunidades de La Cuenca Del Río Pampas, 38.
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These findings help us to understand the problematic relation 
between the state and the relatives of the disappeared during the 
process of search as a form of ‘adding insult to injury’: during the 
attempt of coming to terms with the legacies of a violent crime, 
which is clearly embedded in an historical context of injustice, new 
wrongdoings are inflicted upon those who are seeking redress. This 
is what I call the contemporary past of enforced disappearance: the 
crime, which is past, is embedded in a context of structural injustice 
which has historical roots and is still present. This ongoing context 
of structural injustice is characterized by unequal access to public 
services, and by racism and discrimination against civilians by state 
representatives. If we then relate this contemporary past of enforced 
disappearance to the ‘forensic turn’ in transitional justice, and 
the focus on finding, exhuming and identifying the bodies of the 
disappeared as a means of achieving closure, several problems arise. 
First of all, if carried out as described in the foregoing paragraph, 
the process of searching the disappeared runs a serious risk of re-
victimizing historically excluded population groups.188 The example 
of the exhumation in Hualla does not stand alone. In her reflections 
on exhumations in the district of Chungui, Ayacucho, Nathalie Koc-
Menard comes to similar conclusions: “A process that was conceived 
as a means of restoring dignity to victims has, in the eyes of some 
families, become an experience of insult and discrimination, a 
reminder that they are excluded because they are poor people from 
the countryside.”189 The focus on searching and exhuming the bodies 
188  This resonates with Mijke de Waardt’s findings on how the implementation of 
the reparation program is perceived by survivors: “For the moment, Peru’s attempt 
to close the chapter on its two-decade long internal conflict is seen by interviewees 
and other victim-survivors in the media as having led to the paradoxical result of 
feeling mocked—victimized yet again.” De Waardt, “Are Peruvian Victims Being 
Mocked?: Politicization of Victimhood and Victims’ Motivations for Reparations,” 
849.
189  Nathalie Koc-Menard, “Notes from the Field: Exhuming the Past After the 
Peruvian Internal Conflict,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 2 ( January 
7, 2014): 288.
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can thus become very problematic if new non-physical violence is 
inflicted during the process through which relatives are supposed to 
find closure of the legacies of violence. The ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
are clearly not responsible for the relation between the state and the 
relatives, or for the way the former treats the latter. Nevertheless, 
they are the most important mediator between the two parties, and 
they are the main advocates of inscribing the Peruvian transitional 
justice process in the international ‘forensic turn’ in the first place. 
Hereby, they actively transmit the message to the relatives and to 
society in general that the disappeared should and can be found and 
that this is a priority or even a necessity in order to come to terms 
with the past. This message generates high expectations for the 
survivors. The historical asymmetrical power relations between 
the Peruvian state and its rural indigenous population did however 
not end with the war; they also define the context in which the 
transitional justice process takes place. When advocating for the 
search of the disappeared, the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ should at all 
times take these circumstances into account because they shape the 
limits of the frame in which a certain policy can be implemented.190 
Second, if we situate the implementation of the ‘forensic turn’ in Peru 
in the context of a contemporary past of enforced disappearance, we 
can wonder what the significance is of the kind of closure proposed 
by ‘well-meaning outsiders’, which is attached to the act of finding 
the body, if the condition of structural inequality in which this 
closure is expected to come about does not significantly change. In 
other words: to what extent can survivors appreciate the dignified 
reburial of loved ones as an endpoint of violence - in case they are 
found and identified in the first place - if it does not testify to a 
transformation of their relationship with the state into one based 
on rights and protection? In many cases, survivors’ relation to the 
disappeared has proven to be a highly political one that speaks to the 
190  Indeed, taking some of these limits into account is exactly what the EPAF 
intended to do by pragmatically stressing the priority of the humanitarian umbrella 
over a legal approach in a context of impunity and bureaucracy.
347
V Absent Bodies
present and future as much as it speaks to the past. In Argentina, 
for example, the Madres have explicitly resisted exhumations, 
fearing that the restitution of the corpses of the disappeared would 
obfuscate their demand for structural socio-economic reforms. The 
Madres want to cultivate a ‘fertile memory’ of resistance, instead of a 
‘memory of death’.191 Based on fieldwork with the Peruvian Mamas of 
ANFASEP, Isaias Rojas-Perez demonstrates how the exhumations 
at the military base Los Cabitos in Huamanga opened a space which 
was claimed by the relatives for political purposes as much as for 
ritual ones: “the search for their disappeared [...] is no longer focused 
only on finding the individual missing body, but also on founding a 
new relationship with the body politic.”192 From a pragmatic point 
of view, and turning back to the rural context of Hualla, it is not 
surprising that survivors who live in precarious socio-economic 
conditions prioritize forward-looking policies that might provide 
perspectives for improvement of their socio-economic conditions 
over symbolic measures. For the majority of Huallinos, past-oriented 
activism is simply a luxury: they cannot afford to spend scarce 
resources - money as well as precious time - on anything else than 
the present or the near future. Several villagers indicated that they 
consider participating in the search for their disappeared relatives 
too difficult, too expensive, or that they do not see the purpose of 
digging up the past [¿para qué recordar ya?].193 One research participant 
who is involved in the search for her disappeared husband expressed 
her doubts over the process as follows: 
Deborah: Now I have already found peace. What will happen 
to me when I remember? When I remember I feel sad, I only 
191  Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence, 34.
192  Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 24.
193  Interview with Milushka, victim whose husband and three daughters were 
killed by the military, Hualla, 03.05.2015; fieldnotes, conversation with local 
authority, Hualla, 24.06.2015; fieldnotes, conversation with local authority, Hualla, 
17.11.2015.
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feel sad. Now again, the señor juez [mister judge] from Ayacucho 
sent us a notification [to testify]. eva: And do you still foster 
the hope of finding him? Deborah: I don’t know how it will 
be. Why would he [the judge] be calling us? They are calling 
several of us [the relatives of the disappeared]. That day three 
of us went, but we went in vain. We spent money; the round-
trip ticket costs 50 soles [13 euro]. [...] I don’t know why they 
are calling us. What are they going to tell me? Once again, they 
are making us remember, that’s what I say, because I feel sad.194 
A research participant whose father disappeared in the military basis 
of Canaria explains how the family could no longer follow-up on the 
process and explicitly frames the accountability for the disappearance 
of his father in a wider context of political responsibility: 
We pulled out. You have to dedicate yourself to it, you have to 
travel there [to Huamanga], go back, ... But one has to work 
as well, and that is why one does not have time, so we left it 
there. Moreover, the case has been archived; we couldn’t find 
out who was the responsible, but actually, the real responsible 
who executed, who disappeared, is also the political class: 
the presidents, the ministers, the political system on the level 
of the entire country, actually they are the perpetrators. Of 
course, because Sendero also appeared in an attempt to claim the 
villages because there was no good distribution of resources 
on a national level, because there was  a lot of discrimination, 
there was no access to public services, so all of this created  
194  My translation of original citation: “Deborah: Ahora ya estoy tranquila ya pues. ¿Que 
voy hacer cuando recuerdo? Recuerdo tengo pena pues, ahora ya también, solo tengo pena no mas ya 
pues. Ahora también de Ayacucho el señor juez, nos mandó una notificación. Eva: Y sigue todavía 
con la esperanza de encontrar? Deborah: No sé, como será. ¿Para que nos estará llamando? A 
varios nos está llamando. Esa día hemos ido tres, pero en vano hemos ido. Hemos gastado plata; 
pasaje también ida y vuelta está 50 soles pues. [...] No sé para que nos estará llamando. ¿Qué me 
dirá? De vuelta nos está recordando, digo yo, porque tengo pena.” Interview with Deborah, 
whose husband was disappeared by the military, Hualla, 06.03.2015.
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resentment with the population and Sendero captured this.195
One of the local authorities, when asked about what kind of policies 
Hualla would prioritize in order to come to terms with its violent 
past, states the following:
Well, in my opinion, what we want here is to transform 
ourselves in a different way for the future of our district, of 
our village, so that in that way there is some development. 
Not think about that [the war] anymore but think about 
development: the development of the entire family, the 
development of our country, that is how it should be. From the 
point of development, we have to look at the future.196
In sum, the friction between the notion of closure attached to 
the search of the disappeared as it is promoted by ‘well-meaning 
outsiders’, and the contemporary past of enforced disappearance as 
it is experienced by and inflicted upon survivors, reflects conflicting 
temporalities between the perception of enforced disappearance as a 
criminal event situated in the past that can be redressed in the present 
195  My translation of original citation: “Lo dejamos. Hay que dedicarse, estar viajando 
allá, regresar... Uno también trabaja y no tiene disponibilidad de tiempo, entonces ahí dejamos. 
Inclusive el caso ya se ha archivado, no pudimos detectar quién era el responsable, pero en el fondo 
el verdadero responsable del que ha ejecutado, el que ha hecho desaparecer, está también la clase 
política: el caso de los presidentes, los ministros, lo que es el sistema político a nivel del país, en 
sí ellos son culpables. Claro, porque Sendero también aparece en una acción por reivindicar a los 
pueblos, porque no había una buena distribución de los recursos a nivel del país, porque había 
mucha discriminación, no había mucho acceso al que es el servicio del estado, entonces todas esa 
cosa creó un resentimiento en la población y de eso se agarró Sendero.” Interview with Joaquin, 
local authority whose father was disappeared by the military, Hualla, 05.03.2015.
196  My translation of original citation: “Bueno para mí, acá nosotros queremos 
transformarnos de otra manera para el futuro de nuestro distrito, de nuestro pueblo, entonces de esa 
manera hay un desarrollo. Ya no pensar en esto, sino pensar en el desarrollo: el desarrollo de toda 
la familia, el desarrollo de nuestro país, eso debe ser. Desde el desarrollo tiene que mirar al futuro.” 
Interview with Edilberto, local authority, Hualla, 06.03.2015.
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on the one hand; and the perception of enforced disappearance as 
a symptom of a structural and ongoing denial of the value of the 
lives of certain population groups on the other. While the former 
can be addressed through present-oriented but backward-looking 
policies, the latter expresses a notion of continuous violence of the 
past in the present and a desire for transformation in the future. 
The idea that relatives should actively participate in the search for 
closure by finding the disappeared, and are expected to ‘leave the 
past behind’ once this process has been completed, can leave a bitter 
after taste: in absence of policies that offer solutions to structural 
problems, the body of the desaparecido can become a Band-Aid on a 
historical wound. The absence of the bodies testifies to the ultimate 
denial of the value of the lives of the disappeared and therefore, 
their restitution might be significant for relatives on an individual 
level. Moreover, forensic prove of mass atrocity recovered through 
exhumations can lead to punishment of perpetrators. The friction 
between the ‘forensic turn’ and the contemporary past of enforced 
disappearance should therefore not be taken as a plea against actively 
addressing the problem of the disappeared or against the exhumation 
and restitution of their bodies. Yet, what I intend to demonstrate is 
that finding and restituting the bodies of the disappeared in itself 
does not a priori contribute to justice for the survivors, and less so 
when implemented in a way that adds insult to injury. In combination 
with the particular subject positions assigned to and appropriated by 
survivors, the focus on closure by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ moreover 
runs the risk of depoliticizing and even weakening the survivors’ 
long-term struggle for justice. 
From ‘mournable’ to ‘grievable’ lives?
Taking into account all the difficulties encountered in the current 
policies, it is useful to think of an alternative approach that shifts 
away from the narrow focus on recovering bodies and that intends 
to maximize the emancipatory potential of the disappeared for 
Relatives in front of the cross in memory of the disappeared in Hualla  (2015)
Relatives of the disappeared put down flowers at the cemetery (2014)
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transforming the relation between the state and the survivors in the 
present and future. Judith Butler’s idea of “grievable life” can hereby 
be helpful as a starting point:
If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not 
conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then 
these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense. [...] Without 
grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living 
that is other than life. Instead, “there is a life that will never 
have been lived,” sustained by no regard, no testimony, and 
ungrieved when lost.197
Asking Butler’s question “When is life grievable?” allows us to 
understand the conditions that precede enforced disappearance as 
well as its specific implications for survivors in the aftermath. If, 
as Butler argues, grievability is a precondition for the recognition 
of life, then the absence of this grievability exactly points to the 
contemporary past that made, make and will make enforced 
disappearance possible, namely the depreciation of life and more 
specifically of the lives of certain groups. I therefore argue that it is 
not enough to make the disappeared ‘mournable’; this is to facilitate 
the process of mourning for the relatives by finding and reburying 
the body. Instead, they should become grievable.198 This grievability 
can be achieved retrospectively by recognizing the loss of the life 
of the desaparecido for the relative. At the same time, this process 
of recognition of loss can be a way to achieve the grievabilty of the 
relatives, which is a necessary precondition to prevent the crime 
from happening again. In other words, recognizing the grievability 
of the desaparecidos, I argue, has the potential to become a way of 
recognizing the lives of the relatives as grievable. The difference, 
197  Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, 1.
198  Butler uses the concepts of precariousness and grievability “to apprehend a 
life”. She does not distinguish between grief and mourning. Butler, Frames of War: 
When Is Life Grievable?, 2.
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then, between mournability and grievability lies in going beyond 
the personal process of achieving closure in order to shift the 
focus to the political process of becoming a citizen. This implies a 
temporal shift from a past-oriented to a present- and future-oriented 
emphasis throughout the process of recognition; from ‘how can 
we find the bodies of the disappeared?’ to ‘how can we achieve 
recognition and citizenship for the relatives of the disappeared in 
absence of the bodies?’. It also implies a shift in responsibility: while 
closure - in the psychological sense of ‘being able to move on’ - is 
a goal which can only be achieved by the individual survivor on a 
personal level, it is the state who is responsible for facilitating and 
completing the political process of becoming a citizen, which takes 
place on a societal level. These shifts in emphasis do not necessarily 
imply mutually exclusive choices between either a backward-looking 
individual approach, or a forward-looking societal approach. Rather, 
they reflect the difficult act of balancing priorities in policies of 
dealing with the past. 
To put this in practice, we first of all have to question the basic 
presupposition underpinning the way in which the problem of 
the disappeared is addressed through the ‘forensic turn’, namely 
the belief that “the material remains of the dead are available for 
forensic recovery”.199 Attaching the notion of recognition to the 
restitution of the body is problematic, because it implies that there 
will be no recognition if there are no remains to recover. In the first 
post-TRC decade, less than 2.000 of the 15.000 Peruvian desaparecidos 
have been found and identified. Only a small fraction of the total 
amount of relatives of disappeared persons is thus actively addressed 
through the policies of search, exhumation and restitution. The 
majority does not participate in the search, abandons the process 
along the way, or never achieves the point of restitution because the 
recovered bodies are not identified. Even in case of more efficient 
procedures, the bodies of many of them will remain unfindable or 
unidentifiable because of the precise nature of the crime of enforced 
199  Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 43.
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disappearance. 
Therefore, I want to have a closer look at the way in which the 
disappeared are commemorated by their relatives in Hualla in absence 
of their bodies. Every year in June, the village commemorates the 
victims of the civil war on the Día de la Memoria [Day of Memory] 
during the Mama Sara festival. The Día de la Memoria was set up in 
2012 as an initiative of the EPAF in collaboration with Hualla’s 
victims’ association and the municipality.200 In 2014 and 2015, I 
attended the commemoration which consisted of a commemorative 
mass in the morning, followed by a pilgrimage [romería] from the 
main square to  the cemetery located at the outskirts of the village. 
At the cemetery, villagers brought flowers and candles to the graves 
of their loved ones who died during the war. After that, a communal 
meal was shared in the house of one of the villagers downtown. 
The pilgrimage to the cemetery confronted the relatives of the 
disappeared with a fundamental problem: their loved ones do not 
have a grave and accordingly, they had no place to bring flowers or 
light candles. 
I don’t go. Those who bury [their dead] there, they go, I don’t 
go. Why would I be  going? For nothing.201   
[We remember] just by talking. There is no place to bring 
flowers. […] Because he is not at the cemetery, so nothing, we 
don’t bring anything.202
200  Fieldnotes, Sacsamarca, 28.06.2014.
201  My translation of original citation: “Yo no voy. ¿A qué voy a ir si no está allí? Los que 
entierran allí sí van, yo no voy. ¿Para qué voy a ir? Por gusto.” Interview with Elsa, widow 
of disappeared husband, Hualla, 02.05.2015. 
202  My translation of original citation: “Así hablando no más ya [recordamos]. No hay 
dónde llevar flor [...] Como no está en el cementerio, entonces nada pues, no llevamos nada.” 
Interview with Isabel, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, Hualla, 
05.03.2015.
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To counter this problem, after the first edition of the Día de la 
Memoria, the relatives of the disappeared started lobbying with the 
municipal authorities to put a big cross in honor of the disappeared 
at the graveyard. While the mayor promised to fulfill their demand, 
there was still no cross by the 2014 edition. The relatives of the 
disappeared who participated in the pilgrimage gathered separately 
at the cemetery while the other villagers dispersed to their respective 
graves. A short ritual was performed in which the relatives stepped 
forward one by one and put down flowers in the grass. The mayor 
was called to account for his failure to comply with the construction 
of the cross, after which he apologized and promised to fulfill his 
duty before the next edition.203 Indeed, the cross was inaugurated on 
the Día de la Memoria of 2015. However, instead of putting the cross 
on the cemetery, the mayor decided to put it on the courtyard in 
front of the catholic church. This decision caused much dismay with 
the family members, who claimed that they wanted the disappeared 
to be part of the cemetery; moreover, a decent [ formal] and well-
maintained cemetery:
Señor alcalde [mister mayor], fulfill your promise! […] That cross 
must stand on the cemetery, so that if we go there, we can also 
leave flowers. For those who have niches, we can leave the 
flowers there; for those who don’t, we are going to leave them 
at the cross. We need to have a formal cemetery!204
Señor alcalde! Our cemetery has to be in order, because now it is 
really too disorderly! It doesn’t even look like a cemetery, but 
203  Fieldnotes, Día de la Memoria, Hualla, 26.06.2014.
204  My translation of original citation: “Señor alcalde eso que sí cumple! […] Esa cruz 
que sea en el cementerio, cuando nosotras también vamos para dejar nuestra flor. Si de alguno 
de nosotros tenemos el nicho llevamos ahí, y de los que no tiene van a dejar en la cruz. Debemos 
tener un cementerio formal.” Field recordings, Día de la memoria: inauguración de la cruz, 
intervention by a relative of the disappeared, Hualla, 26.06.2015.
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rather like a place for animals! If we would take this model [the 
cross] to the place as it is now, it would be in vain, it will end up 
in nothing. So, [I suggest] that the señor alcalde makes sure that 
the cemetery will be fenced, as a matter of creating somewhere 
safe for the memory of our village to linger.205 
The fact that the relatives want the disappeared to be part of a formal 
cemetery through the construction of the cross tells us at least two 
things. First of all, it shows that for the relatives of the disappeared, 
the body is not a necessary precondition for integrating their loved 
ones into the space of the dead at the cemetery. In absence of the 
bodies, they developed an alternative way of commemorating which 
is not attached to the physical remains of the desaparecido. Second, 
the fact that the cemetery has to be a formal place, protected by 
the authorities from intrusion by strangers, expresses the political 
demand to make the disappeared grievable; to revalue their lives 
as that of human beings instead of animals; as that of citizens. The 
cross cannot just stand anywhere: it can only fulfill its function 
if it is safeguarded by the community and secured by the local 
representatives of the state. While the ‘forensic turn’ puts emphasis 
on the need to bury the disappeared, the relatives claim the space 
generated by the absence of the disappeared to vocalize their desire 
for inclusion and protection in front of the state. As Isaias Rojas-
Perez states, the presupposition that relatives are mainly concerned 
with offering proper burial to the desaparecidos risks reducing 
survivors to “cultural automatons, preoccupied with following 
cultural rules” rather than seeing them as ‘modern’ citizens who 
205  My translation of original citation: “Señor alcalde! Nuestro cementerio que esté en 
orden, porque está demasiado descuidado! Ni parece cementerio, sino un sitio de animales! En 
vano sería si llevamos este modelo, al final no va quedar en nada. Entonces que el señor alcalde 
está viendo que este cementerio que sea cercado, cosa que ahí va ser una cosa segura, permanecer la 
memoria de nuestro pueblo. Señor alcalde, usted está comprometiendo al pueblo, que al final que se 
cumpla! Gracias, señor alcalde.” Field recordings, Día de la memoria: inauguración de la cruz, 
intervention by a relative of the disappeared, Hualla, 26.06.2015.
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make political claims.206
One of the main characteristics of the crime of enforced 
disappearance is that it generates uncertainty for the family members 
about the fate of the victim. It is this uncertainty that is mostly 
pointed out by survivors as generating distress in the aftermath. 
This brings us back to transitional justice’s core notion of finding 
truth about the events of the past, and to the key idea behind the 
‘forensic turn’ that this truth can be found directly on the body. 
If we want to think of alternative ways of addressing the problem 
of the disappeared, it might as well be useful to think of ways to 
prioritize other mechanisms of revealing the truth about the fate of 
the desaparecidos. In this respect, a desire that is expressed by Huallinos 
in relation to those who disappeared in the military bases of Canaria 
and Chimpapampa, is to hear confessions by the perpetrators. The 
soldiers know what happened, and by speaking out they can relieve 
the survivors’ uncertainty. In Hualla, this truth is kept within the 
confines of the village: one of the soldiers who served in the military 
base of Chimpapampa married a Huallina and still lives in town: 
iSabel: He knows where they are, how many dead, how many 
people they killed, and that person is alive here. eva: And he 
doesn’t speak? iSabel: He doesn’t speak.207
The man’s wife approached Alicia and me several times to invite us 
over to her house for a conversation. When we went at the agreed 
time, her husband turned us down from the courtyard, stating that 
his wife was not home. He left a drunk and aggressive impression as 
he was sided by his barking dogs who kept us at a safe distance. The 
house lies a bit at the outskirts of the village - unsurprisingly, the 
206  Isaias Rojas-Perez, Mourning Remains, 78.
207  My translation of original citation: Isabel: “Él sabe dónde está, cuántos muertos, 
cuánta gente lo han matado y esa persona está viva aquí.” Eva: “¿Y no habla?” Isabel: “No 
habla.” Interview with Isabel, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, Hualla, 
05.03.2015.
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man is malvisto [‘seen badly’, unpopular] and his silence is received 
with bitterness by the relatives of the disappeared.208
Conclusion: In search of the body politic
Without the presence of public authorities, the village feels like an orphan.209 
During one of our conversations in Hualla, Mari-Luz told me that 
ever since her husband had been taken by the soldiers to the military 
base of Canaria, she had been dreaming about him. The dreams 
had stopped recently, however. Wondering why her husband had 
abandoned his nightly visits, Mari-Luz came to the conclusion that 
it was probably because she had received her economic reparation. 
This conclusion could imply various motivations for the restless soul 
of her husband to no longer visit her in her dreams: or he found 
peace because she received the money, or he was upset with her for 
accepting the money and reducing the value of his life to 5.000 soles. 
In any case, it testifies to the direct influence of transitional justice 
policies on the relation between Mari-Luz and her disappeared 
husband.
This chapter addressed the problem of Peru s´ desaparecidos through 
the lens of Hualla, a town in which the violence of the civil war 
was characterized by this specific crime, and the crimes of torture 
and sexual violence that are closely related to it. By looking at the 
implementation of transitional justice policies such as the TRC and 
the reparation program in Hualla in the aftermath of the war, I have 
first of all pointed out how survivors appropriated an identity that 
was offered to them by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ as a precondition 
to claim certain rights. This identity based on trauma, suffering 
and innocence, does not only obfuscate the political agency of the 
208  Fieldnotes, Hualla, 24.06.2014; 03.05.2015.
209  My translation of original citation: “El pueblo se siente huérfano sin presencia de 
autoridades.” Interview with Edilberto, local authority, Hualla, 06.03.2015.
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villagers during the war. It also weakens their struggle for justice in 
the present because it is based on disempowering characteristics, 
reasserts existing gender structures that facilitate sexual violence 
(mainly against women), and prevents certain survivors (mainly 
men) from claiming their rights.
Secondly, the chapter turned from the survivors to the desaparecidos 
to scrutinize how they are being looked for and looked after during 
the transitional justice process. By looking at the tense interaction 
between the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ and the state, and at the poor 
progress that has been achieved since the end of the mandate of 
the TRC, it becomes clear that the implementation of the ‘forensic 
turn’ in Peru has stranded in a deadlock. This deadlock is caused 
by the tension between the legal and humanitarian purposes of the 
search for the disappeared on the one hand; and by the “tyranny” 
of the bureaucracy of the judicial apparatus on the other. Moreover, 
the relation between state representatives and survivors throughout 
the process of searching, identifying and restituting the bodies of 
the disappeared is intersected by racism and discrimination against 
rural indigenous peasants. These forms of exclusion inflicted by the 
state upon survivors add insult to injury: new violence is inflicted 
upon those who seek redress, who are hereby reminded of the 
mechanisms of structural violence that underlie the crimes of the 
past and still characterize the present. I point to this phenomenon 
as the contemporary past of enforced disappearance. By relating this 
contemporary past of enforced disappearance to the implementation 
of the ‘forensic turn’, I identified two main problems. First of all, 
taking into account the problematic attitude of the state towards 
the survivors, the process of searching the disappeared runs a 
serious risk of re-victimizing historically excluded population 
groups. When advocating for the search of the disappeared, the 
‘well-meaning outsiders’ should at all times consider the limits of 
the frame in which a certain policy is implemented if they want to 
respect the ‘do no harm’ principle. In the case of Peru, these limits 
are shaped by the historically asymmetrical power relations between 
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the Peruvian state and its rural indigenous population. Second, the 
notion of closure through reburial and the contemporary past of 
enforced disappearance reflect conflicting temporalities between 
the perception of a criminal event situated in the past that can be 
redressed in the present on the one hand; and the perception of 
enforced disappearance as a symptom of a structural and ongoing 
denial of the value of the lives of certain population groups on the 
other. While the former can be addressed through present-oriented 
yet backward-looking policies, the latter expresses a notion of 
continuous violence in the present and a desire for transformation 
in the future. This desire for transformation is inherently political 
and reflects survivors’ claims for rights and protection by the state.
I therefore argue that, while exhumation and restitution can 
contribute to recognition as well as to justice in important ways, 
the narrow focus on bodies as the main starting point for dealing 
with the disappeared can result to be highly problematic for two 
reasons. First of all, in absence of structural measures against socio-
economic exclusion, and taking into account the insult that is added 
to injury during the process of search, the bodies risk to become a 
Band-aid on a historical wound. Second, from a pragmatic point of 
view, it is necessary to acknowledge that, even in the best possible 
circumstances, the remains of many disappeared will never be found 
or identified. The ‘forensic turn’ in transitional justice created a very 
specific way of dealing with the disappeared, but there might be 
other options that moreover better respond to survivors’ future-
oriented political claims for citizenship and inclusion. In order to 
imagine these alternatives, I suggest shifting the emphasis from ‘how 
can we find the bodies of the disappeared?’ to ‘how can we achieve 
recognition and citizenship for the relatives of the disappeared 
in absence of the bodies?’. When it comes to the implementation of 
transitional justice policies, ‘well-meaning outsiders’ have to pick 
their battles carefully, because choices motivated by normative ideas 
might have very tangible implications for survivors. Therefore, 
taking into account the Peruvian context, I advocate an approach 
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Women harvesting wheat in Hualla (2015)
to the problem of the disappeared that prioritizes the search for the 
body politic, rather than the search for bodies.
Self-defense committees parading during ceremony in Pichiwillca (2018) 
VI 
HIDDEN HEROES
Citizenship Claims of the Comités de Autodefensa Civil 
in the Valley of the Apurímac River 
Map of the VRAEM 1: Fieldwork districts
Map of the VRAEM 2: Points of interest
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Has any enlightened intellectual ever dedicated a chapter to that generation 
of brave self-defense commandos? To fight ‘for the family agriculture’ is like 
fighting for family survival before the indifference of the state... Hasta la 
victoria siempre!1
Introduction
This chapter takes us from the highlands South of Huamanga to 
the subtropical ‘eyebrow’ of the jungle (ceja de selva) that stretches 
Northwest from the capital of the Ayacucho region. Here, in the 
valley of the Apurímac River, the comités de autodefensa civil (CADs, 
civil self-defense committees) played a key-role in defeating the 
Shining Path during the civil war.2 
The Peruvian self-defense committees best fit the definition of 
militias provided by Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger: “armed groups 
that operate alongside regular security forces or work independently 
of the state to shield the local population from insurgents.”3 As the 
authors point out, while other definitions have used the term militias 
to describe any nonstate armed groups, the crucial element in this 
definition is the anti-rebel dimension. Despite the fact that militias 
have emerged in many conflicts, they rarely are the object of study 
as the proliferation and fragmentation of armed actors is mostly 
1  My translation of original citation: “Algún intelectual iluminado [...] en algún momento 
ha dedicado algún capítulo a esa generación de valerosos ronderos? [...] Luchar ‘por la agricultura 
familiar’, es como luchar por la supervivencia familiar, ante la indiferencia del estado...Hasta la 
victoria siempre!” An ex-self-defense committee member in a comment on facebook to 
an article of Noticias Vraem about coca eradication policies, https://www.facebook.
com/permal ink.php?story_fbid=910286432688282&id=100011208014188, 
14.09.2019.
2  While self-defense committees existed in many other parts of the war-affected 
departments as well, their role was especially significant in the valley of the 
Apurímac river. 
3  Corinna Jentzsch, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger, “Militias in 
Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (August 1, 2015): 755.
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studied from a rebel perspective.4 Nevertheless, Jentzsch, Kalyvas 
and Schubiger rightfully claim that “the study of militias contributes 
not only to theories relevant for understanding conflict processes 
but more generally to theories of post-conflict dynamics, including 
postwar violence, inclusiveness, and citizenship.”5 In (post-)conflict 
Peru as well, the role of the CADs is both under exposed and 
controversial. According to the TRC,
[…] for no other actor of the war, the dividing line between 
perpetrator and victim, between hero and villain, is so thin 
and porous as for the self-defense committees. As pacifiers for 
some and murderers for others, they are a concern for all […]6 
Before focusing on the analysis of the diffusion of transitional 
justice with its underlying ideas on time, memory and victimhood 
by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ in the Valley of the Apurímac river, and 
the several ways in which these ideas are contested by the (post-)
conflict reality of the self-defense committees, I will turn to the 
geographical and historical background against which this chapter 
unfolds. Therefore, this chapter starts with a brief introduction 
to the history and geography of the region, which differs in many 
ways from the scenery of Sacsamarca and Hualla. The valley of the 
Apurímac River forms part of the larger region of the Valley of 
the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers, most commonly known 
by its acronym VRAEM. Next to being home to the few active 
remnants of the Shining Path, the region is the country’s and one 
of the world’s biggest providers of coca leaves, cocaine paste and 
cocaine. Depicted mostly in Peruvian and international media as a 
4  Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 756.
5  Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 763.
6  My translation of original citation: “[…] en ningún otro actor de la Guerra la línea 
divisoria entre perpetrador y víctima, entre héroe y villano es tan delgada y tan porosa como en 
los comités de autodefensa. Pacificadores para unos, asesinos para otros, son inquietud para todos 
[…].” CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 74.
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violent no-go area ruled by narcos and ‘terrorists’, it is probably Peru’s 
most contested region. Because of the ongoing struggle against 
‘narcoterrorism’, the VRAEM is declared in state of emergency and 
is the most militarized area of the country.7 
Secondly, I will give an historical overview of how the organization 
of civil self-defense committees in the VRAEM came about during 
the civil war. While the CADs originally emerged from the initiative 
of the local population and their opposition against the violent 
incursions of both the military and the Shining Path, the military 
began actively facilitating and, in some cases, even imposing their 
organization. This resulted in a complex alliance between the 
CADs and the state forces. Furthermore, I will highlight how the 
war developed parallel to the rise of an illicit economy based on 
the cultivation of coca leaves for the production of cocaine paste 
and cocaine, bringing about a pragmatic alliance between the CADs 
– who made and make a living as coca farmers (cocaleros) – on the 
one hand and drug traffickers (narcotraficantes) on the other. I will 
conclude the first part by briefly touching upon the role of the CADs 
in local order and security in the VRAEM today.  
Subsequently, the chapter turns to the diffusion of transitional justice 
by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ with regards to the (post-)conflict 
position of the CADs in the VRAEM. More specifically, I analyze the 
respective position of the TRC and the treatment of the CADs in the 
reparation program (PIR). The process of diffusion of transitional 
justice in the VRAEM differs fundamentally from what we have 
seen in the case studies on Sacsamarca and Hualla. I identify at least 
7  The VRAEM is in the first place a geographical area delineating an emergency 
zone for military intervention, which means it is not one of the 24 administrative 
departments of Peru. Formerly, the denomination VRAE was used but since the 
supreme decree N°074-2012-PCM of 2012 the river Mantaro was included. The 
territory of the VRAEM counts with 66 districts in ten provinces, covering parts 
of the administrative departments of Junín, Cusco, Huancavelica, Apurímac and 
Ayacucho. See also: Christoph Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect 
of Illicit Economies in the Margins of the State” (doctoral dissertation, Philipps-
Universität Marburg, 2017), 182.
369
VI Hidden Heroes
two reasons why this is the case. Firstly, when the TRC started its 
mandate in 2001, the valley of the Apurímac river was still far less 
accessible than it is today because of lack of infrastructure - transport 
was still largely over water- and because of the insecurity caused by 
persisting activities of the Shining Path. This inaccessibility is one of 
the plausible explanations for the rather limited amount of fieldwork 
conducted by the TRC in the VRAEM8 and the remarkable absence 
of (international) human rights NGOs in the region until today, 
especially in comparison with the highlands of Ayacucho. The second 
reason – and the most important one in light of this study - has to do 
with the nexus between human rights, trauma and victimhood that 
underlies transitional justice. Because transitional justice tends to 
describe agency in (post-)conflict in exclusive categories of victims 
and perpetrators, civilian participation in war – whether it takes 
the shape of collaboration, resistance or self-defense - is obfuscated 
and lacks conceptualization. The agency of the CADs corresponds 
to this blind spot in transitional justice. The CADs were definitely 
an important concern for the TRC because of their bad reputation 
and involvement in human rights violations. However, the real 
complexity of their agency and their (post-)conflict identity is left 
untold in the final report and unaddressed in its recommendations 
and follow-up mechanisms such as the reparation program. In 
other words, the CADs of the VRAEM resulted to be a ‘difficult’ 
actor in a ‘difficult’ region. Consequently, transitional justice with 
its underlying ideas on memory, victimhood and time was not as 
actively diffused in the VRAEM as in the highlands of Ayacucho.    
8  The in-depth study of the TRC on the CADs (this means all the CADs, not 
only those in the valley of the Apurímac river) mentions that its findings were 
based on 40 interviews and “some” focus groups with commanders and members 
of the CADs. In July 2002, the TRC organized a two-day workshop in the city 
of Huanta on the topic of the CADs, in which eight commanders of the valley of 
the Apurímac river participated. During my own fieldwork, research participants 
mostly answered negatively to the question whether they had given their testimony 
to the TRC. CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 2002, 8, SCO34509, Centro de 
Información para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos.
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Transitional justice’s underlying ideas on memory, victimhood and 
time are appropriated, reaffirmed and contested in several ways by the 
CADs in the VRAEM.  
Firstly, and in response to the abovementioned blind spot of civil 
participation that characterizes the way transitional justice describes 
the agency of survivors, a look beyond the bad reputation of the 
CADs of the valley of the Apurímac river reveals an image that 
goes beyond that of peasants caught between two fires turning into 
“zombies” or “Andean Rambo’s”.9 As Mario Fumerton has pointed 
out, the role of militias such as the Peruvian self-defense committees 
as providers of local governance and social order is under investigated due 
to the one-sided focus on their destructive nature.10 Jemima García-
Godos equally highlights the importance of the CADs as “the 
governing bodies of peasant communities in the context of war.”11 
According to Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, “one of the least 
explored aspects of militias is their role in setting-up local forms of 
governance that depart from existing state structures and can operate 
with remarkable autonomy.”12 Indeed, the collaboration between 
the CADs and the state forces and the coercion that was in many 
cases exercised by the latter over the former should not obscure the 
peasants’ own initiative in organizing the self-defense committees. 
As Ponciano Del Pino stated when describing the Shining Path’s 
initial mistaken assessment of the self-defense committees: 
Probably the Shining Path never imagined a minimally 
9  Carlos Iván Degregori, “Sendas Peligrosas. La Guerra Del Comandante 
Huayhuaco,” in Jamás Tan Cerca Arremetió Lo Lejos: Sendero Luminoso y La Violenica 
Politica, IEP (Lima, 2015), 127.
10  Mario Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime 
Social Order in Peru’s Civil War,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean 
Studies 105 (2018): 63.
11  Jemima García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission 
and the Challenge of Historical Interpretation,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 2, no. 1 (2008): 69.
12  Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, “Militias in Civil Wars,” 758.
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autonomous response against them by the civilian population; 
even less that the most forceful answer would come from the 
peasantry which they saw as amorphous, incapable of political 
initiative. [… ]  I argue that there are many places where the 
civil defense committees arise by peasant initiative, others 
where the imposition plays an important and even brutal role; 
but in all those [self-defense committees] that are operative, 
there is some disposal of the peasants. The collaboration with 
the army, even when receiving orders from them, does not 
nullify that political decision.13
Carlos Iván Degregori similarly points to the “understanding of 
the peasantry as an actor incapable of initiative” as a blind spot of 
Abimael Guzmán’s pensamiento Gonzalo.14 Moreover, Del Pino adds 
that many politicians and intellectuals made the same mistake of 
merely seeing a “passive peasantry caught between two fires” which 
was forced by the army to organize in self-defense committees.15 
Besides the blind spot of civilian participation in transitional justice, 
the general underestimation of the agency of peasant communities 
in Peru highlighted by Degregori and Del Pino can be considered 
13  My translation of original citation: “Probablemente SL nunca imaginó una respuesta 
mínimamente autónoma de la población civil en su contra; menos aún que la respuesta más 
contundente provendría del campesinado al cual veían amorfo, incapaz de iniciativa política. [… ] 
Postulamos que hay muchos lugares donde los CDC surgen por iniciativa campesina, otros donde 
la imposición juega un papel importante y hasta brutal; pero en todos aquellos que son operativos, 
hay algo de voluntad campesina. La coordinación con el Ejército, incluso recibiendo órdenes de 
él, no le quita valor a esa decisión política.” Ponciano Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y 
de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 
in Las Rondas Campesinas y La Derrota de Sendero Luminoso (Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 1996), 134.
14  My translation of original citation: “su comprensión del campesinado como un actor 
incapaz de iniciativa”. Degregori, Qué Difícil Es Ser Dios El Partido Comunista Del Perú - 
Sendero Luminoso y El Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú: 1980-1999, 226.
15  My translation of original citation: “un campesinado pasivo y atrapado entre dos fuegos” 
Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas 
En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 134.
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as an additional explanation for the lack of conceptualization 
of the agency of the CADs by transitional justice mechanisms 
such as the TRC. While I have argued that the first finds its 
origin in international human rights discourse, the latter can be 
contextualized in a historiographic tradition that, as Cecilia Méndez 
has pointed out, tends to assign a passive role to the Peruvian 
peasantry. 16 My main concern here remains, of course, human rights 
and transitional justice discourse, which is why I will not engage 
in an in-depth analysis of this historiographic tradition, nor of its 
possible underlying assumptions on the inferiority of indigenous 
peasants which have deep historical roots. Nevertheless, the possible 
intersection of transitional justice and human rights discourse 
with existing ideas leading to similar blind spots should not be 
neglected. In this case, both the lack of conceptualization of civilian 
participation in violence that characterizes transitional justice and 
the underestimation of the agency of peasant communities result in 
a failure to shed light on the local processes of governance and social 
order that are both cause and consequence of the organization of 
peasants in self-defense committees during the war. By scrutinizing 
how the CADs “were capable not only of defeating the Shining 
Path, but also of organizing life in the valley in the midst of war”17 
an image of the CADs emerges that is more comprehensive than 
that of predatory warlords or that of a peasantry used by the military 
as cannon fodder, hereby contesting transitional justice’s underlying 
ideas on victimhood and (post-war) agency. 
16  In her review of the historiography of Peruvian Independence, Cecilia Méndez 
points out how “both nationalist and Marxist historians converged in assigning 
peasants a passive role.” While Méndez points out how this trend has shifted since 
the 1980s, its influence should not be underestimated. Cecilia Méndez, The Plebeian 
Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820–1850 (Duke 
University Press, 2005), 8.
17  My translation of original citation: “fueron capaces no solo de derrotar a SL [Sendero 
Luminoso], sino de ordenar la vida dentro del valle en plena guerra.” Del Pino, “Tiempos 
de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río 
Apurímac,” 175.
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Secondly, the kind of memory of the civil war fostered by the CADs 
is in the first place a heroic memory that stresses the decisive role of 
the CADs in the so-called ‘pacification’ of the VRAEM. While the 
memory duty in transitional justice focuses on traumatic memories 
of human rights violations, the CADs foster a heroic memory of 
victory over the Shining Path. With this narrative, they strive for 
the recognition of their contribution to the pacification rather than 
the recognition of their victimhood based on suffering. In other 
words: they claim to be heroes rather than victims. Also, this 
kind of narrative – which glorifies rather than condemns certain 
aspects of the war - does not fit transitional justice’s ‘never again’ 
idea. Therefore, the heroic memory of the CADs contests the 
way in which transitional justice describes the agency of survivors 
(victims vs. heroes) as well as several of the underlying assumptions 
(recognition and prevention) of transitional justice’s memory duty. 
Thirdly, when scrutinizing the (post-)conflict temporality of the 
VRAEM, it becomes clear that for the CADs in the VRAEM, the 
ruptures between past, present and future proposed by transitional 
justice are not that self-evident. When the TRC started its mandate 
in 2001, the CADs clearly did not perceive the struggle with the 
Shining Path as over and they expressed that they were not ready 
at all to disarm. Today, while the CADs naturally distinguish the 
extreme violence of the civil war from the present, there is still a 
strong sense of continuation of conflict in which the violence of 
the past is entangled with, rather than separated from, the ongoing 
struggle against ‘narcoterrorism’. The sustained declaration of the 
VRAEM as an emergency zone and the continuous presence of 
the state forces facilitate this sense of a ‘contemporary past’ in the 
VRAEM, which on its turn is perceived as an obstacle for future 
development of the region. 
Lastly, this chapter reflects upon notions of citizenship and recognition 
in relation to the (post-)conflict agency of the CADs, as these are 
two essential components of transitional justice’s aims of coming to 
terms with the past. As many scholars have concluded in their analysis 
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of national and international wars and conflicts around the globe, 
“soldiering is tied with concepts of citizenship.”18 As both Fumerton 
and García-Godos have argued for the Peruvian self-defense 
committees, and as my research confirms, their militia service was 
a way of claiming citizenship status within the nation-state.19 The 
local governance structure of the CADs is therefore, despite its high 
degree of autonomy, inevitably strongly entangled with the national 
level of the state. I argue that, for the CADs, building this strong 
governance structure was not only a way of organizing, but also 
of legitimizing self-defense and, therefore, a means to claim their 
position within the Peruvian nation. I hereby follow García-Godos’ 
interpretation of Tilly’s (1996) conceptualization of the notion of 
citizenship, which defines citizenship as “the practices in which actors 
engage by virtue of their relationship to the state.”20 This relational 
approach to citizenship “as a tie between people and (agents of the) 
state” helps to study citizenship not as something that is merely 
granted by the state in a top-down manner, but rather as something 
that is claimed and negotiated bottom-up, especially in contexts of 
high socio-economic inequality.21 It allows to study the concept as 
a range varying “from thin to thick citizenship, that is, from a few 
to many transactions, thus allowing multiple categories and forms 
of citizenship within the same state.”22 Moreover, as García-Godos 
argues, the context of the civil war created a space for negotiation 
between the state and its rural populations as the state eventually 
18  Kimberly Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2009): 16.
19  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 79; García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian 
Truth Commission and the Challenge of Historical Interpretation,” 70.
20  Jemima García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-
Study of the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru” 
(University of Oslo, 2005), 36.
21  García-Godos, 38.
22  García-Godos, 36.
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realized that it needed its support to win the war. Consequently, “the 
armed conflict brought peasants and state together in an alliance 
that exchanged support for recognition.”23 This brings us to the link 
between citizenship and recognition. Of course, the CAD’s claimed 
position within the Peruvian nation could or can only fully come 
into being if recognized as such within the larger unity of the nation-
state. A distinction can be made here between the recognition of 
the CADs as a legitimate actor during the war on the one hand, and 
the (post-)conflict recognition of their contribution to the defeat of 
the Shining Path on the other, the latter of which is not only the 
essence of the heroic memory fostered by the CADs, but also of 
their political agency as citizens. Subsequently, the question can be 
asked how conceptions of citizenship and recognition in the case of 
the CADs relate to the aim of reconciling the ‘multiple Peru’s’ that 
stands center-stage in the country’s transitional justice project. 
The chapter concludes by reflecting upon the (methodological) 
implications of my findings for the study of transitional justice 
and (post-)conflict dynamics in general. Most importantly, I will 
argue that there is an urgent need to conceptualize a multi-layered 
survivor identity which embraces the fact that victimhood, violation, 
resistance and heroism are no mutually exclusive features.
Methodology and sources
As Christoph Heuser has pointed out, “the VRAEM is a vast 
territory with great diversity” which is all too often “taken as a 
monolithic block”.24 It is therefore important to keep in mind that, 
while throughout this chapter I will sometimes refer to the VRAEM 
region as a whole when describing the general and contemporary 
context, the case study focuses on the self-defense committees 
of the valley of the Apurímac River. More specifically, Gabriela 
23  García-Godos, 40.
24  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 182.
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Zamora and I conducted forty interviews in twenty small villages 
(centros poblados) in the districts of Samugari and Santa Rosa (province 
of La Mar, department of Ayacucho), Kimbiri and Pichari (province 
of La Convención, department of Cusco), Llochegua (province of 
Huanta, department of Ayacucho) and Rio Tambo (province of 
Satipo, department of Junín25).
Of the forty interviewees, 32 are ex-CAD members - meaning that 
they participated in one way or another in self-defense - of whom 
thirteen are ex-commanders. Other interviewees include relatives 
of ex-CADs, actual CAD members and local authorities. Twelve of 
the interviewees are women. The underrepresentation of women 
is due to the fact that most of the ex-commanders, who were the 
main target group for interviews, were men. Women did, however, 
actively participate in the daily activities of self-defense and in some 
cases took up leading roles. We spoke to a woman in the district 
of Santa Rosa, for example, whose mother was a prominent figure 
in the local self-defense committee and committed suicide after 
persistent intimidation by the Shining Path.26 Another research 
participant who participated from a very young age in self-defense 
recounted how his mother was in charge of the comando de mujeres27 in 
her village, whose task mainly was to provide food for the patrols.28 
A study focusing on female perspectives on self-defense would 
undoubtedly provide interesting complementary insights. More than 
in the highlands, Spanish by now is the dominant language in the 
VRAEM which is why only three of the interviews were conducted 
in Quechua and the remaining in Spanish. Gabriela and I conducted 
the majority of interviews together, except for two conversations 
25  In the district of Rio Tambo, I only conducted fieldwork in the most Southern 
part, which officially belongs to Satipo, Junín, but mostly counts itself as part of 
Pichari, Cusco. 
26  Interview with Flora, daughter of ex-CAD commander, district of Santa Rosa, 
11.07.2018.
27  Women command
28  Interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
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involving close relatives of hers which I conducted alone. Six 
interviewees did not give permission to record the conversation, in 
that case notes were taken during the interview. The fact that the 
fieldwork was multi-sited reflects the nature of the object of study: 
the CADs were organized in a network that covered the entire valley 
and we followed the structure of the organization for our fieldwork. 
Potential interviewees were selected both through our own previous 
knowledge of the subject, which made it possible to identify key 
informants, and through snowball sampling. Participant observation 
was carried out during the commemoration ceremony of the 34th 
anniversary of the foundation of the self-defense committees of the 
valley in the village of Pichiwillca, during several town meetings and 
patron saint celebrations and during a training of the actual CAD 
by the military in the district of Samugari. The commemoration 
ceremony was an excellent moment to network and find possible 
research participants, as ex-members of the self-defense committees 
of the entire valley come to Pichiwillca to participate in the activities. 
Permission to carry out participant observation during the ceremony 
was given by the actual commander of the self-defense committee of 
Pichiwillca. Fieldnotes and an extensive fieldwork diary helped me 
to process the information gathered through observation. In order 
to guarantee the privacy of the research participants, I will mostly 
refer to the districts but not to the specific villages or towns where 
the fieldwork was conducted, unless in cases where the location 
is obvious such as for example in case of the commemoration in 
Pichiwillca. The fieldwork was carried out during three separate 
fieldtrips. Two exploratory fieldtrips of a week were carried out in 
2015 and 2017. Subsequently, the majority of the interviews were 
conducted during one month of fieldwork in 2018, which first 
focused on the Southern part of the valley (the districts of Samugari, 
Santa Rosa and Kimbiri) and then on the Northern part (the districts 
of Pichari and Llochegua). 
My close collaboration with Gabriela Zamora was decisive for turning 
towards the VRAEM. Despite the negative advice of many others, 
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Gabriela encouraged me to explore a part of Ayacucho which had 
always seemed inaccessible. Her parents Victor Zamora and Flora 
Castellares received me in their home in Malvinas as if I were their 
sixth daughter. The family’s help and knowledge were crucial for 
making this field research possible. The lengthy conversations with 
don Victor and mama Flora, whose life stories alone could fill another 
book, were essential for my understanding of the region’s past and 
present. During our time in the field, their home in Malvinas was 
our main operating base from where we traveled to other places 
during the daytime. We did, however, sometimes spend the night 
in other places when it was too late to get home before nightfall. 
During the fieldwork in the Northern part of the valley we also 
stayed several times in the town of Pichari. As we did not have our 
own car or motorbike, we relied on riding along on the loading ramp 
of one of the many Toyota Hilux trucks for traveling long distances, 
mototaxis and walking for short distances and boats to cross the river. 
Quite some information and insights were gained from the many 
hours spent on the road and the conversations with fellow travelers. 
Additionally, my own empirical material was triangulated with data 
from the TRC and the few academic studies involving in-depth 
field research with the self-defense committees in the valley of the 
Apurímac river conducted by Ponciano Del Pino, Mario Fumerton 
and Steven Zech.29 Furthermore, Christoph Heuser’s dissertation 
on the VRAEM’s illicit economy and Jemima García-Godos’ 
research on peasant self-defense in the highland district of Tambo, 
Ayacucho, were important sources of information and inspiration 
for understanding, respectively, the general context of the VRAEM 
and the phenomenon of self-defense during the civil war.30
29  Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas 
En El Valle Del Río Apurímac”; Mario Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant 
Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000 (Amsterdam: Thela 
Publishers, 2002); Steven T. Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian Resistance during 
Internal Armed Conflict in Peru” (University of Washington, 2016).
30  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
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While conducting fieldwork in an emergency zone might seem 
challenging, I did not experience remarkable feelings or real 
situations of insecurity during my time in the field. Nevertheless, 
foreigners do not go unnoticed in the VRAEM. While in most 
villages in the highland provinces of Huancasancos and Victor 
Fajardo the population is used to receiving NGO or state personnel 
coming from Lima or abroad, the foreigners that come to the 
VRAEM are mostly narcotraficantes. In this respect, I feel that being 
a woman for once was an advantage for my security. As a female 
and ‘innocent’ outsider, I would at the very most be mistaken for 
a Jehovah’s Witness trying to convert the local population, while 
my German white male colleague Christophe with whom I spent 
some time in the VRAEM would mostly be suspected of being a 
North-American drug trafficker. Or, even worse, whispers behind 
his back would accuse him of being the pishtaco, a mythical violent 
figure in Andean tales, who is mostly described as a white male that 
murders and rapes locals in a particularly cruel way.31 As Gabriela 
and I presented ourselves as researchers during the commemoration 
ceremony in Pichiwillca, many of the people who we approached for 
interviews already knew about our presence in the valley. The fact 
that we were investigating the history of the self-defense committees 
was overall received positively. The fact that Gabriela’s family is well-
known, especially in the Southern part of the valley, also made it 
easier to gain access. Nevertheless, I remained alert for the possible 
bias that the family connection entailed. Sometimes don Victor would 
warn us that we should not try to talk to certain people, herewith 
referring to existing conflicts between families and individuals. The 
self-defense committees also ‘had our back’ which of course was an 
Margins of the State”; García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A 
Case-Study of the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, 
Peru”; García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and 
the Challenge of Historical Interpretation.”
31  On the notion of the pishtaco, see: Mary Weismantel, Cholas and Pishtacos: Stories of 
Race and Sex in the Andes (University of Chicago Press, 2001).
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asset for our (feeling of) security. In some places, they actively kept 
us up to date about the security situation by phone or whatsapp. On 
one occasion, we were actively warned no to go somewhere because 
of rumors about the presence of the Quispe Palomino clan, one of the 
remnants of the Shining Path.
Another important source of information for this case study were 
the documents kept in the archive of the central headquarter of 
the self-defense committees in Pichiwillca. Negotiating access to 
the documents was not self-evident, but permission was eventually 
granted by the self-defense committee of Pichiwillca to consult the 
archive for the purpose of my study.32 While the archive is most 
likely incomplete - several documents containing incriminating 
information could have been intentionally destroyed - and in a bad 
state of conservation due to the climatological and infrastructural 
conditions in which it has been kept, it still contains a wealth of 
information of which I can only include a small fraction in this book. 
In total, I consulted around 600 documents. The archive includes 
correspondence from the base and zonal committees (cfr. infra) 
to the headquarters of the self-defense committees in Monterrico 
or Pichiwillca33, drafts and originals from communication and 
orders send out from the headquarter to the base committees, 
communication between the headquarter of the self-defense 
committees and the military, letters written by the president of 
32  One of the promises that Gabriela and I made during the negotiation was 
that we would do an effort to improve the conditions of conservation, which 
we did by storing the majority of documents in plastic boxes that we brought. 
However, more specialized conservation techniques should be applied to properly 
store the documents, for example by centralizing them in the archive of peasant 
communities in Huamanga. Nevertheless, this should of course be discussed with 
the self-defense committee and the involved communities. 
33  In the early years of the war, the regional headquarter was established in the 
town of Monterrico. In 1984-1985, the central leadership was taken over by the 
self-defense committee of Pichiwillca. At least part of the archive was moved 
from Monterrico to Pichiwillca as well, because the current archive in Pichiwillca 
includes a lot of documents that are addressed to the headquarter in Monterrico. 
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the headquarter of the self-defense committees addressed to the 
Peruvian congress, to president Fujimori, to national media, etc. 
Interestingly enough, all documents are written in Spanish. The 
documents are either handwritten or written with a typewriter 
and contain a lot of spelling mistakes and linguistic interferences 
with Quechua.34 The English translation of the citations leans as 
close as possible to the Spanish original. However, punctuation was 
sometimes added to enhance the readability of the text. Similar as 
in the case of the interview citations, the Spanish original (without 
extra punctuation) is included in the footnote. I will refer to the 
documents in the footnotes by their title, subject, or number; to the 
sender, which mostly is one of the base committees or the headquarter 
in Pichiwillca and to the date - always if any is mentioned.35  For 
privacy reasons, I will again avoid mentioning any names of persons. 
Last but not least, studying an archive which was produced during 
wartime by an actor as ambiguous as the self-defense committees 
is challenging in many respects. Some documents contain a 
straightforward license to kill or have the purpose of justifying 
horrific acts of violence, while others foremost reflect the desperation 
of a population left to its fate by the rest of the nation. 
That being said, nothing in this chapter, whether based on fieldwork 
or archival sources, should be read as a justification of the human 
rights violations committed by the CADs rather than as an effort to 
unravel the agency and governance of a ‘difficult’ actor in a ‘difficult’ 
region.
34  For example, one very common linguistic interference between Quecha and 
Spanish is using ‘i’ for ‘e’. Incorrect spelling will be referred to in the Spanish 
original of the citations with [sic].
35  Date annotations, both in case of the archival sources as in the case of interviews, 
follow the structure dd.mm.yyyy.  
Town of Pichari (2018)
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6.1 The self-defense committees in the VRAEM
‘No-man’s land’: History and geography of the VRAEM
The Apurímac river runs as a leitmotif through the histories of the 
valley, which until today remains rather difficult to access because 
of its geography and (perceived) insecurity. Its fast-flowing water 
roars as an untamable monster during the rainy season and gradually 
transforms into a rough cleavage made up of sandbanks when the 
dry time of the year sets in. During the civil war, the belligerent 
parties turned the river into a mass grave. As one research 
participant claims, the bodies of the desaparecidos that came ashore 
served as prey for the condors, who found their way into the valley 
all the way from their regular environment in Arequipa.36 ‘The God 
who speaks’, as is the significance of the river’s name in Quechua, 
splits the valley in a left and right bank, respectively belonging to 
the departments of Ayacucho and Cusco. The main entry point of 
the valley from the side of Ayacucho is the town of San Francisco37. 
The curvy road connecting Huamanga to San Francisco, which was 
constructed in 1964, runs over high mountain tops and enters the 
cloud forest alongside deep abysses. In the past few years, many 
parts of the road have been improved and asphalted, reducing 
travel time from the former ten hours to currently five hours in a 
four-wheel drive truck (if everything goes well). During the rainy 
season, however, landslides frequently block the road. When I first 
visited the VRAEM in 2015, we got stuck in such a landslide on our 
journey back to Huamanga and had to wait for a day on the side of 
the road before the passage was cleared. (Returning is mostly not 
36  Fieldnotes, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018. 
37  Locals jokingly say that one can find the whole world in the VRAEM, because 
many towns and villages in the valley are named after other places in the world, e.g. 
San Francisco, Luisiana, Palestina and Malvinas. As San Francisco in California 
has the famous Golden Gate bridge, San Francisco of the VRAEM has a big bridge 
that connects the town to Kimbiri which was inaugurated in 1971. 
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an option in these situations, because hundreds of cars queue up 
on both sides.) As this road is an important axis for transportation 
of drugs, cars are regularly searched at the military checkpoint in 
Machente right before entering San Francisco, or by the police 
before entering Huamanga. Because of the bad infrastructure and 
relatively high risk, traveling between Huamanga and San Francisco 
is rather expensive compared to Peruvian standards: the journey 
in the cabin of a pick-up truck costs 60 to 70 soles (around €17). 
The majority of the roads connecting the central districts on both 
the left and right bank of the Apurímac river were constructed in 
2002. Before the existence of this road, transportation of people and 
goods throughout the valley all happened over water in small boats 
or in some cases by plane.38 Today, most of the transport happens 
over land with private pick-up trucks - almost exclusively Toyota 
Hilux - that cross the river by ferry.
In the 17th century, when Jesuits and Franciscans made their way 
into the cloud forest, eager to Christianize the native Asháninka 
population who had lived there for centuries, the landscape of 
the valley must have been pristine. It largely remained as such 
until the beginning of the 20th century, when colonos39 from the 
Northern highlands of Ayacucho entered the “no-man’s land”40 
38  In the 1950s, airstrips were constructed on the haciendas of Teresita and Luisiana. 
At the height of the development of the coca economy (1985-1995), the airstrip of 
Palmapampa was highly frequented by Colombian narco-flights for transportation 
of cocaine paste. Mario Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion 
and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000 (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 2002), 
109; Ponciano Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos 
y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” in Las Rondas Campesinas y La Derrota 
de Sendero Luminoso (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1996), 170; Heuser, “Contested 
State Fromation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the Margins of the State,” 200.
39  Settlers
40  One of the research participants, whose family was among the first generation of 
colonos, referred to the valley as “tierra de nadie” (“no-man’s land”) when recounting 
the colonization process. Fieldnotes, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018. 
Apurímac River in the district of Kimbiri (2017)
Landslide on the road between Huamanga and San Francisco (2015)
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of the valley in search for better lands and lives.41 Especially from 
the 1950s onwards, it became home to farmers who explored the 
valley’s fertility to grow cocoa, coca, coffee, peanuts and barbasco42. 
In this early stage of colonization, a handful of farmers succeeded 
in claiming big pieces of lands and establishing haciendas in several 
places. Peones43 coming from the highlands were exploited on these 
haciendas while other small-scale farmers had to struggle to survive. 
These inequalities between wealthy landowners and merchants on 
the one hand, and peasant smallholders and peones on the other, led 
to class tensions that would later play into the hands of the Shining 
Path.44 Between 1968 and 1975, the agricultural reforms of president 
Velasco Alvarado obliged the redistribution of the land of the 
hacendados45, which gave rise to minifundias46 and small cooperatives 
of farmers.47 In 1976, the Federación Campesina del Valle del Río 
Apurímac (FECVRA)48 was founded as an umbrella of around 100 
small cooperatives. In absence of the state, the FECVRA became 
an important entity for organizing public services such as education 
and health care.49 
41  For a detailed overview of the colonization process, see: Del Pino, “Tiempos 
de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río 
Apurímac,” 123–28.
42  Barbasco is a plant containing strong chemical compounds that was formerly used 
as an insecticide. Today, barbasco is not used anymore because plagues have become 
more resistant due to the use of chemical insecticides distributed by multinational 
companies such as Bayer. 
43  Seasonal wage workers
44  Interview with José Pablo, ex-CAD commander, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
45  Hacienda owners
46  Small farm, the opposite of a hacienda
47  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 191–94. By now, most of the land in the VRAEM is shredded 
in small parcels because peones bought pieces of land from the smallholders, and 
because of the fact that inheritances are mostly divided under a large amount of 
children in one family. This makes for small-scale agriculture with low profits. 
48  Peasant Federation of the Valley of the Apurímac River
49  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
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As the colonos almost exclusively came from the Northern highlands 
of Ayacucho and maintained strong ties with their communities 
of origin, they imported the Andes culture into the subtropical 
valley. As a response to the invading settlers, the native Asháninka 
population largely displaced itself downstream to the valley of the 
river Ene. Until today, however, several Asháninka communities 
in the valley of the Apurímac river coexist with the colonos from 
the highlands, although their territory was in many cases fiercely 
reduced by the settlers.50 According to the TRC, the total population 
of the valley was around 100.000 by 1980, excluding the floating 
population of peones.51 As soon as the Shining Path initiated the war 
in the highlands of Ayacucho in 1980, more peasants from that area 
decided to leave their hometowns to seek refuge in the VRAEM. 
The valley was then still considered a safe zone.52 It would not take 
long, however, before the Shining Path would also make its way into 
the jungle. 
The civil war in the valley of the Apurímac river53
Similar to the process that gave rise to the emergence of the Shining 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 110.
50  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 74.
51  The numbers are, however, quite unclear. Ponciano Del Pino speaks of a 
population of 40.000 in 1981 and 111.000 in 1994. Nevertheless, both the TRC and 
Del Pino base themselves on numbers of the INEI. CVR, 75; Del Pino, “Tiempos 
de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río 
Apurímac,” 122.
52  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 107.
53  I will limit myself here to a summarized account of the civil war in the Apurímac 
valley. For a more detailed account, see: Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: 
Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac”; Fumerton, 
From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-
2000, 110–52; Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian Resistance during Internal 
Armed Conflict in Peru,” 207–81; CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 74–86.
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Path in the highlands of Ayacucho, the dissemination of communist 
ideology via popular schools also played a key-role in the valley of 
the Apurímac river. In 1978, in the Southern highland district of 
Chungui, primary and secondary schools were founded by teachers 
who were trained at the UNSCH and formed part of the Shining 
Path.54 Between 1980 and 1982, the Shining Path appeared several 
times in the valley, mostly intimidating or killing existing authorities. 
The FECVRA, which from the beginning refused to collaborate 
with the Shining Path’s strategy of closing off all markets in order 
to starve the cities, became one of the Shining Path’s first targets in 
the valley.55 In 1982, militants set fire to a truck carrying agricultural 
products of the peasants associates of the FECVRA and blew up a 
bridge in Machente in order to sabotage export.56
The violent escalation of the war fully took off in 1983. As an answer 
to the increasingly violent attacks of the Shining Path, the marine 
forces of the Peruvian army established bases throughout the 
valley.57 The severe repression by the state forces against civilians in 
some cases caused an opposite effect by generating more sympathy 
from the local population toward the Shining Path.58 The FECVRA, 
attacked by the Shining Path for not wanting to collaborate and by 
the military on the suspicion of doing so, was dissolved in 1983.59 
In order to defend itself against the military, the Shining Path 
54  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 77.
55  According to the Shining Path, commercial crops destined for sale at markets, 
such as coffee, cacao and barbasco, only enriched the wealthy merchants. Therefore, 
the Shining Path wanted the peasants to produce crops for subsistence only. 
Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, 
Peru, 1980-2000, 111.
56  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 78.
57  In 1985, the marine forces were replaced by the regular army. CVR, 84.
58  CVR, 79.
59  The direct cause for the dissolution was the enforced disappearance of 
the FECVRA’s president Julio Orozco Huamaní in August 1983, most likely 
perpetrated by the marine forces. Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-
Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 110.
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centralized its support bases in several camps throughout the valley 
where communist ideology was preached and practiced. Significant 
parts of the local population were forcedly recruited and had to 
live in these camps against their will, often in very poor livelihood 
conditions.60 One of the research participants in the district of 
Pichari was recruited by the Shining Path together with his parents 
and brothers when he was six years old and lived with the Shining 
Path for two years:
eva: But your parents were not with la política [the Shining 
Path]? caMilo: Indeed, they were not, but you were obliged 
in it. You were taken as a recruit, whether you want it or not, 
you’re there, and from then on, there is no school, there is 
nothing anymore. [...] Likewise, the military were the other 
abusivos [brutes], that’s why I am on my guard because they 
were the same, the same as the terrucos [terrorists], they were 
the same, they did not spare [anyone], they found [a suspect] 
and took [him or her] out, it  [the violence] was from the both 
[sides], pues.61
The brutal response of the military to the Shining Path, which 
basically consisted of indiscriminately killing peasants, was far from 
effective. Instead of defeating the Shining Path, they drove the 
ejército guerrillero popular further into the forest on the right bank of 
the Apurímac river. This area belongs to the Cusco department, and 
was therefore not part of the emergency zone designated for military 
intervention. Here, the Shining Path could thus operate more freely, 
60  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 80.
61  My translation of original citation: “Pero tus papás igual no estaban con la política?” - “ 
Claro, no estaban, pero estabas obligado pues dentro de ello. Ahí estás tomado recluta, quieras o 
no quieras estás ahí, para ahí ya no hay escuela, ya no hay nada ya [...] Igualito los militares eran 
otros abusivos, por eso justo pongo mi guardia porque eran iguales, igual que terrucos, igualitos 
eran, no perdonaban, encontraban y sacaban, de los dos era pues.” Interview with Camilo, 
ex-recruit of the Shining Path, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018.
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regain forces and prepare for attacks all over the valley.62 
In the midst of this crossfire between the marine forces and the 
Shining Path, a third actor arose that turned out to be decisive for 
the development of the war in the valley: the civilian self-defense 
committees. Despite the initial sympathy and support for the 
revolutionary ideas of the Shining Path, arbitrary and excessive 
violence –including forced recruitments (of children), torture, 
assassinations and restricted access to land and markets - generated 
deep feelings of resentment in the population over time. In addition, 
the peasant population was chased rather than protected by the 
disproportionately violent repression of the state forces.63 An ex-
commander in Pichari describes the situation of mutual mistrust 
between the population and the armed forces as follows: 
That time, it was difficult to live with the armed forces, because 
that time it was all confusion, because it was not known if you 
were on that side or not, or if your friend was on that side, 
or your woman was on that side, sometimes everyone was 
involved and you could not trust anyone.64
The escalation of the war forced many peasants to leave their homes 
in the valley behind to build their lives elsewhere. However, as 
mentioned, a significant part of the population already consisted of 
refugees from the highlands. Persecuted by the war, the peasants 
who stayed in the valley decided to organize themselves against the 
violence perpetrated by both the state forces and the Shining Path. 
62  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 112.
63  Fumerton, 114.
64  My translation of original citation: “Ese tiempo fue difícil convivir con las fuerzas 
armadas, porque ese tiempo todo era confusión, porque no se sabía si tú estabas en ese bando o no, 
o si el amigo estaba en ese bando, o la mujer estaba en ese bando, a veces todos estaban metidos y 
no podías confiar en nadie.” Interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of 
Pichari, 08.07.2018.
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The organization of peasant self-defense committees as it came 
about in the valley of the Apurímac river shared characteristics with 
a tradition that already existed in other parts of the country before 
the civil war. In the 1970s, peasants organized themselves in so-
called rondas campesinas65 in the Northern Andes region of Cajamarca 
to protect their communities from cattle rustling and other common 
crimes in a region where the presence of the state was poor or even 
non-existent.66  The first self-defense committees in the context of 
the civil war in the VRAEM, the so-called montoneros, organized 
themselves in the Southern part of the valley of the Apurímac 
river, in the highland districts of Chungui and Anco.67 In 1984, 
these montoneros held a march downstream from Chungui to San 
Francisco and Kimbiri in order to encourage the peasants of the 
entire valley to organize themselves in self-defense committees. The 
idea quickly gained ground as the population was tired of being 
caught between the incursions of the Shining Path and the military. 
The previous organizational experience of the FECVRA helped 
the peasants to bring about an efficient model of self-defense which 
spread through the valley like wildfire.68 Every new-founded comité 
65  Peasant rounds
66  For a detailed account of the phenomenon of the rondas campesinas in the 
Northern Peruvian Andes, see: Orin Starn, Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); When the self-defense committees 
in the VRAEM arose, there was confusion between them and the phenomenon 
of the rondas campesinas from the North. The rondas campesinas, however, distanced 
themselves from the self-defense committees in the VRAEM and their use of 
violence. In a document issued by the NGO SER in 1986, a comparison is made 
between the rondas campesinas and the self-defense committees which mainly depicts 
the rondas as a peaceful organization and the self-defense committees as a violent 
militia. José Burneo Labrín and Marianne Eyde, “Ronda Campesina y Defensa 
Civil : Cuadro Comparativo” (SER, 1986), Centro de Información para la Memoria 
Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos.
67  Interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018, 
Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, 
Peru, 1980-2000, 115.
68  Del Pino also points to the rise of evangelical churches and religious narratives 
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de base69 corresponded to a geographical ‘sector’ and was steered by 
a board of directors consisting mostly of a president, vice-president, 
secretary of acts, treasurer, operations commander and intelligence 
officer.70 Per family, at least one healthy man or woman between 
the age of more or less 15 and 70 was obliged to participate in the 
self-defense committee.71 When the self-defense committees left 
the base committee to patrol for several weeks, the proprietarios72 
often bought of their duty by paying their peones to join the patrols 
in their place. Only those youngsters who were studying in high 
school were mostly exempted from participating in the self-defense 
committees.73 One research participant recounted how his mother 
wanted him to attend school rather than join the patrols of the self-
defense committees. When the patrols came after him to recruit him, 
his mother made up excuses, argued with them or hid him. In the 
end, he joined the patrols voluntarily at the age of sixteen, leaving his 
mother in distress.74 Participation in the committee involved duties 
directly related to self-defense such as patrolling. 75 Communal 
work, such as cleaning irrigation canals and repairing roads, was 
also organized and executed by the self-defense committee. While 
both men and women participated, they were assigned different 
as an important factor in the mobilization of the population against the Shining 
Path. For example, the Shining Path was portrayed as the devil or the antichrist, the 
war as the apocalypse. See: Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, 
Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac.”
69  Base committee
70  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 116.
71  Interview with Flora, daughter of ex-CAD commander, district of Santa Rosa, 
11.07.2018. 
72  Peasant who owns land, the opposite of a peón
73  Interview with Juana, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 29.06.2018.
74  Interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
75  García-Godos gives an excellent detailed account of the ‘practices of self-
defense’ applied in the district of Tambo, which are very similar to those in the 
VRAEM. García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study 
of the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 128.
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tasks which were mostly gendered, with women for example 
preparing the food for the patrols. Nevertheless, when the village 
was under attack, man and women alike were expected to take part 
in the community’s defense.76 Disobedience was not tolerated and 
participation in the self-defense committees was enforced through 
fines and corporal punishments such as whipping.77 Moreover, the 
self-defense committees had their own intelligence service and were 
constantly looking for infiltrated members of the Shining Path in the 
community, resulting for example in violent nightly house-to-house 
searches.78 The commanders who made up the board of directors 
were often licenciados who fostered a military attitude.79 The main 
headquarter of the self-defense committees of the valley - the Sede 
Central del Comité de Defensa Civil Valle del Río Apurímac - was established 
in Pichiwillca on the 21st of June of 1984. In the following years, 
the self-defense committees of Pichiwillca, under the leadership of 
Antonio Cardenas, became the driving force behind the proliferation 
of the model of self-defense throughout the entire valley by – often 
violently - forcing peasants in every single locality to organize 
themselves in what they called Comités de Defensa Civil Antisubversiva 
(DECAS)80.81 The organizational structure was highly hierarchical: 
the headquarter in Pichiwillca (the sede or comité central) instructed the 
76  Interview with Diana, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 25.06.2018; 
interview with Nelida, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 30.06.2018; 
Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 70.
77  Interview with Sebastián, ex-CAD member, district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018; 
Fumerton, 70.
78  Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas 
En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 148.
79  Interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander and licenciado, district of Pichari, 
09.07.2018; interview with Sergio, ex-CAD commander and licenciado, district of 
Samugari, 27.06.2018; interview with Franco, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 
24.06.2018.
80  Anti-Subversive Civil Defense Committees
81  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 83.
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sub sectores or comités zonales82 which on their turn instructed the sectores 
or comités de base.83 According to Ponciano Del Pino, the valley of 
the Apurímac river counted 280 self-defense committees by 1991.84 
The historical review written by the central self-defense committee 
of Pichiwillca in 1993 speaks of 393 communities organized in base 
committees and 23 zonal committees.85
For safety reasons, the commanders operated under nicknames such 
as Sombra (Shadow), Bestia (Beast), Huayhuaco (a type of big crow), 
Gato (Cat) or Dragón (Dragon).86 One of the events that marks the 
history of the self-defense committees in the valley is the Shining 
Path’s attack of the headquarter in Pichiwillca on April 13, 1988. In 
a bloody confrontation, the self-defense committee of Pichiwillca, 
assisted by the self-defense committee of Anchihuay and the 
military, succeeded in overthrowing a group of forty armed Shining 
Path members who were accompanied by 400 peasant recruits.87 
Despite the Shining Path’s brutal responses to the peasants’ 
resistance, the self-defense committees were efficient in regaining 
control over the valley. In 1985, the Shining Path issued a statement 
saying that it had lost its initial support bases in the valley and that 
the committees gained ground. Moreover, many Shining Path 
fighters defected to the mesnadas88 or yana umas89, as the self-defense 
82  Zonal committees
83  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 142; Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: 
Ronderos, Evangélicos y Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 153. 
84  Del Pino, 118.
85  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, 
Con motivo de las fiestas de homenaje al 9no aniversario de los comites de auto defensa (DECAS) 
y 7mo aniversario de la central del valle del rio Apurimac y Ene. Breve reseña historica, 6, 1993.
86  Interview with Franco, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018.
87  Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian Resistance during Internal Armed Conflict 
in Peru,” 214.
88  The term mesnadas is in this context best translated as ‘paramilitaries’, which, as 
Ponciano Del Pino has suggested, reveals the fact that the Shining Path considered 
the CADs in the first place as imposed by the military. Del Pino, 134.
89  Yana uma is Quechua for ‘black head’, referring to the black balaclavas worn 
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committees were called by the Shining Path. These defectors or 
arrepentidos90 provided the self-defense committees with essential 
information on the war strategy of the revolutionaries. As an ex-
commander puts it: “we eliminated the Shining Path with their 
own war strategy, with their own people.”91 For example, a letter 
from one of the base committees to the headquarter reports on the 
capture of a Shining Path member and sums up the armament and 
other material that according to the captive can be found in the 
nearby Shining Path camps, among which ten machine guns and 
twenty-five police uniforms, and states that 
[...] according to our opinion, we think that this person should 
serve as a guide, because he knows the places where the above-
mentioned objects are to be found.92
For this reason, Shining Path fighters captured by the self-defense 
committees were not handed over to the military but either 
incorporated into the committees or – if they refused to join – killed, 
as an ex-commander in the district of Pichari explains:
by the self-defense committees. The population, however, also uses yana umas 
sometimes to refer to members of the Shining Path, who also used balaclavas. 
Fieldnotes, district of Kimbiri, 25.06.2018. Others refer to Shining Path members 
as puca umas, red heads. Interview with Diana, ex-CAD member, district of 
Samugari, 25.06.2018.
90  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 134.
91  My translation of original citation: “Nosotros les hemos eliminado a sendero con su propia 
estrategia de guerra, con su propia gente.” Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, 
district of Llochegua, 09.07.2018.
92  My translation of original citation: “[...] segun la opinion de nosotros opinamos que 
esta persona debiria serber (sic) como una guia, porque conoce, los lugares donde se encuentran los 
objetos arriba mencionado.” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del 
Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio N°08 g-g 85, Informe sobre la declaracion de los detinidos que se 
encuentraba en nuestro base, Canal, 15.01.1985.
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When we caught them and they were slightly, as if they did 
not want to [collaborate], well, to the river then, straight away. 
Straight away. And if they did want to collaborate, well, all 
right.”93 
A new violent counteroffensive by the Shining Path between 1986 
and 1987 gave rise to an expansion and reorganization of the self-
defense committees in the entire valley. A statement from the 
central committee of the self-defense forces in Pichiwillca directed 
to the commander of the state forces in the military base in Luisiana 
describes, for example, how on the 9th of May 1987 a base committee 
in the district of Kimbiri was attacked by “80 terrorists made up of 
men, women, from the age of eight years to 40 years with machine 
guns, revolvers, breechloaders and bladed arms like knive, sticks, 
slings.”94 Only a few days earlier, the central committee had ordered 
the base committees of the entire valley to reorganize by rearming 
the population of every base with bladed arms and reactivating the 
trenches and watchtowers, while threatening to severely punish any 
failure to comply with the orders.95 By the end of 1989, the self-
defense committees had succeeded in controlling the entire valley 
from Anchihuay in the South to Boca Mantaro in the North.96 
While 1984 to 1986 were the bloodiest years, the war in the valley 
93  My translation of original citation: “Cuando chapamos, cuando era medio este, que no 
quería, ya al rio pues, de frente. Ya. Y si quería colaborar, ya, listo.” Interview with Rafael, 
ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
94  My translation of original citation: [...] “80 tarroristas (sic) conformado por hombres, 
mujeres, desde los 8 años hasta 40 años con armamentos de Fall. metralletas, revolveres, retros 
y armas blancas como cuchillo, palos, hondas.” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité 
de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio N°065-87-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-E-P, 
Ataque sufrido de lq Defenza Cvil (sic) de Serenachayocc, Pichiwillca, 11.05.1987.
95  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, 
Oficio N°059-87-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-B-P, 03.05.1987.
96  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 142.
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raged until the mid-nineties.97 As one of the ex-commanders of the 
CADs in the district of Llochegua recounts: 
Between 1983 and 1995, there were no laws, guns were the 
masters of life.98 
Despite their efficiency in controlling the valley and fighting the 
Shining Path, the self-defense committees – a violent armed actor in 
need of asserting its authority - also contributed to the proliferation of 
violence.99 Several research participants mentioned the excessive use 
of violence by the CADs and their involvement in personal reprisals 
and struggles over power.100 According to Steven Zech’s analysis, 
over the span of the entire conflict in the Ayacucho department, 
armed civilians were involved in 409 of the 8.202 violent incidents 
registered by the TRC.101 The TRC ascribes the responsibility for 
24% of the total number of victims during the war in the entire 
country to peasant rounds, self-defense committees, the MRTA, 
paramilitary groups and non-identified agents.102
97  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 77.
98  My translation of original citation: “De 1983 hasta 1995 no había leyes, el arma era 
dueño de la vida.” Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 
10.05.2017. 
99  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 120.
100  Fieldnotes, district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018; interview with Flora, daughter of 
ex-CAD commander, district of Santa Rosa, 11.07.2018; interview with Humberto, 
ex-CAD commander, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018; interview with Rosa, ex-
CAD member whose father was killed by the Shining Path, district of Kimbiri, 
23.06.2018; interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 
09.07.2018.
101  The participation of armed civilians was most significant in the provinces 
of Huamanga, Huanta and La Mar with respectively 171, 73 and 121 incidents 
involving armed civilians Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian Resistance during 
Internal Armed Conflict in Peru,” 83.
102  46% was attributed to the Shining Path and 30% to the state forces. CVR, 
“Informe Final, Anexo 2” (Lima, 2003), 13.
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Although the self-defense committees originally emerged from 
spontaneous peasant action, the marine forces facilitated and in 
some places even enforced their organization under the name of 
Comités de Defensa Civil (CVC)103.104 In 1991, under the first government 
of president Alberto Fujimori, the self-defense committees were 
officially recognized by law under the name Comités de Autodefensa 
(CAD)105, and allowed to use firearms “obtained by purchase or 
by donation from the State or individuals” in “activities of self-
defense of their community to avoid infiltration of terrorists and 
drug traffickers, to defend themselves from their attacks and to 
help the Peruvian Army and the National Police with the tasks of 
pacification and national development”.106 This legalization was a 
clear strategy to gain stricter governmental control over the CADs, 
their weaponry and the nature of their interventions in order to 
prevent them from transforming into independent death squads or 
criminal organizations.107  Already in 1989, before the CADs were 
even legally allowed to use firearms, president Alan García had 
personally visited the valley and donated 200 shotguns to the CADs 
in the town of Rinconada, the home base of the notorious self-
defense commander Huayhuaco.108 The army registered 1.564 CADs 
103  Civil Defense Committees
104  Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y 
Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 139.
105  Self-Defense Committees
106  Reconocen a Comités de Autodefensa, como organizaciones de la población 
para desarrollar actividades de auto defensa de su comunidad (Decreto Legislativo 
741); This does not mean that firearms were not used before this legislation. Many 
peasant who did not have the resources to buy firearmes fought, however, with 
bladed weapons. Interestingly enough, the research of Zech shows that “weapons 
and other resources make self-defense forces more capable but are not a necessary 
condition for sustained civilian resistance. Organizational capacity and technical 
expertise played a more important role.”  Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian 
Resistance during Internal Armed Conflict in Peru,” 233.
107  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 80.
108  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
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with 6.1450 members and 5.583 firearms for the entire department of 
Ayacucho by 1993.109 The alliance between the CADs and the state 
forces, which became stronger from the beginning of the 1990s, 
was complex throughout the whole course of the war and varied 
from place to place. In first instance, collaborating was a pragmatic 
choice for both parties. Because of their cruel and indiscriminate 
repression, the peasants in many cases perceived the state forces as a 
greater threat than the Shining Path. By consolidating their alliance 
with the marine forces and the military, the peasants demonstrated 
which side they were on and liberated themselves of the constant 
suspicion of belonging to the Shining path.110 This was the case 
for example in the district of Sivia, where self-defense was in the 
first place organized as a response to the violent incursions of the 
state forces against the population. The Shining Path on its turn 
responded with attacks against the population as a punishment for 
their resistance against the revolution.111 Furthermore, settlements 
reluctant to organize themselves in self-defense committees risked 
brutal punishment by the military or by notorious CADs, such as 
those of Pichiwillca.112 At the same time, for many peasants, fighting 
alongside the representatives of the state became a way of pursuing 
a sense of belonging to the national community (cfr. 6.3).113 The 
marines and the military, on their turn, were unfamiliar with the 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 138.
109  There were 4.205 CADs with 235.465 members and 16.1696 firearms on a 
national level in 1993 according to the numbers of the Comando Conjunto of the 
army, in Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y 
Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 181.
110  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War 
in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 114.
111  As Zech points out, Shining Path violence was thus in many cases a consequence 
of and not a direct cause for peasant self-defense. Zech, “Between Two Fires: 
Civilian Resistance during Internal Armed Conflict in Peru,” 256.
112  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 117.
113  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 85.
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geography of the valley and the Shining Path’s guerrilla warfare 
and therefore needed the CAD’s territorial knowledge.114 During 
joint patrols, the self-defense committees mostly functioned as the 
shield of the military.115 Initially there was, however, a lot of mutual 
distrust between the state forces and the CADs:
In 1990 we got together with the military. And we got started 
and we told him [the general]: ‘We have talked with the general 
in Ayacucho.’ ‘No this is bad, goddamn, you are going to 
ambush us, you are going to take us yourselves and hinder us.’ 
‘Okay general’, I said to him, ‘you don’t want to? Well then, we 
will attack you as well. Come to our base, visit us or something, 
and we will knock the shit out of you as well.’116
They did not believe us [when we said that the Shining Path 
was present], it was difficult to establish this relation with the 
army [...] we needed the army for their fire force, not because 
they were so brave [...] Step by step, we entered in a relation 
and in the end they gave us this confidence and then we have 
cooperated well [...] but the biggest part, the biggest part, 
almost 90% of what has been done was the self-defense, that 
is, the peasant population.117
114  Interview with Franco, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018.
115  Interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
116  My translation of original citation: “En el ‘90 nos juntamos ya con los militares. Y 
comenzamos y le decimos: ‘Hemos hablado con el general en Ayacucho, con el general Rueda.’ 
‘No que esto está mal, carajo, ustedes nos va llevar a emboscar, ustedes mismos nos va llevar, nos 
va malograr.’ ‘Bueno,’ le digo ‘general, usted no quiere? Entonces también les vamos a atacar a 
ustedes. Vienen a nuestra base, nos visitan o algo, también le sacamos el ancho.’ ” Interview 
with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017. 
117  My translation of original citation: “Ellos no creían [...] era difícil de encontrar esa 
relación con el ejército [...] al ejercito nosotros necesitábamos por la potencia de fuego que tenía, no 
por lo que eran valientes [...] de poco a poco de poco a poco, entramos en una relación y hay bueno 
a final de cuenta pues nos dieron esa confianza y ya si, hemos trabajado bien  [...] pero la mayor 
401
VI Hidden Heroes
Notwithstanding their alliance with the military, the CADs 
maintained a high degree of autonomy. Because the Peruvian army 
in many cases had no proper strategy, the soldiers were scared and 
often stayed inside their bases while the CADs did the dirty work 
of confronting the Shining Path.118 Consequently, the CADs and 
not the army controlled most of the valley. The CADs thus became 
the main target of the Shining Path.119 Violent confrontations 
also took place between the CADs and the army, when the latter 
entered a CAD-controlled zone without permission.120 The relation 
between the CADs and the police was outspokenly bad, as the latter 
historically sided with the big landowners and was notorious for its 
discrimination against the peasant population.121
The arrival of the Shining Path and the organization of peasants 
in self-defense committees in 1983 furthermore coincided with a 
deep economic crisis caused by increasing insecurity and the rise 
of illicit drug trafficking. The constant threat of the Shining Path 
made it very dangerous for the peasant population to work on their 
lands, which led to general scarcity and famine.122 The restrained 
access to markets caused the collapse of traditional crops such 
as cocoa, coffee and peanuts. At the same time, the increasing 
international demand for coca leaves for the production of cocaine 
paste and cocaine motivated peasants to focus on the cultivation 
of coca. Moreover, cultivating coca is a lot less time-consuming 
part,e la mayor parte casi el 90% de que ha trabajado es más la autodefensa como así decirlo, la 
gente campesina.” Interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
10.07.2018.
118  Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017; 
interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 10.07.2018; 
Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, 
Peru, 1980-2000, 120.
119  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 84.
120  Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y 
Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 169.
121  Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
122  Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
The former hacienda of Luisiana, which was turned into a military base during 
the war (2015)
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and more profitable than the traditional crops. It therefore resulted 
easier to combine with the tasks of self-defense.123 In addition, the 
government’s counterinsurgency strategy increasingly failed during 
the presidency of Alan García (1985-1990). Tensions between the 
president and the army in some cases resulted in mutiny. The CADs 
were hence in need of new allies in their struggle to control the 
valley.124 This is how a pragmatic alliance between the CADs – who 
made a living as cocaleros – and the narcotraficantes was established in the 
VRAEM between 1985 and 1987.125 Because the CADs controlled 
access to most parts of the territory, they provided security for the 
narcotraficantes and made sure they were left undisturbed by incursions 
of the Shining Path. The narcotraficantes – initially mostly connected 
to Colombian drug cartels - on their turn assured the demand for 
coca and provided the CADs with arms, money and food.126 The 
economic surplus generated by the coca boom allowed the CADs 
to form the comandos especiales – the so-called Tigers and Condors: 
elite militias who received professional training and a monthly 
salary.127 It is therefore a recurring saying by ex-commanders and 
the population in general that “the VRAEM was pacified thanks to 
the coca” (“gracias a la coca se pacificó el VRAEM”).128 In contrast to 
the Northern jungle parts of the Alto Huallaga, where the Shining 
Path allied with the drug traffickers to finance its revolutionary 
struggle, the coca economy and the alliance with the narcotraficantes 
123  Contrary to most other crops, coca can be harvested the whole year long. 
Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
124  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 120.
125  Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y 
Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 127.
126  Del Pino, 167.
127  Interview with Mario, ex-CAD member, district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018; 
Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, 
Peru, 1980-2000, 142.
128  Fieldnotes, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017; interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD 
member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
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financed the population’s defense against the Shining Path in the 
valley of the Apurímac river.129 As Heuser has pointed out, the kind 
of illicit economy that developed in the VRAEM should in the first 
place be seen as a war economy resulting from the population’s 
survival strategy. What was gained from the coca was immediately 
re-invested in the self-defense committees by buying weapons and 
other war infrastructure.130 The cultivation of coca did not generate 
big concentrations of wealth nor gave rise to the emergence of 
big cartels or paramilitary groups, as was the case in Colombia or 
Mexico.131 Colombian drug cartels did, however, play an important 
role in the VRAEM’s drug economy. During the coca boom that 
lasted from 1985 to 1995, the region was dollarized. Small airplanes 
that took off and landed at the airstrip of Palmapampa transported 
weapons and money into the valley while taking out cargos of cocaine 
paste with a value of several million dollars.132 The disruption of 
the Colombian cartels after the death of Pablo Escobar in 1993 and 
the repressive anti-drug policies under the government of president 
Fujimori caused a sudden collapse of the drug economy in 1995. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, the region had recovered 
from the crisis and returned to the production of coca for the drug 
market.133 
129  Del Pino, “Tiempos de Guerra y de Dioses: Ronderos, Evangélicos y 
Senderistas En El Valle Del Río Apurímac,” 119.
130  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 202.
131  Some of the CAD commanders were however closely involved in drug 
trafficking and have served time in jail, such as the infamous commander 
Huayhuaco. Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian Resistance during Internal Armed 
Conflict in Peru,” 215. An ex-commander in the district of Kimbiri whom we 
interviewed also was in jail twice for drug trafficking. Interview with Lalo, ex-CAD 
commander, district of Kimbiri, 28.06.2018. 
132  Heuser, 200.
133  Heuser, 201.
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The VRAEM and the self-defense committees today
Today, life in the VRAEM is still very much defined by the history 
of the civil war and the illicit economy that developed parallel to it. 
The smell of heaps of harvested coca leaves that lie drying in the 
sun covers the valley as a blanket. Coca is still the most lucrative 
crop, with one hectare yielding approximately as much profit as 
five hectares of cocoa.134 Thus, for the majority of the peasants 
in the VRAEM, coca is the main source of income. Apart from 
its economic value, coca also has a cultural value as a divine and 
ancestral plant, a tradition that was imported from the highlands 
into the VRAEM. Coca is thus used for chewing135, as a substrate in 
medicinal preparations, as offering in rituals or for fortune-telling. 
Notwithstanding the legal uses of coca leaves, the big majority 
of coca production is still destined for the illegal market.136 The 
narcotraficantes in many cases even pick up the harvest straight from 
the fields of the cocaleros. The many bars, hotels and brothels in the 
bigger towns of the valley provide the drug traffickers with shelter 
and diversion. Cocaine paste and cocaine are produced in laboratories 
hidden in the forest.137 The visible side-effects of the existence of 
these laboratories are the many gas stations, agricultural shops and 
pharmacies selling respectively petrol, fertilizers and chemicals - all 
of them elementary components for cocaine production.138 The so-
134  Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
135  Chewing coca is a widespread habit among peasants on the Peruvian 
countryside. It has a stimulating effect comparable with caffeine and is therefore 
used during work on the land and to replace meals. 
136  According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Peru became the 
largest producer of coca in 1980 and of coca and cocaine in 2012. UNODC cited 
in: Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 7.
137  In Llochegua, a luxury hotel with a rooftop jacuzzi looks over the shabby 
houses of most of the villagers. Fieldnotes, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
138  Environmental pollution because of the drug laboratories and the herbicides 
that are used in the coca cultivation are a huge problem in the VRAEM. Many soils 
Cocalero drying his coca harvest in the district of Río Tambo (2018)
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called mochileros139, mostly young men, transport the drugs by foot 
through the jungle – a relatively lucrative but dangerous business. 
The general management of the drug economy is now in the hands 
of several local family clans instead of international cartels.140 
Despite its illegality, the illicit coca economy in the VRAEM can to a 
certain extent be seen as a provider of order rather than of chaos and 
violence.141 The majority of the population, including the military 
and the police – (in)directly beneftis from the drug economy.142 As 
one of the ex-commanders of the CADs in Pichari affirms:
I cannot lie and I say this very clearly: narcotráfico exists. We here 
in the VRAEM live directly and indirectly from the narcotráfico. 
Because we grow coca leaves. This is our petty cash, it’s coca. 
Right now, I will go weeding my coca. I can’t deny it. Now, I 
grab my coca and I sell it to whoever wants to buy it.143 
Nevertheless, coca is not generating great wealth for the local 
population. The VRAEM is one of Peru’s poorest regions. The 
overall poverty level for the region was estimated at 42,9% in 2013, 
compared to 23,9% nationally. The Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática (INEI, National Institute of Statistics and Information 
are by now so polluted that the only crop that still can be grown is coca. Interview 
with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018; interview 
with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 10.07.2018; interview with 
Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 09.07.2018.
139  Backpackers
140  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 209.
141  Heuser, 1.
142  Heuser, 204.
143  My translation of original citation: “No puedo mentir y digo bien claro: el narcotráfico 
existe. Nosotros acá en el VRAEM vivimos directa- y indirectamente del narcotráfico. Porque 
producimos hoja de coca. Eso es nuestro caja chica de nosotros, es coca. Ahorita pronto voy 
deshierbando mi coca. No puedo negar. Ahora, yo agarro mi coca, vendo a quien sea.” Interview 
with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
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science) considers all the districts of the VRAEM either poor or 
extremely poor.144 Access to public services such as healthcare and 
education is dramatically bad. Until the late 1970s there was a single 
hospital with one doctor for the entire valley.145 During the war, 
deceases such as malaria, cholera and measles affected significant 
parts of the population, especially children.146 Today, only one out 
of two inhabitants of the VRAEM has direct access to basic health 
care. Education levels are far below the national average, with 29% 
of youngsters between the age of 20 and 24 not having completed 
primary education.147 The government programs intended to 
promote alternative crops and development in the valley are failing 
dramatically for several reasons.148 Furthermore, the VRAEM is 
still an emergency zone where the approximately 10.000149 stationed 
members of the Peruvian army and the police are supposedly fighting 
a war on drugs against the so-called narcoterroristas, remnants of the 
Shining Path that now provide security for drug traffickers.150 In 
2018 and 2019, several Peruvian newspapers reported on villagers 
from the communities of La Libertad de Mantaro and Vizcatán 
144  INEI cited in: Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit 
Economies in the Margins of the State,” 183.
145  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 107.
146  Interview with Ramiro, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 25.06.2018.
147  INEI cited in: Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit 
Economies in the Margins of the State,” 184.
148  Heuser, 190. For example, a few years ago, the government encouraged 
peasants to switch from coca to pineapple. Once the pineapples were harvested, 
however, the state did not ensure the demand and exportation. Nobody wanted 
to buy the pineapples and tons of fruit rotted away, leaving the peasants indebted. 
Fieldnotes, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
149  Official numbers are not available, but the number of 10.000 was mentioned 
several times to Christoph Heuser during his field research. Personal communication 
with Christoph Heuser, 21.03.2019.
150  The so-called Quispe Palomino Clan is the main remnant of the Shining Path. It 
still has an ideological façade but its main purpose is drug trafficking. They mostly 
attack the police. Heuser, 230.
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del Ene, in the Northwestern part of the VRAEM, who fled their 
villages after several assassinations committed by remnants of the 
Shining Path.151 Nevertheless, the image of the VRAEM as a violent 
war zone dominated by drug gangs and terrorists that is common in 
the media and in Peruvian society in general contrasts highly with 
the ease and calm that one perceives on the ground. Drug-related 
violence exists but is rather rare. Official statistics on crime rates 
in the VRAEM are not available, but the impression of a relatively 
quiet and peaceful region, especially in the valley of the Apurímac 
river, is mostly confirmed by the local population.152 Moreover, 
the population is frustrated with the negative image depicted by 
journalists and politicians who have often never even visited the 
valley. As it is said by one of the local authorities in Pichari, who 
dreams of turning the VRAEM into a hotspot for tourism:
It looks as if the VRAEM were Syria but in reality, it’s 
marvelous.153
Indeed, the presence of the army and the police seems at least out 
of proportion. Additionally, ironically enough, Heuser’s research 
shows that the presence of the state forces increases rather than 
decreases the population’s feeling of insecurity, because they are 
151  “Familias enteras llegan a Huancayo huyendo del terrorismo,” Diario Correo, 
September 19, 2018, https://diariocorreo.pe/edicion/huancayo/familias-enteras-
llegan-huancayo-huyendo-del-terrorismo-842783/; “Desplazamiento convierte 
a La Libertad en pueblo fantasma,” Diario Correo, September 22, 2018, https://
diariocorreo.pe/edicion/huancayo/desplazamiento-convierte-la-l ibertad-en-
pueblo-fantasma-843261/; El Comercio, “Testimonios desde el destierro,” March 
25, 2019, https://especiales.elcomercio.pe/?q=especiales/testimonios-desde-el-
destierro/.
152  Interview with Rosa, ex-CAD member whose father was killed by the Shining 
Path, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
153  My translation of original citation: “El VRAEM parece Syria pero en realidad es 
una maravilla.” Interview with Eduardo, Pichari, 12.05.2017.
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generally perceived as corrupt and incompetent.154 One research 
participant in the district of Pichari stated that the police only comes 
“to traumatize the children and to check out the girls”.155 Moreover, 
several research participants suggested that state representatives 
are (highly) involved in the drug economy and therefore have an 
interest in maintaining the emergency zone in the VRAEM. An 
ex-CAD commander in the district of Pichari describes the state’s 
involvement in the drug economy and the problem of corruption in 
general:
A big part of our governors are narcos. They are narcos with 
suits and ties. […] That is why they keep the VRAE as an 
emergency zone, because that is where the resources of the 
armed forces come from. […] The narcos from the population 
are only the arms, the state is the head.156
It is true what they say that in my country we are sitting on a 
bench of gold157, it is true, but only few are gaining from it. The 
authorities, they gain from Peru’s golden bench. […] If Peru 
would take part in a corruption contest than we would become 
world champion without even having to score goals.158
154  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 228. 
155  Interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018.
156  My translation of original citation: “Gran parte de nuestros gobernantes son narcos. Son 
narcos de saco y corbata. […]  Por eso aquí al VRAE lo mantienen como zona de emergencia. 
Porque así sale el recurso económico para el comando conjunto de las fuerzas armadas. […]  Los 
narcos de la población son los brazos, el estado es la cabeza.” Interview with Alejandro, ex-
CAD commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018.
157  “El Perú es un mendigo sentado en un banco de oro” (“Peru is a begger on a bench of 
gold”) is a quote ascribed to the Italian explorer Antonio Raimondi who arrived to 
Peru in the 19th century, and refers to the contrast between the natural resources 
of the country and the poverty of the population.
158  My translation of original citation: “Si bien es cierto lo que dicen que en mi país estamos 
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In the district of Llochegua, an ex-commander refers as follows to 
the continuing military presence in the VRAEM:
And now for the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
other ministries, the Shining Path is their little piece of 
chocolate. Do you know how many millions have entered the 
VRAEM in order for the region to make progress? And look 
at  how it is, full of dust, as you can see.159
Another ex-commander in the district of Pichari answered the 
question whether the community experienced problems because of 
narcotráfico as follows:
No, even worse, for the government of course the entire 
VRAE is narco, but we aren’t, pues. Here, as you can see, we 
work in what we can. Rather, the government is devastating 
the VRAE. What we have is coca, but the coca has defended 
the pacification. In the first place, the coca was for buying 
arms and for the self-defense.160
This negative perception of the state and its representatives is one 
of the main reasons why the CADs are still important providers of 
sentados en un banco de oro, sí es cierto pero solo se benefician unos cuantos. Las autoridades, ellos 
se benefician de ese banco de oro del Perú […] Si lo metemos a una competencia de corrupción el 
Perú sale campeón mundial sin ni siquiera meter goles.” Interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD 
commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018.
159  My translation of original citation: “Y ahora el ejército, el ministerio del interior y 
otros ministerios, ya su chocolatito es sendero. Usted sabe cuántos millones de dinero ha entrado 
al VRAEM para que esto salga adelante? Y mira cómo está, mira usted, lleno de polvo.” 
Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 09.07.2018.
160  My translation of original citation: “No, peor, claro para el gobierno todo el VRAE 
es narco, pero nosotros no somos pues. Aquí como estás viendo trabajamos en lo que podemos. Más 
bien el gobierno está malogrando al VRAE. Lo que tenemos es coca, pero la coca ha defendido 
la pacificación. Número uno, la coca era para comprar armamentos y para la autodefensa.” 
Interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018.
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authority, order and security for the population of the VRAEM. 
While the self-defense committees thus continue to exist and carry 
arms, their role has changed significantly since the end of the 
Shining Path’s revolutionary war. To begin with, participation is no 
longer obligatory. In most of the villages, the next generation is now 
organizing the CADs which mainly function as a local security force 
handling general crimes such as robbery and domestic violence. 
During festivities and other public events, the CADs patrol and 
intervene in skirmishes. They mostly hold an administrative office 
somewhere in the center of the village, where they hold regular 
meetings.The legitimacy of the CADs relies heavily on the heroic 
collective memory of their successful struggle against the Shining 
Path (cfr. infra 6.3). Nevertheless, times have changed and so have 
the (often violent and repressive) methods of the CADs. During 
fieldwork, a member of the actual CAD in Pichari complained 
about the fact that the CADs cannot practice their former ways of 
punishment anymore “because of human rights”, which according 
to him makes their work more difficult:
It is not easy. They have changed the law in favor of the 
criminals, you cannot touch them anymore or they will 
prosecute you.161
Both during and after the war, several CAD commanders were 
indeed prosecuted for human rights violations.162 Many of the 
ex-commanders who ended up in jail nevertheless enjoyed a 
timely release because of their close relations with the military.163 
Fujimori’s 1995 Amnesty Law furthermore protected the CADs 
from prosecution for human rights violations committed between 
161  My translation of original citation: “No es fácil. Han cambiado la ley a favor de los 
delincuentes, ya no les puedes tocar o te denuncian.” Interview with Adrián, local authority, 
district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
162  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 85.
163  Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
Training of CADs by the military in the district of Samugari (2018)
Boats on the Apurímac River in the district of Kimbiri (2017)
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1980 and 1995.164 In some places, the CADs gradually seize to 
exist. Some of the ex-commanders suggest that the state intends to 
deactivate the self-defense committees because they perceive them 
as a threat.165 Nevertheless, the CADs still receive military training 
from the army and sometimes assist them in their missions.166 The 
police also organizes joint patrols with the CADs.167 
The majority of the first-generation of commanders were young 
men when the war started. Antonio Cardenas, the leader of the 
central self-defense committee of Pichiwillca, was only nineteen 
years old when he assumed his task as a coordinator of the CADs 
of the entire valley. Their personal projects, as those of many other 
survivors, were thwarted by the war. An entire generation of young 
adults gave up their personal education to engage in the tasks of 
self-defense. They now project their hopes for a better future on 
their children and grandchildren. Many of the ex-commanders and 
members of the self-defense committees furthermore indicate that 
they still suffer from mental health problems due to the war. An 
ex-commander in the district of Llochegua states that the war has 
destroyed the social fabric of the VRAEM:
The VRAEM needs mental healthcare to restore confidence. 
We have seen terrible things.168 
164  CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 66.
165  This probably partly holds true, in the sense that the state knows that most of 
the CADs are cocaleros. If the government would decide on a complete eradication 
of coca crops in the VRAEM, as happened in the Alto Huallaga region, the fear is 
that the CADs will violently defend the coca. 
166  I was present at such a training in Pichiwillca, which mainly consisted of physical 
training and shooting practice. Fieldnotes, district of Samugari, 22.06.2018.
167  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 238.
168  My translation of original citation: “El VRAEM necesita salud mental para que 
se le devuelva la confianza. Hemos visto cosas atroces.”  Interview with Percy, ex-CAD 
commander, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
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Another ex-commander states that he sometimes suffers from 
violent anger attacks because of what he has lived through during 
the war.169 Among other psychosocial consequences, alcoholism is 
a widespread problem among ex-CAD commanders and members. 
During fieldwork, we found several potential interviewees drunk at 
their homes, or we were warned in advance that they were borrachitos 
(alcoholics).170 The leader of the central self-defense committee of 
Pichiwillca, Antonio Cardenas, died from liver cirrhosis at the age of 
48.171 Another emblematic ex-CAD commander lives in Huamanga 
near the cemetery and, as one research participant claims, attends 
the funerals for the alcohol that comes with them.172 Many CAD 
members are furthermore physically mutilated for the rest of their 
life, like one of the ex-commanders in the district of Pichari:
I have broken three ribs, regular stuff, but I survived. I have 
ammunition here, and here [points at body]. I have seventeen 
scraps in my entire body. A bullet in my leg. That’s why I limp a 
little. […] I lost my sight, they blew me up here, all this [points 
at body]. I still had my teeth, they blew me up, I threw up blood 
for three days. Just last year I had surgery. I had a lump inside 
and also pieces of wood, from what the terrucos [the terrorists, 
i.e. the Shining Path] had blown up, and I did not know until 
last year.173
169  Interview with Humberto, ex-CAD commander, district of Kimbiri, 
23.06.2018.
170  Fieldnotes, district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018.
171  Gustavo Gorriti, “Muere Antonio Cárdenas,” IDL Reporteros, accessed April 
22, 2019, https://idl-reporteros.pe/muere-antonio-cardenas/.
172  Interview with Humberto, ex-CAD commander, district of Kimbiri, 
23.06.2018.
173  My translation of original citation: “Yo me he roto tres costillas, normal, pero he 
vivido. Tengo munición por acá, tengo por acá. Tengo 17 perdigones en todo el cuerpo. Una bala 
en la pierna. Por eso cojeo un poco. [...] Perdí la vista, me reventaron acá, todito esto. Tenía mi 
dentadura ya, me volaron, yo boté tres dias de sangre. […] Recién el año pasado me han operado. 
Se había hecho una bola así y había madera, de lo que había reventado los terrucos, y no sabía, 
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6.2 Diffusion of transitional justice 
Between “hero and villain” and “tribune and tribunal” 174
Already during the conflict, intellectuals and human rights activists 
pronounced their worries about the participation of armed civilians 
in the struggle against the Shining Path. One of the concerns was 
that the CADs might convert into Colombian-style paramilitary 
organizations.175 Mario Fumerton points out how the events in 
the village of Ucharaccay in 1983 sparked the public opinion’s 
disapproval of peasant self-defense.176 In this small community in 
the highlands of Huanta, eight journalists who wanted to report on 
the conflict were mistaken for Shining Path members and murdered 
by the villagers upon their arrival. The narrative of the subsequent 
parliamentary commission of inquiry led by novelist Mario Vargas 
Llosa portrays the peasants as savages for whom “this violence is the 
normal sphere in which they live from the moment they are born 
until their death”.177 Furthermore, the fact that the CADs counted 
with the support of president Fujimori and a significant part of the 
military sectors increased their unpopularity in the eyes of the human 
recién el año pasado.” Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
12.05.2017.
174  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 2” (Lima, 2003), 288; CVR, “Informe Final, 
Tomo 4,” 74. CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 61. 
175  CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 3,” 2002, 36, SCO34510, Centro de Información 
para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos.
176  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 76.
177  This quote was translated into English from the Dutch translation of a 
text which presumably originally was written in Spanish. Mario Vargas Llosa, 
“De Geschiedenis van Een Moordpartij,” in Het Continent van de Eenzaamheid 
(Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1992), 79; for the entire report of the commission of 
inquiry, see: Mario Vargas Llosa, Abraham Guzmán Figueroa, and Mario Castro 
Arenas, “Informe Sobre Ucharaccay” (Lima, 1983).
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rights community.178 In 1989, historian Carlos Iván Degregori - who 
would also become a commissioner of the TRC – expressed his 
disapproval of the CADs in a reaction to a controversial interview 
with the notorious CAD commander Huayhuaco in the newspaper 
Expreso:
Because although in the Apurimac river the organization 
[of the CADs] is reborn from its ashes [i.e. from the older 
tradition of peasant organization], it does so to a certain extent 
like zombies, also converted, like the Shining Path, into a war 
machine, no matter how much they invoke peace and make a 
profession of democratic faith. The proof: they believe that 
they will solve the problem with rifles.179
From the outset, the existence of the CADs indeed proved to be 
a thorny question in the transitional justice process. While, as 
mentioned, self-defense committees also existed in many other 
parts of the country during the war, the TRC states that the CADs 
of Vinchos180 and especially those of the VRAEM were the most 
important and violent ones, and “therefore the most relevant for 
the TRC.”181 As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the TRC 
178  CVR, 36.
179  My translation of original citation: “Porque si bien en el río Apurímac la organización 
renace de sus cenizas, lo hace en cierta medida como los zombis, convertida también, como Sendero 
Luminoso, en máquina de guerra, por más que invoquen la paz y hagan profesión de fe democrática. 
La prueba: creen que con fusiles solucionan el problema.” Carlos Iván Degregori, “Sendas 
Peligrosas. La Guerra Del Comandante Huayhuaco,” in Jamás Tan Cerca Arremetió 
Lo Lejos: Sendero Luminoso y La Violenica Politica, IEP (Lima, 2015), 127.
180  Vinchos is one of the fifteen districts of the province of Huamanga, 
department of Ayacucho. It is situated in the highlands Northwest of the capital 
city of Huamanga.
181  My translation form original citation: “En este sentido, son las más relevantes 
para la CVR.” CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 23. The TRC thus both makes 
generalizations on the phenomenon of the CADs and specifies the different 
regional variations that existed, among which the CADs of Vinchos and those of 
the VRAEM are considered by the TRC as the most problematic ones. 
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presents the self-defense committees in the final report as an actor 
balancing on the fragile divide “between hero and villain”.182 The 
CADs of the valley of the Apurímac river are mentioned in two 
different parts of the TRC’s final report. Firstly, they are mentioned 
in the first chapter of the second volume, which deals with the 
armed actors of the civil war. Here, the TRC considers the CADs 
as the fifth armed actor of the civil war, after the Shining Path, 
the police forces, the army and the MRTA.183 The fact that they are 
ranked together with the other armed actors suggests that the TRC 
categorizes the CADs in the first place as perpetrators. While the 
TRC also points to their role in the defeat of the Shining Path, it 
foremost considers the CADs responsible for the escalation of the 
war: 
Despite the merits that they undoubtedly have for the 
restoration of peace, there can be no doubt that the rondas 
contrasubversivas [contra subversive rounds, i.e. the CADs] have 
contributed to the spiral of violence beyond what in a war 
context could be considered inevitable.184 
Secondly, the first chapter of volume four, which describes the course 
of the civil war in different regions of the country, distinguishes 
the valley of the Apurímac river as a separate region marked by the 
presence of the CADs as an additional actor in the war.185 Here, 
the TRC also stresses the human rights violations and the “bad 
reputation” of the CADs.186
182  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 2,” 288; CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 74.
183  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 2,” 288–304.
184  My translation from original citation: “No obstante los méritos que indudablemente 
tienen para el restablecimiento de la paz, no puede haber dudas de que las rondas contrasubversivas 
han contribuido a la espiral de la violencia más allá de lo que, en un contexto de guerra, se podría 
considerar inevitable.” CVR, 299.
185  CVR, “Informe Final, Tomo 4,” 73–86.
186  CVR, 83.
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Furthermore, in the preliminary in-depth thematic study of the 
TRC187 on the role of the CADs, the possibility of holding a public 
hearing in which the CADs can testify is treated with caution: 
To cancel it [the public hearing] would mean damaging the 
“tense calm” relationship that currently exists between the 
ronderos [members of the CADs] and the TRC. The challenge, 
as for all public hearings, is to find a balance between tribune 
and tribunal; that is, a forum cannot be provided to the ronderos 
to justify their abuses, but at the same time the importance of 
their participation in the pacification must be recognized.188
In the discussion preceding the in-depth study, commissioner Sofía 
Macher stressed that during the public hearings, the witnesses reveal 
“their truth” (“su verdad”) and not that of the TRC. At the same 
time, she stated that, in order to be legitimate, the conclusions of 
the final report should include both victims and perpetrators.189 In 
the internal preparatory documents for a two-day workshop with 35 
invited members of the CADs, organized by the TRC in the city of 
Huanta in June 2002, the TRC expressed its concern with regards 
to the position of the CADs towards the work of the commission:
Regarding the work of the TRC, we have perceived that 
187  The TRC conducted 19 in-depth studies of “significant cases”. The redaction 
of the final report was based on these in-depth studies. The content therefore partly 
overlaps with the text of the final report, but the in-depth studies are more detailed 
and extensive. 
188   My translation from original citation: “Cancelarla significaría estropear la relación 
de ‘tensa calma’ que actualmente existe entre ronderos y CVR. El reto, como para todas las 
audiencias institucionales, es encontrar el balance entre tribuna y tribunal; es decir, no se puede 
facilitar un foro a ronderos para que justifiquen sus abusos, pero a la vez hay que reconocer la 
importancia de su participación en la pacifiación.” CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 61. 
The public hearing did take place, but the recording was not available when I visited 
the archive. 
189  CVR, 1.
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there is much ignorance and even fear for alleged persecution 
of members of the CADs, although we did not perceive an 
outspokenly contrary position. Knowing that the CADs 
are actors of primary importance in the process of violence 
of the last decades and that they represent current leaders 
and an important part of the population that the TRC has 
been working with, the presence of the mentioned positions 
is worrisome because it can hinder the work of the TRC, 
encourage contrary positions in the population, take away 
legitimacy.190
With regards to the general willingness of survivors to engage with 
the TRC, the population of the valley of the Apurímac river was 
said to be remarkably taciturn in comparison to other parts of the 
Ayacucho region.191 Despite the initial doubts, a thematic public 
hearing192 on “political violence and self-defense committees” 
(violencia política y comités de autodefensa) did take place in Lima on May 
16th 2003. Nine representatives of self-defense committees and 
rondas campesinas from all over the country gave their testimony.193 
190  My translation from original citation: “Respecto a la labor de la CVR hemos 
percibido que existe mucho desconocimiento e incluso temor por la presunta persecución a miembros 
de los CADs aunque no una posición claramente contraria. Sabiendo que los CADs son actores 
de primera importancia en el proceso de la violencia de las últimas décadas y que representan 
líderes actuales y parte importante de las poblaciones con las que viene trabajando la CVR, la 
presencia de las posiciones mencionadas es por demás preocupante porque puede entorpecer la labor 
de la CVR, incentivar posiciones contrarias a ella en la población, restarle legitimidad.” CVR, 
“Taller Con Comités de Autodefensa,” 2002, SR2-46-01, Centro de Información 
para la Memoria Colectiva y los Derechos Humanos.
191  Literal citation: “[...] a diferencia con el VRAE donde, como dijimos, existe todavía 
mucho hermetismo en la población.” CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 21.
192  In addition to the eight public hearings with victims in different parts of the 
country, the TRC organized five thematic public hearings. CVR, “Informe Sobre 
Las Actividades Realizadas Por La Comisión de La Verdad y Reconciliación y 
Convocatoria Al País.”
193  CVR, “Audiencia Pública Temática Violencia Política y Comités de 
Autodefensa,” accessed April 10, 2019, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/apublicas/
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In his closing speech of the public hearing, commissioner Carlos 
Iván Degregori recognized the state’s failure to protect its citizens 
as an important explanatory factor for the existence of the CADs. 
Nevertheless, he stated that
[…] the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reaffirms 
that the end does not justify the means. Even if the end has 
been self-defense and pacification, as Peruvians, civilians and 
soldiers, we must learn that it is not possible to condone the so-
called “excesses”. We know that it is extremely difficult, that in 
a war situation “you cannot wait for the enemy with bouquets 
of flowers,” as Mr. Germán Anaya [one of the testifying self-
defense committee members] said. However, the challenge for 
all Peruvians is to learn from the mistakes of the past and to 
face any challenge that may arise in the future, respecting the 
law of war, human rights and international humanitarian law.194
Not surprisingly, the excessive use of violence which resulted in 
human rights violations, constituted the main difficulty for the 
TRC in dealing with the role of the CADs. Nevertheless, in the 
in-depth study, the only attempt that was made to understand 
and contextualize the use of violence by the CADs resulted in a 
questionable cultural explanation: 
audiencias/atematicas/atcads_index.php.
194  My translation of original citation: “[...] la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
se reafirma en que el fin no justifica los medios. Aun cuando el fin haya sido la autodefensa y 
la pacificación, los peruanos y peruanas, civiles y militares, debemos aprender que no es posible 
condonar los denominados ‘excesos’. Sabemos que es sumamente difícil, que en una situación de 
guerra ‘no se puede esperar al enemigo con ramos de flores’, como dijo el señor Germán Anaya. Sin 
embargo, el desafío de todos los peruanos es justamente aprender de los errores del pasado y poder 
enfrentar cualquier desafío que se presente en el futuro, respetando las leyes de la guerra, los derechos 
humanos y el derecho internacional humanitario.” CVR, “Clausura de Audiencia Pública 
de Balance ‘Violencia Política y Comités de Autodefensa,’” accessed April 10, 2019, 
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/apublicas/audiencias/atematicas/atcads_clausura.php.
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Without wanting to justify, we want to recall the sociocultural 
context in which the internal war developed; a context in 
which there have always been different strategies to resolve 
conflicts, both democratic and violent, and where the 
historical tradition, marked by gamonalismo [exploitation by big 
landowners], manifests itself in a conception in which the use 
of violence is considered legitimate, “natural” and, more than 
anything, inevitable.195
Furthermore, the TRC’s discussion on accountability for human 
rights violations revolved around the question whether the CADs 
acted as civilians, i.e. protected by the Geneva Convention and under 
the jurisdiction of the Peruvian state; as an independent institution, 
i.e. a separate actor participating in hostilities which can be held 
accountable for war crimes; or as representatives of the state forces, 
i.e. volunteers in the Peruvian army as defined by international 
humanitarian law. In any case, the TRC concluded that “those 
citizens who have violated rights protected by the Peruvian state 
should be judged.”196 The TRC took a clear stance against any form 
of amnesty for the CADs and reminded that the 1995 Amnesty Law 
issued by Fujimori, which also protected the CADs from prosecution 
for abuses committed between 1980 and 1995, was revoked by the 
Inter-American Court in 2001.197 On the contrary, the TRC stated 
that the Special Investigations Units of the commission should try 
its best to judicialize more cases involving members of the CADs.198 
195  My translation from original citation: “Sin afán de justificar, queremos recordar el 
contexto sociocultural en el cual de (sic) desenvolvió la guerra interna; un contexto donde siempre 
han existido diferentes estrategias para resolver conflictos, tanto democráticas como violentas, y 
donde la tradición histórica, marcada por el gamonalismo, se manifiesta en una concepción en la 
cual el uso de la violencia es considerado legítimo, ‘natural’ y, más que nada, inevitable.” CVR, 
“Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 28.
196  My translation from original citation: “[…] aquellos ciudadanos que han violado 
derechos protegidos por el estado peruano deben ser juz gados.” CVR, 60.
197  CVR, 66.
198  CVR, 61.
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The issue of human rights violations also dominated the TRC’s 
recommendations on reparations for (relatives of) CAD members 
who were injured or who died in combat. While the TRC stated 
that the government had to recognize the contribution of the CADs 
through symbolical acts, it also argued that a specific reparation 
program for the CADs was not a good idea:
The inclusion of reparation programs specifically for ronderos 
[members of the CADs] can cause frictions in cases where 
the CAD is integrated in the communal structure  […] 
furthermore, it could collide with international law in the 
event that it has ronderos who have committed human rights 
violations among its beneficiaries.199
Instead, the TRC recommended that the compensations which 
had been promised to the CADs by the state since 1992200 also 
had to be awarded retrospectively, i.e. for events that occurred 
since the beginning of the civil war, and that the procedure had 
to become more accessible.201 Despite this recommendation, and 
199  My translation from original citation: “La inclusión de programas de reparación 
específicamente para ronderos puede causar desavenencias en casos donde el CAD está integrado 
a la estructura comunal […] además, puede chocar con el derecho internacional en caso que entre 
sus benficiarios haya ronderos que han cometido violaciones a los derechos humanos.” CVR, 58.
200  Compensations varying from 20.000 to 39.000 PEN were stipulated in 
supreme decree 077-92 (1992) and 068-DE-S/G (1998) based on a list of conditions 
that the petitioner should meet corresponding to the type of damage suffered 
(death, disability or material damage). These compensations only apply for harm 
inflicted by members of the Shining Path upon the CADs, and not for perpetration 
by the armed forces. Defensoría del Pueblo, “La Indemnización a Los Miembros 
de Los Comités de Autodefensa y Rondas Campesinas Víctimas Del Terrorismo,” 
Informes Defensoriales (Lima: Defensoría del Pueblo, 2000), 7.
201  According to the TRC, only 29 members of the CADs or their relatives had 
received compensation in 2000, while in 1989 only at least 345 CADs would have 
died. CVR, 48, 61. The TRC’s recommendation to enhance the compensations 
stipulated in supreme decree 077-92 in a way contradicts its recommendation not to 
create a separate reparation program for the CADs because of possible frictions in 
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notwithstanding the TRC’s stress on the human rights violations 
perpetrated by the CADs, the Integral Reparation Plan (PIR) that 
was designed in the wake of the TRC does include CAD members 
as potential beneficiaries, even if they were injured during active 
combat or confrontation and regardless of their previous conduct 
or the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.202 This 
differs from the clean hands doctrine that is applied to members 
of the Shining Path to exclude them from the PIR (cfr. chapter 
3.3).203 The PIR does, however, not provide a special category for 
the CADs. As Jemima García-Godos states:
The PIR makes no specific mention of peasant ronderos casualties 
because their dead and injured are included in the universe of 
victims and beneficiaries. The expanded definition of ‘victim 
of violation,’ which includes Peruvian armed forces, police and 
CAD members in combat or in confrontation with guerrillas, 
allows the identification of CAD casualties as victims and 
beneficiaries and entitles them to various forms of reparations 
on equal terms with other victims and beneficiaries.204
The CADs in the blind spot of civilian participation in violence
Indeed, while the TRC considers the CADs in the first place as 
the communities, because the amounts of compensation stipulated in the supreme 
decree are a lot higher than those that can be claimed by beneficiaries of the PIR 
(up to 10.000 PEN maximum). 
202  García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and 
the Challenge of Historical Interpretation,” 75.
203  The PIR does however exclude CAD members who have already been 
beneficiaries of the abovementioned compensation decree. What is more, the 
PIR recommended the complete withdrawal of the compensation decree and 
the integration of the CADs in the PIR. It should be noted, however, that the 
maximum compensation in the PIR (10.000 PEN) is a lot lower than that of the 
compensation decree. García-Godos, 76.
204  García-Godos, 77.
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combatants and thus potential perpetrators, the PIR in contrast 
identifies the CADs primarily as civilians and potential ‘innocent’ 
victims of human rights violations. Consequently, both the TRC and 
the PIR describe the agency of the CADs in terms that contrast 
victims and perpetrators; and civilians and combatants. The two most 
important transitional justice mechanisms thus make no significant 
attempt to further scrutinize or conceptualize the issue of civilian 
participation in violence, which in this specific case appears in the 
form of self-defense militias.205 In fact, the agency of the CADs 
thus corresponds to a blind spot in the transitional justice process 
which results from the categorization of survivors described in 
chapter 2.2. As explained, trauma and human rights are transitional 
justice’s most important parameters for defining the (post-)conflict 
identity of survivors of war and violence. This generally results in 
two opposed and highly moralized ways of describing that identity: 
the innocent victim of human rights violations who has the right to 
truth, justice and reparation as opposed to the vicious perpetrator 
who needs to be held accountable for human rights violations. As 
Erica Bouris points out, when it comes to describing (non)combatant 
status, “a chain of equivalence” runs from non-combatant status to 
innocence which “is intended to widen the moral gap between the 
perpetrator and victim, to assist in moral calculations that make it 
easier to recognize and sympathize with the victim and condemn the 
perpetrator.” Moreover, this dichotomy is gendered because women 
and children are likely to be identified as noncombatants and adult 
men as combatants.206 These (post)conflict identities described by 
the opposition between civilians vs. combatants and victims vs. 
perpetrators are typically static and ignore the fluidity of roles that 
characterizes war contexts. Accordingly, the properties which they 
are assigned are often considered exclusive. For example, the issue 
205  For a detailed assessment of peasant’s incentives for organizing self-defense 
during the civil war in the VRAEM, see chapter five of: Zech, “Between Two Fires: 
Civilian Resistance during Internal Armed Conflict in Peru.”
206  Bouris, Complex Political Victims, 36, 37.
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of perpetrator trauma is largely ignored, as trauma is a feature that 
in the first place defines victimhood. While, ironically enough, the 
concept of PTSD was originally developed to conceptualize the 
suffering of combatants (more specifically Vietnam war veterans), it 
became primarily associated with victimhood during the subsequent 
decades.207 Indeed, as Stef Craps and Lucy Bond point out:
While, in strictly clinical terms, it makes sense to argue for 
the recognition of the phenomenon of perpetrator trauma, in 
the real world such recognition will effectively be interpreted 
as making a dubious case for exonerating perpetrators, 
considering them ‘legitimate victims’, which amounts to a 
betrayal of the memory of the real victims.208 
In its pursuit of a moral separation between good and evil, 
transitional justice puts innocent victims and their rights center-
stage. The perpetrators’ active narrative of inflicting violence is thus 
subordinate to the victim’s passive narrative of undergoing violence. 
This means that (post-)conflict agency and identity are defined by 
the effects of violence rather than by its causes. The violence in 
itself is consequently described as ‘meaningless’ and ‘irrational’ and 
lacks (historical) contextualization. Lars Waldorf identified similar 
problems for the case of ex-combatants who testified before the 
South-African TRC:
The South African TRC missed several opportunities when 
it came to those ex-combatants who did testify at hearings. 
First, it failed to ask questions about chains of command 
that could have helped document broader patterns of abuse. 
Second, it focused on noncombatant victims, while treating 
ex- combatants as perpetrators and criminals […] Having 
207  Alan Gibbs, Contemporary American Trauma Narratives (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2014), 166.
208  Lucy Bond and Stef Craps, Trauma (Routledge, 2019), 120.
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categorized participants as either victims or perpetrators, the 
TRC ‘[left] ‘ordinary’ soldier experiences largely invisible.’ 
Finally, by treating combatants as perpetrators or “wishing 
them away,” it made their reintegration more difficult.209
In case of the CADs, the TRC was explicit about why they constituted 
a ‘difficult’ group of survivors that does not fit the category of the 
‘ideal’ innocent victim: 
In sum, there is no room for the CADs in the post-war world. 
Their reputation is bloodstained and their authoritarianism 
and the male values they hold are unattractive to international 
agencies or to NGOs which promote a culture of peace and 
gender equality.210 
Two important obstructions for the identification of the CADs as 
victims are mentioned here: their gender and the fact that they are 
an armed - and thus bloodstained - actor. Indeed, as stated in chapter 
3.3, the victim-perpetrator dichotomy often translates in a female-
male opposition: the dominant victim identity that is constructed is 
female, and the dominant perpetrator identity is male. The fact that 
the CADs actively cherish their masculine warrior identity while the 
TRC takes a gender-sensitive approach in favor of women increased 
their unpopularity before the TRC: 
The identity of the anti-subversive warrior that the commanders 
209  Lars Waldorf, “Ex-Combatants and Truth Commissions,” in Disarming the Past: 
Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants, ed. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo De Greiff, and 
Lars Waldorf (New York: ICTJ, 2009), 115.
210  My translation of original citation: “En suma, en el mundo posguerra no hay lugar para 
los CAD. Su reputación está manchada con sangre, y su autoritarismo y los valores masculinos 
que guardan, no son atractivos para agencias internacionales y ONG que promuevan la cultura 
de paz y la equidad de género. […]  El Estado, por su lado, da la impression que el tema le es 
desagradable y prefiere callar.” CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 49.
428
VI Hidden Heroes
construct during the conflict will not only bring them in trouble 
in the post-war period […], it also marginalizes women in the 
construction of the official history of the counter-insurgency 
war that emphasizes masculine heroism.211
The question of masculinity furthermore returned in the discussion 
on the future of the CADs, where the TRC considered their 
reorientation from self-defense to tasks related to socio-economic 
community-building:
The question thus is what to do with them [the CADs]. 
[…] On the other hand, the marginalization of the CADs 
by support agencies, like the international cooperation and 
NGOs, makes it even more unlikely that they [the CADs] will 
assume development tasks. To change this, they would have to 
abandon the masculine and militarized authoritarianism that 
characterizes them.212
While the TRC argued that “sooner or later, the self-defense 
committees should disappear” and pointed to the “demilitarization 
of daily life” and the “demilitarization of the minds” as “maybe the 
biggest challenge”, the discussion on the future of the CADs did not 
lead to concrete proposals for their disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR)213. This is probably due to the missing link 
211  My translation of original citation: “La identidad del guerrero antisubversivo que los 
comandos construyen durante el conflicto no solo les traerá problemas en la época posguerra […] 
sino margina a las mujeres en la construcción de la historia oficial de la guerra contrainsurgente 
que enfatiza el heroísmo masculino.” CVR, 31.
212  My translation of original citation: “La pregunta, entonces, es qué hacer con ellos. […] 
Por otro lado, la marginación de los CAD por parte de organismos de apoyo, como la cooperación 
internacional y las ONG, hace más difícil aún que asuman tareas de desarrollo. Para que ello 
cambie, tendrían que renunciar al autoritarismo masculino y militarizado que los caracteriza.” 
CVR, 56.
213  The UN defines disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration 
as follows: “Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and 
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between DDR and transitional justice that characterizes many (post-)
conflict contexts. While DDR and transitional justice share many of 
their long-term goals, “there is little, if any, coordination between 
the two.” According to Lars Waldorf, “this is largely explicable 
because of their different beneficiaries and aims: ex-combatants and 
security, on the one hand, and victims and justice, on the other.”214 
In the case of (post-)conflict Peru, no separate DDR program was 
set up to complement the existing transitional justice measures. 
While the TRC did express its concern about the disarmament 
and demobilization of the self-defense committees, the CADs on 
their turn made clear to the TRC that they did not perceive the 
conflict as finished and did not even consider disarming (cfr. 6.3). 
According to the TRC, however, it was definitely the state and 
disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of 
combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes 
the development of responsible arms management programmes. Demobilization 
is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces 
or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the 
processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops 
in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly 
areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support 
package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. Reinsertion is the 
assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-
term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to 
help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include 
transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term 
education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, 
continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-
term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up 
to one year. Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian 
status and gain sustain- able employment and income. Reintegration is essentially 
a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country 
and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.” 
UN, “Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Standards,” 2014.
214  Waldorf, “Introduction,” 16.
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not civilians that had to assume the responsibility for the struggle 
against the remnants of the Shining Path.215 At the same time, the 
TRC admitted that the government did not necessarily take this 
responsibility and described the position of the state towards the 
self-defense committees as follows:
The state, on its turn, gives the impression that it finds the 
topic unpleasant and prefers to silence it.216
Indeed, a first obvious reason for the state to avoid the topic of the 
CADs was the inconvenient truth that the state’s failure to defend 
its citizens against the Shining Path was the first reason of existence 
for the self-defense committees.217 Secondly, the CADs did not 
only undermine the state’s monopoly on the counter-insurgency 
campaign, they also proved to be more successful in fighting the 
Shining Path.218 In sum, the TRC encountered ambiguous and 
contrary positions towards the CADs from the state as well as from the 
human rights community. The CADs of the VRAEM thus resulted 
to be a ‘difficult’ actor in a ‘difficult’ region, where there did not 
even seem to be a consensus yet on whether the conflict was actually 
over when the transitional justice process took off. Consequently, 
transitional justice with its underlying ideas on memory, victimhood 
and time was not as actively diffused in the VRAEM as in the 
highlands of Ayacucho. To begin with, the absence of human rights 
215  My translation of original full citation: “Un reto aparte es la desmilitarización de la 
vida cotidiana (la “desmilitarización de las mentes”, como dijimos arriba), y la construcción de una 
cultura de paz que rompa el círculo de reproducción de la violencia política en la vida cotidiana. 
Eso, por cierto, es quizás la parte más difícil y requiere de una acción concertada entre el Estado, 
ONGs y la sociedad civil organizada.” CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 56.
216  My translation of original citation: “El Estado, por su lado, da la impresión que el 
tema le es desagradable y prefiere callar.” CVR, 49.
217  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 141.
218  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 63.
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NGOs that focus on (post-)conflict related topics is remarkable. The 
ICRC is the only humanitarian institution in the VRAEM working 
in the area of transitional justice. More specifically, their work is 
concerned with the search for the disappeared. They have, however, 
not more than one responsible staff member for the entire region.219 
As a result of the absence of NGOs - which in many remote parts of 
the country take over the state’s responsibility of informing citizens 
about their rights - disinformation and confusion about the TRC and 
the PIR seem even more remarkable in the VRAEM than in most 
parts of the highlands of Ayacucho.220 For example, some research 
participants in the VRAEM point out that they did not have the 
opportunity to testify because the TRC never came.221 Similar to 
many research participants in the highlands, others state that they 
did not want to testify before the TRC out of fear or distrust.222 
Several research participants were unaware of the fact that they can 
still register in the RUV and there is general confusion about the 
administrative procedure and the type of reparations that can be 
claimed.223 Some state that they have claimed reparations but did 
not receive anything, while in principle they should be entitled.224 
The administrator in charge of the RUV in a town in the district of 
219  Fieldnotes, conversation with ICRC representative, district of Pichari, 
11.05.2017.
220  This is a general impression that I gain from my fieldwork, which would need 
further in-depth comparative research in order to be proven.
221  Interview Camilo, ex-recruit of the Shining Path, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018; 
interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018; 
interview with Humberto, ex-CAD commander, district of Kimbiri, 13.05.2017. 
222  Interview with Nilda, ex-CAD member and widow, district of Kimbiri, 
23.06.2018; interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
24.06.2018; interview with Nelson, ex-CAD commander, district of Samugari, 
30.06.2018.
223  Interview with Victoria, widow of local authority killed by the Shining Path, 
district of Samugari, 29.06.2018; interview with Nilda, ex-CAD member and 
widow, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018; interview with Rosa, ex-CAD member 
whose father was killed by the Shining Path, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
224  Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
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Samugari admits that disinformation, the replacement of authorities 
and the lack of political will generate major problems in the follow-
up of the reparation program in the VRAEM.225 Furthermore, some 
research participants explicitly refer to the VRAEM as a context 
that makes testifying or claiming reparations more difficult: 
Until now [we have received] nothing, miss. Zero. The people, 
and especially here in the jungle, have not received anything. 
Of course, those who have asked for it, they received some 
support, some animals to breed, but that was in the highlands, 
here nothing. […] But also, the government could give 
[something], but because of this coca the government does not 
think good of us, the people of the jungle. They tell us we are 
narcotraficantes, that everyone has a lot of money and therefore 
all the support goes to the highlands.226
It is because you are in the VRAEM. So, when you are in the 
VRAEM, this means that there is more fear […] there is still 
more fear to give information […] it’s mostly to protect our 
225  Fieldnotes, conversation with RUV officer, district of Samugari, 27.06.2018. The 
reports of the CMAN list the implementation of individual and collective reparations 
per department. As the VRAEM is a region that entails several departments, 
it is hard to deduce advancements in the VRAEM from these reports. While I 
requested official numbers on the implementation of the PIR in the districts of the 
VRAEM to the CMAN, I never received them. With regards to the implementation 
of collective reparation projects in the VRAEM, Lisa Bunselmeyer’s research for 
the district of Santa Rosa states that a collective reparation project was designed 
for that district, but never implemented. Bunselmeyer, “Trust Repaired?”, p. 189.
226  My translation of original citation: “Hasta ahorita nada, señorita. Cero. La gente y 
sobre todo aquí en la selva no ha recibido nada. Claro los que han pedido, se les ha dado apoyo, 
algunos animalitos para que críen pero eso en la sierra, pero aquí nada. […] Pero también el 
gobierno puede dar, pero con esto de la coca el gobierno no nos mira bien aquí a los de la selva. Nos 
dicen que somos narcotraficantes, que todos tienen mucho dinero y en ese sentido el apoyo va para 
la sierra.” Interview with Ivan, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 27.06.2018.
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families. […] Like every country has its war, Peru’s little war is 
the VRAEM.227
Finally, the position of the CADs themselves as the potential 
‘receivers’ of transitional justice and human rights discourse should 
also be taken into account when analyzing its diffusion. The TRC’s 
accusations of human rights violations are met with bitterness by 
the CADs. An ex-commander in Llochegua stated that the TRC 
was “leftist” and “not neutral”. Besides, he feels bothered by the bad 
image that the TRC created of the CADs:
[The TRC] says that we have violated human rights, but the 
Shining Path was worse!228
While they openly admit that they have committed ‘excesses’, the 
CADs justify their acts as self-defense and seem to be frustrated by 
the framing in the language of human rights. They refer to human 
rights as something that did not exist in the VRAEM before and 
during the war and that ignores the reality of combat:
We applied the law of retaliation, an eye for an eye, who kills 
has to die, like it is said in the Bible.229
227  My translation of original citation: “Es por la misma naturalidad de que estas en 
el VRAEM. Entonces cuando estas en el VRAEM, significa que hay mayor temor […] hay 
temor todavía aun entre dar información […] es una protección familiar mayormente […]. Como 
cualquier país tiene su guerra, su pequeña guerra del Perú, creo, su pequeña guerra lo hace el 
VRAEM.” Interview with Sandra (daughter of Ladislao), district of Samugari, 
24.06.2018.
228  My translation of original citation: “Dice que los CADs han atropellado los derechos 
humanos, pero si Sendero era peor!” Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district 
of Llochegua, 10.05.2017.
229  My translation of original citation: “Aplicamos la ley del Talión, ojo por ojo, quién 
mata debe morir, así como dice la biblia.” Interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, 
district of Pichari, 08.07.2018.
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Yes, there was killing, but in defense, pues. This is what I tell 
you, but I don’t have anything to hide. I don’t have to lie about 
this or mislead you. But look, yes, there were killings. We are 
not going to say there were none. […] But they [the Shining 
Path] caught you and ambushed you and…230
Where do human rights exist? Where someone is watching 
you. And where no one is watching? Where no one sees it? 
There is no Mister Human Rights there. They [the Shining 
Path] grab you here and no one is watching you. They take you 
like that. There are no human rights. There should be human 
rights for us, the ones who were injured.231
Gabriela: Señor Nelson, what do you think of human rights? 
nelSon: Well, I think that they [the human rights ‘people’] 
accuse you, sometimes people tell you: ‘It was like that, it was 
like this.’ They practically say: ‘Let’s see, who did you kill?’ No, 
we didn’t kill, we always defended ourselves […] We are not 
that crazy here that we just kill like that. What are we, crazy 
because we take lives? If they confront you with a weapon, you 
don’t want to be killed either. It’s a war; what falls, falls.232
230  My translation of original citation: “Sí se ha matado pero en defensa pues. Eso yo les 
enseño a ustedes pero no tengo nada que ocultar. No tengo porqué mentir, ni engañarlos. Pero mira, 
sí se ha matado. No vamos a decir que no. […] Pero ellos te agarraron y te emboscaban y…” 
Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
231  My translation of original citation: “Derechos humanos existen dónde? Cuando el otro 
te ve. Y si donde no ve? Donde no ve? No está el señor de derechos humano. Te cogen por acá, 
no te ha visto nadie. Te llevan nomás. No hay derechos humanos. Derechos humanos debe haber 
para nosotros que hemos quedado heridos.” Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, 
district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
232  My translation of original citation: “Bueno creo que ellos te inculpan, a veces la gente 
te dice: ‘esto ha sido así, que es esto’. Ellos dicen prácticamente: ‘a ver, donde, a quienes le has 
matado?’ No, nadie le ha matado, siempre se ha defendido […] Acá ni loco para matar así. 
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In those times you could not even denounce [human rights 
violations]. Where? There were no authorities. Even here we 
recently have a prosecutor and a judicial system. […] That’s 
why the charges have to be fresh or at least after a year, but 
already twenty or thirty years have passed. […] Those things 
do not count anymore, because after going through a war, 
which surely has left a dark history, it is not worth the quarrel 
anymore. That’s why they speak of national reconciliation, if it 
is like that than we better burry it before it becomes the only 
thing that is left for history.233
In sum, the fact that the CADs were in many cases unsympathetic 
to human rights discourse contributed to the gap between them and 
the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ concerned with transitional justice. 
6.3 Appropriation, reaffirmation and contestation of 
transitional justice 
The law of the jungle? The CADs as providers of local governance and social 
order
Shedding light on the local processes of governance and social order 
that are both cause and consequence of the organization of peasants 
in self-defense committees during the war can help us to both 
¿Qué somos nosotros, locos para quitar la vida? Cuando te enfrentan con arma, no vas a querer 
que te maten también. Es una guerra, que se cae, se cayó.” Interview with Nelson, ex-CAD 
commander, district of Samugari, 30.06.2018.
233  My translation of original citation: “Ese tiempo no podías ni denunciar, ¿Dónde? No 
había autoridades. Aquí mismo recién tenemos fiscalía, poder judicial. […] Por eso las denuncias 
tiene que ser calientitos o por lo menos después de un año, pero ya han pasado 20 a 30 años. 
[…] Esas cosas ya no valen, porque después de haber pasado una guerra, que si bien es cierto ha 
quedado una historia negra, ya no vale hacernos leña por eso. Por eso se habla de la reconciliación 
nacional, si eso es así es mejor echarlo tierra porque si no solo queda para la historia.” Interview 
with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018.
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conceptualize and contextualize civilian participation in violence. 
This enables us to counter the idea of a peasantry helplessly caught 
between two fires turning into predatory warlords.  The organization 
of self-defense committees during the civil war drastically changed 
the local governance structure of the peasant society in the valley 
of the Apurímac river. As Mario Fumerton points out, the Shining 
Path’s strategy of targeting existing governmental and authority 
structures left a “governance vacuum” which was filled by the CADs. 
While the indiscriminately violent intervention of the state forces 
was the main catalyst for the organization of peasant self-defense234, 
the Shining Path was “the actor primarily responsible for creating 
the opportunity for peasant self-defence committees to assume 
governance functions within their villages”.235 In the midst of the 
cross-fire, peasants started building an alternative and strong local 
governance structure. Indeed, until the beginning of the war, most 
peasants had lived dispersed on their lands or in small hamlets.236 As 
an ex-CAD commander in the district of Pichari describes:
In that time [before the war], we all lived separately in our 
house on our land. There was no village, it is not like how it is 
now. Each one of us lived on his land. And for the meetings, 
for the faenas [collective communal work] we had an inspector, 
someone who communicated, a chasqui [messenger].237
However, the self-defense committees forced the population to 
centralize in fortified nucleated settlements, so-called bases civiles 
234  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 68.
235  Fumerton, 79.
236  Interview with Nilda, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018; 
interview with Julia, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018. 
237  My translation of original citation: “En ese tiempo, cada uno vivíamos en nuestra casa 
en nuestra chacra. No había pues población, no es como ahora. Vivíamos cada uno en nuestra 
chacra. Y para las reuniones, para las faenas teníamos un inspector, alguién que comunicaba, un 
chasqui.” Interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018.
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antisubversivas238 where the population often lived in provisional 
carpas239 before building more permanent houses.240 The newly 
founded base committees received clear orders from the headquarter 
on how to organize:
First of all, your base has to be well organized. Second, all the 
personnel of your base has to live in huts or tents, both men 
and women, without any exception, everyday,  but they will 
leave to their work during the day. Third, all the personnel has 
to do their service, obligatory, day and night, strictly. Forth, 
capture all the unknown persons that are walking around your 
base with firearms and bring them or hand them over to the 
organized bases.241
The centralization in strictly guarded bases allowed the CADs to 
control every movement of people leaving or entering the territory. 
Peasants had to ask written permission to the CADs to leave 
238  Civil anti-subversive bases
239  Tents
240  Interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018; 
interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 10.07.2019; 
interview with Ramiro, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 25.06.2018. This 
is how the constellation in the VRAEM fundamentally differs from districts in 
the highlands of Ayacucho where self-defense was also strong, such as the district 
of Tambo. In these communities, the already existing community organization 
was replaced by the CADs/CDCs. García-Godos García-Godos, “Citizenship, 
Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of the Effects of Armed Conflict on 
Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 125.
241  My translation of original citation: “Premero [sic] su base tiene ser bién [sic] organizado, 
Segundo todo el personal de su base tiene que vivir en chusas[sic]  o carpas tanto barones [sic] y 
mujeres sin ninguna deferencia [sic] alguna todos los dias pero saldran a sus trabajos de dia. Tercero 
todo el personal tienen que hacer su cirvicio[sic], obligatoriamente dia y noche estrectamente[sic], 
Cuarto captorar[sic] a las personas desconocidas que están caminando al rededor de su base con sus 
armas de juego[sic]  y treyerlo[sic]  o entregarlo a las bases organizadas.” Archivo de la Sede 
Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio N°42°6-S-C-C-
D-C-V-R-A-B-P, Pichiwillca, 06.11.1986.
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and enter the base, for example to travel to Huamanga or to find 
refuge in the valley after fleeing the violence in the highlands. In 
some cases, the CADs asked an entrance fee to finance the self-
defense committees.242 At the height of the war, the task of self-
defense, which generally consisted of patrolling through the valley 
and safeguarding the bases, became the main occupation of most 
peasants. Throughout the years, these larger concentrations of 
population centralized in the base committees led to the formation 
of new communities and towns who became legally recognized as 
such.243 The town of Santa Rosa, for example, emerged from such a 
centralization of fourteen dispersed hamlets.244 Indeed, documents 
from the archive demonstrate how non-organized hamlets decided 
to regroup and organize in self-defense committees, hereby always 
asking permission from the central headquarter to found a new 
base committee.245 Because every active member of the community 
participated in the tasks of self-defense, the CAD and the community 
converged into one single entity. As Fumerton states, “[...] the militia 
members were none other than the villagers themselves.”246 The 
fact that in their writings the peasants refer to their communities as 
“base” or “civil defense” (“defensa civil”), also when it comes to non-
242  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Solicita: Autorización, San Francisco, 07.01.1985; Constancia para permanecer en 
el CDC, Monterrico, 25.04.1985; interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, 
district of Pichari, 10.07.2018; interview with Rosa, ex-CAD member whose father 
was killed by the Shining Path, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
243  Gabriela Zamora Castellares, “Los Comités de Autodefensa y Las Comunidades 
Del VRAEM En El Conflicto Armado Interno 1980-2000” (Latin American 
Studies Association “Diálogos de saberes,” Lima, Perú, 2017).
244  Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes : Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in 
Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000, 118; Zamora Castellares, “Los Comités de Autodefensa 
y Las Comunidades Del VRAEM En El Conflicto Armado Interno 1980-2000.”
245  For example: Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle 
Apurímac-Ene, Solicita autorizacion para la creasion de nuestra defensa civil, sector barrio 
Miraflores Pichari, 06.11.1992; Oficio No. 008-92-PCDF/SA, Chuvibana, 20.06.1992. 
246  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 70.
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war-related issues, demonstrates the militarization of community 
life. The self-defense committees thus defended the interests of the 
community, which was one of their organizational strengths as it 
enhanced their legitimacy. Moreover, the network structure that 
allowed small entities to join forces provided for an efficient model 
of mobilization. The correspondence between the bases and the 
headquarter shows the constant communication and collaboration 
between the bases:
[...] we send our members accompanied by their escort and 
three detainees accompanied by an infant and their respective 
charge of suspects of the ExtremistSubversion [i.e. the Shining 
Path]. On the other hand, we send [our members] with the 
finality of coordinating and receiving indications about our 
difficulties and fighting fraternally hand in hand until reaching 
our demands.247
The hierarchical network structure of the self-defense committees 
thus became the principal governing body for the entire valley. 
While clearly emerging in a war context, the governance function of 
the CADs went beyond war affairs as the self-defense committees 
became the main organizers of daily life in the valley, including 
public services such as health and education. Moreover, the 
governance of the CADs ranged from managing rather banal daily 
local affairs (such as, among others, the transportation of 150 beer 
crates from one base to the other248, the organization of fairs and 
247  My translation of original citation: “[...] enviamos nuestros miembros acompañado de 
su Escolta y tres detenidos acompañado de una criatura y su respectivo atestado como sospechosos 
de la Suberción [sic] Extremista, por otro lado enviamos con la finalidad de coordinar y recibir 
indicaciones sobre nuestras dificultades y luchar fraternalmente mano a mano hasta alcansar [sic] 
nuestra reinvendicaciones [sic].” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa 
del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Dialogo de relaciones de nuestra organisación, Rinconada Baja, 
03.12.1984. 
248  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Comunicado, s.d. 
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football tournaments249 or requests for intervention in cases of 
theft250 and adultery251), to administering war affairs (proof hereof 
are, among many other documents, letters to the military252 or lists 
of self-defense patrols and their armament253) and communicating 
with (representatives of) the national government and international 
institutions such as the UN. While being an example of a local and 
bottom-up independent organizational structure, the governance of 
the CADs did not take place in isolation but explicitly related to a 
position in the nation and even the international community. To 
begin with, the fact that the CADs generated their own bureaucracy 
in Spanish - the language of power - shows their relation to national 
politics and governance.254 Furthermore, the CADs actively 
maintained their diplomatic relations with the state, for example 
by sending representatives to Lima to negotiate certain problems 
or demands with the central government. The relation between 
249  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, 
Se invita a participar a un campeonato relámpago de minifútbol y gran kermess, Pichiwillca, 
18.06.1986. The first price of the tournament was a bull of six years old, the fifth 
price a box of beer. 
250  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Denuncia por delito, Palmapampa, s.d.
251  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Oficio N°001 Informe sobre el problema de esta base, Palestina, 10.01.1985. This 
letter concerns a community member who is maintaining sexual relationships with 
several women despite being married and asks the headquarter to intervene. A 
handwritten note on the bottom of the letter says that a patrol of four to five self-
defense members will be send out to punish the men on the 13th of January 1985 
at five in the morning. 
252  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Oficio N°116-87-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-E-B, Pichiwillca, 18.11.1987.
253  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Relación de las patrullas de la defensa civil de Pichihuillca para realizar patrullaje asia 
Marintari son los siguientes personas, Pichiwillca, 10.06.1988.
254  On this topic, see also: García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and 
Reconstruction: A Case-Study of the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State 
Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 144.
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the CADs and the government was particularly close during the 
presidency of Fujimori, who, as mentioned, legally recognized the 
self-defense committees. For example, as evidenced by the archive, 
a commission was sent to Lima in 1992 after Fujimori’s autocoup. 
During this visit, the CADs had a personal meeting with economist 
and presidential advisor Hernando de Soto to discuss the antidrug 
policy for the Apurímac valley designed in accordance with the 
United Nations and the US State Department.255 In 1993, the 
president of the headquarter of the self-defense committees wrote 
a personal letter to president Fujimori calling for the design of 
the amnesty law that would absolve members of the self-defense 
committees for human rights violations committed in the context 
of self-defense:
[We ask] that the Council of Ministers designs a bill granting 
AMNESTY TO ALL THOSE DENOUNCED AND 
JURIDICALLY ACCUSED members of the Self-defense 
[...] As you know Mister President, many fighters for the 
PACIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY, during the previous 
government, we were mistakenly denounced for a series of 
crimes by the Democratic Lawyers and the so-called Human 
Rights Defenders, only for the fact that we defended our lives, 
the lives of our sons, of our family and the community against 
the attack of the bloodthirsty hordes of the Shining Path.256
255  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Informe Nro. 09-92, Pichiwillca, 1992. 
256  My translation of original citation: “Que el Concejo [sic] de Ministros elabore un 
Proyecto de Ley otorgando la AMNISTIA PARA TODOS LOS DENUNCIADOS 
Y PROCESADOS JUDICIALMENTE que son miembros de la Autodefensa [...] Como 
usted sabe Señor Presidente, muchos luchadores por la PACIFICACION DEL PAIS, 
durante el Gobierno anterior fuimos denunciados por una serie de delitos, injustamente por los 
Abogados Democráticos y los llamados Defensores de los Derechos Humanos, solamente por el 
hecho de defender nuestras vidas, la vida de nuestros hijos, de nuestra familia y la comunidad 
por la aremetida s [sic] de las hordas sanguinarias de Sendero Luminoso.” Archivo de la 
Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Pedimos solucion a 
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A letter dated in 1994 directed from the headquarter to the president 
of the constituent congress announces the arrival of a commission 
of representatives of the CADs with the purpose of  
[...] solving our problematic and searching once and for all the 
Pacification and the  Development that our region needs after 
ten years of struggle against the terrorist subversion of the 
“Shining Path”.257 
In the same year, the national TV channel América Televisión 
broadcasted a reportage that, according to the president of the 
central headquarter of the self-defense committees, portrays the 
CADs as narcotraficantes and brutes in a sensational way. In a letter 
to the provincial prosecutor, the president fiercely counters these 
allegations:
[...] we are humble peasants who live in abandonment and 
backwardness and to date we are the victims of the negative 
appetite of the enemies of the entire NATION [i.e. América 
Televisión].258
A letter concerning the same question is also directed to the 
Attorney General of the Nation, which concludes with the following 
statement:
problemas policiales y judiciales, Pichiwillca, 19.11.1993.
257  My translation of original citation: “[...] solucionar nuestra problemática y buscar 
definitivamente la Pacificación y el Desarrollo que necesita nuestra región, después de diez años de 
lucha contra la subversión terrorista de “Sendero Luminoso”.” Archivo de la Sede Central 
del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio N°068-DECAS-94, 
Pichiwillca, 17.08.1994.
258  My translation of original citation: “[...] somos humildes campesinos que vivimos en 
el abandono en el atraso y a la fecha somos víctimas de los negativos apetitos de los enemigos de 
la PATRIA entera [...] “ Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del 
Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio No 058-94-CAD-DECAS, Pichiwillca, 19.08.1994.
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We call the Attention, to a profound reflection of the 
Governing Entities and International [entities] (UN, Human 
Rights, Amnesty International) and the mass  Media; who 
when they had the chance turned a deaf ear closing their 
doors in the most critical moments of the struggle against 
the terrorist subversion of the Shining Path, who was the first 
violator of the Human Rights of our villagers.259
Furthermore, through their governance of both war-related and 
other daily affairs, the CADs became the main providers of social 
order260 during the civil war in the Apurímac valley: in the midst 
of the chaos of the war, the population developed strategies for 
survival and coexistence through the self-defense committees. Most 
interesting, in light of this study, is how the peasants dealt with the 
infiltration and reintegration of (ex-)Shining Path members in the 
community in an autonomous way, this is without appealing to the 
state forces. The CADs were constantly aware of the potential threat 
from within. They developed their own intelligence and reported 
any suspicious activity to the headquarter:
[...] we inform you about the declaration of our villager: that 
yesterday a man has  turned up who was going to palmapampa 
259  My translation of original citation: “Llamamos la Atención, a una profunda reflexión 
a las Entidades Gubernamentales e Inernacionales (O.N.U., Derechos Humanos, Amnistía 
Internacional) y los Medios de Comunicación masiva; que en su oportunidad hicieron oidos sordos 
cerrando sus puertas en los momentos más álgidos de la lucha contra la subversión terrorista 
de Sendero Luminoso quienes fueron los primeros violadores de los Derechos Humanos de 
nuestros comuneros.” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle 
Apurímac-Ene, Oficio No 058-94-CAD-DECAS, Pichiwillca, 19.08.1994.
260  Fumerton borrows Ana Arjona’s concept of “wartime social order”, which she 
defines as “the set of rules that structure human interaction in a given community 
during wartime, allowing for [...] predictability to exist”, Ana Arjona, “Wartime 
Institutions: A Research Agenda,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 8 (December 1, 
2014): 1374; Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime 
Social Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 64.
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coming from the locality of atalaya specially to spy on the 
organized bases [...]261 
As mentioned above, Shining Path members who were captured 
were not handed over to the military but incorporated (by force) 
into the self-defense committees. As the self-defense committee 
and the community were one single entity, to be incorporated 
meant to be (re)integrated in the community through the process 
of arrepentimiento262: the arrepentidos263 had to make a statement264 
expressing their remorse, after which they sometimes received public 
corporal punishments. Subsequently, by demonstrating their loyalty 
to the community through active participation in self-defense, the 
arrepentidos could gain or restore confidence.265 An ex-CAD member 
in the district of Samugari describes the process as follows:
For example, there were always persons who met [arrepentidos] 
while they were working on their land, so they brought them to 
the self-defense, and they informed them that they had found 
261  My translation of original citation: “[...] informamos su manifistación [sic]  de nuestro 
comuniro [sic]: que el dia de ayer a suvido [sic]  un hombre con destino a palmapampa de la 
lucalidad [sic] de atalaya espicialmente [sic] como expiar [sic]  a las bases organisadas [...]”, 
Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, 
Comunicado, s.d.s.l.
262  Repentance
263  Repentants
264  García-Godos elaborates on such testimonies given by arrepentidos in the 
community of Huayao, district of Tambo, which were recorded in the registry book 
of the local CDC/CAD and are very similar to the kind of statements that I found 
in the archive of the CAD headquarter in Pichiwillca. García-Godos points to 
the importance of the testimony as a time-marker indicating a ‘before’ and ‘after’. 
García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of the 
Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 136.
265  Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017; 
interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018; 
Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 73.
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an arrepentido. And then they [the arrepentidos] confessed: ‘I have 
come from that place, and this is how things were, and I could 
not bear it any longer, and that is why I have left.’ [...] And if 
you have a possibility to escape, you do it, and if you die while 
trying, well then you die. But there are two options: you die, or 
they forgive you. But the self-defense did forgive.266
The arrepentidos could be former members of the same community 
that reintegrated them, but due to the course of the war and the 
recruitment strategy of the Shining Path, many arrepentidos landed 
in communities where they did not originate from. For example, 
one research participant recounts how arrepentidos arrived from the 
highlands to seek refuge in the VRAEM:
A lot of times they came from the highlands, plenty of people 
with their white flag, carrying a baby, the other one of age, or a 
heavily pregnant woman. And the command waiting for them 
and we shouting: ‘Are the terrucosarriving, or what?’ - ‘No, 
these are arrepentidos’, that’s what they said at the time. They 
arrived in herds, like animals, to every village.267
He also describes how, after several days or even weeks of patrolling, 
the self-defense committees came back to the village accompanied 
266  My translation of original citation: “Por ejemplo siempre hay pues las personas que 
están en las chacras y se encontraban, entonces lo habían llegar a las autodefensas y les informaban 
que yo he encontrado a esta persona y es un arrepentido, o se ha arrepentido. Y así avisaban ‘yo 
he venido de tal sitio, y así eran las cosas, y ya no soportaba más y por eso me he salido.’ [...]  Y si 
tienes una posibilidad de escapar, lo haces, y si tienes que morir en el intento pues mueres. Pero son 
dos cosas, mueres o te perdonan. Pero las autodefensas si perdonaban.” Interview with Ivan, 
ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 27.06.2018.
267  My translation of original citation: “Muchas veces llegaban de la sierra, gente bastante 
con su banderita blanquito, bebé cargado, el otro anciano, o la señora embarazada a las justas. Y 
comando esperan, llamamos pe ‘¿Están llegando terrucos o no?’ - ‘Esos son arrepentidos’, decían 
esa fecha. En manadas llegaban como animal pe, a cada pueblo.” Interview with Ladislao, 
ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
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by arrepentidos and prisoners. Upon their arrival to the village, the 
arrepentidos were separated from the prisoners and lodged in the 
school building, where they were fed and had to make a statement. 
Subsequently, the proprietarios would stand guarantee for a family 
of arrepentidos in order to facilitate their reintegration process by 
granting them access to a piece of land or by offering them a job as 
peón on their own land. Once the community had decided that they 
could stay, the arrepentidos were inscribed in the civil register and had 
to participate in self-defense.268 According to Kimberly Theidon’s 
research in the highlands of Huanta in the 1990s, where peasants 
were also organized in self-defense committees, the process of 
arrepentimiento 
[...] evaded the watchful eyes of the soldiers stationed in the 
military bases or other state representatives who made their 
way to these rural villages. Concerns that the military would 
denounce their villages as zonas rojas (“red zones” - sympathetic 
to the guerrilla) kept these processes occult.269
Indeed, as stated above, the peasants’ urge to distance themselves 
from the Shining Path in front of the state forces was one of the 
primary reasons of existence for the self-defense committees. At 
the same time, pragmatic reasons, such as the need to maintain 
coexistence and the possibility of obtaining valuable information 
concerning the position of the enemy, motivated the peasants to 
268  Interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
269  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 230. On p. 234, Theidon points to the history 
of the concept of arrepentimiento, which predates the conflict. Furthermore, in 
1992, president Alberto Fujimori passed the so-called Repentance Law (Ley de 
Arrepentimiento) as part of his counterinsurgency strategy, which encouraged Shining 
Path members to turn themselves in and, in exchange for information about other 
suspects, receive reduction of sentence. While this motivated some 6.630 Shining 
Path members to come forth, the law also led to many false accusations and 
arbitrary detentions. 
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resort to local reintegration strategies.270 Moreover, as is often 
stressed by research participants as well as in the declarations of 
prisoners found in the archive271, a significant part of the arrepentidos 
were forcedly recruited by the Shining Path and thus did not join 
the movement voluntarily. These recruits, who often lived in terrible 
conditions in the Shining Path camps in the jungle for many years, 
were often approached with compassion upon their return to the 
community. An ex-CAD commander in Pichari is moved when he 
recalls the arrepentidos:
There [in the Shining Path] the people involved were humble 
persons, those were  not prepared persons. They were humble 
peasants, poor mocositos [snot-nosed children]. They were 
recruited. What were they do blame? So, we could not kill 
them either. The only thing we had left to do was to try to 
rescue them. [...] When I remember what [happened], such 
sorrow... [starts crying] We brought them very  ill, how could 
we kill them? You had to save them.272
One of these notorious Shining Path camps was the one in Sello 
de Oro, in the district of Santa Rosa, which was liberated by the 
270  Kimberly Theidon uses the term ‘micro-reconciliation’ to refer to mechanisms 
such as arrepentimiento and analyzes the relation with Christian notions of compassion, 
confession and forgiveness. Theidon, 225-50. In light of the present study, I prefer 
to speak of reintegration instead of reconciliation, because reconciliation is a term 
that implies references to certain underlying personal processes which I find hard 
to grasp.  
271  For example: Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle 
Apurímac-Ene, Manifestación de un reclutado, Canal, 17.05.1988.
272  My translation of original citation: “ Y bueno ahí estaban metidos las personas 
humildes, no eran pues personas preparadas. Eran humildes campesinos, pobres mocositos. Eran 
pues reclutados. Y ellos qué culpa tenían? Entonces tampoco los podíamos matar. Y lo que nos 
quedaba era tratar de rescatarlos. [...] Cuando recuerdo lo que, qué pena...[llora] Los hemos 
traído muy enfermos. Que vas a poder matarlos? Tenías que rescatarlos.” Interview with 
Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018.
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self-defense committees in 1993. A video broadcasted by VRAE 
TV shows the Shining Path members – including many women and 
children - coming out of the forest with white flags, handing over 
their weapons to the commander of the self-defense committees 
who, according to the voice-over, “orders to give a good treatment 
to those who return to society.”273 
Furthermore, Theidon points out how the self-defense committees 
increased the population’s feeling of security and “[...] allowed 
people to feel less threatened by [...] those who lived next door.”274 
By eliminating direct feelings of fear and distrust, the CADs 
enhanced the population’s social capital for reintegrating ‘intimate 
enemies’.All these different elements - taking distance from the 
Shining Path in the eyes of the army, the need for local coexistence, 
the development of intelligence as a war strategy, feelings of 
compassion and enhanced security - contributed to the peasant’s 
motivation for developing internal strategies of reintegration that 
did not involve external intervention from the government or 
judiciary. The infiltration of Shining Path members and the process 
of arrepentimiento are recurring topics in interviews as well as in the 
documents found in the archive of the CADs, which demonstrates 
the population’s need for managing relations in a war context that 
generates pressure on existing structures and expectations of social 
cohesion. For example, several lists of “presumed terrorists” found 
in the archive show how the peasants differentiated between the 
many different ways of collaborating with or actively participating in 
the Shining Path: “collaborator with his boat”, “combatant”, “former 
combatant”, “soldier combatant villain”, “the best collaborator”, 
“responsible of the Shining Path members”, “collaborator with 
273  My translation of original citation:“ordena dar un buen trato a los 
que vuelven a la sociedad.” https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_
fbid=122771488084100&id=100010537472680&sfnsn=mo, last consulted 
18.03.2019. 
274  Theidon, Intimate Enemies, 250.
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foodstuff”, “consciousness-raiser”.275 
A declaration of a forcedly recruited arrepentido concludes with 
the phrase: “now I come here to declare my mistakes”, hereby 
demonstrating the importance of showing remorse.276 Nevertheless, 
requests for reintegration were sometimes also resisted by the 
community. For example, one of the base committees writes to the 
headquarter concerning the case of a family of “fugitivos” (“fugitives”) 
who want to re-enter the community: 
The abovementioned family is one of the fugitives, one of the 
ideologists of the Shining Path [...] He was the enemy in our 
organization with the peasants of our  community. For this 
reason, all the inhabitants of this community do not agree with 
the entry of this element to the base.277
Indeed, the process of arrepentimiento could not always mend what 
had been broken. A note from one of the base committees to the 
headquarter concerns the faith of a prisoner, who, according to the 
writer, should be released and left to believe that he can stay in the 
community. Then, after several days, a conspiracy should be set up 
to kill him because:
275  My translation of original citation: “colaborador con su bote”, “combatiente”, 
“combatiente anterior”, “soldado combatiente maton”, “el mejor colaborador”, “responsable de 
los senderos”, “colaborador con viveres”, “conscientisador” Archivo de la Sede Central del 
Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Declaración de persona capturada en la 
base de Mapitunari, Mapitunari, s.d.
276  My translation of original citation: “Ahora vengo a declarar mis errores.” Archivo de 
la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Manifestación, 
Iribamba, 12.08.1988.
277  My translation of original citation: “La familia arriba mensionado [sic]   es uno de 
los fuguitivos  [sic] , como uno de los ediólogos [sic]   del sendero Luminoso  [...]  Era el hombre 
enemigo en nuestra organizacion con los campesinos de nuestra comunidad. Por esta razon todos los 
moradores de esta comunidad, no estan de acuerdo con el engreso  [sic]  de este elemento a la base.” 
Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, 
Oficio N°044.D.C.M-85, Manitea, 10.02.1985.
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[...] he can condemn us with his parties [Shining Path members] 
we have to do this [the killing] in complete secrecy without 
people being aware of it, because this kind of person has to die 
because he betrays our organization [the CAD].278
Nevertheless, arrepentimiento was a key-element of the war strategy 
and of the CAD’s governance, as is reflected in the description of 
their mission in a letter sent by the headquarter to the Attorney 
General of the Nation:
[...] the liberation of the people of the entire Valley of the River 
Apurímac and Ene  [by] expelling and retaking the terroristas 
arrepentidos [...]279
Myths and machos: The (hidden) heroes of the pacification
On the main square of the town of Kimbiri stands a monument 
depicting a CAD commander who stands on a high tree-like 
column and triumphantly holds his riffle up in the air. On the rocks 
below him stand four other characters: an Asháninka man ready to 
release an arrow from his bow, a combative peasant man waving a 
machete and holding a stick, a peasant woman with a basket and an 
Asháninka woman breastfeeding her baby. The men stand on the 
first level below the commander; the women on the second level, 
hereby reflecting the gendered hierarchy of self-defense. The CAD 
278  My translation of original citation: “[...] nos puide [sic] condenar con sus partedos [sic] 
esto tenemos que hacer complitamente [sic]  en forma muy secreto sen [sic]  que sepa gente enconciente 
[sic], porque este tipo de persona debe de murer [sic]  porque nos ase [sic]  la traecion [sic] ha [sic] 
nuestra organisacion [sic]” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del 
Valle Apurímac-Ene, Nota, 15.05.1987.
279  My translation of original citation: “[...] la liberación de los pueblos de todo el Valle 
de Río Apurímac y Ene expulsando y recuperando a los terroristas arrepentidos [...]” Archivo 
de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio No 
058-94-CAD-DECAS, Pichiwillca, 19.08.1994.
451
VI Hidden Heroes
is protecting the population and its environment: the column is 
surrounded by water and all kinds of wild animals, among which, 
most noteworthy, a jaguar ready to attack the spectators of the 
monument. A plaque on the column holds the following inscription:
In honor of the men who fought for our pacification, and who 
day by day continue in the struggle for the grandeur of Kimbiri 
- VRAE.280
The monument in Kimbiri does not stand alone. The CADs and 
their collective memory are embedded in the public space of several 
towns throughout the valley. When entering Pichwillca, a signboard 
welcomes visitors to the cuna de la pacificación nacional281. In Pichari, 
huge coca leaves with the inscription Pichari bastión de la pacificación282 
stand solemnly on the main square, reminding passers-by of the 
strong link between coca and self-defense. 
The building of the actual CAD in Llochegua is decorated with 
a wall painting depicting the shield of the CADs right above the 
entrance door. The shield consists of two riffles crossed above the 
Apurímac river and surrounded by mountains, carrying the slogan 
por la pacificación venceremos283 underneath on a red-white ribbon 
which represents the Peruvian flag. On the inside, the building is 
decorated with portraits of the ‘heroes of the pacification’, former 
CAD commanders who have died in battle. 
In a corner of the main square of the town of Santa Rosa stands a 
statue of Antonio Cárdenas, the emblematical leader of the central 
self-defense committee of Pichiwillca. The monument was erected 
in 2016. Antonio, who according to the stories had a remarkable 
charisma, holds his riffle in one hand and a sling with a rope and 
280  My translation of original inscription:“En honor a los hombres que lucharon por 
nuestra pacificación, y que día a día continuan en la lucha por la grandeza de Kimbiri - VRAE.”
281  Cradle of the national pacification
282  Pichari, stronghold of the pacification
283  For the pacification we will win
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stone in the other. The inscription says: 
Monument in honor of Antonio Cárdenas Torres  
1 OCT 1964 - 31 OCT 2012  
Central President DECAS - CAD - VRAE284
Antonio Cárdenas and his legacy are also the central theme of the 
yearly celebration of the anniversary of the foundation of the central 
self-defense committee of Pichiwillca on the 21st of June, which 
brings together hundreds of ex- and actual members of the self-
defense committees of the entire valley. The leaflet of the invitation 
does not only include the detailed program of the commemorative 
activities, but also a short biography of el líder histórico285. When 
attending the commemoration in 2018, we were invited to join 
the actual and former leaders, the local authorities and the general 
commanders of the VRAEM unit of the Peruvian army in the 
romería286 to Cárdenas’ grave before the start of the public ceremony 
on the main square. Like many peasants in the VRAEM, Cárdenas 
was buried on his land, which lies right at the entry of the village. 
During the gathering at his burial site, Cárdenas and the self-defense 
committees were honored for their contribution to the pacification in 
the speeches of the respective representatives and through a musical 
tribute of the military orchestra. In the meantime, the crowd started 
gathering at the main square for the central ceremony, which was 
solemnly opened by singing the national anthem. The anthem was 
followed by more speeches of the abovementioned representatives 
in which patriotism, memories of the war and reflections on the 
actual situation in the region were interwoven, as reflected in the 
following fragment of the speech of a local authority:
284  My translation of original inscription: “Monumento en homenaje a Antonio Cardenas 
Torres 1 OCT 1964 - 31 OCT 2012 Presidente Central DECAS - CAD - VRAE”
285  The historical leader
286  Pilgrimage
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Today 21st of June we commemorate one more year of the 
foundation of our glorious self-defense [...] that has fought 
for the pacification of our VRAEM, and why not say of our 
dear Peru. Let us remember these times when things were 
very different. Let us thank our older brothers, maybe some 
of them are disabled, others have passed away, some widows 
[are] helpless, [there are] orphans who have not had the chance 
to study, but we are still here. We have defended democracy 
with the self-defense, we have defended la bicolor [the red and 
white Peruvian flag] like good Peruvians. [...] The self-defense 
committees do not have a salary, we worked ad honorem. Using 
our sacred plant [coca] we have financed ourselves to find 
peace. Today we thank the Peruvian Army and the Marine 
forces who were also involved in the pacification. [...] In this 
region, we have been marginalized, we have not even been 
taken care of by public services [...] but today we are free, and 
we can say that we are VRAEM, we can say that we are present, 
ladies and gentlemen, present!287
After the speeches, the desfile Civico Patriótico288, consisting of 
delegations of self-defense committees from the entire region - both 
287  My translation of original citation: “Hoy día 21 de junio conmemoramos un año mas 
de la fundación de nuestro glorioso autodefensa [...] que ha luchado en las areas de la pacificación 
de nuestro VRAEM, y porque no decir a nuestro Perú querido. Recordarle aquellas épocas 
cuando las cosas eran muy diferentes. Agradecerles a nuestros hermanos mayores, tal vez algunos 
ya son inválidos, algunos ya son finados, algunas viudas desamparados, niños huérfanos ni siquiera 
han podido estudiar, pero estamos. Hemos defendido la democracia con la autodefensa, hemos 
defendido la bicolor como buenos peruanos [...]. Los comités de autodefensa no tienen sueldo, 
trabajamos ad honorem [...] utilizando nuestra planta sagrada nos hemos autofinanciado para 
estar tranquilos. Hoy por hoy agradecemos también al Ejército peruano a La Marina que también 
se han involucrado para llegar a esta pacificación [...] Esta región hemos sido marginados, ni 
siquiera hemos sido atendidos en las instituciones publicas [...] pero hoy por hoy ya somos libres y 
podemos decir que somos VRAEM, podemos decir que estamos aquí presentes señores, presentes.” 
Field recordings, speech of a local authority at the commemoration ceremony of 
the self-defense committees, Pichiwillca, 21.06.2018.
288  Civil Patriotic parade
Ex-CAD commanders at the grave of Antonio Cárdenas in Pichiwillca (2018)
CADs singing the national anthem during the commemoration ceremony in 
Pichiwillca (2018)
Welcome sign at the entrance of Pichiwillca (2018)
Building of the CADs in the town of Llochegua (2018)
Statue in Kimbiri (2015, 2017)
Statue of Antonio Cárdenas in Santa Rosa (2018) A coca leaf-shaped monument in honor of the 
pacification in Pichari (2017)
Portrait of a fallen commander in the office 
of the CADs in Llochegua (2018)
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from the old and new generation, men as well as women - and school 
children dressed up as self-defense committee members, marched 
around the main square and through the village. The parade was 
followed by a communal meal and a party with a band playing live 
music. Pichiwillca is not the only town in the VRAEM where this 
kind of commemoration is held.  The town of Puerto Mayo in the 
district of Pichari, for example, celebrates the anniversary of the 
beginning of the population’s armed struggle against the Shining 
Path every year in the first week of July.289 In the town of Llochegua, 
the anniversary of the CAD is celebrated each year in the beginning 
of August during a two day festival including, among other activities, 
a parade with delegations of several self-defense committees of the 
region and reenactments of interventions of the CADs during the 
war.290 
As pointed out in 6.2, the TRC referred to the “male values” 
cherished by the CADs as problematic and “unattractive” to the 
international community. The protagonists of the heroic memory 
of the CADs are indeed warriors whose identity is shaped at the 
intersection of militarization and machismo. The idea that men have 
to protect their family is a central element of machismo that in this 
respect can be related to the emergence of self-defense. For example, 
the mother whom I mentioned earlier in this chapter, who did not 
want her son to join the self-defense patrols, was a single parent. At 
the age of sixteen, her son decided that “he was now a macho” (“ya 
era macho ya yo”) and had to take up the role of the father (“yo soy el 
padre”), which is why he decided to join the self-defense committee 
rather than finishing school.291 Throughout the war, this macho 
warrior identity was progressively constructed as activities related to 
self-defense became a priority. As mentioned, both men and women 
participated in these activities. Despite the fact that tasks were 
289  Interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018.
290  Field recordings, Meeting with board of directors of the self-defense committee of Llochegua, 
Llochegua, 10.07.2018. 
291  Interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
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mostly gendered, women in some cases also assumed male roles 
such as patrolling. As communities were labeled ‘bases’ and peasants 
became soldiers, “military life came to the VRAEM”.292 Values 
such as discipline, obedience, strength and loyalty became central 
elements of the organization of daily life. The nicknames of the 
commanders, such as Beast or Dragon, represented their dauntless 
military alter ego. Both the fact that many of the commanders 
were licenciados, and the firm alliance with the Peruvian army that 
emerged in many places, contributed to the construction of this 
military identity. Moreover, through their emblematical leadership, 
some of the CAD commanders became legendary figures in the eyes 
of the population and were perceived with a mixture of fear and 
admiration.293 As Zech’s research on civilian resistance during the 
war in Peru suggests, community narratives of pride and resistance 
featuring the celebration of a heroic warrior identity played a key 
role in the mobilization of peasants in self-defense committees.294 
The construction of heroes and living legends thus became one 
of the many strategies of survival in the midst of war. Today, the 
‘heroes of the pacification’ have become the protagonists of the 
myths and narratives about self-defense that play an important 
role in shaping (post-)conflict identities in the VRAEM. New 
communities were founded as self-defense bases and thus, the 
genesis of these communities is inevitably rooted in the war. For an 
entire generation, the war was their primary formative experience. 
As Kimberly Theidon stated about the Colombian ex-combatants 
she conducted research with, “these men embody their violent pasts 
in enduring, albeit often unconscious, ways.” For combatants, the 
psychological experience of the war is inevitably interrelated with 
the physical capacity of their body which has been trained for, and 
292  My translation of original citation: “La vida militar llegó al VRAEM.” Interview 
with Francisco, ex-CAD commander and licenciado, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
293  Zech, “Between Two Fires: Civilian Resistance during Internal Armed 
Conflict in Peru,” 229.
294  Zech, 107.
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in many cases mutilated by, the war. Many ex-commanders still hold 
on to their warrior identity, for example by cherishing their weapons 
or by expressing military views on order and authority. One of the 
ex-commanders stated, for example, that Peru needed “un gobierno 
pero que sea un buen macho” (“a good macho government”), preferably 
“someone like Pinochet” to solve its problems with corruption.295 
Many ex-commanders, as well as many people in general in the 
VRAEM, express nostalgia for the authoritarianism of Fujimori. 
Another ex-commander complained about the fact that his merits 
are not recognized by his fellow villagers by stating that he is no 
longer perceived as a macho.296 
As to be expected, the heroic memory of the pacification coexists 
with memories that stress the abuses of the CADs. During one of 
our visits to the town of Santa Rosa, a woman selling chicha and 
anticuchos297 on the main square, who was not a local from the 
VRAEM herself, pointed at the statue and entrusted us that ‘people 
talk bad about that man’ and that ‘he was said to have killed innocent 
people’.298 During interviews and informal conversations, several 
research participants shared memories of violence perpetrated by 
the CADs against civilians, although this did not necessarily impede 
their recognition of the CADs as heroes.299 
Indeed, the dominant narrative that is celebrated and displayed 
in public space honors the CADs as pacifiers of the valley rather 
than as perpetrators of war crimes.300 It is a glorious narrative that 
295  Interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 10.07.2018.
296  Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
297  Chicha: a drink made from fermented corn, anticuchos: grilled meat skewers.
298  Fieldnotes, district of Santa Rosa, 11.07.2018.
299  Interview with Flora, daughter of ex-CAD commander, district of Santa Rosa, 
11.07.2018; interview with Nilda, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018; 
interview with Franco, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018.
300  The heroic role of the CADs was almost unanimously confirmed by research 
participants. There is, of course, an important potential bias in the research 
participants, as nearly all the interviewees were closely involved with the CADs, 
as was most of the population during the war. The main focus of my research 
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identifies heroes rather than victims. This heroic memory fostered 
by the CADs conflicts in two interrelated ways with the kind of 
commemorative discourse and practice that stands center-stage in 
transitional justice and its underlying assumptions on prevention 
and recognition. First, the memory duty in transitional justice is 
based on the assumption that keeping a memory of human rights 
violations alive will prevent similar violations from happening in the 
future. The memory of the CADs, however, puts an active narrative 
of participation center-stage rather than telling a story of trauma 
and suffering. In this public narrative, the memory of the positive 
outcome of their participation - namely victory over the Shining Path 
- prevails over the negative consequences of the war. Consequently, 
their narrative glorifies rather than condemns (certain aspects of) 
the war. For the CADs, one of the underlying ideas of this heroic 
memory is that their active contribution should be remembered in 
order to enable similar participation in present and future conflicts. 
One of the assumptions behind their commemorative practice is 
that the experience of self-defense during the civil war serves as a 
learning process that will help the actual and future leaders to take up 
an active role in problems related to crime and drug trafficking. As 
the current regional leader of the self-defense committees affirmed 
in his speech during the commemoration ceremony in Pichiwillca:
Now indeed the Shining Path is not what it used to be back 
then, in 1984, but now there is another enemy, which is 
criminality, so we have to apply the same experience against 
this evil enemy, which is why, once again, I thank the men and 
women that have given their time, their struggle, their blood, 
their tears. This is why we are taking up this responsibility in 
honor of them, [...] to continue with this same goal of pursuing 
in the VRAEM was the dominant narrative on the war of those who still live in 
the valley. To scrutinize the counter-memories that live beneath the surface of the 
public domain and intersect this dominant narrative, further research is necessary.
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peace for our people [...]301
Another current leader of the self-defense committees, who also 
played an active role during the conflict, expressed similar views 
during his speech:
We have pacified what no one has been able to [pacify] and 
we have saved human lives, we have taken care of human 
lives for free but for the favor, for the blessing of God we 
are not dead yet and we will continue forward while this 
glorious organization exists [...] We will continue to eliminate 
our enemies, as there still is a group of senderistas [Shining 
Path members] and now war is being declared to us by crime, 
corruption and environmental contamination in the VRAEM 
[...] As we have foughtto pacify, do not dedicate yourself to 
drinking, do not dedicate yourself to smoking  drugs. Today, 
dear authorities, there is drug addiction in the VRAEM, there 
is child prostitution, to all of this we are saying ‘enough!’ We 
have to save the lives of this new generation. [...] Long live the 
self-defense!302 
301  My translation of original citation: “Ahora efectivamente ya no hay  el Sendero como 
en ese año, en el año 84, pero ahora viene otro enemigo que es la delincuencia, entonces esa misma 
experiencia tenemos que aplicar contra ese enemigo del mal, entonces por lo tanto, una vez más, doy 
las gracias a los hombres y mujeres que han dado su tiempo, su lucha, su sangre, su lagrima que 
han derramado y por eso estamos llevando este cargo en honor a ello para [...] seguir con ese mismo 
objetivo de querer la paz para nuestro pueblo [...]” Field recordings, Speech of the regional 
leader of the self-defense committees at the commemoration ceremony of the self-defense committees, 
Pichiwillca, 21.06.2018.
302  My translation of original citation:“Nosotros hemos pacificado lo que no ha podido 
nadie y hemos salvado vidas humanas, hemos cuidado vidas humanas gratis pero por el favor, 
por la bendición de dios todavía no estamos muertos y seguiremos adelante mientras existe este 
glorioso organización todo comité de defensa antisubversiva [...] seguiremos eliminando a nuestros 
enemigos que todavía  hay un grupo de senderistas y ahora que la guerra nos está declarando 
es la delincuencia, la corrupción y la contaminación ambiental en el VRAEM [...] mientras 
que nosotros hemos peleado para pacificar, no se dediquen a tomar, no se dediquen a fumar la 
droga, hoy en día señores autoridades hay drogadicción en el VRAEM, hay prostitución infantil 
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The CADs conception of history as a life teacher thus differs from 
transitional justice’s assumption of memory as a prevention of 
future conflict, in which victims and their traumatic experience of 
violence stand are the living proof of the fact that similar events 
should never happen again. For the CADs, their heroic memory serves 
as an example to act similarly in case violence happens again. Second, while 
in transitional justice memory is considered as a moral duty in order 
to recognize the suffering of the victims, the heroic memory of the 
CADs stands in function of the recognition of their contribution to 
the defeat of the Shining Path. While the CADs do not disregard 
that the population has suffered during the war, they perceive 
themselves in the first place as heroes and not as victims. Moreover, 
these heroes actively cherish a macho warrior identity which is 
diametrically opposed to the kind of victim identity constituted by 
transitional justice. Nevertheless, as argued in 6.2, the agency of the 
CADs corresponds to a blind spot in the transitional justice process 
which results in a failure to conceptualize the active participation of 
civilians in the violence. The ‘heroes of the pacification’ thus remain 
hidden in the categorization of agency put forward by transitional 
justice mechanisms such as the TRC and the PIR. This is much to 
the frustration of the CADs who strive for the recognition of their 
contribution. The last paragraph of this chapter will return to this 
point.
The VRAEM’s contemporary past
As pointed out in the foregoing paragraph, the entanglement of the 
memories of the war with references to the current situation in the 
VRAEM is remarkably present both in interviews and in public 
discourses, such as the speeches delivered at the commemoration 
a todo eso estamos diciendo alto  [...] hay que salvaguardar su vida de esta generación nueva. 
[...] ¡Que viva la autodefensa!” Field recordings, Speech of current self-defense leader at the 
commemoration ceremony of the self-defense committees, Pichiwillca, 21.06.2018.
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ceremony. Indeed, several aspects can be identified that contribute 
to a sense of ‘contemporary past’ in the VRAEM: a temporality that 
challenges the ruptures between past, present and future proposed 
by transitional justice, and which helps us to relate recent human 
rights violations to longer historical processes of injustice that have 
not yet concluded, and potentially spark new outbreaks of social 
conflict and violence (cfr. chapter 2.3).
First of all, there is the question of (dis)armament of the CADs and 
their perception of the end of the war. During the TRC’s mandate, 
many of the CADs perceived the conflict with the Shining Path as 
still ongoing and they did not count on the state to protect them. 
This is clearly demonstrated in the report that summarizes the 
interventions of the CADs during the workshops organized by the 
TRC:
They [the CADs] questioned tangentially the investigative 
work of the TRC and held up that the ronda [read CADs] is the 
only mechanism to pacify the country.303
They [the CADs] affirm that the conflict with the Shining 
Path has not ended.304
They [the CADs] propose that the TRC enters the zone of the 
Ene [river] to collect testimonies and verify the situation of 
political violence.305
303  My translation of original citation: “Cuestionaron tangencialmente la labor 
investigatoria de la CVR y sostuvieron que la ronda (léase CADs) es el único mecanismo para 
pacificar el país.” CVR, 2.
304  My translation of original citation: “Afirman que el conflicto con Sendero Luminoso 
aún no ha terminado.” CVR, 3.
305  My translation of original citation: “Propone que la CVR entre a la zona del Ene 
para recoger testimonios y verificar la situación de violencia política.” CVR, 5.
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[According to the CADs] the topic of security corresponds to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Nevertheless, [according to 
the CADs] all policemen are corrupt.306
The CADs fiercely defended the right to carry arms during the 
mandate of the TRC and, as mentioned, they were never officially 
disarmed.307 On the contrary, some of the CADs even asked the 
TRC for more armament.308 Today, the right to carry arms is still 
considered self-evident by the CADs and they still do so when 
patrolling and providing security during communal parties and 
other events.309 The arms that were once used to fight the Shining 
Path, whether purchased or donated by the state, are now applied in 
defense of criminals, as a local authority in the district of Samugari 
explains:
This armament that they have given to us is to defend us 
from common criminality, to scare them, to protect our 
community.310
Some research participants furthermore complained about 
the military collecting the rifles of the CADs, supposedly for 
maintenance, and not giving them back.311 Many rifles are in bad 
condition or lack ammunition but nevertheless, the ex-commanders 
mostly still cherish their weapons and express to be ready to use 
306  My translation of original citation: “El tema de la seguridad corresponde al Ministerio 
del Interior. Sin embargo, todos los policías son corruptos.” CVR, 5.
307  CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 3,” 39.
308  CVR, “Comité de Autodefensa 2,” 55.
309  Fieldnotes, district of Kimbiri, 13.05.2017; district of Samugari, 21.06.2018; 
district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018; district of Llochegua, 10.07.2018.
310  My translation of original citation: “”Ese armamento que nos han dado es para 
defendernos de la delincuencia común, para asustarlos, para resguardar nuestra comunidad.” 
Interview with Renzo, local authority, district of Samugari, 26.06.2018.
311  Fieldnotes, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018; interview with Mariano, boatman, 
district of Samugari, 29.06.2018.
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them if necessary. As one of the ex-commanders affirms: 
Until today I have riffles in my house. It is for my defense. 
[...] There are no ex[-commanders] here. We are not ex, we 
continue.312
For the CADs, their guns were and are an essential part of their 
macho warrior identity, especially in a context where other armed 
actors are still present, and vigilance is required. 
This brings us to the second point. Despite the fact that the 
constellation of the current security situation fundamentally differs 
from the civil war in many aspects, the same violent actors - both 
the Shining Paths converted into narcoterroristas and the state forces 
- are still present and active in the territory of the VRAEM. While 
deadly confrontations are rare, the fact that the emergency zone 
is still officially declared in the context of the struggle against 
narcoterrorism, sustains the idea of the VRAEM as a conflict zone in 
media and public opinion. For the local population, the idea prevails 
that the Shining Path “is still walking” (“siguen caminando”).313 At the 
same time, as I have explained in 6.1, the majority of the actual and 
ex-CADs are cocaleros - as are most of the peasants in the VRAEM. 
They are therefore part of the base of the pyramid of the illicit drug 
economy that dominates the region. The possibility that the anti-
drug policy of the government will result in a complete eradication 
of coca crops in the VRAEM, as has happened in the Alto Huallaga 
region, worries many cocaleros.314 While in the past, coca has financed 
312  My translation of original citation: “Hasta ahora tengo escopetas yo en mi casa. Es 
para mi defensa. [...] Acá no hay ex. No somos ex, seguimos.” Interview with Rafael, ex-
CAD commander, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
313  Interview with Nelida, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 30.06.2018.
314  Interview with Ruth, survivor whose brother was disappeared by the Shining 
Path, district of Kimbiri, 25.06.2018; interview with Ladislao and Sandra, ex-CAD 
member and his daughter, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018; Zech, “Between Two 
Fires: Civilian Resistance during Internal Armed Conflict in Peru,” 280; For a 
comparison between the illicit economy in the VRAEM and the Alto Huallaga, 
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the struggle of the self-defense committees against the Shining Path, 
today the CADs will not hesitate to stand up in defense of coca, 
their main source of income.315 The relation between the state forces 
and the CADs is thus, once again, ambiguous. On the one hand, 
as pointed out, the CADs are in some places still trained by the 
military to assist them in their missions. Joint patrols are organized 
by both the police and the military. In the actual base of the CADs 
in Llochegua, for example, the announcement board at the entrance 
included a letter from the Ministry of Defense addressed to the 
CADs, dated on September 21st, 2017, asking for the self-defense 
committee’s reorganization and support in patrolling. The letter 
stated that:
[...] the self-defense committees are organizations, of the 
rural and urban population, that have originated freely and 
spontaneously to develop activities of self-defense against 
delinquency, terrorist infiltration and drug trafficking, to 
defend themselves from attacks of these [actors] and to support 
the Armed Forces and the PNP [Policía Nacional del Perú] in the 
tasks of Pacification and Socio-economic Development of the 
zones in which they operate.”316
On the other hand, the possibility of an alliance between the CADs 
and the strong and well-organized cocalero movement makes the 
see: Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State.” 
315  Interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 10.07.2018; 
interview with Ivan, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 27.06.2018.
316  My translation of original citation: “[...] los Comités de Autodefensa son organizaciones, 
de la población rural y urbana, surgidos espontáneamente y libremente para desarrollar actividades 
de autodefensa contra la delincuencia, inflitración del terrorismo y del narcotráfico, defenderse 
de los ataques de estos y apoyar a las Fuerzas Armadas y PNP en las tareas de Pacificación y 
Desarrollo Socioeconómico de las zonas en las que operan.” Ministerio de Defensa, Oficio 
N°796/BCT-42/S-5/13.00, Sobre autorización para reorganizar a las comunidades que 
pertenecen al Distirto de Llochegua, Pichari, 21.09.2017.
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government cautious in their position towards the CADs and is 
an incentive to stimulate their demobilization and disarmament. 
Nevertheless, for the population, the persisting distrust towards the 
state forces as providers of order and security sustains the essential 
idea of self-defense, namely the need to provide for their own 
security and to be prepared to react against violence and criminality. 
A third element that contributes to a sense of contemporary past in 
the VRAEM is the socio-economic marginalization and isolation 
of the region within the national context. While the idea of the 
VRAEM as an ongoing conflict zone might be more perception 
than reality, this strong perception by outsiders also has an influence 
on the self-perception of the population. The fact that the VRAEM 
is labeled as a territory in state of emergency isolates the region from 
the rest of the country which is ‘pacified’. Research participants 
often link this sense of isolation to the socio-economic situation 
of the region, which, as I have pointed out in the beginning of this 
chapter, is very poor. The persistence of the emergency zone is 
seen as an obstruction to development and inversions in the region. 
The massive presence of the state forces does, ironically enough, 
not compensate for the sense of abandonment by the state. As the 
dramatic figures on basic services such as education, health care and 
malnutrition show, the feeling of abandonment by the state is in 
the first place based on a painful reality and not just on perception. 
An ex-CAD member and former major in the district of Samugari 
furthermore stresses the importance of development and education 
to prevent future outbreaks of violence in the region:
The pupils have several diseases, it looks as if we cannot 
accomplish anything. First, we need nutrition, first we need 
water and basic sanitation, nutrition, if not, how are we going 
to talk about education? [...] So, analyzing all these things  [...] 
the situation is disastrous, and with all the more reason any 
delinquency, any dirty dark politics can appear.317
317  My translation of original citation: “Los alumnos tienen diferentes enfermedades, 
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His daughter, a woman in her early twenties who is engaged in local 
politics, expressed her frustration about the negative perception of 
the VRAEM by national politicians: 
They don’t want to see it in a better way, but in a bad way, yes, 
as if the VRAEM is  horror, terror, death, narcoterrorism, 
narcotráfico. [For them] it [the VRAEM] is a world that excels 
for the bad, but to excel with the good, not that much.318
This present-day marginalization is entangled with the consequences 
of the war which in the VRAEM, as in all affected regions, has 
thwarted the personal development and future perspectives of an 
entire generation. As an ex-commander in the district of Pichari, 
who is now in his early sixties, puts it:
I have spent my entire youth fighting. And now that I am 
injured, I am already old and injured, I don’t see well anymore. 
[...] I have used up my entire youth in the bush.319
Another ex-CAD commander in the district of Pichari describes 
the precarious situation of many survivors and the intergenerational 
consequences of the war as follows:
parece que no se puede lograr nada, primero es alimento, primero es agua, saneamiento básico, 
alimentación, ¿sino de que educación vamos a hablar? [...] Entonces todas esas cositas analizando 
[...] estamos total, y con más razón cualquiera delincuencia, cualquiera política sucia oscura, 
puede aparecer.” Interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
24.06.2018.
318  My translation of original citation: “No quieren verlo de una mejor forma, pero como de 
las malas si, como que el VRAEM es horror, terror, muerte, narcoterrorismo, narcotráfico. Es un 
mundo donde sobresalen con lo malo, pero sobresalir con lo bueno, no es tanto.” Interview with 
Sandra (daughter Ladislao), district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
319  My translation of original citation: “Toda mi juventud me lo he pasado combatiendo. 
Y ahora que ya estoy herido, ya estoy viejo y herido, ya no veo bien. [...] He terminado toda mi 
juventud en el monte.” Interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
12.05.2017.
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We are going to return to the same problem of before because 
let’s say that la subversión Sendero [the Shining Path] would have 
killed like twenty people, but their children, their wives, some 
of them widows or widowers, the husbands of whom the wives 
were killed, they have left orphans who did not have a good 
education nor any support from the government. One day, 
they will feel the sorrow because they have seen the dead body 
of their parents. Candy, chocolate, ten soles, twenty soles, some 
chicken to eat, but the next day you have absolutely nothing. So, 
these girls today are single moms and the boys are delinquents. 
[...] I know that with these problems ahead, the same situation 
will rise again. The people will not have anything to live from 
and they will dedicate themselves to assaulting, stealing, some 
will maybe go to other places, I don’t know, but for the majority 
who will stay, this conflict will not end.320
In the VRAEM, this frustration of personal lives by the outbreak 
of the war is inevitably linked to the phenomenon of self-defense 
and the active role of civilians in the struggle. More than in other 
areas, daily life in the VRAEM became militarized. Instead of 
learning how to read, youngsters learned how to handle a gun. This 
generation of ex-CAD members now stresses the importance of 
education for their children in order to strive for a better future. In 
the VRAEM, the key to obtaining this education is - once again - 
coca. While in the past coca was the pacifier, it is now seen as the 
320  My translation of original citation:“Vamos a volver al mismo problema de antes porque 
la subversión sendero habrá matado como 20 personas… pero ellos, los hijos, las esposas, algunas 
viudas o viudos, los esposos y han matado a la esposa, pero han dejado huérfanos y estos no 
han tenido una buena formación ni apoyo del gobierno. Un día tendrán pena porque han visto 
el cadáver de sus padres. Caramelo, chocolate, diez soles, veinte soles, comida pollo, pero al día 
siguiente ya no tienes absolutamente nada. Entonces esas niñas ahora son madres solteras y los 
niños son delincuentes [...] Yo sé que con este problema que viene se va suscitar la misma situación. 
La gente no va tener de que vivir y se van a dedicar a asaltar, a robar, otro de repente se irá a otros 
lugares no sé, pero la mayoría que se queden, no vamos a terminar ese conflicto.” Interview with 
Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 09.07.2018.
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resource that will finance the education of the next generation. A 
woman whose brother was disappeared by the Shining Path during 
the war expresses her fear for the possible eradication of coca crops 
as follows: 
They say that planes will come, helicopters will come, and they 
will search for all the pozas [puddles, i.e. laboratories where 
coca is processed to cocaine paste], whatever, and they will 
attack all the hills [on which coca is grown] and they will 
make it [the crops] disappear. And how then are we going to 
make money? With which money are we going to educate the 
children?321
“Esas armas son del Estado y ustedes son el Estado”: Citizenship and recognition 
At this point in my story, it should already be clear that the 
emergence of self-defense in the VRAEM during the civil war 
was not just an application of ‘the law of the jungle’. Despite its 
geographical isolation, the struggle of the CADs was embedded in 
their relationship with the state. Consequently, their militia service 
became a way to claim their belonging to the nation. An ex-CAD 
commander in the district of Pichari puts it as follows: 
When we started our armed struggle, they borrowed us their 
weapons. [...] The marine forces said: ‘These weapons are from 
the state and you are the state. Take the weapons, a lance, a 
grenade, take it.’ The captain gave me a box of grenades, his ten 
FALs [Fusil Automatique Léger]322, his mines [...] and in that way, 
321  My translation of original citation: “Dice avioneta va entrar, helicópteros van a entrar 
y van a buscar pues todas las pozas, lo que sea, y todos los cerros va atacar pues y lo va desaparecer. 
¿Y de dónde va entrar la plata? . ¿Con qué se van a educar los niños?” Interview with Ruth, 
survivor whose brother was disappeared by the Shining Path, district of Kimbiri, 
25.06.2018.
322  The FAL is a semi-automatic rifle produced by the Belgian company FN 
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we started to reconquer all the spaces of the villages, creating 
new villages, putting people there, and we reconquered all of 
this.323
The abovementioned citation demonstrates quite literally how the 
CADs became representatives of the Peruvian state by taking up 
arms against the Shining Path to ‘liberate’ the local population. 
Weapons were hence not only an essential part of a macho warrior 
identity, they also turned into a means for peasants to ‘become 
Peruvians’. Another ex-commander expresses how, in the end, the 
different parties in the war were all Peruvians, no matter which side 
they were on: 
It is like seeing a movie... of the Indians and the apaches, more 
or less like that, right? That’s what it was like. They identified 
themselves and all of the sudden you could tell from the abuses 
that the apaches were good and the gringos were bad, but maybe 
the apache was a rebel and a deserter [...] but we were all from 
the same blood, we were, in essence there was no difference in 
anything.324
An ex-commander in the district of Samugari refers to the relation 
between the CADs and the state forces as follows:
Herstal. 
323  My translation of original citation:”Cuando iniciamos nuestra lucha nos prestó sus 
armas. [...] La Marina dijo: “esas armas son del Estado y ustedes son el Estado. Tomen las 
armas, una lanza, granada, tomen.” El capitán me dio una caja de granadas, sus 10 FALs, 
sus minas [...] y así, arrancamos a recuperar todos los espacios de los pueblitos, creando nuevos 
pueblitos, poniendo gente, y recuperamos todo esto.” Interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD 
commander, district of Pichari, 08.07.2018.
324  My translation of original citation: “Como le digo es como ver una película… de los 
indios y los apaches así maso menos, no, así era. Se determinaron y de repente se podía ver del abuso 
apache era bueno y el gringo era malo, pero de repente el apache era rebelde y renegado [...] pero 
éramos de la mismas sangre, éramos, no había diferencia en nada en absoluto.” Interview with 
Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 09.07.2018.
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When a Peruvian heart beats, a Peruvian soldier exists. That 
soldier is the best soldier in the world, the Peruvian soldier, 
injured but not defeated. [...] They are soldiers of our fatherland; 
we are their soldiers.325
The language used in the documents from the archive of the 
CAD headquarter in Pichiwillca confirms that the organization of 
self-defense as a local survival strategy was intrinsically linked to 
patriotism. For example, in a letter to the headquarter, one of the 
base committees asks for donations of food and money and closes 
with the formulation:
We thank you in advance for your patriotic collaboration [...]326
Another letter concerning the foundation of a new base committee 
ends with the sentence:
Expecting your willingness to be a good combatant against 
the subversion for the greatness of our dear Peru.327
For a group whose citizenship had been (and in many ways still 
is) historically thin due to discrimination and socio-economic 
exclusion, militia service became a foundation for claiming a thicker 
citizenship. In line with the findings on the CADs as providers 
325  My translation of original citation: “Cuando late un corazón peruano existe un 
soldado. El soldado es el mejor soldado en el mundo, el soldado peruano herido, pero no vencido 
[...] Ellos son soldados de nuestra patria, nosotros somos soldados de ellos.” Interview with 
Francisco, ex-CAD commander, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
326  My translation of original citation: “Agradecemos por anticipado su colaboración 
patriotica y nos despedimos de ud. [...]” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de 
Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Of. no. 28, Chirumpirari, 30.11.1984.
327  My translation of original citation: “Esperando su inquietud de ser un buen luchador 
contra la subverción [sic] por la grandesa [sic] de nuestro queredo [sic] Perú [...]” Archivo de la 
Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Oficio No. C08-
92-PCDF/SA, San Antonio, 20.06.1992.
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of local governance and social order, it needs to be stressed that 
militia service as a basis for claiming citizenship goes beyond the 
military aspect of the self-defense committee. It cannot be untied 
from the strong local governance structure of the CADs and how 
it related to the national level. The highly centralized nature of the 
Peruvian state and the socio-economic and cultural breaches that 
exist between Lima and the provinces often leads to an image of 
the Peruvian countryside as a place where the state is largely absent. 
While holding truth, as the presence of the state is in some places 
very thin, this image needs some nuance. As García-Godos states, 
peasant-state relations intensified during the agrarian reform of 
1968, which is why, at the time of emergence of the Shining Path, 
“it cannot be argued that peasant populations lived in total isolation 
and/or without knowledge of the nation-state.”328 In addition, 
Heuser points out that states are mostly analyzed from the national 
perspective, resulting in oppositions such as strong and weak states 
to describe the (lack of) monopoly on governance or the use of 
violence. However, this image is, thus Heuser, highly reductionist 
and fails to conceptualize the “variety of local structures [...] which 
are parallel [to] or entangled with the “state”.”329 The wartime 
governance of the CADs clearly constitutes such a structure. The 
archive of the headquarter of the CADs in Pichiwillca shows how 
the local governance structure of the self-defense committees - 
notwithstanding its high degree of autonomy - is embedded within 
the larger project of the nation-state. For example, several pieces in 
the archive demonstrate the population’s concern with the possession 
of identity documents, which are essential for claiming citizenship 
and belonging to the national community. A letter directed from 
one of the base committees to the headquarter concerns the case 
of 52 passport photographs that were lost or mixed up by the 
328  García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of 
the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 1.
329  Heuser, “Contested State Formation? The Effect of Illicit Economies in the 
Margins of the State,” 2.
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photographer, who seems to have disappeared. The letter states that:
[...] we are very concerned about this barter of New Passbooks, 
our villagers are very worried about their photographs [...]330
Another letter asks the headquarter for help in obtaining passbooks 
for the villagers:
[...] at the present moment, most of the villagers we do not 
have this indispensable document, we beg you mister President 
of the central headquarter to give us a concrete answer with 
regards to this case.331
In case of the CADs in the VRAEM, militia service as a basis for 
claiming citizenship entails the paradox that the violence exercised 
by the state forces was at least an equally important trigger for 
organizing self-defense as was the violence of the Shining Path. 
Nevertheless, the context of the civil war created a space for 
negotiation between the state and its rural populations as the state 
eventually realized that it could not win the war without its support. 
Consequently, as García-Godos has argued, “the armed conflict 
brought peasants and state together in an alliance that exchanged 
support for recognition.”332 
Indeed, the CAD’s claimed position within the Peruvian nation 
330  My translation of original citation: “[...] encontramos muy preocupado para el canje 
de Libretas Nuevas, que nuestros comuneros están muy preocupados por sus fotografías [...] “ 
Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Of. 
N°076-84-B.C.D.C.I.A., Isoqasa, 23.12.1984. 
331  My translation of original citation: “[...] en estos momentos estamos la mayoría de 
los comuneros sin este documento indespensable, rogamos señor Presidente de la sede central 
darnos una respuesta concreta sobre este asunto.” Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité 
de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-Ene, Solicita: Inscripción en el Registro Militar, 
Paquichari Baja, 23.07.1988.
332  García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of 
the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 40.
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could or can only fully come into being if recognized as such within 
the larger unity of the nation-state. As mentioned in the beginning 
of this chapter, the self-defense committees were recognized by law 
under the name Comités de Autodefensa and allowed to use firearms by 
the Legislative Decree 741 issued in 1991, under the first government 
of president Alberto Fujimori.333 A year later, the Supreme Decree 
77-DE-92 complemented this law by providing regulations on the 
organization and functions of the CADs.334 This finally provided 
a legal framework for peasant self-defense organizations which, 
by then, had been participating in the armed struggle for almost 
a decade. As García-Godos has stressed, the impact of this legal 
framework on issues of legitimacy, identity and citizenship of the 
CADs was huge.335 At last, the agency of the CADs was considered 
legitimate. They had succeeded in demonstrating that they were ‘on 
the right side of history’ and that they were fighting the same enemy 
as the state. As Fumerton affirms, “this piece of legislation gave 
them a stronger sense of having a real stake in contributing to the 
future wellbeing of la Patria, for which every rondero death was now 
wrapped in a new discourse of “sacrifice for the father- land.”336 
The notions of contribution and sacrifice are crucial here: the CADs 
were now officially no longer just fighting a local cause, they were 
fighting for the entire nation. Jemima García-Godos’ argument 
that “peasant citizenship and identity in Tambo are defined by the 
peasant contribution to victory over the Shining Path during the 
armed conflict” can also be applied to the CADs of the VRAEM. 
García-Godos clarifies this as follows:
333  “Reconocen a Comités de Autodefensa, como organizaciones de la población 
para desarrollar actividades de auto defensa de su comunidad” (Decreto Legislativo 
741).
334  García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of 
the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 170.
335  García-Godos, 172.
336  Fumerton, “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social 
Order in Peru’s Civil War,” 77.
477
VI Hidden Heroes
The conflict and peasants [sic] participation in it, have become 
not only the point of reference for demands for public goods and 
services and the discourse of reconstruction and development 
[...], but also the basis for self-definitions of identity among the 
peasant population of areas affected by violence.337
For example, when the CADs sent a commission to Lima in 1992 to 
meet with government representatives, they stated in their report of 
the visit that, because of their role in the pacification:
[...] the [valley of the] River Apurímac and Ene are now 
engraved in the mind of our governors and they listen to our 
demands, which in the past was almost impossible.338
Consequently, in addition to both the military and the governance 
aspect performed by the CADs during the war, the recognition of 
their contribution after the war became an essential aspect for the 
CADs’ appropriation of citizenship. The hope that this recognition 
would become reality was sparked by the legal framework of 1991 
and 1992. This framework in the first place institutionalized the 
CADs as a legitimate actor in the present more than recognizing 
its contribution during the past decade. However, in subsequent 
years, the expectation that the latter would also become reality was 
not met. Today, the heroic memory of the CADs in the VRAEM 
is interwoven with bitterness and disillusionment. The lack of 
recognition for their contribution ran as a red thread through 
conversations with ex-CAD members and their relatives:
The state doesn’t remember how we have fought, nothing. We 
lost. [...] We inverted our life in the pacification and that’s why 
337  García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of 
the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 212.
338  Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del Valle Apurímac-
Ene, Informe Nro. 09-92, Pichiwillca, 1992.
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we don’t have anything now.339
Nothing, nothing, there is nothing for us, it is totally forgotten. 
It is not only me, there are several mothers, several families, 
several families like that, several combatants like that, there 
are several widows, that’s how it is, señorita.340
As self-defense, we went all the way, so that time, often we 
have fought in exchange for nothing, señorita. Up until now, the 
government doesn’t give us any recognition, we simply have 
this legal regulation, nothing more [...] Everyone is valorized, 
the army, the national police, they are valorized, but we, the 
self-defense, we are not, because they receive compensations in 
education, in every aspect they have [compensations], but the 
self-defense, no, we don’t receive anything.341
339  My translation of original citation: “El Estado no se acuerda de lo que hemos luchado, 
nada. Hemos perdido. [...] Nuestra vida hemos invertido en la pacificación por eso no tenemos 
nada nosotros.” Interview with Humberto, ex-CAD command, district of Samugari, 
27.06.2018.
340  My translation of original citation: “Nada, nada, no hay nada para nosotros, total 
está olvidado. No solo soy yo, hay varias mamás, varias familias, hay varias familias así, hay 
varios así combatientes, hay varios, no solo soy yo sola, hay varios así combatientes, así estos, hay 
varias viudas, así es señorita.” Interview with Nelida, ex-CAD member and widow of 
CAD-commander, district of Samugari, 30.06.2018. 
341  My translation of original citation: “Autodefensa normal nos metemos a donde sea, 
entonces a veces muchas veces nosotros hemos luchado, aquel tiempo señorita, a cambio de nada 
pues. Hasta ahora el gobierno, no nos hace ningún reconocimiento, simplemente estamos con una 
norma legal nada más [ ...] Todo es valorado, el ejército, la policía nacional, ellos valorados, 
nosotros la autodefensa no, porque ellos tienen indemnizaciones en educación, en todos aspectos 
tienen ellos, pero autodefensa no, no recibimos nada.” Interview with Sebastián, ex-CAD 
member, district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018.
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The national reconciliation was not put in a document [i.e. 
institutionalized] [...] There are no institutions that want to [...] 
support the self-defense committees, but in fact, [we brought 
about] the pacification in the VRAEM, and this is known in 
the entire world, that is the truth... The army they did little 
or nothing, maybe they served as a shield, but who was the 
cannon fodder? Who has marched? Who has captured? Who 
has gone to jail like Huayhuaco [a notorious ex-commander]? It 
was us, complying their duties [...] Honestly, until this moment, 
it gives me a lot of sorrow.342 
In order to understand this lack of recognition of the contribution 
of the CADs to the defeat of the Shining Path, I have to return to 
the blind spot of civilian participation in violence that characterizes 
transitional justice, on which I have elaborated in 6.2.  Before doing 
so, it is necessary to mention that, in 1998, the Supreme Decree 
068-98-DE-S/G issued compensations for CAD casualties, which 
already had been promised in the Supreme Decree of 1992. As I 
have already briefly pointed out in 6.2, and as García-Godos has 
analyzed in-depth, this compensation decree - which predated the 
transitional justice process - turned out to be a disappointment as 
the criteria were so strict that but very few (29 persons by 2000 
according to the TRC) could benefit from it. One of the most 
problematic characteristics of the compensation decree was that it 
only issued compensations from 1992 onwards, when the CADs 
were officially recognized, herewith ignoring the casualties of the 
342  My translation of original citation: “No se ha hecho reconciliación nacional en un 
documento [...] No hay instituciones que quieran [...] apoyar a los de los comités de autodefensa, 
porque muy deveras la pacificación en el VRAEM, y eso le reconocen a nivel mundial, porque eso 
es la verdad… Pero el ejercito poco o nada ha hecho, claro ubicados como un escudo si han servido, 
pero quién ha sido carne de cañón? Quién ha caminado? Quién ha capturado? Quién ha ido preso 
[...]? Hemos sido nosotros, cumpliendo sus funciones [...] Sinceramente hasta el momento a mi 
me da mucha pena.” Interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
09.07.2018.
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first and bloodiest decade of the war.343 The compensation decree 
thus failed as an opportunity to recognize the contribution of the 
CADs. Shortly after this failure, a new opportunity to consider the 
role of the CADs presented itself when the TRC was established in 
2001, followed by the design and implementation of the reparation 
program. Nevertheless, as explained in 6.1, the TRC considered the 
CADs in the first place as combatants while the PIR included them 
in the universe of victims. With regards to the PIR, to be recognized 
as a victim of suffering is not the same as to be recognized for an 
active contribution to a victory that has been widely claimed by the 
state. As García-Godos has pointed out: 
[...] the legal figure of ‘victim of violation’ strips peasant ronderos 
of the active role they played in support of the state during 
the conflict. The focus shifts from agency, participation and 
contribution to victimization, passivity and suffering.344
A parallel claim can be made for the TRC’s categorization of 
the CADs as perpetrators: a focus on their destructive nature 
obfuscates the merits of their contribution which, at least as much 
as their human rights violations, define their role in the war. 
Consequently, this blind spot of civilian participation in violence 
impedes a recognition of the CADs’ contribution, which, as 
García-Godos has pointed out, is a missed opportunity “to carve 
a place in Peruvian national history for the people who made peace 
possible.”345 Indeed, in the beginning of this chapter, I have stated 
how the tendency to assign a passive role to the peasantry has 
long been predominant in the Peruvian historiographic tradition. 
It seems that, be it unintentionally, the transitional justice process 
343  García-Godos, “Citizenship, Conflict and Reconstruction: A Case-Study of 
the Effects of Armed Conflict on Peasant-State Relations in Tambo, Peru,” 212.
344  García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and 
the Challenge of Historical Interpretation,” 79.
345  García-Godos, 82.
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reproduced this tendency by failing to conceptualize the agency 
of the peasantry in organizing self-defense. Furthermore, as the 
above-mentioned citations on the lack of recognition demonstrate, 
the CADs immediately link this lack of recognition to their 
‘contemporary past’ of socio-economic marginalization. Despite the 
fact that the TRC identified this exclusion as one of the major causes 
of the outbreak and proliferation of the war, the transitional justice 
process has not succeeded in bringing about a significant change 
in the socio-economic situation of the majority of survivors in the 
VRAEM. It thus seems that the aim of ‘reconciling the two Peru’s’ 
and restoring the social contract that stood center-stage in the 
Peruvian transitional justice process has, at least in case of the CADs 
in the VRAEM, gone wrong on two fronts. In looking backward, it 
has failed to recognize the contribution of the CADs to the victory 
over the Shining Path, which on its turn is a missed opportunity to 
thicken the citizenship of an historically excluded population group 
in the present. In looking forward, it did not succeed in bridging the 
socio-economic gap, which is a necessary prerequisite for bringing 
about fundamental changes for the future generation. 
Conclusion: Towards a multi-layered survivor identity
This chapter analyzed the diffusion and contestation of transitional 
justice for a ‘difficult’ actor in a ‘difficult’ region: the comités de 
autodefensa in the VRAEM. By doing so, I have identified five 
processes that challenge transitional justice’s underlying ideas on 
memory, victimhood and time.
First, by looking at the work of the TRC and the implementation of 
the PIR with regards to the CADs in the VRAEM, it has become 
clear that the two most important transitional justice mechanisms 
made no significant attempt to conceptualize the question of civilian 
participation in violence. The agency of the CADs thus corresponds 
to a blind spot in the transitional justice process, which results 
from the typical categorization of survivors as victims (civilians) or 
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perpetrators (combatants). This simplistic categorization of agency 
in war emerges at the intersection of trauma and human rights 
discourse and is still predominant in transitional justice. 
Second, to respond to this blind spot, I have shown how the CADs 
became the most important providers of local governance and social 
order during the war in the VRAEM. In the midst of the chaos of 
the war, an endemic body arose that, besides its military functions, 
provided order in daily life and regulated processes of reintegration 
as crucial strategies of survival and coexistence. Consequently, a 
more comprehensive image of the CADs has emerged that goes 
beyond the abovementioned simplistic categorization of survivors 
by transitional justice and which contests its underlying ideas on 
victimhood.
Thirdly, the heroic memory fostered by the CADs plays an 
important role in shaping (post-)conflict identities in the VRAEM. 
This heroic memory conflicts with the kind of commemorative 
discourse and practice that stands center-stage in transitional 
justice and challenges its underlying assumptions on prevention 
and recognition. The memory of the CADs puts forward an active 
narrative of participation rather than telling a story of trauma and 
suffering. This narrative stands in function of the recognition of 
their contribution to the defeat of the Shining Path and identifies 
heroes rather than victims. Moreover, these heroes cherish a macho 
warrior identity which is diametrically opposed to the kind of victim 
identity constituted by transitional justice.
Fourthly, I identified several aspects that contribute to a sense 
of ‘contemporary past’ in the VRAEM and challenge the linear 
temporality of transitional justice. On the one hand, the absence 
of disarmament and demobilization of the CADs is entangled with 
the current situation of (a perception of) ongoing conflict and 
emergency which impedes further development of the region. On 
the other hand, research participants link the poor socio-economic 
conditions in the VRAEM to the consequences of the war, which 
has thwarted the personal development and future perspectives of 
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an entire generation.
Lastly, I have highlighted the intersection between the CAD’s militia 
service as a means to claim citizenship on the one hand, and the (lack 
of) recognition for their contribution to the defeat of the Shining 
Path on the other. The lacking conceptualization of the agency of 
the peasantry resulted in a failure to recognize their contribution. 
Consequently, the transitional justice process missed an important 
opportunity to thicken the citizenship of an historically excluded 
population group.
These findings have several conceptual and methodological 
implications for the study of transitional justice and (post-)conflict 
dynamics in general. First of all, despite the many criticisms that 
have already been formulated against the binary conceptualization 
of victims versus perpetrators, there is an urgent need to develop 
the idea of a multi-layered survivor identity which embraces the fact 
that victimhood, violation, resistance and heroism are no mutually 
exclusive features.346 Studying the (post-)conflict role of self-defense 
militias such as the CADs - who are not an exclusively Peruvian 
phenomenon - can help us to move beyond descriptions of (post-)
conflict realities in which conceptualization of agency is limited 
to armed actors as potential perpetrators and civilian populations 
as potential victims. While the CADs indeed were an armed actor 
that to a certain extent, as the TRC states, contributed to the spiral 
of violence, their role fundamentally differs from that of the state 
forces or the Shining Path. It is at least as important to understand 
the constructive nature of their agency - their capacity to provide 
order and governance in the heat of battle - as it is to condemn their 
human rights violations. In fact, a focus on the constructive potential 
346  For a recent example of such a criticism grounded in empirical research, see: 
Amy Rothschild, “Victims versus Veterans: Agency, Resistance and Legacies of 
Timor-Leste’s Truth Commission,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, no. 
3 (November 1, 2017): 443–62. The author argues that transitional justice needs 
“alternative and more expansive ways of conceiving of resistance, heroism and 
agency.”
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of militias such as the CADs - however controversial - is likely to 
teach us more about (post-)conflict dynamics than a focus on their 
destructive nature, especially if the latter goes without any attempt 
to scrutinize the motivation behind the violations. Therefore, the 
study of processes such as self-defense and resistance as common 
forms of civilian participation in war violence can help us to move 
beyond a limited human rights-based scope that a priori condemns 
any form of violence and therefore fails to see the agency behind it, 
whether legitimate or not. 
An approach that integrates the study of militias in (post)-conflict 
reconstruction furthermore needs to bridge the gaps between 
transitional justice and DDR. As Theidon has pointed out, 
[...] traditional approaches to DDR have focused on military 
and security objectives, which have resulted in these programs 
being developed in relative isolation from the field of 
transitional justice and its concerns with historical clarification, 
justice, reparations, and reconciliation.”347 
Transitional justice on its turn, while focusing on victims, has failed 
to see the potential of self-defense militias such as the CADs in 
facilitating processes of reintegration, social reconstruction and 
(post-)conflict coexistence.  It must be emphasized that the multi-
layered survivor identity that I propose here will only become visible 
through a truly intersectional lens. Transitional justice’s one-sided 
approach to gender, which all too often results in an exclusive focus 
on women, obfuscates the importance of phenomena such as machismo 
in defining (post-)conflict identities. At the same time, the (post-)
conflict identity and agency of the CADs cannot be disconnected 
from their socio-economic situation within the Peruvian nation. 
To end on a methodological note, locally produced written 
documents, such as the archive of the headquarter of the CADs, 
347  Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” 2.
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can be a very rich source to gain insight in civilian participation 
in violence. Without ignoring the fact that these documents were 
always produced with a certain motivation that we might not always 
be able to grasp, they are still snapshots that directly reflect wartime 
dynamics and provide a different perspective than a post-factum 
testimony. All too often, when studying marginalized groups, 
especially in ‘the Global South’, it still seems to be assumed that they 
have no written records. In addition, García-Godos has suggested 
that initiatives to recognize the contribution of the Peruvian 
peasantry during the civil war could include the reconstruction 
of local histories of the self-defense committees.348 In case of the 
CADs of the VRAEM, there are enough stories to be told from 
their archive to fill another book. 
348  García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and 
the Challenge of Historical Interpretation,” 82.
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“In the past as today, the vocation of social scientists often emerges from a 
combination of interest in the permanent process of invention of which societies 
are both the source and the product, and judgment about the state of affairs as 
they encounter them in the social world. Critical thinking sits at the crossroads 
between the two, between curiosity and indignation, between the desire to 
understand and the will to transform.”1
Hoy más que nunca pienso en una mesa larga, en un banquete; en una familia 
de desconocidos, en mis amigos extraviados, en una patria, si se quiere; en una 
justicia, en una paz.2
In 2000, after two decades of civil war initiated by the revolutionaries 
of the Shining Path, Peru became one out of many countries 
worldwide that chose to implement transitional justice. This study 
set out to investigate how the paradigm of transitional justice - with 
its underlying normative ideas on memory, victimhood and time 
- modeled Peru’s process of dealing with the legacies of the civil 
war. Now that we have come to the end of this dissertation, it is 
time to reflect on where my “curiosity and indignation” concerning 
the diffusion of transitional justice in Peru and its appropriations, 
reaffirmations and contestations by survivors have brought us. 
The desire to understand: 
Violence and citizenship in Ayacucho
The first set of reflections concerns ‘the desire to understand’ 
mentioned by Fassin: what is the essence of the claims articulated by 
survivors? Let us start by briefly returning to the context in which 
1  Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason (University of California Press, 2012), 243.
2  My English translation of Spanish original: “Today more than ever I think of a 
long table, a banquet; of a family of strangers, of my lost friends, of a homeland, if 
you like; of a justice, a peace.” Quote taken from a facebook post by Peruvian writer 
Eduardo Loayza Díaz on April 17, 2019, the day former president Alan García 
committed suicide while being arrested for corruption.
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these claims arise. While Peru’s process of coming to terms with 
the legacies of the civil war is internationally seen as a successful 
example of transitional justice, it did not succeed in accomplishing 
its goal of ‘reconciling the nation’. Despite the TRC’s emphasis 
on socio-economic exclusion as one of the main causes for the 
escalation of violence, the implementation of its recommendations 
in many cases proved to be Band-Aids on historical wounds. Until 
today, Peru is a country of different worlds separated by breaches 
that run alongside class, race, gender and geography. Place and 
context are thus of utmost importance here. In order to understand 
the civil war and its aftermath, this dissertation turned to three rural 
field settings in the Ayacucho department, the (former) epicenter of 
the conflict. Two of the settings are situated in what was the Shining 
Path’s zona liberada: Sacsamarca and Hualla. These villages are both 
peasant communities situated in the Andes that were founded in 
the sixteenth century as conglomerations of indigenous settlements. 
From early on, these communities possessed their own land and 
were not subservient to large haciendas. The area pertaining to the 
province of Huancasancos was historically richer due to a strong 
tradition of cattle-breeding, whereas the province of Victor Fajardo 
disposed of less resources. From the 1960s onwards, the secondary 
school Los Andes in Huancasancos played a key-role in disseminating 
the Pensamiento Gonzalo designed by Abimael Guzmán and his 
followers at the UNSCH throughout the region. When the Shining 
Path gained a foothold in Sacsamarca, its revolutionary struggle got 
entangled with existing power imbalances and slumbering conflicts 
over land and resources among the community elite. In this village, 
the course of the war was defined by both collaboration with and 
resistance against the Shining Path. Hualla, in turn, was a hotbed of 
Shining Path militancy during the early years of the armed struggle. 
Due to the Shining Path’s recruitment of fighters for the ejército 
guerrillero popular on the one hand, and the extrajudicial detention and 
execution of suspects by the state forces on the other, the history 
of the war in Hualla is marked by one crime in particular: enforced 
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disappearance. The historical and geographical context of the 
third setting, then, fundamentally differs from that of Sacsamarca 
and Hualla. The jungle of the Valley of the Apurímac River was 
colonized by settlers from the highlands of Ayacucho from the 
beginning of the 20th century onwards. These colonos reduced the 
territory of the native Asháninka population and imported the 
Andes culture into the valley. In the early 1980s, many of these new 
settlers were refugees from the highlands that had fled the violence 
of the Shining Path. By the time the revolutionaries also made their 
way into the jungle, few community structures existed since most of 
the peasants in the VRAEM still lived dispersed on their lands. The 
increasing insecurity caused by violent incursions of both the state 
forces and the Shining Path forced the population to centralize and 
organize. Consequently, the comités de autodefensa emerged as both a 
military institution to organize civilian self-defense, and a political 
body that governed daily life and social order in the newly founded 
agglomerations of peasant settlements. The history - and the raison 
d’être - of communities in the VRAEM is thus intrinsically linked 
to the history of the civil war and the organization of peasant self-
defense militias. At the same time, the valley is an area of protracted 
conflict where the struggle against the narcoterroristas of the Shining 
Path continues.
The findings from the three case studies generate a series of insights 
concerning the practice of remembering the past in communities 
in Ayacucho, the identity and (post-)conflict agency of survivors 
in these localities, and their approach to the process of (not) 
closing the violent past. The common thread that runs through 
the appropriations, reaffirmations and contestations of transitional 
justice by survivors is the pursuit of citizenship: recognition of 
equality, protection by the state and inclusion into the nation. These 
citizenship claims do not only tell us something about survivors’ 
strategies of dealing with the past. They also show how survivors 
make use of the process of coming to terms with the civil war to 
denounce present injustices and raise expectations for the future. A 
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brief threefold recapitulation of the findings from the different case 
studies further clarifies this.
First of all, in Sacsamarca and in the VRAEM, the desire for 
inclusion is the central tenet of the heroic memory that emphasizes 
the peasants’ contribution to the defeat of the Shining Path: to be 
recognized as defenders of the Peruvian nation is to become part 
of it. This heroic narrative of resistance contests the notions of 
prevention, redemption and recognition that underlie transitional 
justice’s memory duty in several ways. In Sacsamarca, the heroic 
narrative of resistance conceals the history of collaboration with 
the Shining Path, which is surrounded by open secrets. These 
processes of concealment and secrecy, which help the Sacsamarquinos 
to maintain a tense coexistence between ‘intimate enemies’, contest 
the idea of redemption and recognition through truth-telling and 
memory. The heroic memory in the VRAEM, on its turn, contests 
the idea of prevention through remembrance: for the CADs, the 
past serves as an example to act similarly in case violence happens 
again instead as a lesson to avoid repetition. By cultivating a heroic 
narrative, both the Sacsamarquinos and the CADs claim recognition 
of their (post-)conflict identity and agency on the basis of an 
active narrative of contribution, rather than a passive narrative of 
victimhood and suffering. One of the reasons for the fact that this 
recognition is lacking is the general underestimation of the agency 
of peasant communities and survivors, which is reaffirmed by the 
passive victim identity extended by the ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
of transitional justice. The contestation of this identity is most 
outspoken in the case of the self-defense committees in the VRAEM. 
The CADs foster a macho warrior identity that is diametrically 
opposed to the innocent (and predominantly ‘female’-value-driven) 
victim identity that is central to transitional justice. By failing to 
conceptualize the (post-)conflict agency of survivors in peasant 
communities and falling short in recognizing their contribution, 
the transitional justice process missed an important opportunity to 
thicken the citizenship of an historically excluded population group. 
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Second, the way in which survivors deal with the absence of the 
bodies of the disappeared in Hualla reflects their search for the body 
politic: they claim the space generated by the absence to vocalize their 
desire for inclusion and protection vis-à-vis the state. According to 
the ‘forensic turn’ in transitional justice, the bodies of the disappeared 
constitute the key to establishing historical truth and hence, the 
historical memory of the desaparecidos. Nevertheless, the Huallinos 
developed an alternative way of remembering the disappeared by 
including them into the space of the dead at the cemetery, despite the 
fact that their bodies are absent. This enables them to vocalize their 
political demand to make the disappeared ‘grievable’; to revalue their 
lives as that of human beings and citizens.3 The deadlock in which 
the search for the disappeared has stranded constitutes a failure to 
recognize the ‘grievability’ - the citizenship - of the desaparecidos and 
their relatives. Moreover, while the Sacsamarquinos concealed their 
involvement in the Shining Path with heroism, the Huallinos had to 
resort to the victim identity extended by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ 
to cover themselves with innocence and enable them to claim 
rights concerning reparations and exhumations. The appropriation 
of an ‘innocent’ victim identity is therefore most pronounced in 
Hualla. This research has demonstrated that the appropriation and 
reaffirmation of this identity as a precondition for claiming rights 
can have serious implications for survivors and their struggles for 
justice; such as the reassertion of gender stereotypes that facilitate 
sexual violence (mostly against women), the exclusion of certain 
groups of survivors (mostly men) and the failure to consider the 
political agency of survivors during and after the conflict. All these 
implications weaken survivors’ pursuit of citizenship instead of 
reinforcing it. 
Thirdly, in all three case studies, survivors link the feeling of being 
abandoned by the government to a contemporary past of ongoing 
structural violence in the form of poverty and socio-economic 
exclusion: despite their heroism or their suffering during the 
3  Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, 1.
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conflict, they still face the same difficult living conditions. These 
conditions were not significantly improved by the implementation 
of transitional justice policies. Survivors’ perception of the ruptures 
between past, present and future are thus less clearly delineated than 
proposed by the linear temporality of transitional justice, in which 
the transitional moment aims to contain the violence of the past 
by turning it into history. In this view, obtaining a clean slate - by 
implementing transitional justice - forms the prerequisite for a better 
future. Survivors’ perceptions of the process of dealing with the 
past, however, reflect continuity rather than change. They consider 
the pursuit of citizenship as a first step towards the improvement 
of socio-economic living conditions. This continuity between past 
and present takes place in the most literal sense in the VRAEM. 
The CADs were never disarmed, nor did they perceive the war as 
over at the moment the TRC was established, which obstructed the 
diffusion of transitional justice in this region in the first place. The 
protracted conflict between the state forces and the narcoterroristas 
of the Shining Path sustains the idea of the VRAEM as a war 
zone. The involvement of all parties in the illicit drug economy 
moreover results in a complex entanglement of old and new feuds 
and alliances. At the same time, the population is frustrated with 
the lack of alternatives to coca production and the negative image of 
the VRAEM, which impedes development and investments in the 
region. This deadlock caused by the illicit economy, in combination 
with the very poor socio-economic situation, sustains the 
population’s perception of being hostages of the past. In Hualla, the 
continuity between past and present takes the shape of non-physical 
violence - racism and discrimination against rural indigenous 
peasants - which is perpetrated by the state upon survivors during 
the process of searching for the disappeared. The mechanisms of 
structural violence that fomented the escalation of the civil war are 
once again inflicted upon survivors and add insult to injury. 
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The will to transform: 
Implications for transitional justice research and practice
Let us now shift from ‘the desire to understand’ to what Fassin calls 
‘the will to transform’: what are the implications of this study for 
research and policy concerning transitional justice? Before turning 
to these implications, I shortly want to go back to the start of this 
dissertation: the genesis of transitional justice and the discussions 
at its core. Arthur has argued that the birth of transitional justice 
must be situated in a historical context characterized by a global 
decline of the radical Left during the Cold War. While the term 
‘transition’ was originally recycled from Marxist discourse on social 
transformation, it was now used to describe political reform on the 
legal-institutional level, more specifically democratization.4 This 
decline of the radical Left and the emergence of ‘humanitarian 
government’ caused a shift from describing injustice in the socio-
economic language of class warfare to a new universalist language 
of human rights which primarily resorts to narratives of suffering 
and trauma to describe (the aftermath of) violence.5 This is why 
issues concerning social and distributive justice, such as socio-
economic rights and development, featured less prominently in the 
paradigm of transitional justice when it first originated. Nevertheless, 
discussions on the inclusion of social, cultural and economic rights 
next to civil and political rights caused an immediate proliferation of 
the original narrow legal-political conception of transitional justice. 
In this respect, scholars such as Lambourne, Gready and Robins 
have advocated a shift from transitional to transformative justice 
to emphasize local agency and resources, to prioritize process over 
preconceived outcomes and to take into account power imbalances 
4  Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 338.
5  Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason (University of California Press, 2012); Didier 
Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry Into the Condition of 
Victimhood (Princeton University Press, 2009).
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and mechanisms of exclusion.6 Others recommend, however, to be 
modest and realistic about the aims and potential of transitional 
justice. According to Duthie, transitional justice cannot be expected 
to be transformative. He argues that “transitional justice efforts 
make up but one set of tools for effecting social change in a particular 
context, one that on its own can make an important contribution 
to but will not bring about a radical transformation of society.” 7 
The findings from the present research can be situated within this 
debate on the transformative potential of transitional justice. By 
analyzing survivors’ appropriation, reaffirmation and contestation 
of transitional justice in precarious rural contexts affected by civil 
war on the one hand, and by poverty and structural socio-economic 
violence on the other, it makes an empirically tested contribution 
to this discussion. Furthermore, by putting survivors’ responses to 
and uses of transitional justice center-stage, this study has generated 
insights that can be applied to the debate on victim participation in 
transitional justice. 
Turning back to Peru, it would indeed be too ambitious to expect 
from transitional justice that it could heal all the country’s deep 
historical wounds and re-conciliate a nation that was never really 
conciliated. Nevertheless, when taking into account the critiques 
of the paradigm of transitional justice that this dissertation entails, 
there seems to be some room to rethink priorities, methodologies 
and concepts in order to enhance the transformative potential 
of transitional justice. The most urgent question that arises from 
these critiques, then, is how transitional justice can become more 
responsive to calls for recognition, inclusion and protection 
articulated by survivors. This requires, as Gready and Robins 
6  Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 28–48; Gready and 
Robins, 340.
7  Roger Duthie, “Afterword,” in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local 
Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 256.
496
General Conclusions
suggest, an approach that underscores on-the-ground agency and 
that is sensitive to long-term processes of structural violence that 
come on top of - and often formed the breeding ground for - the 
human rights violations addressed through transitional justice 
policies. Therefore, I will end by formulating three implications of 
this dissertation that can contribute to such an approach.
Reconsidering (post-)conflict agency 
The first implication relates to the conceptualization of agency of 
survivors in (post-)conflict settings. The presumption that ‘innocent 
victims’ are and should be the main subjects of transitional justice 
policies has been at the expense of the conceptualization of the 
(political) agency of survivors. Many scholars have critiqued the 
simplistic conceptualization of victims and perpetrators, for example 
by pointing to the existence of ‘complex political victims’.8 As Amy 
Rothschild states, transitional justice needs alternative and more 
complex ways of conceiving agency.9 These should not overlook the 
fluidity and obscurity of roles in (post-)conflict situations, how they 
might be combined in one person and the way they change over 
time. Michael Rothberg’s notion of the ‘implicated subject’ forms 
an important contribution to the vocabulary available to describe 
agency in (structural) violence. However, this notion only concerns 
those “aligned with power and privilege without being themselves 
direct agents of harm.”10 No significant attempts have been made 
8  Erica Bouris, Complex Political Victims (Kumarian Press, 2007).
9  Amy Rothschild, “Victims versus Veterans: Agency, Resistance and Legacies of 
Timor-Leste’s Truth Commission,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, no. 3 
(November 1, 2017): 443–62.
10  “Implicated subjects occupy positions aligned with power and privilege without 
being themselves direct agents of harm; they contribute to, inhabit, inherit, or 
benefit from regimes of domination but do not originate or control such regimes. 
An implicated subject is neither a victim nor a perpetrator, but rather a participant 
in histories and social transformations that generate the positions of victim and 
perpetrator, and yet in which most people do not occupy such clear-cut roles.” 
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to establish a conceptualization that covers the messiness of (post-)
conflict agency, including direct participation in violence, such as 
self-defense or involvement in subversive groups. The present study 
shows that there is an urgent need to develop the concept of a multi-
layered survivor identity which embraces the fact that victimhood, 
violation, resistance and heroism are no mutually exclusive 
features. One of the findings to emerge from this research is that 
establishing victimhood and innocence as exclusive preconditions 
for claiming rights can have serious consequences for survivors. 
These consequences, such as disempowerment or the reassertion of 
gender stereotypes, are counter-productive for the long-term goals 
of transitional justice. 
One of the keys to establishing this concept of a multi-layered 
survivor identity is the study of civilian participation in violence. 
Scrutinizing local and regional processes of resistance and self-
defense allows us to move beyond a narrow human rights-based 
scope that a priori condemns the use of violence rather than trying 
to understand the motivations behind it. The findings from the 
case studies on Sacsamarca and the CADs in the VRAEM have 
demonstrated that these motivations are often more complex 
and unpredictable than they appear to be at first sight. The macho 
warrior identity cherished by the CADs, in combination with their 
bloodstained reputation as human rights violators in the eyes of ‘well-
meaning outsiders’, led to a focus on the destructive character of 
their agency during the war. Scholars such as Jentzsch, Kalyvas and 
Schubiger have however pointed out that the study of militias can 
lead to a better understanding of post-conflict dynamics, “including 
postwar violence, inclusiveness and citizenship.”11 In line with this 
claim, this study has elaborated on the constructive force of the 
self-defense committees in providing local governance and social 
Michael Rothberg, The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators, 1st edition 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019), 1.C
11  Corinna Jentzsch, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger, “Militias in 
Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (August 1, 2015): 1001.
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order during wartime. By doing so, it has generated insights that can 
be applied for the design of transitional justice policies concerning 
reintegration, social reconstruction and (post-)conflict coexistence. 
Hereby, this dissertation makes a contribution to existing efforts to 
close the gap between transitional justice and DDR.12 
Furthermore, the ‘innocent’ and rather passive victim identity 
extended to survivors by transitional justice risks to intersect with 
already existing conceptions of marginalized groups as incapable of 
political agency. This can result in a paternalistic attitude of ‘well-
meaning outsiders’ towards survivors. Developing the concept of a 
multi-layered survivor identity that moves beyond a morally inspired 
simplistic conceptualization of agency in (post-)conflict situations is 
therefore a necessary prerequisite for establishing genuine on-the-
ground participation of civilian populations affected by violence in 
transitional justice. 
To imagine such a multi-layered survivor identity, we can look 
at how the Sacsamarquinos shift their identity on the axis between 
victimhood and heroism and embrace the contradictions that their 
experiences of the war entail. The conceptualization of this multi-
layered survivor identity should not be taken as a denial of the 
existence of situations in which clear-cut victims and perpetrators 
can be identified. Rather, it is an attempt to cover the messiness of 
(post-)conflict agency and go against the negative consequences of 
the reduction of this complex agency to the diametrically opposed 
roles of victims and perpetrators.
12  See, for example: Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo De Greiff, and Lars Waldorf, 
Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants (New York; Chichester: 
Social Science Research Council ; John Wiley [distributor, 2010); Kimberly 
Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 
1 (2009): 1–34.”
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Rethinking (post-)conflict dynamics 
The second suggestion relates to the approach and methodology 
applied to study violence and its aftermath. History is remarkably 
absent in transitional justice, notwithstanding its concern 
with dealing with the past. The vocabulary of victimhood and 
perpetration that emerges at the intersection of trauma and 
human rights discourse produces “histories without history”.13 
Violence and its consequences are homogenized, universalized and 
decontextualized. These decontextualized descriptions of war and 
conflict are reaffirmed by transitional justice’s inherently short-
term approach in which conflict is in the first place considered as 
a politically rather than a historically rooted phenomenon. One of the 
ways to go against this decontextualization is to integrate a historical 
approach into the study of (post-)conflict dynamics. This call to 
‘take history seriously’ complements the pleas for context-bound 
and culturally sensitive approaches to transitional justice that have 
been formulated by scholars such as Lieselotte Viaene.14 History is 
an essential component of context and culture that often remains 
under exposed in the analysis of violence and its aftermath.
This historical approach can have varying geographical, thematical 
or temporal scopes. By writing a microhistory of the civil war in 
Sacsamarca, for example, this study has demonstrated that the 
villagers were not the subject of a coincidental outbreak of violence 
caused by external forces. Rather, the Sacsamarquinos in the first 
place are the protagonists of their own history. Their (post-)conflict 
strategies of remembrance, concealment and coexistence cannot and 
should not be separated from the (pre)history of the conflict. In 
addition, locally produced written documents - such as those found 
in the archive of the headquarter of the CADs - can provide for a rich 
13  Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 214.
14  Lieselotte Viaene and Eva Brems, “Transitional Justice and Cultural Contexts: 
Learning from the Universality Debate,” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 28, 
no. 2 (2010): 199–224.
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source of information with regards to the (post-)conflict agency of 
civilians. These written records are often neglected, especially when 
studying marginalized groups within the framework of a paradigm 
that values post-factum testimonies of victims as the ultimate key to 
establishing historical truth. Moreover, as Jemima García-Godos has 
suggested for the CADs, writing the history of these marginalized 
groups can be a first step towards the recognition of their agency.15 
The historical lens furthermore allows us to highlight historical 
processes of ongoing and structural violence which in many (former) 
transitional justice contexts have roots that go back to colonialism. 
By doing so, this study has proposed an alternative approach for 
one specific transitional justice mechanism, namely the search for 
the disappeared. Taking into account the difficult circumstances in 
which this process of search takes place, this approach suggests a shift 
in emphasis from ‘how can we find the bodies of the disappeared?’ 
to ‘how can we achieve recognition and citizenship for the relatives 
of the disappeared in absence of their bodies? ’. This shift in emphasis 
is not a plea against exhumation and restitution as mechanisms that 
have the potential to bring about recognition and justice. Rather, it 
is a proposal to rethink priorities. 
Redefining the ‘local’ in transitional justice
Finally, the local versus global dichotomy remains predominant in 
studies that aim to grapple with the frictions between international 
policies and the local realities in which they are implemented.16 
However, frictions on the ground prove to have a versatile character 
that cannot easily be reduced to top-down versus bottom-up or 
local versus global dynamics. The entanglement of international, 
15  García-Godos, “Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and the 
Challenge of Historical Interpretation,” 82.
16  See for example: Alexander Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms 
and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 2010).
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General Conclusions
national and local actors and ideas can only be unraveled by taking a 
multidirectional and multiscale approach that integrates horizontal 
and vertical movements across local, national and international scales. 
Emphasizing the entanglement of actors and ideas moreover enables 
us to go against the presumption that ‘ideas’ and ‘politics’ (exclusively) 
belong to the global or international realm, and ‘experience’ and 
‘culture’ to the local. This is crucial if we want to make transitional 
justice more responsive to the calls for recognition, inclusion and 
protection articulated by survivors instead of implementing ready-
made mechanisms that are expected to accomplish ambitious goals 
such as truth, justice and reconciliation. The ‘local’ context is not 
the just the domain of reception of transitional justice policies. As 
this research has demonstrated, it is a vivid scenery in which a wide 
range of actions including diffusion, appropriation, reaffirmation 
and contestation take place. Redefining the ‘local’ in this fashion 
is therefore a necessary first step towards putting on-the-ground 
agency center-stage. Only then, the real protagonists of stories of 
war and its aftermath - including open secrets, absent bodies and 
hidden heroes - become visible.
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List of abbreviations 
AFAVISPH Asociación de Familiares Víctimas de la Violencia Sociopolítica 
de Hualla - Association of Relatives Victims of the Socio-political 
Violence of Hualla
ANFASEP Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos 
y Desaparecidos del Perú - National Association of Family members 
of the Kidnapped, Detained and Disappeared of Peru (Huamanga)
APRA Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana - American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance
APRODEH Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos - Association for 
Human Rights (Lima)
CAD Comité de Autodefensa Civil - Civil Self-Defense Committee
CALS Centre for Applied Legal Studies ( Johannesburg)
CEAS Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social - Episcopal Commission for 
Social Action (Lima)
CEJIL Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional - Center for 
Justice and International Law (Buenos Aires, Río de Janeiro, San 
José, Washington) 
CELS Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales - Center for Legal and Social 
Studies (Buenos Aires)
CICR / ICRC Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja - International 
Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva)
CMAN Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel / High-Level Multisector 
Commission (Lima)
CONADEP Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas - 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Argentina)
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CONAVIP Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones de Afectados por la 
Violencia Política - Coordinator of Organizations of Persons Affected 
by the Political Violence 
COMISEDH Comisión (Nacional) de Derechos Humanos - National 
Commission of Human Rights (Lima) 
CORAVIP Coordinadora Regional de Organizaciones de Afectados por la 
Violencia Política - Regional Coordinator of Organizations of Persons 
Affected by the Political Violence 
CNDDHH Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos - National 
Human Rights Coordinator (Lima)
CSVR The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
( Johannesburg)
CVC Comité de Defensa Civil - Civil Defense Committees
CVR Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación - Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Peru)
DARS Dirección Académica de Responsabilidad Social de la Pontífica  
Universidad Católica del Perú - Academic Direction of Social 
Responsibility of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (Lima)
DDR Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration
DECA Comité de Defensa Civil Antisubversiva - Anti-Subversive Civil  
Defense Committee
ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(Phnom Penh)
EFE Equipo Forense Especializado - Specialized Forensic Team (Peru)
EPAF Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense - Peruvian Forensic 
Anthrolopology Team (Lima)
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EU European Union
FAL Fusil Automatique Léger 
FECVRA Federación Campesina del Valle del Río Apurímac - Peasant 
Federation of the Valley of the Apurímac River
FEDEFAM Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de 
Detenidos y Desaparecidos - Latin American Federation of the Detained 
and Disappeared (Caracas)
FIDH Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos - International 
Federation for Human Rights (Paris) 
H.I.J.O.S. Hijos por la Identidad y la Justica contra el Olvido y el Silencio - 
Sons and daughters for Identity and Justice against Forgetting and 
Silence (Buenos Aires and Guatemala City)
HRW Human Rights Watch (New York)
IACHR  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(Washington)
ICC International Criminal Court (The Hague)
ICJ International Commission of Jurists (Geneva) 
ICMP International Commission on Missing Persons (The Hague/
Sarajevo)
ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice (New York)
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (The Hague)
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(The Hague)
IDEHPUCP Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontífica 
Universidad Católica del Perú - Institute of Democracy and Human 
Rights of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru
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IDL Instituto de Defensa Legal - Institute for Legal Defense (Lima)
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IJTJ International Journal of Transitional Justice 
INEI Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - National Institute 
of Statistics and Information science (Lima)
LUM Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social - Place of 
Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion (Lima)
MINJUS Ministerio de Justicia - Ministry of Justice (Lima) 
MOVADEF Movimiento por la Amnestía y Derechos Fundamentales - 
Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights 
MRTA Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru - Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of 
the United Nations (Geneva)
PCP-SL Partido Comunista del Perú - Sendero Luminoso - Communist 
Party of  Peru - Shining Path
PIR Plan Integral de Reparaciones - Integral Reparation Plan 
PNIAF Plan Nacional de Investigaciones Antropológico Forenses - National 
Plan for Forensic Anthropological Investigations 
PUCP Pontífica Universidad Católica del Perú - Pontifical Catholic 
University of Peru (Lima)
PJTT Project on Justice in Times of Transition (Current name: 
Beyond Conflict, Boston)
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
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SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone (Freetown)
SER Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales - Asociation Rural 
Educational Services (Lima/Huamanga)
SIS Sistema Integral de Salud - Integral Healthcare System
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
RUV Registro Único de Víctimas / Unique Victim Register 
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations (Current name: UNDPO, United Nations Department 
of Peace Operations)
UNSCH Universidad Nacional San Cristobal de Huamanga - National 
University San Cristobal of Huamanga (Huamanga)
USIP United States Institutes of Peace (Washington)
VRAEM Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro - Valley of the 
Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers
WOLA Washington Office on Latin America (Washington) 
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Glossary
Adobe Sun-dried bricks made from sand, clay and straw
Arrepentido Repentant; ex-Shining Path members who were 
reintegrated in the community
ChiChA (Fermented) drink on the basis of corn or barley
Cholo,-A Term used in Peru to refer to the Andean population, can 
have a derogatory meaning 
CoCAlero/-A Coca farmer
Colono Settler
Comité ZonAl Zonal committee, central support base of the 
Shining Path in Ayacucho
CompAdre / ComAdre Godfather or godmother of one’s child, 
mostly an intimate friend
ComunidAd CAmpesinA Peasant community
Criollo,-A Term used to refer to white Peruvians from the coast
desApAreCido(s) Disappeared person(s)
direCtivA ComunAl Communal board of directors
iChu (Quechua) Peruvian feather grass
ejérCito guerrillero populAr Popular Guerrilla Army
esCuelA populAr Popular school; school on the countryside where 
the ideology of the Shining Path was taught
estAnCiA A small farmer’s house in the highlands mostly surrounded 
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by a cattle pen built in stone to house llamas, alpacas, cows or sheep
FAenA Collective communal work in function of the public space 
of the community
juiCio populAr Popular trial; the ad hoc trials of the Shining Path
gAmonAl Large landowners who exploit the indigenous population, 
also used in general to refer to the rich elite of the community 
gringo, -A Term used in Latin America to refer to US citizens, and 
by extension also to (white) Europeans
mesnAdA Militia
mestiZo Person with combined European and indigenous 
American descent
miniFundiA Small farm, the opposite of a hacienda
minkA Collective communal work in function of agriculture
moChileros Backpackers, reference to young men who smuggle 
cocaine  (paste) by foot through the jungle 
montoneros Self-defense militias form the area of Chungui
nArCotrAFiCAnte Drug trafficker
pAgApu (Quechua) Andean ritual to pay tribute to Mother 
Earth 
pAChA mAmA (Quechua) Mother Earth
pensAmiento gonZAlo Gonzalo Thought, ideology of the Shining 
Path based on Marxist, Leninist and Maoist thought, developed by 
Abimael Guzmán
peón Seasonal wage worker
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(el) perú proFundo The deep Peru, reference to Peru’s rural areas 
in opposition to Lima
proprietArio,-A Owner; reference to peasant who owns land (in 
contrast to a peón)
punA (Quechua) Highlands
rondAs CAmpesinAs Peasant rounds
rondero Member of a ronda campesina, also used to refer to CAD  
members 
senderistA Member of the Shining Path
sinChis Nickname of the anti-terror unit of the Guardia Civil
terruCo,-A Terrorist; reference to Shining Path members
tinterillo Inkpot, derogatory term to refer to clerks
tutA puriqkunA (Quechua) Those who walk at night, reference to 
Shining Path militias
vArAyoCs / vArAdos Governing body of elderly members of the 
community that existed since colonial times and watched over the 
maintenance of land and cattle
yAnA umA (Quechua) Black head; reference to the black balaclavas 
worn by the self-defense committees or the Shining Path
ZonA liberAdA Liberated zone; the territory controlled by the 
Shining Path
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Interviews (chronologically per chapter, personal archive of 
the author, Ghent)
All names of research participants are pseudonyms, unless marked with (*).
Interviews marked with (Q) were conducted in Quechua, all the others were conducted in 
Spanish. 
Chapter 3
Interview with Sofía Macher, ex-commissioner of the TRC, Lima,  
24.05.2017. (*)
Chapter 4
interview with Victor, one of the participants in the battle against 
the Shining Path on 21 May 1983, Sacsamarca, 28.03.2015.
interview with Francisco, one of the leaders of the rebellion against 
the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 10.04.2015.
interview with Carlos, victim whose father was assassinated by the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 11.04.2015
interview with Maria, daughter of one of the participants in the 
rebellion against the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
interview with Daniel, ex-authority and participant in the rebellion 
against the Shining Path,  Sacsamarca, 13.04.2015.
interview with Alonso, witness of the events of 1983, Sacsamarca, 
13.04.2015.
interview with Jesús, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 14.04.2015.
interview with Elena, widow whose husband was killed by the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
interview with Mauricio, one of the leaders of the rebellion against 
the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 15.04.2015.
interview with Suyana, widow whose husband was disappeared by 
the Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 16.04.2015.
interview with Manuel, Hualla, 30.04.2015
interview with Barbara, widow, Sacsamarca, 20.05.2015.
interview with Andrés, ex-authority, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
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interview with Daniela, widow, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015. (Q)
interview with Veronica, widow whose husband was killed by the 
military, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015. (Q)
interview with Sara, direct witness of the events of February 1983, 
Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015.
interview with Julio, participant in the rebellion against the Shining 
Path, Sacsamarca, 22.05.2015.
interview with Pablo, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the 
Shining Path, Sacsamarca, 29.06.2015.
Chapter 5
interview with Tania, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, 
Hualla, 05.03.2015.
interview with Isabel, relative of victim of enforced disappearance, 
Hualla, 05.03.2015. (Q)
interview with Joaquin, local authority whose father was 
disappeared by the military, Hualla, 05.03.2015. 
interview with Luís, village authority and witness of the events of 
11 July 1982, Hualla, 06.03.2015.
interview with Edilberto, local authority, Hualla, 06.03.2015.
interview with Deborah, whose husband was disappeared by the 
military, Hualla,  06.03.2015.
interview with Erika, widow of disappeared husband, Hualla, 
01.05.2015. (Q)
interview with Flavio, Lena and their son Lucho, victims of torture 
and internal displacement, Hualla, 02.05.2015.
interview with Emilio, victim of torture by the military, Hualla, 
02.05.2015.
interview with Elsa, widow of disappeared husband, Hualla, 
02.05.2015. (Q)
interview with Tomás, victim of forced displacement and returnee, 
Hualla, 03.05.2015.
interview with Milushka, victim whose husband and three 
daughters were killed by the military, Hualla, 03.05.2015. (Q)
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interview with Carolina, mother of two disappeared children, 
Hualla, 03.05.2015. (Q)
interview with Juan, witness of torture, relative of victims of 
en-forced disappearance, victim of forced displacement, Hualla, 
04.05.2015.
interview with Gisela, victim of sexual violence perpetrated by the 
military, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
interview with Alicia, relative of victims burial site Hualla, 
25.06.2015.
interview with Zaïra, survivor whose father was killed by the Shining 
Path during the massacre of August 1984, Hualla, 26.06.2015 (Q)
interview with Katarina, widow whose husband was kidnapped by 
the Shining Path, Hualla,  26.06.2015
Chapter 6
interview with Rafael, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
12.05.2017.
interview with Adrián, local authority, district of Pichari, 12.05.2017.
interview with Humberto, ex-CAD commander, district of 
Kimbiri, 13.05.2017; 23.06.2018.
interview with José Pablo, ex-CAD commander, district of 
Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
interview with Nilda, ex-CAD member and widow, district of 
Kimbiri, 23.06.2018
interview with Rosa, ex-CAD member whose father was killed by 
the Shining Path, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
interview with Ladislao, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
24.06.2018.
interview with Sandra (daughter of Ladislao), district of Samugari, 
24.06.2018.
interview with Franco, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 
24.06.2018.
interview with Julia, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 
24.06.2018.
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interview with Francisco, ex-CAD commander and licenciado, 
district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
interview with Diana, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
25.06.2018.
interview with Ramiro, ex-CAD member, district of Kimbiri, 
25.06.2018.
interview with Ruth, survivor whose brother was disappeared by 
the Shining Path, district  of Kimbiri, 25.06.2018.
interview with Renzo, local authority, district of Samugari, 
26.06.2018.
interview with Sebastián, ex-CAD member, district of Santa Rosa, 
27.06.2018.
interview with Ivan, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
27.06.2018.
interview with Sergio, ex-CAD commander and licenciado, district 
of Samugari, 27.06.2018
interview with Mario, ex-CAD member, district of Santa Rosa, 
27.06.2018
interview with Humberto, ex-CAD command, district of Samugari, 
27.06.2018.
interview with Lalo, ex-CAD commander, district of Kimbiri, 
28.06.2018. 
interview with Juana, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
29.06.2018.
interview with Mariano, boatman, district of Samugari, 29.06.2018.
interview with Victoria, widow of local authority killed by the 
Shining Path, district of  Samugari, 29.06.2018.
interview with Nelida, ex-CAD member, district of Samugari, 
30.06.2018;
interview with Nelson, ex-CAD commander, district of Samugari, 
30.06.2018.
interview with Alejandro, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
08.07.2018.
interview with Percy, ex-CAD commander, district of Llochegua, 
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09.07.2018.
interview with Camilo, ex-recruit of the Shining Path, district of 
Pichari, 09.07.2018.
interview with Oliver, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
09.07.2018.
interview with Alfonso, ex-CAD commander, district of Pichari, 
10.07.2018.
interview with Flora, daughter of ex-CAD commander, district of 
Santa Rosa, 11.07.2018.
Fieldnotes and personal correspondence (chronologically, 
personal archive of the author, Ghent)
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 16.03.2012.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 23.06.2014.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 24.06.2014.
FielDnoteS, Mama Sara festival, Hualla, 25.06.2014.
FielDnoteS, Día de la Memoria, Hualla, 26.06.2014.
FielDnoteS, Localization burial site, Hualla, 27.06.2014.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with the mayor and representatives of the 
victims’ association, Sacsamarca, 27.06.2014.  
FielDnoteS, Conversation with representatives of the victims’ 
association, Sacsamarca, 28.06.2014.
FielDnoteS, Taller y coloquio IFEA, Lima, 15.07.2014.
FielDnoteS, Reunión autoridades de Cayara con APRODEH, 
Huamanga, 28.02.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with village authority, Hualla, 04.03.2015.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 05.03.2015
FielDnoteS, Reunión ANFASEP y Centro Loyola sobre la Hoyada, 
Huamanga, 10.03.2015.
FielDnoteS, Seminario Desaparición Forzada y Ejecución 
Extrajducial EPAF, Huamanga,  14.03.2015.
FielDnoteS, Visita Ollanta Humala, Huancasancos, 27.03.2015.
FielDnoteS, Visit to the graves of Putaccasa I y II, Sacsamarca, 
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28.03.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with local authority, Sacsamarca, 
10.04.2015.
FielDnoteS, Communal assembly, Sacsamarca, 12.04.2015.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 30.04.2015.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 02.05.2015
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 03.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 04.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 05.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Huamanga, 09.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Exhumation, Hualla, 06.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with relatives grave Putaccasa I, Hualla, 
18.05.2017.
FielD recorDinGS, Mass for the victims, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Commemoration ceremony, Sacsamarca, 21.05.2015.
FielDnoteS, Exhumation Putaccasa II, Putaccasa, 16-19.06.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with a local authority, Sacsamarca, 
19.06.2015.
FielD recorDinGS, Día de la memoria: inauguración de la cruz, 
intervention by a relative of the disappeared, Hualla, 26.06.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with local authority, Hualla, 17.11.2015.
FielDnoteS, Visita a Chimpapampa, Hualla, 25.06.2015.
FielDnoteS, Exhumation bis, Hualla, 11.08.2015
FielDnoteS, Coloquio internacional IDEHPUCP: Impactos de las 
reparaciones a las víctimas en las sociedades posconflicto. Memoria 
de los cuerpos, conmemoración y patrimonialización, Lima, 
24.08.2015.
FielDnoteS, Meeting relatives burial site Hualla, Lima, 27.08.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conmemoración CVR+12 Ojo Que Llora, Lima, 
28.08.2015.
FielDnoteS, Hualla, 17.11.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with local authority, Hualla, 17.11.2015.
FielDnoteS, Conmemoración batalla de Trigopampa, Hualla, 
18.11.2015.
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FielDnoteS, Seminario SER, Huamanga, 19.11.2015.
FielDnoteS, Reunión residentes Accomarquinos, Lima, 09.12.2015.
FielDnoteS, Restitution massacre Chungui, Huamanga, 16.12.2015.
FielDnoteS, district of Llochegua, 10.05.2017
FielDnoteS, conversation with ICRC representative, district of 
Pichari, 11.05.2017.
FielDnoteS, district of Kimbiri, 13.05.2017.
FielDnoteS, Meeting of the vicims’ association, Hualla, 18.05.2017.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with relatives grave Putaccasa I, Hualla, 
18.05.2017.
FielDnoteS, Pacha Pupum festival, Sacsamarca, 19.05.2017.
FielDnoteS, Conversation with the ex-president of the victims’ 
association, Sacsamarca, 19.05.2017.
FielD recorDinGS, speech of a local authority at the commemoration 
ceremony of the self-defense committees, Pichiwillca, 21.06.2018.
FielD recorDinGS, speech of the regional leader of the self-defense 
committees at the commemoration ceremony of the self-defense 
committees, Pichiwillca, 21.06.2018.
FielD recorDinGS, speech of current self-defense leader at the 
commemoration ceremony of the self-defense committees, 
Pichiwillca, 21.06.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Samugari, 21.06.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Samugari, 22.06.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Kimbiri, 23.06.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Kimbiri, 24.06.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Samugari, 24.06.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Kimbiri, 25.06.2018
FielDnoteS, district of Santa Rosa, 27.06.2018
FielDnoteS, district of Santa Rosa, 11.07.2018.
FielDnoteS, conversation with RUV officer, district of Samugari, 
27.06.2018.
FielD recorDinGS, meeting with board of directors of the self-
defense committee of Llochegua, Llochegua, 10.07.2018.
FielDnoteS, district of Llochegua, 10.07.2018.
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Archivo de la Sede Central del Comité de Autodefensa del 
Valle Apurímac-Ene (chronologically, Pichiwillca) 
Comunicado, s.d.
Comunicado, s.d.s.l.
Declaración de persona capturada en la base de Mapitunari, 
Mapitunari, s.d.
Denuncia por delito, Palmapampa, s.d.
Of. no. 28, Chirumpirari, 30.11.1984.
Dialogo de relaciones de nuestra organisación, Rinconada Baja, 
03.12.1984.
Of. N°076-84-B.C.D.C.I.A., Isoqasa, 23.12.1984.
Solicita: Autorización, San Francisco, 07.01.1985.
Oficio N°001 Informe sobre el problema de esta base, Palestina, 
10.01.1985.
Oficio N°08 g-g 85, Informe sobre la declaracion de los detinidos 
que se encuentraba en  nuestro base, Canal, 15.01.1985.
Oficio N°044.D.C.M-85, Manitea, 10.02.1985.
Constancia para permanecer en el CDC, Monterrico, 25.04.1985.
Se invita a participar a un campeonato relámpago de minifútbol y 
gran kermess, Pichiwillca, 18.06.1986.
Oficio N°42°6-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-B-P, Pichiwillca, 06.11.1986.
Oficio N°059-87-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-B-P, 03.05.1987.
Oficio N°065-87-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-E-P, Ataque sufrido de lq 
Defenza Cvil (sic) de Serenachayocc, Pichiwillca, 11.05.1987.
Nota, 15.05.1987.
Oficio N°116-87-S-C-C-D-C-V-R-A-E-B, Pichiwillca, 18.11.1987.
Manifestación de un reclutado, Canal, 17.05.1988.
Relación de las patrullas de la defensa civil de Pichihuillca para 
realizar patrullaje asia Marintari son los siguientes personas, 
Pichiwillca, 10.06.1988.
Solicita: Inscripción en el Registro Militar, Paquichari Baja, 
23.07.1988.
Manifestación, Iribamba, 12.08.1988.
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Oficio No. 008-92-PCDF/SA, Chuvibana, 20.06.1992.
Oficio No. C08-92-PCDF/SA, San Antonio, 20.06.1992.
Informe Nro. 09-92, Pichiwillca, 1992.
Solicita autorizacion para la creasion de nuestra defensa civil, sector 
barrio Miraflores Pichari, 06.11.1992.
Pedimos solucion a problemas policiales y judiciales, Pichiwillca, 
19.11.1993.
Oficio N°068-DECAS-94, Pichiwillca, 17.08.1994.
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Resumen de la tesis doctoral 
En el año 2000, después de dos décadas de guerra civil iniciada por 
el grupo maoísta Sendero Luminoso, Perú se convirtió en uno de los 
muchos países del mundo que optaron por implementar la justicia 
transicional. Bajo presión de la sociedad civil se creó la Comisión 
de la Verdad y la Reconciliación, que hizo recomendaciones 
sobre reparaciones, exhumaciones de fosas comunes y reformas 
institucionales. Esta disertación es un estudio del paradigma 
internacional de la justicia transicional y la forma en que este 
paradigma modeló el proceso de lidiar con las consecuencias de 
la guerra civil en el Perú. Más precisamente, desentraña cómo 
este proceso está formado por la participación de actores locales, 
nacionales e internacionales y sus respectivas ideas y prácticas 
para lidiar con un pasado violento. La presente investigación 
estudia esta participación al observar dos clústeres de acciones. 
El primero es la difusión de la justicia transicional: ¿cómo y por 
quién se propaga y pone en práctica el paradigma internacional de 
la justicia transicional? ¿Qué tipo de interacciones e intercambios 
tienen lugar a nivel local, nacional e internacional a lo largo de estos 
procesos de difusión? El segundo clúster de acciones se refiere a 
la apropiación, la reafirmación y el cuestionamiento de la justicia 
transicional: ¿cómo los sobrevivientes se involucran, resisten o 
transforman estas ideas y prácticas internacionales en función de 
objetivos específicos y luchas (políticas)? Trascendiendo el binario 
local-global y enfatizando el entrelazamiento de actores e ideas a 
escala local, nacional e internacional, este estudio tiene como 
objetivo ir en contra de la presunción de que las ‘ideas’ y la ‘política’ 
(exclusivamente) pertenecen al ámbito global o internacional, y la 
‘experiencia’ y la ‘cultura’ al ámbito local.
La primera parte de la disertación investiga el surgimiento del 
paradigma de la justicia transicional (capítulo uno), sus ideas 
normativas subyacentes sobre memoria, victimización y tiempo 
(capítulo dos) y su implementación en el Perú (capítulo tres). La 
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segunda parte envuelve un análisis empírico en profundidad 
de la difusión y contestación de la justicia transicional a través 
de tres estudios de caso de diferentes contextos rurales en la 
región de Ayacucho. En el pueblo de Sacsamarca (provincia de 
Huancasancos), la tensión entre la participación en y la resistencia 
contra Sendero Luminoso durante la guerra civil dio lugar a una 
dinámica particular del (post)conflicto entre la narrativa pública, 
por un lado, y los secretos a voces y los silencios que lo rodean, por 
el otro (capítulo cuatro). En la comunidad de Hualla (provincia de 
Víctor Fajardo), la guerra civil y su legado se caracterizan por un 
delito en particular: la desaparición forzada (capítulo cinco). En el 
valle del río Apurímac (VRAEM), los Comités de Autodefensa Civil 
desempeñaron un papel clave en la derrota de Sendero Luminoso. 
La experiencia de la autodefensa configura la identidad y la agencia 
de los actores (post)conflicto en esta área de conflicto prolongado 
contra el narcoterrorismo (capítulo seis). El hilo común que atraviesa 
los cuestionamientos de justicia transicional de los sobrevivientes 
es el reclamo de ciudadanía e inclusión, que aparece como el talón 
de Aquiles del proceso de lidiar con los legados de la guerra civil 
peruana. Además, este estudio desarrolla la noción de un ‘pasado 
contemporáneo’ para referirse a experiencias de violencia de forma 
continua y estructural: violencia que ha sucedido en el pasado y que 
todavía está sucediendo en el presente, aunque de distintas formas.
Los resultados de esta disertación tienen tres implicaciones 
conceptuales y metodológicas para el estudio de dinámicas (post)
conflicto y la implementación de políticas de justicia transicional. 
La primera implicación se relaciona con la conceptualización de la 
agencia de sobrevivientes en entornos (post)conflicto, y propone la 
conceptualización de una identidad de sobreviviente que va más allá 
de la oposición entre víctimas y perpetradores, y que abarca el hecho 
de que victimización, perpetración de violaciones, resistencia y 
heroísmo no son características mutuamente excluyentes. La segunda 
recomendación se refiere al estudio de la violencia y sus secuelas, 
y aboga por la integración de un enfoque histórico que responda 
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mejor a las nociones de violencia estructural. La tercera sugerencia, 
finalmente, es una invitación a repensar lo ‘local’ como algo más que 
un campo de recepción de políticas de justicia transicional, tomando 
en cuenta el entrelazamiento de actores e ideas locales, nacionales e 
internacionales.
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Samenvatting van het doctoraat 
In 2000, na twee decennia van burgeroorlog ontketend door de 
Maoïstische rebellen van het Lichtend Pad, werd Peru één van de 
vele landen wereldwijd die ervoor kozen om transitional justice of 
overgangsgerechtigheid te implementeren. Onder druk van het 
middenveld werd een waarheids- en verzoeningscommissie opgericht 
die aanbevelingen formuleerde met betrekking tot herstelbetalingen 
voor slachtoffers, opgravingen van massagraven en institutionele 
hervormingen. Dit proefschrift bestudeert het internationale 
paradigma van overgangsgerechtigheid en de manier waarop dit 
paradigma Peru’s omgang met de nalatenschap van de burgeroorlog 
vormgaf. Het stelt de vraag hoe dit proces gevormd wordt door de 
betrokkenheid van lokale, nationale en internationale actoren en 
hun respectievelijke ideeën en initiatieven om met het gewelddadige 
verleden in het reine te komen. Deze betrokkenheid wordt onderzocht 
door te kijken naar twee verschillende clusters van acties. De eerste 
cluster is de verspreiding van overgangsgerechtigheid: hoe en door 
wie wordt het internationale paradigma van overgangsgerechtigheid 
gepropageerd en in de praktijk gebracht? Welke interacties en 
uitwisselingen vinden plaats tussen het lokale, nationale en 
internationale niveau tijdens deze verspreidingsprocessen? De 
tweede cluster van acties betreft de toe-eigening, herbevestiging en 
contestatie van overgangsgerechtigheid door nabestaanden in Peru: 
hoe zijn zij betrokken bij deze (inter)nationale ideeën en praktijken, in 
welke mate verzetten ze zich ertegen, of instrumentaliseren ze deze 
voor specifieke (politieke) doeleinden? Door de binaire tegenstelling 
tussen het lokale en mondiale niveau te overstijgen, en de nadruk te 
leggen op de verstrengeling van lokale, nationale en internationale 
actoren en ideeën, wil dit onderzoek ingaan tegen de assumptie dat 
‘ideeën’ en ‘politiek’ (exclusief) tot het mondiale of internationale 
terrein behoren, en ‘ervaring’ en ‘cultuur’ tot het lokale.
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift onderzoekt de opkomst van 
het paradigma van overgangsgerechtigheid (hoofdstuk één), de 
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onderliggende normatieve ideeën over herinnering, slachtofferschap 
en tijd (hoofdstuk twee), en de implementatie van mechanismen 
van overgansgerechtigheid in Peru (hoofdstuk drie). Het tweede 
deel omvat een diepgaande empirische analyse van de verspreiding 
en contestatie van overgangsgerechtigheid door middel van 
drie verschillende gevalstudies van rurale contexten in de regio 
Ayacucho. In het dorp Sacsamarca veroorzaakte de spanning 
tussen betrokkenheid bij en verzet tegen het Lichtend Pad tijdens 
de burgeroorlog een specifieke post-conflict dynamiek tussen het 
publieke narratief over het verleden enerzijds, en de geheimen en 
stiltes die dit narratief omringen anderzijds (hoofdstuk vier). In de 
Andesgemeenschap Hualla worden de burgeroorlog en de nasleep 
ervan gekenmerkt door één specifiek type misdaad in het bijzonder: 
gedwongen verdwijning (hoofdstuk vijf ). In de vallei van de 
Apurímac rivier (VRAEM) speelden de Comités de Autodefensa Civil of 
zelfverdedigingscomités een sleutelrol in het verslaan van het Lichtend 
Pad tijdens de burgeroorlog. Deze ervaring van zelfverdediging 
vormt de (post-)conflictidentiteit van nabestaanden in dit gebied, 
waar de strijd tegen narcoterrorismo verder duurt (hoofdstuk zes). De 
rode draad die door de contestaties van overgangsgerechtigheid 
door nabestaanden loopt, is de roep om burgerschap en inclusie, die 
de achilleshiel van Peru’s verwerkingsproces blijkt te zijn. 
De bevindingen van dit proefschrift hebben drie conceptuele en 
methodologische implicaties voor de studie van (post-)conflict 
dynamieken en de implementatie van overgangsgerechtigheid. De 
eerste implicatie heeft betrekking tot de conceptualisering van agency 
van nabestaanden in (post-)conflictsituaties, en stelt de ontwikkeling 
van een gelaagde nabestaanden-identiteit voor: een identiteit die de 
tegenstelling dader-slachtoffer overstijgt en de realiteit omarmt dat 
slachtofferschap, daderschap, verzet en heldhaftigheid geen elkaar 
uitsluitende eigenschappen zijn. De tweede aanbeveling betreft het 
onderzoek naar (post-)conflictsituaties, en pleit voor de integratie 
van een historische benadering die aandacht besteedt aan noties van 
structureel geweld. De derde suggestie, ten slotte, is een uitnodiging 
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om het ‘lokale’ niveau te beschouwen als meer dan enkel het domein 
van implementatie en receptie van overgangsgerechtigheid door de 
verstrengeling van lokale, nationale en internationale dynamieken in 
acht te nemen.
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Abstract of the dissertation
In 2000, after two decades of civil war initiated by the Maoist 
rebels of the Shining Path, Peru became one out of many countries 
worldwide that chose to implement transitional justice. A Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was set up which formulated 
recommendations concerning reparations, exhumations of mass 
graves and institutional reform. This dissertation is a study of the 
international paradigm of transitional justice and the way in which 
this paradigm modeled Peru’s process of dealing with the legacies of 
the civil war. More precisely, it unravels how this process is shaped 
by the involvement of local, national and international actors and 
their respective ideas on and practices of coming to terms with 
the past. This involvement is studied by looking at two different 
clusters of actions. The first is the diffusion of transitional justice: how 
and by whom is the international paradigm of transitional justice 
propagated and put into practice? What kind of interactions and 
exchanges take place between the local, national and international 
level throughout these processes of diffusion? The second cluster 
of actions concerns the appropriation, reaffirmation and contestation 
of transitional justice: how do survivors engage with, resist or 
transform these (inter)national ideas and practices in function of 
specific aims and (political) struggles? By transcending the local 
versus global approach and emphasizing the multi-scale and multi-
directional entanglement of local, national and international actors 
and ideas, this study aims to go against the presumption that ‘ideas’ 
and ‘politics’ (exclusively) belong to the global or international 
realm, and ‘experience’ and ‘culture’ to the local. The first part 
of the dissertation investigates the emergence of the paradigm of 
transitional justice (chapter one), its underlying normative ideas on 
memory, victimhood and time (chapter two) and its implementation 
in Peru (chapter three). The second part entails an in-depth empirical 
analysis of the diffusion and contestation of transitional justice by 
means of three different case studies from rural contexts in the 
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Ayacucho region. In the village of Sacsamarca, the tension between 
involvement with and resistance against the Shining Path during the 
civil war resulted in a particular (post-)conflict dynamic between 
the public narrative on the past on the one hand, and the (open) 
secrets and silences that surround it on the other (chapter four). In 
the highland community of Hualla, the civil war and its aftermath 
are characterized by (the legacies of) one specific crime in particular: 
enforced disappearance (chapter five). In the valley of the Apurímac 
River (VRAEM), the Comités de Autodefensa Civil or civil self-defense 
committees played a key-role in defeating the Shining Path. The 
experience of self-defense shapes (post-)conflict identity and agency 
in this area of protracted conflict against narcoterroristas (chapter six). 
The common thread that runs through survivors’ contestations of 
transitional justice is the claim for citizenship and inclusion, which 
appears as the Achilles’ heel of Peru’s process of coming to terms 
with the legacies of the civil war. This study furthermore develops 
the notion of a ‘contemporary past’ to refer to survivors’ experience 
of ongoing and structural: violence that has happened in the past 
and is still happening in the present - albeit in different forms.
The findings of this dissertation entail three conceptual and 
methodological implications for the study of (post-)conflict dynamics 
and the implementation of transitional justice policies. The first 
implication relates to the conceptualization of agency of survivors 
in (post-)conflict settings and proposes the notion of a multi-
layered survivor identity that goes beyond the opposition between 
victims and perpetrators and embraces the fact that victimhood, 
violation, resistance and heroism are no mutually exclusive features. 
The second recommendation relates to the study of violence and 
its aftermath and pleads for the integration of a historical approach 
that is more responsive to notions of structural violence. The third 
suggestion, finally, is an invitation to rethink the ‘local’ as more than 
a mere domain of reception of transitional justice policies by taking 
the entanglement of local, national and international actors and 
ideas into account.

